Arnold Wastewater Privatization: The Policy Breakdown

As Arnold residents prepare to decide on whether to sell the city’s wastewater facilities to Missouri American Water for $13.2 million, they should carefully consider both the possible positive and negative results of such a deal and whether the city of Arnold is getting a fair price for its facilities. And while we would argue this is a good deal for Arnold, residents should consider some general criticisms of water privatization deals, which are listed (with opponent responses) below:

Criticism: Privatized water systems mean higher rates for residents. Many cities that have privatized water or sewer systems, including Florissant, Missouri, have seen rates rise, usually faster than inflation.

Proponent response: Wastewater and water system privatizations often occur because cities are faced with expensive, necessary upgrades to sewer infrastructure. Cities that charge a utilities fee that is too low to generate enough funds for large upgrades are forced to decide between a large tax increase or subsidies from the general fund. In the case of Arnold, the city claims it will have to increase rates should privatization not occur. Luckily, Missouri American Water reports that its rate increases will be less than those the city would implement, even with necessary capital improvements.

Criticism: Cities are selling city assets in order to receive short-term cash infusions. This short-term gain will result in high utility fees in the long-term.

Proponent response: Just because cities could spend sales money foolishly, does not mean they will do so. In Florissant, the city spent a portion of the sales proceeds on immediate needs and put $10 million in a rainy day fund. Arnold plans to use proceeds to pay off existing debt, but beyond that residents should ensure that the city does not spend wastefully.

Criticism: Some cities with privatized water systems have seen the drinking water become unsafe. Companies looking to make a profit might cut corners and provide lower service.

Proponent response: Private water and wastewater management has a proven track record in the United States. The vast majority of municipalities that privatize their water or wastewater system end up renewing the contract. Like municipally owned water utilities, in individual cases private companies fail to meet safety standards, but this is not the norm. Also, the issue of water quality is less important under a wastewater system privatization than a water system privatization, for obvious reasons.

The residents of Arnold should carefully consider these questions surrounding the planned wastewater privatization deal, and whether both the funds the city will receive and benefits of private management outweigh the risks of selling a public asset.

Kansas City Airport Effort Still not Transparent

After a year considering the need for a $1.2 billion new terminal at MCI airport, the final report issued on May 30 to Mayor Sly James by the Airport Terminal Advisory Group (ATAG) leaves much to be desired—both in its thoroughness and accurate representation of the facts. On page 15, the report still asserts that airport funds cannot be used for the “City’s financial needs related to sewers, hotels, neighborhood development, unfunded pension obligations et.al.” This is demonstrably false; the city does use airport funds for other needs.

Even if the report is factually flawed, it aspires to ensure good government. On page 30, the report recommends more transparency:

In addition to KCAD [Kansas City Aviation Department], the City should provide for additional oversight to maintain transparency and improve two-way communication. This oversight (possibly in the form of an informal oversight committee) would be responsible for insuring City involvement and help to oversee the process over the next two years. The oversight committee could also assist in vetting the planning and design process and communicating it to the Mayor of Kansas City, Kansas City Manager, City Council, as well as the general public and local businesses.

Several months have passed, and none of this has been acted upon. It was ignored on the day the City Council received the report. Mayor James said in the July 10, 2014, City Council business session that discussed the report (remarks begin at 37:52):

The question was, as currently configured, does KCI meet the needs of Kansas City now and into the future? And if not, what are our options? Now, the options are being determined now by the airlines as they are in consultations—secret, private consultations—with the Aviation Department. That is their job. They will determine how much money they want to spend. And when they determine how much money they want  to spend they will pretty much tell us what they think we ought to do.

So much for transparency. Also, so much for the work of the ATAG in the first place; a year’s worth of work and $100,000 spent on consultants seems to have been wasted. (As for the financial costs and benefits of a new terminal, the Show-Me Institute has issued its own report.)

Kansas City leaders need to make sure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated. While it is good that the airlines are involved—they should have been all along—it does not bode well that the process is again opaque. When the time comes to present options to the public, the truth still may be that, according to Kansas City Star editorialist Yael Abouhalkah, “Director Mark VanLoh does not have the public credibility to lead on this extremely crucial project.” The voters of Kansas City have spoken clearly on this matter, and they deserve to get the transparency and accountability necessary for good public policy.

Missouri Charter School Law: A Soup Sandwich for Military Families?

army child

The Show-Me State forbids charter schools from opening in non-urban, accredited school districts, unless they are sponsored by the district itself. In effect, this means public school choice is limited to residents of unaccredited districts in Saint Louis and Kansas City. However, the need for school choice extends beyond those confines. This is especially apparent to Missouri’s military families.

Fort Leonard Wood, a U.S. military base located in the Ozarks, resides in Waynesville School District, which is home to 4,500 military impacted students. Educating these students can be difficult, since many have attended several school districts in several states within a span of just a few years.

These students come from a variety of backgrounds and have varying educational needs.

Waynesville School District is the only option for many students living on the base. Though the district performs relatively well compared to struggling urban districts, it is unfortunate that charter schools are not permitted in this area. Charters essentially are specialized public schools that serve the unique needs of students.

waynesville table image

In other communities, if parents are dissatisfied with the performance of their school district, they can move into another district. For military families, this is nearly impossible. This highlights just one problem of Missouri’s restrictive charter law—it disproportionately limits military families’ access to the school of their choice.

Some states have recognized how charter schools can meet the unique needs of military students. There are currently eight charter schools located on military bases across the United States. One such charter school is Sigsbee in Key West, Florida, which offers coursework in environmental science and marine life. Another is Belle Chasse Academy in Belle Chasse, Louisiana, specifically designed to address the diverse academic backgrounds of students whose parents are on active duty.

Military personnel already make sacrifices for their country; they should not have to sacrifice their children’s education as well. The expansion of charter schools is just one way Missourians can provide more access to better quality education for military families.

For more information about charter school reform, read James Shuls’ case study on the Louisiana Recovery School District.

 

 

New Friedman Foundation Report Explains Cost Savings from School Vouchers

In my paper, “Available Seats?: Survey Analysis of Missouri Private School Participation in Potential State Scholarship Programs,” I explained how Missouri could potentially save money from a private school choice program. The Friedman Foundation did me one better. Their new paper, “The School Voucher Audit,” examines how much money private school vouchers have actually saved taxpayers. Based on their estimates, “a cumulative total savings of at least $1.7 billion has been realized since 1990-91, the first year of the historic Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP), through 2010-11 . . .”

That is some serious savings! I encourage you to check out the slide share above or the full paper here.

The Bankruptcy of Indiana Toll Road Highlights Privatization Advantages

Recently, the Indiana Toll Road Concession Company (ITRCC), which operates the Indiana Toll Road, declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This bankruptcy will mean a new operator for the toll road and significant loses to ITRCC’s investors and creditors. Although this bankruptcy might be viewed as evidence that Missouri should not allow private toll concessions in the state, in reality this situation highlights the advantages of these concessions to taxpayers.

ITRCC is a 50-50 partnership between a Spanish toll road operator and an Australian investment bank. In 2005, those partners paid the state of Indiana $3.8 billion for the right to operate the Indiana toll road for 75 years. As part of the agreement, ITRCC had to make significant capital improvements to the toll road; from 2006 to the present the company invested $458 million.

ITRCC investors expected steadily rising highway traffic to generate returns that would exceed these upfront costs and justify the many stipulations under which the company had to operate the toll road. However, post-recession highway utilization has made the original traffic projections, and hence the debt repayment plan, untenable. This is what forced the company to declare bankruptcy.

While it is unfortunate to see any company fail, Indiana taxpayers have made out like highway robbers on the deal. The state invested its $3.8 billion windfall in a 10-year, statewide transportation improvement plan. The privatized toll road received $458 million in upgrades courtesy of ITRCC, making it a better road now than when Indiana privatized it. And even though ITRCC has declared bankruptcy and must be restructured, the investors, not the taxpayers, will take the hit for overly optimistic traffic projections.

The important lesson of the Indiana Toll Road bankruptcy is not that a private company failed to make a profit, but rather that privatization deals can tap into significant capital for infrastructure improvements and transfer risk to the private sector. In the case of Indiana, we can retrospectively say that the buyer overpaid, but that was (and still is) a risk investors are willing to make when there is a reasonable prospect of profit. Indiana residents did not share the investors’ risk, but they have benefited from more than $4 billion of investments to their transportation infrastructure. With MoDOT slowly running out of the money necessary to maintain its state highway system, the fate of Indiana’s highway privatization deal should not make Missourians wary. It should make them jealous.

Streetcar Costs Balloon in Charlotte

Austin Alonzo at the Kansas City Business Journal reported that Kansas City is tabulating up the cost of the failed streetcar expansion. We’re still waiting on that, but news out of Charlotte, North Carolina, suggests that streetcars are more expensive than proponents argue.

The Charlotte Observer reports,

When Charlotte was planning to build its streetcar line last decade, one touted benefit was cost savings. The idea was that an electric-powered streetcar is cheaper than a diesel-powered bus and that a larger streetcar provides more economies of scale than a smaller bus.

But as the costs of a 4-mile streetcar line are coming into focus, an analysis shows that the streetcar will likely be more expensive to operate than city buses and the Lynx Blue Line.

The specific overruns in Charlotte are detailed in the article.

My colleague Joe Miller points out that some streetcar advocates claim streetcars have lower operating costs than buses because they compare the costs of operating a streetcar at full capacity to a bus at full capacity (120 passengers versus 60). However, in real life the transit systems don’t normally operate at anything close to full capacity, so their numbers are very inaccurate. Even then, this doesn’t include the enormous capital costs of rail.

Regular readers of this blog will not be surprised that streetcars are inefficient. We have been highlighting the poor economics of rail transit for some time. The same Charlotte Observer article also points out that the supposed economic development benefits of the rail line—those so dramatically emphasized in Kansas City—”are difficult to evaluate in a cost-benefit analysis of a transit project.”

The initial streetcar website in Kansas City relied heavily on data prepared by the Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS), so it is no surprise that the claims made were similar. As Charlotte deals with higher-than-expected construction and operational costs, Kansas City voters should be pleased that, at least in this instance, they made a wise choice by not going along with other streetcar cities.

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