Film Tax Credits Are Bad for States

The new George Clooney film, Up in the Air, premiered at the Tivoli in Saint Louis over the weekend. Many are using the event as an opportunity to promote film tax credits, to be used as a means to bring more film productions to Missouri. John Combest links to a video on KMOV about the subject.

I could support the film tax credits if they actually did attract money from outside of Missouri. But, as I have blogged previously, this just doesn’t happen; states tend to spend more attracting filmmakers with tax credits than the filmmakers generate in the state. I have not been able to find information about how much money Up in The Air generated for Missouri, but I would not be surprised if that number is less than the $4.5 million in tax credits that it was awarded. I will continue to look for this information.

Instead of film tax credit programs, Missouri should spend its money on programs that create jobs that are better-paying and longer-lasting. We see from the KMOV video that these film tax credits do not result in sustained job creation. Certainly, many St. Louis residents are cast as extras in these films, but these jobs are low-wage and temporary. According to the casting call for Up In the Air, extras were compensated only $7.05 per hour (before taxes) and they were asked to work for just one day. Aspiring actress Adrienne Lamping was quoted in the video saying that she got to work on set for a week, but discloses that she does not have an acting job lined up in the future.

I understand why states like Missouri want to attract filmmakers. Certainly, it’s exciting for the hoi polloi to recognize their local haunts on the big screen and to spot celebrities like George Clooney. Unfortunately, however, almost nobody discusses the sheer cost of these programs.

Contrary to Popular Opinion, Health Care Does Follow Free-Market Mechanisms

On Sunday, one of my favorite economists, Greg Mankiw, used basic economic concepts to describe how the government reimbursement system distorts the health care market:

If a government policy increases the demand for a service, the price of that service tends to rise. If the government prevents prices from rising, shortages develop. The quantity provided is then determined by supply and not demand. In the presence of such excess demand, the result could be a two-tier market structure.

Mankiw’s point is that, by failing to reimburse providers for the full cost of providing services, the government is creating an artificial shortage. Some health care providers will stop seeing Medicare and Medicaid patients because they lose money on the services that they provide to them. The Mayo Clinic is already doing this. Unless the government starts to reimburse fully for the services performed, more providers will follow Mayo’s example.

Mankiw continues. Here, he describes the aforementioned two tiers of the market:

Consumers who can somehow pay more than the government mandated price will be able to purchase the service, while those paying the controlled price may be unable to find a willing supplier.

In other words, patients who rely on government reimbursements (i.e., Medicare and Medicaid patients) will have difficulty accessing services, but those who pay out of pocket will not.

I have seen this happen in my professional experience. Before I started working at the Show-Me Institute, I worked as an analyst in the business strategy department at a major health care system. In our expansion, we deliberately avoided populations with high proportions of Medicare and Medicaid patients. Instead, we targeted populations that were concentrated with fee-for-service patients, because they would pay for their services in full.

Parenthetically, this government reimbursement system raises health care prices. Providers charge more to fee-for-service patients then they would in a non-distorted market. In order to stay in business, they have to make up for those patients who cannot afford to pay more than the government mandated price. It’s just like how retail stores increase their prices in order to compensate for losses due to shoplifting.

I like Mankiw’s post because it illustrates how, contrary to popular opinion, health care does follow free-market mechanisms. Health care is subject to the same laws of supply and of demand as any other market. When the government intervenes, it creates a price floor or a price ceiling, and a shortage or a surplus.

Another Way Teachers Would Benefit From a Competitive Education Market

Some teachers who want to sell lesson plans online are running into trouble with the districts that employ them, according to this New York Times article. The concept of mutual gains from trade is foreign to the education establishment:

Joseph McDonald, a professor at the Steinhardt School of Culture, Education and Human Development at New York University, said the online selling cheapens what teachers do and undermines efforts to build sites where educators freely exchange ideas and lesson plans.

“Teachers swapping ideas with one another, that’s a great thing,” he said. “But somebody asking 75 cents for a word puzzle reduces the power of the learning community and is ultimately destructive to the profession.”

If this were just one professor’s theory, it would be no big deal; what matters for teachers is that many districts use these ideas to justify forbidding the sale of lesson plans and curricula.

There are districts that allow teachers to sell their work online, and others that don’t yet have policies for or against it. In a competitive education market, those districts would be rewarded, because the best teachers would choose to work in schools where they could keep the rights to their lessons. Students, in turn, would flock to the schools with the best teachers, and money would follow.

Charters Can Earn Community Support as They Grow

An article in Time profiles Yinghua Academy, a Mandarin-immersion charter school in Minnesota. (And, yes, although equally innovative schools are cropping up in various sectors of the education market, this school really is a charter; someone in the Yinghua Academy office confirmed its status over the phone.)

Yinghua Academy started out with only 30 percent of students who were not Asian. That’s risen to 50 percent, and the entire student body has tripled. The school has attracted new students as more people see how successful the immersion program is.

If Yinghua Academy had been proposed in Oregon, it might have been turned down because it lacked broad support in the community. Districts could have argued that Mandarin language was a narrow subject that few people who are not Asian would want to learn. After all, when Yinghua Academy opened, it was a small school that served mostly Asian students.

States with restrictive policies toward charter schools can learn from Yinghua Academy’s example. When a proposed charter school is going through the application process, you don’t know for sure whether it will be a good school or a bad one. A charter’s full worth can’t be judged after just a few weeks or months, either. Only when parents have had time to evaluate the school can you see whether it meets a demand in the education market.

Of course, charter proposals that are incompetent or frivolous should be turned down from the start. But proposals whose drawbacks are that they’re specialized or ambitious should get a chance to prove themselves. Schools that satisfy parents can draw wider support after a few years.

Health Care Insurance Without a Public Option

A recurring concern within our national health care debate has been about insurance, and how to make it work for our friends that don’t want, or cannot afford, to participate. This led some of us to examine how that problem is solved elsewhere. One approach is seen in Switzerland. As many are aware, Switzerland is a country with a history of high-quality health care. It has 7.2 million people living in 26 cantons (states). The 1994 Swiss health insurance law requires everyone staying in that country for 90 days or more to purchase a basic health insurance policy.

Before 1994, health care insurance was not compulsory in Switzerland and premiums were risk-related. That older system was similar to what we have now in the United States. At that time, most people with jobs had some form of private health care insurance supplied by an employer. Members of the military and full-time government employees had health care insurance through a government-owned company. People outside of those categories were able to purchase insurance, and the rates varied over a wide range. A publicly discussed concern at that time was the fact that certain individuals, classed as high-risk because of chronic disease and age, found health insurance unaffordable. In response to the public outcry about that, the Swiss Federal Health Insurance Act was designed to help all the people without insurance and to promote competition between health insurers.

Now there are 91 Swiss health insurance companies that offer these compulsory policies through their “not-for-profit” divisions. Market forces are such that some companies have chosen to limit the cantons where they sell insurance. In each canton, as a result, there are about 50 companies competing in the health care insurance marketplace. The compulsory policy premiums are community-based, so everyone living within the same mail code is charged an identical fee, without regard to any previous medical problems. The competing insurers differentiate themselves and make their profits by selling extra benefits through complementary policies managed by the for-profit divisions of those companies. The extra benefits available through those insurers include things like dental care programs, hotel-quality single bed hospital rooms, “in-your-home” child care when a parent is ill, spa/gym memberships, etc.

The Swiss health plan purchasing process is designed to make consumers aware of their personal ownership of the insurance policies. A nationwide website guides people to the most appropriate plan to match their personal needs. Each policy must be bought by an individual, even though the government may reimburse a purchaser for part of the cost. The policy belongs to the purchaser, and goes with the purchaser when moving to a new job, because it is not a job benefit.

People that are indigent have health care insurance, too. In each canton, a “means test” determines how much the canton will reimburse an indigent resident, but that person gets to pick their own preferred private insurer just like everyone else. Then, the cantonal government issues a voucher that the recipient transfers to the insurance company. In 2001, the cantonal governments paid about 19 percent of the health care policy premiums.

Regulations there require a given insurer to charge the same fee to each purchaser for the basic policy, without regard to any preexisting health conditions. This results in a universalized program that provides for the treatment of illnesses, accidents, and pregnancies, and which includes the costs of all medical treatments, hospitalizations, and medications. However, at every interaction with the health care system, an individual must contribute something out-of-pocket. This is intended to make the purchaser acutely aware of the medical costs. These payments are not just nominal amounts of money, as seen in health insurance co-pays in this country; it is the full price of the interaction. In a typical Swiss policy, an individual pays a deductible, and the initial cost of all treatment and medications are paid out-of-pocket. Then, after the event, the patient is reimbursed by the insurer for almost 90 percent of the amount paid. However, to avoid any sudden economic calamities, the compulsory policies have a pre-set maximum out-of-pocket level, and all expenses beyond that are paid directly by the insurer.

The Swiss compulsory universal health insurance program was developed through a series of referendum elections in each canton. Significant improvement in health care access has been reported, because the system is intended to allow everyone to see a physician whenever necessary. Perhaps as a result, about five years ago Swiss life expectancy at birth was 79 years for men and 84 years for women. In comparison, U.S. life expectancy is just this year beginning to approach 78, and in Missouri, during the most recent year with accurate data, it was only 76.4.

Such care is not inexpensive, but it costs less than what we pay here. Implementation of the Swiss plan resulted in spending on health care representing only 11.5 percent of that country’s GDP, at a time when the health care spending in the United States approached 15.3 percent of our GDP. Although our country is not the same as theirs, maybe there is something we can learn from them.

To learn more about the Swiss and other health care systems, please see “The Grass is Not Always Greener: A Look at National Health Care Systems Around the World,” by Michael Tanner of the Cato Institute.

Lessons Learned From Kelo

The Wall Street Journal reflects on Pfizer’s recent decision to leave its location in New London, Conn. I like the following statement from the op-ed in particular:

If there is a lesson from Connecticut’s misfortune, it is that economic development that relies on the strong arm of government will never be the kind to create sustainable growth.

This is a lesson that cities like Saint Louis should remember and asseverate in their future development projects. As demonstrated in New London, government involvement produces opposite-than-desired results, such as driving out businesses and attracting feral cats.

The Scales of Justice

There’s an article on the Wall Street Journal‘s website about fishing rights in New England. It’s a very interesting case. It seems that a small-time commercial fisherman refuses to get the mandated fishing license, asserting that his right to fish the waterways is protected by a 423-year-old legal compact between the former British governor and the local townspeople. According to the article, a post-revolutionary war court upheld the “Dongan Patent” in 1777, and there are apparently other legal cases providing a precedent for the right to fish the local waters of Long Island’s East End without obtaining any extra permission.

As is evident from the far-reaching historical backdrop of this case, government regulation of fishing has a very long history. The economics of fishing permits are fairly cut and dried: This is an application of the tragedy of the commons. When a number of individuals have a right to consume from a public region — i.e., fishing on a river or other waterway — each one of them is individually incentivized to get as much as possible as quickly as possible, especially when it is their livelihood rather than their recreation. On the other hand, in cases where there is only a single owner, there is much less reason to worry about others “getting theirs first,” and the owner can economize with an eye on maintaining the future value of the property. The problem with a single concern having access is the same as the problem with any monopoly: higher prices and less service, with none of the benefits of competition. One solution to the tragedy of the commons is some form of social arrangement, with social stigma or other punishment for “cheating.” These sorts of arrangements have been studied at length by Elinor Ostrom, and she recently won a Nobel Prize in economics for her work.

A far more common solution, though not necessarily more efficient or desirable, is a government regulation of “the commons,” such as by requiring fishing licenses. If regulators can accurately determine the impact of each additional fishermen extracting each additional fish, they can set a price on licenses such that the most efficient outcome will be reached. This level of prescience is less likely than what actually happens in practice: License fees are set too low, in which case you still get overfishing, or they are set too high, in which case not enough fish are extracted to maximize value over time. I don’t know which case is more likely, but I strongly suspect the former is more common.

For what it’s worth, the state of Missouri sells recreational fishing licenses in unlimited quantities, and they are quite affordable — a daily pass is cheaper than a movie. Although I’m sure it’s a nice revenue stream for the Missouri Department of Conservation, I seriously question whether this is a proper area for government involvement in people’s lives.

Should Missouri Reassess Property Less Often?

There is no reason Missouri could not do just fine if we went through reassessment every three years instead of every two. I’m serious, here. Today, Combest linked to a story from the Rolla Daily News about budget cuts in the state’s assessment reimbursement fund. Every county gets repaid by the state for a portion of its assessment costs, because county assessors value property for many entities other than just the county. School districts, fire districts, state government itself (for the blind pension fund), cities, and many other governments utilize property taxes based on the county assessments. So, now that we have that straight, what do we think about cuts to the assessment fund?

It’s perfectly fine with me. In tough budget times, the state has to cut spending somewhere, and assessors deserve the cuts just like everyone else. (I am fully aware of the mistaken Keynesian arguments in favor of increasing government spending at all levels right now.) The assessor in Phelps County is complaining that the cuts to the reimbursement fund — from $6 per parcel to $4 — leave him hanging:

Rasmussen said actual per-parcel, assessment-maintenance expenses amount to $28.48. Assessment maintenance includes the actual assessment, pricing new construction projects, assessing all personal property in the mobile-home count and keeping parcel ownerships current.

I have proposed a perfectly reasonable method of residential assessment, based on very common real estate property indices, that would substantially lower the cost of doing assessments. It would also make the job of the Phelps County assessor easier, and thereby less expensive, if they adopted the certificate of value method, like in St. Louis, but we all know that won’t happen. If the residents of rural Missouri don’t want certificates of value to be filed when homes are sold, that is fine with me, but they have to realize their rejection of that method might increase the local taxes they have to pay for their assessments.

But why do we have to do the assessments? I see no problem with amending the state law to allow for reassessment every three years instead of every two, allowing for some caveats, because you probably do want to do a reassessment after each census when you have the most accurate information available. I really doubt anyone would complain if, after 2011, the next assessment does not take place until 2014. I certainly wouldn’t.

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