One of the items vetoed was $2 million for Missouri’s Violent Crime Clearance Grant Program. That was a disappointment. I’ve written previously about why improving violent crime clearance rates is one of the smartest public safety investments Missouri can make.
Even so, I understand why it was vetoed. Missouri cannot continue expanding government..
Spending restraint means worthwhile programs will sometimes be cut. The question isn’t whether every veto was perfect. No governor gets every decision right. The question is whether Missouri is finally willing to reverse a spending trajectory that accelerated during the years of extraordinary federal COVID aid and continued even after those dollars disappeared.
I hope lawmakers and the governor revisit the Violent Crime Clearance Grant Program when Missouri’s finances allow. Public safety is government’s first responsibility, and I continue to believe this is a high-return investment.
But spending restraint only works if programs with genuine merit are still subject to scrutiny. If every worthwhile program receives an exemption, then spending never declines. The test of fiscal reform is whether Missouri begins living within its means and creates the conditions necessary to reduce the tax burden on its citizens over the long term.
Susan Pendergrass speaks with Andy Smarick, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, about Missouri’s education leadership shake-up and what comes next. They discuss how to find the right commissioner of education, why outside reformers tend to succeed where insiders struggle, what the dismantling of the US Department of Education means for state accountability systems, why public complacency about poor academic outcomes persists, and more.
Susan Pendergrass (00:00):
Thank you so much, Andy Smarick, for joining once again on the Show-Me Institute Podcast. We love having you on and I appreciate you taking the time. You’re a busy man, so it’s really wonderful to have you back.
Andy Smarick (00:06):
I love being here. It’s a treat. Thank you for having me. I always like talking to you, but also anytime I get to talk about state-level education policy, it’s a treat.
Susan Pendergrass (00:19):
Well, I know that you have experience serving on a couple of state boards, both K-12 and higher ed. Just to bring you up to speed on what’s happening in Missouri: we have a relatively new governor, about a year in, and we had a state board of education where people stayed in expired seats, rubber-stamped decisions, and were very complacent, I feel comfortable saying. Our governor shook up that group and appointed new people who came in and said, what do you mean we don’t have bylaws? It was like, this is bananas. At the same time, the governor issued an executive order requiring letter grades on schools and districts, new school report cards. I don’t know exactly how everything went down, but our Commissioner of Education resigned, our Deputy Commissioner resigned, and our president of the state board of education resigned, all in about one week. So we are now straightening things out and there is a new board president. But this new, relatively new board now has the task of finding a commissioner. The way things have happened in Missouri is we always get a new commissioner from the ranks of the state education agency, maybe from the legislature, always from Missouri. Just a real this-is-how-we’ve-done-it mentality. And we have not been big reformers. No Chiefs for Change in Missouri. Like a lot of states, our reading scores for young kids are tanking, forty percent below basic for third and fourth graders. We have a state accountability system called the Missouri School Improvement Plan in which 516 of our 520 districts are fully accredited and about four are provisionally accredited, none unaccredited. So we have this meaningless accountability system where every district is fully accredited, even St. Louis, which I can’t even go into. So here we are, and I want to know a few things from you. Number one, if you were on the Board of Education in Missouri, how would you go about finding a new commissioner? What would you look for? And then later I want to get into what’s happening at the national level. We are not doing well academically, we have never had a bold reformer in charge, we keep doing the same thing and getting the same result. What would you do if you were in their spot?
Andy Smarick (02:59):
So in education, I’m going to wind up to this answer, so just bear with me for a second. Conservative can mean two different things. One is the traditional conservative view, which is to preserve, to stand athwart big, swift, dramatic, perpetual change. You’re trying to keep things the way they are because there’s a lot of wisdom that has gone into it and people are accustomed to it. In education, there’s also this other right-of-center conservative view, which is we have to be much more open to choice, competition, accountability metrics, and so on. And it seems that Missouri has been one of those very red states that has tended to believe in the first kind of conservatism: protect our traditional school districts, protect the hierarchies we have, protect the tradition of you grow up as a professional, as a teacher, then a superintendent, then maybe go to the state education agency. A lot of people believe that’s the way to do it.
There probably is an ethic among a lot of people to keep it that way. The only way you get out of that is if there’s a recognition among leadership that we can’t continue to preserve the status quo, that we have to change some things. That is a big step for a place that has elevated the idea of preserving for a very long time. If they get to that step, then they have to do the very tough things, which is start to pull out the Jenga pieces of that conservatism. The most important one is having board leadership and having a state superintendent who come from outside the state, and then having a board chair or board president who is not going to just do what the staff of the state education agency says or what the district superintendents say. We saw this work quite well about fifteen or twenty years ago. There was a big movement nationwide in educational reform led at the state level, and a number of states chose out-of-state superintendents and commissioners of education who did a terrific job of shaking things up and advancing a bunch of important proposals. The downside is a lot of them were so brash and so young, and I have to say so cocky, that they made unnecessary waves and kicked a lot of people in the shins in the states where they landed. So my view is a place like Missouri should pick someone from out of state for a state chief, someone with a long track record of success, but someone who isn’t so green as to think he or she knows everything. Someone with enough humility and enough time on task to know what they don’t know, and who can come in and be bold enough to make some changes, but not think that everyone in the state is a dummy who needs to be ignored. That’s how I would think about it. And if you have a board chair and board membership who get all of this, it makes things a whole lot easier. But that might be the hardest part of all. Who is your board president? Who are the board majority going to be? They have to be the ones with the backbone.
Susan Pendergrass (05:57):
Yeah. I feel like we’ve had people come in and say, well, I’m only the commissioner, it’s not my fault that the kids don’t read. And then people say, well, we’re a local control state, so it’s really the local guys’ fault that the kids can’t read. Then the legislators are like, well, who’s supposed to be making sure the kids can read? And technically, kind of they are, but them plus the board, and there’s just fingers pointing every different direction with nobody really taking responsibility. If we had the capacity for hard things, we would not have all of our districts be fully accredited. There’s even pushback on the letter grade idea because folks will say, well, then the teachers in those F schools feel bad and the parents feel bad and the kids who go there feel bad. I’ve seen some states change it to colors or something where nobody feels bad. I’ve also heard folks say it’s racist because a lot of the D and F schools enroll large percentages of students of color. So there are just all of these reasons to resist. It’s going to happen because there’s an executive order, but I feel like we’re going to have a hard time finding somebody who’s willing to do those things.
Andy Smarick (07:17):
Well, your state, like every other state, has a state constitution that makes the state ultimately responsible for education. Your state, like others, has both tradition and some laws that give a number of powers to local districts. The weird thing, and I’ve seen this in a lot of different states, is the state government ends up in a very weird position. The state can get sued and state leaders can get criticized if kids aren’t learning, because the state actually has constitutional authority to make sure kids are learning. But as a matter of practice, and often of state statutes, a lot of this power is delegated to districts. States then try to recapture some of that power through the accreditation system. It’s the way the state can say, okay, districts, you have the power to do these things, but we’re going to hold you accountable for results and we’re going to accredit you or not. And then it turns out it’s virtually impossible to take away the accreditation of these districts because of legislative pushback, and the state typically doesn’t have the capacity to run a district if it does take away accreditation. It just becomes a complete hot mess. That’s why you need state leadership who has some experience but also some backbone to say, this is how we’re going to thread the needle of state authority, state responsibility, local control, and still making sure that kids learn. This is not easy, other states have gone through it, but it isn’t the kind of thing that someone who has lived in Missouri all their life and grown up professionally there can do easily. It’s going to be hard for that person to get out of that box. Having someone from the outside who can start to do some bold things, including hiring smart, tough lawyers, having board leadership who’s going to stick by it. But I just want to emphasize this point: every state I ever talk to begins by saying, well, you know, we’re a local control state, our districts have all the power. Everybody says that. Go back to your state constitution. The state is the one that’s going to be responsible. And if the state has the backbone, it can do a whole lot. But whether it has the backbone is the operative phrase.
Susan Pendergrass (09:41):
Yeah. So about seven years ago we developed our own school report cards with letter grades, called MOSchoolRankings. I’ll just plug it. It was with GPAs, and this year for the first time I just took the GPAs and converted them to letter grades because folks found GPAs tricky. I put up the methodology. I took all the data from our state education agency, DESE, and just tried to make it a map you can zoom in and out on, easier to navigate. And my thinking is you have to do these things, make sure you say how you do it, and then people can argue with you and debate whether it’s right or wrong or good or bad. And many people have. A lot of people don’t like that the average is a C. I’m open to discussing why the average should be anything other than a C, but you have to at some point just make the move and then be confident enough in what you did that you can defend it and change it if people point out flaws. But this is where I think we struggle at DESE. They struggle to just put that out there because they worry about every negative outcome and consequence. And it’s like, yeah, but at some point to not do it is worse than to do it.
Andy Smarick (11:10):
For sure. And I’ve gotten to the point of realizing that if you have been in a system at different ranks for thirty or thirty-five years, all of your friends, your reputation, your pension, your income, everything about your identity is wrapped up with that system. Expecting these folks to suddenly turn the corner and say, you know, we’ve messed up, tens of thousands of kids are not learning right now today in classrooms, and we have to start holding the adults accountable for that, including teachers and principals and local school board members and local superintendents, and we have to be courageous about it. That’s asking a lot of people who are of, by, and for the system. It can be a whole lot easier if you just get someone from the outside with the courage to do it.
Susan Pendergrass (11:54):
Yeah. So can you think of an example of a state that has done this well?
Andy Smarick (12:02):
Definitely during the late No Child Left Behind era and then the Race to the Top era, a number of states found people from outside. Tennessee was famous for this. Arne Duncan ended up going to a couple of different places, including Rhode Island. New Jersey ended up picking Chris Cerf. There was a movement where probably ten or fifteen states did this quite well. My state, Maryland, brought in the superintendent of Mississippi after Mississippi had had so many gains, so she could carry some of those especially reading reforms to our state. This is not uncommon. Texas did something like this for a while. Louisiana became very famous during the John White era for doing this. But in all of these cases it began often with a governor, and then some members of a state legislature who said, we just can’t keep doing things the way we’ve done in the past. We have to do things differently. Once the governor says something like that, he or she can appoint people to the Board of Education who will do things differently, and the legislature, at least his or her party, will start to fall in line, and the media then starts to understand how serious it is. It is hard to do this without the governor leaning forward and giving the blessing to the bureaucracy to do things differently. So the question for you is, is your governor going to spend any political capital on this and say things are messed up and we have to do things differently?
Susan Pendergrass (13:29):
I don’t know. I hope so. But I haven’t seen evidence of that. I suspect, though I could be wrong, that they’re looking more internally than externally. However, I just want to add one wrinkle to this context that we’ve been thinking a lot about at the Show-Me Institute. If you’re following the US Department of Education, I believe you used to work there. Is that right?
Andy Smarick (13:54):
Yes, back in the day.
Susan Pendergrass (13:55):
Last week they moved the Office of Special Education over to the Department of Health and Human Services. They moved the Office of Civil Rights over to the Department of Justice. The building where the Department of Education used to be is now vacated. All those people are over at an old Department of Energy building. It’s a significantly reduced staff. Without touching the Every Student Succeeds Act, they are effectively dismantling most of the structure over there, at a time when the current president said that sending education back to the states was one of his priorities. I’m particularly concerned that at a time when Missouri has this vacuum, we could be looking at the apron strings being cut, states being told to sink or swim from the federal perspective. You don’t have to maintain the accountability systems. The Secretary is encouraging states to submit requests to waive parts of the law. I don’t really know exactly where it’s headed, but that concerns me. Do you think they’re going to let off the gas on mandated accountability systems in exchange for flexibility?
Andy Smarick (15:15):
Such a good question. To begin with just some editorializing: it is astonishing that Congress has allowed this to happen. In general I’m a big fan of decentralizing education power to the states, but that they’ve been able to administratively dismantle a department without Congress doing anything about it is just shocking to me. Even members of the Republican Party twenty years ago, let alone forty or sixty years ago, who jealously guarded the prerogatives of the legislative branch to create departments and fund departments, would have been appalled at this. There would have been unanimous consent to stop this from happening. So that says a lot that Congress has just sort of excused itself from the discussion. It has been remarkable the extent to which that building where we used to work, and the thousands of people there, is just empty, and they are handing off all the tasks to other places. I don’t know how this is legal, but I guess they’re figuring out a way to do it.
Now, the people who are leading this from inside genuinely believe that education will be better off if Uncle Sam isn’t meddling in it so much. That requires a theory of action, or at least a theory, that the reason why things are bad is that Uncle Sam is causing them to be bad, as though if Uncle Sam backs up there’s going to be a sunnier future ahead. Or it requires believing that it is just morally wrong for Uncle Sam to get involved, and whether states sink or swim after he gets out, that’s up to them. That’s a theory, it’s an ideological approach, and they have the right to pursue it. Donald Trump was elected and he gets to hire who he wants to. But then, to your point, it starts to implicate the Every Student Succeeds Act, which still requires the federal government to do some things related to state accountability systems. And if you believe you have the power administratively to undo a cabinet department, I suspect you probably believe you have the power to ignore some federal accountability provisions and just allow states to do what they want. So we’re going to be left in this position of saying, all right, the federal government is getting out of the business of accountability, therefore the states need to do it well. And then anyone who cares about kids learning will ask, okay, are states going to do this well? And so I turn to you as a state leader. Is Missouri going to
Susan Pendergrass (17:23):
Yeah.
Andy Smarick (17:47):
kick butt and take names?
Susan Pendergrass (17:48):
I’m concerned. I mean, No Child Left Behind was difficult and a lot of people didn’t like it, but test scores went up. Strict accountability, test scores went up. As we backed off, the Race to the Top era with waivers, and then Every Student Succeeds, which allowed more waivers, states were able to lower a lot of bars. Some states raised bars, like you mentioned, Mississippi and Louisiana. Some states are doing a great job, especially with early literacy. Others are not. And so Missouri, I think of it like this: you have a college student and you’re paying all their bills. You’re writing the checks, ordering their textbooks, doing all that work. Then one day you say, you know what, instead of that, I’m going to give you $3,000 a month: you pay your rent, your utilities, get your own books. There are going to be kids who step up and do fine. And there are going to be a lot of kids who take that $3,000 and immediately go to Cancun. We know this. It kind of depends on what you’ve done with the kids so far. And I feel like we have lulled the states into a feeling of compliance. If we just tell you how we spend our Title I dollars, fill out this form, and report that our test scores keep going down, no one cares. There’s no stick. They don’t withhold the money. We just say our test scores this year are lower than last year, and they say, good to know, here’s your
Andy Smarick (19:14):
Yep.
Susan Pendergrass (19:22):
check. So if that’s how you were raising your kids so far, why would you expect them to step up and become suddenly responsible?
Andy Smarick (19:31):
Okay, I have to admit that I have learned a hard lesson in my years doing education policy, which is that I was wrong that the political system of its own volition will always push for big action to make sure schools are great. I believed that if we had accountability systems showing that schools were underperforming, there would be a perpetual energy within the public to say we have to fix this, that it was just a matter of making the knowledge available and then everything else would take care of itself. It turns out it just doesn’t work that way. You need leaders at the top to constantly push and say, we are not doing well enough, we have to do dramatic things to make sure kids are going to be better off. Otherwise, No Child Left Behind is in place for a while and then people get sick of it. Or you have some interesting testing regimes and then there’s pushback to that, or just resistance to Uncle Sam in general. And people like the two of us say, but kids aren’t learning anything anymore. We are seeing a cratering of student learning since the peak of No Child Left Behind’s learning gains. This is horrible. Kids just aren’t learning anymore. The Andy of twenty years ago would have assumed the nation would revolt and say, how dare we do this to our schools and our kids, we have to do something differently. Instead, I don’t want to say it’s crickets, but there has not been a major wave of energy to change things again. The only way to do this is for governors or presidents to say this is not good enough and keep pushing. It is the ultimate dog that didn’t bark. The story is why something isn’t happening. If things are so bad in student learning, why is there not a dramatic energy within the public to do things differently? So maybe I look to you. In Missouri, are people just satisfied? Do they just not want the hassle?
Susan Pendergrass (21:28):
Why do you think? Yeah, they are like, we love our schools. All the time: we love our schools. We love, love, love our rural schools. It’s hard, kids show up with a lot of baggage, it’s just hard. But we love our schools. God forbid we have tiny districts getting below fifty kids. We love it. There isn’t an appetite to say, well, thirty-some percent of our rural high schools don’t offer calculus, and we don’t think we need it. It’s like, well, those kids are going to join a world where a lot of other kids had access to these things. It’s just, I don’t know the word. Complacency for sure. And it gets exhausting to continue to talk about it because it feels like
Andy Smarick (22:20):
Yeah. So this is why it can feel that way. And listen, if I were a state superintendent, based on the things I have learned, I would always begin a big reform movement by saying, first, all of the things you just said, but sincerely, because I believe this. I would say I love our public schools. I know how much they do for kids. I know that we love our teachers. I know that these schools are part of the community. I know that they help shape young people in ways beyond reading and math scores. I know that we love to go to these sports events. I know that we love to go to our fifth-grade graduation. This is an important strand in the fabric of our community. We love these schools, we love our teachers, we need to protect them, and we have to do better. What I found in that previous movement of big, dramatic out-of-state actors who came in and took over is they were awesome at the we-have-to-do-better part and absolutely lousy at the we-love-the-schools-and-teachers part. And that just caused a lot of anger. It was toxic in the long run. It is so important to a state to hear the we-love-our-schools message. That’s why they end up picking leaders, board presidents and superintendents who are of the system, who sincerely love their schools and say that. But they’re bad at the second part: we have to do things differently. The key to leadership right now is finding someone who can say both. We love these schools. We love public education in our communities. But Lord, our kids deserve a whole lot better than this. We have to do some things differently. That’s a rare leader.
Susan Pendergrass (24:00):
Yeah. Well, I think that’s a great place to end, because what else can you say? That’s awesome. That’s what we’re looking at. We’re going to find out soon, and not just Missouri. Many states have the same problems. I would love to have you come back again, Andy. We love having you.
Andy Smarick (24:16):
I love getting emails from you or Zach asking me to come on. I’m happy to give my bad opinions on anything.
Susan Pendergrass (24:23):
No, you have such a good, crystallized view of these things, and your experience on state boards is invaluable. I do appreciate it. Thank you for taking the time. I know you’re busy and hopefully you’ll come back soon.
Andy Smarick (24:40):
Whenever you call. Have a great summer.
The Kansas City Chiefs just released a two-page statement with numerous claims about the benefits of a new stadium, practice facility, and team headquarters in Kansas. There are reasons to be skeptical.
First, the press release includes some findings from an economic impact analysis that was conducted by a consultant the team hired. We don’t have the full report itself—just these selected highlights the Chiefs chose to share.
The consultant, Econsult Solutions, appears to be using standard economic impact methods. My concern isn’t who performed the study; it’s that these models are only as good as the assumptions that go into them, and those assumptions haven’t yet been made public.
The full report should be released so we can see and evaluate the assumptions. For example, I’d like to know how the authors calculated visitor spending, how they calculated multiplier effects, and how much of this projected economic activity is actually new to Kansas.
These studies are often flawed in their analysis and assumptions. Academic economists caution that these studies can overstate the benefits of publicly subsidized projects by measuring gross economic activity rather than net new economic activity. The ongoing debate over the World Cup’s promised economic benefits illustrates why those assumptions deserve careful scrutiny.
A $4.5 billion project will undoubtedly generate billions of dollars in economic activity. The question isn’t whether activity occurs; it’s whether that activity is genuinely new to Kansas and whether it generates tax revenue to justify the public subsidy.
Also, what exactly is included in the $1.2 billion in ancillary development the press release mentions? Hotels? Housing? Entertainment? And how much of that development is expected because of the stadium, rather than development that would have occurred anyway? Recall that the STAR bond district captures all additional tax revenue, regardless of whether it is due to the Chiefs’ developments.
As a result, this selected summary of the report doesn’t tell us if the deal is worthwhile for taxpayers.
There are some things in the report that should be of note to taxpayers. For example, the release has the capital investment increased by about 12% from what we were told in December, but the projected construction impact increased by nearly 90%. That raises an obvious question about what changed between the two projections.
One answer may be that the press release measures impacts across the greater Kansas City region, not just Kansas. Kansas taxpayers, who are paying for this thing, should ask about the benefits to them specifically.
A skeptic might wonder if the authors included areas outside Kansas to inflate the economic impact number.
The press release tells us about new tax revenue—but not how much it will cost taxpayers to get that revenue. Every salesman wants to focus on the benefits of what they are selling. Kansans need to be mindful of the costs.
Regarding costs, in the December 2025 announcement, Kansas leaders were adamant that the Chiefs deal paid for itself through future revenues, required no funds from the state budget, and would require no new taxes.
Is that still the case?
We’re still waiting to learn the size of the STAR district—almost 300 square miles in past statements—and the baseline year for determining the amount to be given to the Chiefs. Those details matter because they determine whether the projected tax revenues actually exceed the public commitment. Until those questions are answered, it’s impossible to know whether the project pays for itself.
We just don’t know.
And again, this is all based on a two-page statement from the Chiefs about an economic impact study they haven’t released. The team owes taxpayers more information and more transparency.
In his 2026 report, Looking for Growth: A Productivity Story, economist Joseph Haslag finds that eliminating Missouri’s state income tax could raise the state’s annual growth rate by a quarter to a half percentage point and lift workers’ incomes.
The anti-school choice position is usually framed as a defense of public education. But at its core, what it really does is defend a particular way of assigning students to schools: where you live determines where your children go to school.
The strongest opponents of school choice oppose vouchers, charter schools, and interdistrict open enrollment. In effect, they argue it is best if families have only one option: the public school assigned to them by their residential address.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores a simple fact: many families already exercise school choice by choosing where to live. Parents routinely pay higher housing costs or relocate to neighborhoods with schools they prefer. When a school develops a poor reputation, a nearby charter school is not required to siphon off enrollment—families with the means to move often do exactly that.
School choice is alive and well in the U.S. education system; it simply operates through the housing market.
The real question, then, is not whether school choice should exist—it’s which families get to participate. Families with financial resources already buy access to different schools through the housing market. Families without resources are frozen out.
Policies such as charter schools, vouchers, and open enrollment do not create school choice. They expand school choice opportunities to families who cannot participate via the housing market. Seen this way, the anti-school choice position becomes much harder to defend. Opponents are not preserving a world without school choice—they are preserving a world in which meaningful school choice is available to some families, while remaining out of reach for others.
I’m not anti-public school. On the contrary, I want high-quality public schools to thrive. But I do not believe traditional public schools should be protected from competition by denying lower-income families the choices that wealthier families already enjoy.
J.C. Bradbury, professor of economics at Kennesaw State University, joined Patrick Tuohey, guest hosting Mundo in the Morning on KCMO Talk Radio, to discuss his forthcoming book This One Will Be Different and why publicly funded stadiums almost never deliver on their promised economic benefits.
Patrick Tuohey (00:00)
Good morning, Kansas City. This is Patrick Tuohey, Kansas City’s second favorite Patrick, sitting in on the Pete Mundo Show for the whole morning. If you have read anything in the Kansas City papers about either the Royals Stadium or the Chiefs Stadium, the chances are that you are familiar with my next guest. J.C. Bradbury, a professor of economics at Kennesaw State University, has been studying the economic impacts of building stadiums, tearing down stadiums, getting teams, and losing teams. He’s got a book coming out at the end of next month called This One Will Be Different. I’ll get to the book in a second, JC, but my first question is: why do you hate baseball?
J.C. Bradbury (00:43)
Hi Patrick, thanks for having me on. I get that question a lot because I bring a lot of bad news, or uncomfortable truths, let’s say, about baseball. But I study these things because I love baseball. I’m a huge fan. I grew up an Atlanta Braves fan, but I follow baseball generally and all sorts of sports. I was an Atlanta United season ticket holder for many years. That’s why I do this — because I enjoy it.
Patrick Tuohey (01:09)
It’s funny — years ago somebody recommended Moneyball. It’s a fantastic book. The movie is just as good. I rewatched it the other day, and if you haven’t seen it or haven’t seen it in years, it really holds up. I think of that because baseball claims to be so statistics driven that you’d think fans would be more amenable to the kind of economic analysis you’re doing. But maybe it’s just love of the game and fandom that clouds their reason.
J.C. Bradbury (01:44)
There’s some of that. There are many people who are baseball fans, sports fans, who understand what I’m arguing — and I’d argue it’s more than you’d realize. But most of the people vocally speaking out about stadium issues and public finance are largely blinded by their own fandom. I deal with people on social media all the time who respond to things I say about stadiums and tell me I don’t understand the public finance — and they’re just totally incorrect. They don’t even bother to check it. It’s religion to some people. I say most people would give up their religion before they’d give up their subsidies to their sports teams.
Patrick Tuohey (02:27)
If you don’t already follow J.C. Bradbury on Twitter, I recommend it — JC underscore Bradbury. If you’re a fan of baseball, economics, or The Simpsons, you’ll love his account. So JC, tell me about your book, This One Will Be Different, which comes out at the end of July.
J.C. Bradbury (02:44)
I’ve been studying stadium subsidies and publicly funded stadiums for a very long time. I fell into it accidentally because the Atlanta Braves Stadium opened in Cobb County, a few miles from where I live — just outside Atlanta, where my family has been for generations. I had a lot of interest in how the stadium was built and funded, with three hundred million dollars in subsidies. I was familiar with a lot of the economics behind stadiums, and when I tried to share this research with other people, I was heavily rebuffed. So I began to study the issue more, and before I knew it, I had a very long book about the economics of stadiums. My idea was to explain public finance issues in stadiums using simpler methods. I use sound research methods, but I try to explain it through the narrative story of the Braves coming to Cobb County — here’s what happened, here’s what people argued, here’s what actually happened, let’s look at some of the financial numbers, and let’s understand the general intuition of why stadiums get built even though economists say they’re a bad deal. I look at the politics of it too. And one of the things I find is that these stadiums are mostly built by insider coalitions — chamber of commerce types, folks who are going to sit in the owner’s box and enjoy cocktails, or people with season tickets. They’re the large beneficiaries of the subsidy. They push these advocacy campaigns and try to get them passed as quickly as possible without going to voters if they can. That’s why we get these deals.
Patrick Tuohey (04:35)
One of the things that frustrates me about this whole issue — and I’d be curious if you agree, though I hate when TV and radio hosts make a statement and then ask the guest if they agree, and here I am — is that when St. Louis was considering funding a Major League Soccer stadium, or here in Kansas City with the Royals or the Chiefs, what I wish they would do is just say, “Hey everybody, we are a sports town. We think it’s important to have a sports team here, so we’re going to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to build something.” And just leave it at that. It would be a defensible argument. You could argue whether it’s worth the expenditure, but at least everybody would be honest. But they don’t do that. They go the extra step and say, “And we’re going to make money doing it.” That’s where they mess everything up. That’s where they get the numbers wrong. Is it as simple as that, or am I missing something?
J.C. Bradbury (05:31)
Absolutely. I wish there was some honesty in these debates. The reality is that a lot of people who argue these things don’t actually believe the phony economic impact studies they put out. They do it for a couple of reasons. Number one, politically, it’s a winning issue — if you tell someone it’s good for them economically, they’re more likely to support it. But also, if you just argue it’s good for the community and we’re a sports town — okay, how much does it cost? A billion dollars. How much does that increase taxes? Three hundred dollars. Well, hold on, we’re not that much of a sports town. Think about how you make your own decisions. What kind of car do you want to drive? I want a Ferrari. Great. But to drive a Ferrari, you’d need to move into a two-bedroom apartment, never travel again, and eat ramen noodles. You know what — I’ll get the base model sedan. People make those kinds of decisions, and that’s one of the reasons they use false economic benefits — because once you start talking about social benefits, people look at the costs more closely, and it makes a lot less sense.
Patrick Tuohey (06:40)
I had your colleague Victor Matheson on a few weeks ago and we talked about this, specifically with the World Cup. I’ve also asked Neil Damas this question. In your experience, how good are journalists at reaching out to you and your colleagues to vet the numbers they’re being told by chambers of commerce or the city? Where are we now, and are we getting better?
J.C. Bradbury (07:14)
I think the situation is getting worse, and a lot of it is accidental. Newsrooms have gotten smaller and younger, so there’s less institutional knowledge. People don’t remember the last stadium being built, and they’re told to go cover this stadium story. They call a few local sources — who of course are members of the local chamber — and those people say it’s great. At best, they call a local economist who says it’s bad, and it ends up being a tie. But often they don’t even call the economist. That’s part of the nature of the news business, which is one of the reasons I think it’s so important to use social media and other mediums to get the word out. Even journalists trying to do their best often fall short. And journalists deserve some blame here — when I reach out to try to help them, they often get very defensive, and I think that needs to stop. I’m not just angry at journalists. Both my parents were journalists, and my first job was in a newsroom. I understand what’s going on.
Patrick Tuohey (08:19)
The previous segment, I talked about World Cup reporting. Local people put out outrageous economic development claims a year and a half ago, nobody questioned them, and journalists just repeated them — even though past experience hadn’t lived up to those claims. So what can we do to encourage journalists to reach out, or maybe just give them a primer on what economic impact studies look like and where the flaws are? Whether I’m looking in St. Louis, Kansas City, or around the country, they are all flawed in the same way.
J.C. Bradbury (08:56)
It’s important to always speak up. It’s easy to get tired and think you can’t keep doing it. When someone asks me to look through one of these studies, I tell them it’s not a real study — it’s a fake study. I try to spread that message. Part of the problem is that the big number is the story, and that’s what they want out there. The fact that it’s wrong later doesn’t matter. And sometimes people get mad at me because I’ll call out bad reporting. I do it not because I dislike journalists, but every time I’ve tried to be nice about it, I get told I don’t know what I’m talking about or that they don’t want to tell their boss they need a correction. I think it’s important for journalists to know that if they get it wrong, they’re going to get called on it — not to be mean, but to set the standard.
Patrick Tuohey (09:54)
And do a better job because policymakers and business owners are making decisions based on the numbers you’re putting out there. We see this with the World Cup — people were expecting much bigger crowds than they got. It’s not just a matter of being right. It’s a matter of being right so that people make decisions based on real information, not just projections. JC, I’m grateful for your time this morning. Thank you so much. We’ve been talking to J.C. Bradbury of Kennesaw State University. His book, This One Will Be Different, comes out at the end of July. We’ll be right back.
The movie The Odyssey is being released next month, and that’s appropriate for the Jackson County assessment district because the county is truly between Scylla and Charybdis now. The reassessment process in Jackson County has been a disaster for over a decade now. The only thing I will say in defense of the county and the assessor’s office is that Jackson County was underassessed for a long time. (My explanation as to why that was can be found here.) The process to accurately assess property within Jackson County was never going to be easy or fun, but the county has failed at the overall process by any measure.
Jackson County has begun attempting to correct its poorly conducted reassessments in 2023 and 2025. It will do this by retroactively rolling back property assessments for some property owners, sending refunds to other taxpayers, and withholding future tax funds from other taxing entities, such as fire districts, to make up for the overpayments by taxpayers in 2023 and 2025. The county has to withhold future payments because counties collect all the property taxes within the county, but then distribute almost all of that money to other taxing districts. Jackson County does not have a large pot of its own money it can make amends from. Not surprisingly, some of those taxing entities are suing over the withholding of their future tax payments.
The problem is, those school districts and other taxing entities were not the ones who caused the problems in 2023 and 2025. They followed the rules, set their tax rates, received their tax money, and spent it. Now they are being told they have to give some of it back.
So, I understand the objections by the taxing districts, but I have much more sympathy for the taxpayers who were victimized by a poor process over the past few reassessments. The Jackson County assessor’s office, among other problems, failed to provide taxpayers with the rights of appeal and relief they were entitled to during the process. So, yes, some taxpayers were overcharged because they did not have their full opportunity to appeal their taxes.
In short, the new Jackson County leadership team deserves credit for changing course and finally trying to correct the problems and refund money to some taxpayers. I think the taxpayers deserve these refunds—and the entire process needs wholesale changes.
I have no idea how the courts will rule in this lawsuit. I’ll be following it closely. Hopefully this controversy and similar, recent issues in Platte County can lead to massive changes in how we conduct property reassessments in Missouri.
Susan Pendergrass speaks with Andrew G. Biggs, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, about the Social Security trustees’ latest report and what it means for the program’s future. They discuss the projected 2032 insolvency of the retirement trust fund, why the trustees’ birth rate assumptions may be too optimistic, the proposed Moreno-Warren plan to eliminate the payroll tax ceiling, the Cassidy-Kaine plan, and why pension experts oppose it, what would actually happen if the trust fund ran out, and more.
Susan Pendergrass (00:00):
I feel fortunate to have grabbed some of your time. Andrew Biggs from the American Enterprise Institute, I appreciate you coming on to talk to us. Social security has been nothing but in the news recently, and you know more than anyone else. So thank you for taking the time.
Andrew Biggs (00:14):
That’s why I’m so cheerful. The more you know about Social Security, the happier you are. But thanks for having me, Susan. It has been busy. I’m really happy to be with you today.
Susan Pendergrass (00:16):
I’m in my sixties. I see something about Social Security running out of money and I pay attention. So just to bring us all up to speed: in the last week, there was a news flash that Social Security is going to run out of money sooner. What does it really mean?
Andrew Biggs (00:39):
Every year the Social Security trustees, which is mostly members of the cabinet, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Social Security Commissioner, and so on, come out with a report projecting the program’s financial health, both in the short term and the long term. That happens every year, and it’s been getting worse every year. In this year’s report, they projected that the retirement trust fund will go insolvent, or run out of money, in 2032. They also projected a significantly larger long-term funding gap in the years thereafter, and this is worth explaining.
When the trust fund runs out, it doesn’t mean there’s zero money to pay benefits. As long as we’re paying a trillion dollars a year in payroll taxes, there will be money to pay benefits. But when the trust fund runs out, it means benefits will be cut, and their projection is somewhere around 22%. The size of that long-term funding gap dictates how big the cuts are going to be in the years thereafter. The trustees lowered their projections for birth rates, and they found that the One Big Beautiful Bill has worsened Social Security’s finances. A variety of things made this long-term funding gap worse. It’s really hard to paint a happy picture. The trust fund can be running out in about six years, and the funding gap and the benefit cuts in years thereafter are going to be larger. It’s a sobering picture.
Susan Pendergrass (02:16):
I’m not trying to pile on, but I think I saw that they extended the time when they expect birth rates to bounce back. Is that true? Because I have not seen anything anywhere, and I’ve spoken to some demographers, to suggest birth rates are ever going to bounce back.
Andrew Biggs (02:35):
Here’s the interesting thing. If you look at the Congressional Budget Office or the US Census Bureau, right now the fertility rate is about 1.6 children per woman on average, and both the CBO and the Census project that’s going to remain pretty much steady, declining a little bit over coming decades. Social Security had a very different picture. As of last year, they thought the birth rate, which is 1.6 now, was going to immediately start rising and go back up to 1.9 children per woman in the next several decades. That makes Social Security’s finances better. More kids being born means more people paying into the system. What they did in this year’s report is moderate a bit on fertility. They said, okay, it’s not going to rise back to 1.9, it’ll rise back to 1.75. So they are still over-optimistic. I’ve talked to some demographers and economists who’ve really focused on the birth rate, and they described the trustees’ assumptions as, quote, fanciful, meaning they just weren’t plausible. Now they’re somewhat more plausible, but they still tend
Susan Pendergrass (03:32):
Okay.
Andrew Biggs (03:48):
to be more optimistic than other agencies. And to me, frankly, this is a concern. You really want the people who are the scorekeepers, the umpires, to be playing it as straight as they possibly can. We know that these guesses are going to be wrong because this stuff is impossible to predict with certainty, but most demographers think the best guess is we’ll stay around 1.6 going forward. You’ve seen a decline, and a good predictor of birth rates is religiosity, the level of religious belief in a country. The US has typically been much more religious than Western Europe, and that’s played into fertility. There has been a big decline in religious belief, particularly among younger Americans, along with all the other pessimism you see among younger people. When people are pessimistic, they tend not to have a lot of kids. So the best guess is we’re going to stay about where we are.
I wrote something the other day saying the bad news in this trustees report is even worse than last year’s, but it could have been even worse. They project a long-term funding gap above 4.4 percent of payroll. What that means is if you took the 12.4% payroll tax today and raised it immediately and permanently by 4.4 percentage points, from 12.4 to 16.8, that would in theory keep the trust fund solvent for 75 years. But a better guess would be a funding gap of around 4.8 to 5 percent. This is real money. For years, people on the left have said, well, okay, we know Social Security has a solvency problem, but it’s a manageable issue. They were saying that when the funding gap was 2% of payroll. Now you’re looking at four to five percent. That’s a lot of money, at a time when a lot of other things are making claims on the budget. We have some difficult choices to make and we really have to start thinking hard about this.
Susan Pendergrass (06:09):
Okay, so what about this idea that’s been floated in the last week of getting rid of the payroll cap? First of all, explain the payroll cap, and then this idea of getting rid of it.
Andrew Biggs (06:17):
Sure. Social Security has a 12.4% payroll tax, half paid by you and half paid by your employer. That applies only to wages up to $184,500. That’s called the payroll tax ceiling, or the tax max. That dollar figure goes up every year, but this year it’s $184,000. You only pay taxes on those wages, and you also earn benefits only on those wages. People say, well, Bill Gates doesn’t pay more taxes than that. But he doesn’t earn any benefits either. So you’re capping both the taxes and the benefits.
To fast forward a little bit: there’s an op-ed in the Washington Post this week from Senator Bernie Moreno, a Republican from Ohio, and Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat from Massachusetts. They say it’s just common sense to eliminate that cap and tax all earnings for Social Security. The interesting thing is how uncommon that would actually be. Our payroll tax ceiling is $184,000. Almost every other country has a ceiling on their payroll taxes for their pension system, and in almost every other country that ceiling is lower. In Canada, you only pay taxes and earn benefits up to around $60,000 in earnings. In the UK it’s about $70,000. In Germany it’s about $70,000. We are already an outlier for how high up the income ladder we tax people. To eliminate the cap entirely is a big deal. It’s effectively a 12 percentage point increase in the top marginal tax rate. I pulled an example of somebody living in New York City. A high-income person already pays 37% in federal income taxes, plus regular Medicare taxes, the additional Medicare tax, state taxes, and city taxes. If you add another 12 percentage points on top of that, their marginal tax rate would be in the mid-60s. And that’s before we’ve fixed Medicare or done anything else. The federal budget is still broke, and you’ve taxed these people as high as you possibly can. So these things that look like common sense, why don’t we just tax everybody,
Susan Pendergrass (08:37):
Right, right.
Andrew Biggs (08:46):
look, there are reasons for that.
Susan Pendergrass (08:49):
And were they suggesting that if I make $300,000 and I pay my 6.2 percent, totaling 12.4 with my employer, on my entire salary, that my Social Security benefit one day would be higher? Are they talking about capping the benefit or just getting rid of the cap on contributions?
Andrew Biggs (09:06):
They haven’t been very specific. They say Social Security would continue to be an earned benefit, which kind of implies you would continue to earn benefits on the additional taxes you would pay. Let’s say if we uncap the payroll tax and base your taxes on your total earnings, you’d also base your benefits on your total earnings. What you get then is, okay, you’re getting all this money from people in the short term, but you have to pay them higher benefits in the long term. That offsets some of the savings. And this morning I was running some numbers looking back to the 1970s. We had a huge run-up in benefit levels from Social Security in the 1970s. The benefit formula we have today is not the one FDR invented. It really happened in the 1970s, where they jacked up benefits in a really foolish way, and then to help pay for it, they increased the payroll tax ceiling. Right now you pay taxes on earnings up to $180,000. If we had just kept the tax max from 1970 and indexed it to wages, it would have been only $95,000. So they essentially doubled the wages on which you pay Social Security taxes. But what happens is they also doubled the wages on which people earn benefits. I’ve highlighted the point that if you have a high-income
Susan Pendergrass (10:38):
Mm-hmm.
Andrew Biggs (10:43):
couple retiring today, they could get almost $100,000 in total benefits, which is absurd. There’s no reason a government program should be paying anybody that amount. If you want that kind of income in retirement, you save more in your 401k. It’s better for you, better for the economy. But it was a result of this short-term step they took in the 70s. They said, hey, we raised benefits too high, let’s jack up the tax max. And they didn’t worry about the fact that in the future you’d have to pay benefits on that. Well, the future is today.
Susan Pendergrass (11:05):
Okay.
Andrew Biggs (11:13):
Now we’re broke again, we need extra money again, and these guys say, well let’s just jack up the tax max. But then you’ll pay extra benefits in the future. It becomes this chasing-your-tail kind of thing.
Susan Pendergrass (11:16):
Yeah. Yeah.
Andrew Biggs (11:25):
And the problem when you do it is there’s no country on earth paying $100,000 a year from a social insurance program, except for us. And the reason we do is these stupid historical decisions. If you’ve got this high-income couple in the US retiring today, they can get almost $100,000 from Social Security. If they lived in Canada, they’d get like $35,000. And that’s perfectly fine. Nobody’s starving to death in Canada in retirement. They just save more on their own.
Susan Pendergrass (11:35):
I’ll say.
Andrew Biggs (11:55):
The irony is that we think of ourselves as a free-market, small-government country, and our Social Security program is enormous, primarily because we’re paying benefits to people that other countries say, yeah, we don’t need to pay benefits to these guys.
Susan Pendergrass (12:11):
And yet people say, I put my money in, I get my money out.
Andrew Biggs (12:14):
Yeah, and I understand it. When I say we shouldn’t be paying $100,000 a year to a high-income couple, you get the email saying, well, I paid in. And if you paid in, you feel you have this moral claim on benefits. The problem is Social Security is still broke. We still need higher taxes or lower benefits. The idea that you’re just going to get your full benefits with the taxes you paid doesn’t work because the system can’t afford to do it. So you have to make the choice: do I want to pay higher taxes or get lower benefits? I’ve got to pick my poison. Most high-income people would prefer to get lower benefits. They care more about their taxes than their benefits. But people are still living in this dream world where this system, which is $30 trillion in the hole, is somehow going to pay them everything they’ve been promised and just screw somebody else. Everybody thinks they’re the guy who’s going to get everything and somebody else is going to get screwed.
Susan Pendergrass (13:14):
Yeah. I definitely hear people saying today, maybe I should go ahead and take it early and then I’ll get grandfathered in and my benefits won’t get lowered.
Andrew Biggs (13:26):
It probably won’t make a difference. In general, the Social Security benefit formula works based on your birth cohort, the year in which you’re born, not really the year in which you claim benefits. And people who are going to do Social Security reform understand the incentives. They don’t want to make it easy for people to game the system. So Social Security reform will probably work itself out in such a way that
Susan Pendergrass (13:42):
Right.
Andrew Biggs (14:03):
you can’t get some big advantage by claiming early. I could think of some conceivable possibilities, but I still would not encourage people to claim early.
Susan Pendergrass (14:14):
Okay, I want to talk about two more things I read in the last week. One was a letter from Tim Kaine about his idea with Senator Cassidy. What’s that idea for fixing it?
Andrew Biggs (14:24):
The interesting thing is people say Social Security reform has to be bipartisan. So we have two bipartisan ideas. We have Moreno and Elizabeth Warren, a Republican and a Democrat. They’ve got one idea, eliminating the payroll tax ceiling.
Susan Pendergrass (14:39):
Third rail.
Andrew Biggs (14:49):
Cassidy, a Republican from Louisiana, and Tim Kaine, a Democrat from Virginia, they’ve got a bipartisan plan. And guess what? Their plan is also terrible. If there’s any lesson from this, it’s that bipartisan doesn’t mean good.
Susan Pendergrass (15:00):
Bipartisanly terrible.
Andrew Biggs (15:04):
Yeah. Look, ultimately Social Security reform is going to have to be bipartisan, given the way the political system works. On the other hand, there is some lesson that if both Republicans and Democrats can agree on something, it might be a terrible idea. With Cassidy and Kaine, they are explicitly, and Cassidy said this, solving a political problem. The political problem is that neither Republicans nor Democrats want to vote for either tax increases or benefit cuts. You’d think Democrats want to raise your taxes and Republicans want to cut your benefits. The reality is they don’t want to do either of those things because they realize both are politically unpopular, which is why we’ve gone 40 years literally doing nothing. So their solution is that we don’t have to make these difficult votes. Instead, the federal government will borrow about $2 trillion, invest that money
Susan Pendergrass (16:02):
Tough.
Andrew Biggs (16:04):
in stocks and private equity, high-risk, high-return stuff. Then they claim they’re going to hold this fund for 75 years so it can build up value. In the meantime, when Social Security’s trust fund runs out in 2032, the federal government will borrow against the assumed gains on this investment fund.
Susan Pendergrass (16:06):
Right. Mm-hmm.
Andrew Biggs (16:29):
They say the borrowing will be at a lower rate because it’s the federal government. And they say after 75 years, all the gains in this investment fund will pay back all the borrowing and we’re all good. And let me count the ways there are problems with that. If you work at the state level,
Susan Pendergrass (16:45):
It’s just kicking the can.
Andrew Biggs (16:52):
state-based think tanks almost know more about this than federal people. A lot of underfunded state pension systems do things called pension obligation bonds. Their pension system is underfunded, they don’t want to raise contributions or cut benefits, so they borrow and invest in the stock market and hope it works. The pension obligation bond is the hallmark of a poorly funded, poorly run pension system. Think New Jersey, Illinois, things like that.
Susan Pendergrass (17:21):
Yeah.
Andrew Biggs (17:23):
There’s a national group of state budget officers that has come out and basically said as an institution, don’t do this. Borrowing for your pension is a bad idea. So it really is fitting for the times that the Cassidy-Kaine plan says, let’s take this worst idea from state and local government
Susan Pendergrass (17:45):
Yeah.
Andrew Biggs (17:47):
employee pensions, which has been condemned as bad practice, and put it on steroids and do that for Social Security. And what it really gets to is they just don’t understand the finances of it. And to be frank, they won’t listen. They have talked to every pension expert I know, and this Social Security world is pretty small. We all know each other on both sides. We may not agree on everything. Literally every pension expert I know says this is a terrible idea.
Susan Pendergrass (17:54):
Yeah.
Andrew Biggs (18:17):
But their political considerations are more important than policy, and that’s the problem with all of them.
Susan Pendergrass (18:24):
I mean, it feels free. They’re basically saying it’s like a timeshare. It just feels free right now. We just borrow the money. Okay, so
Andrew Biggs (18:31):
It’s been pointed out to them that if you can fund Social Security this way, you could fund the entire federal government this way and never collect any taxes. At one point Senator Cassidy was quoted in a newspaper article saying, well, yeah, sure, in theory you could. And I’m like, if something implies there’s a free money machine, maybe you need to question your assumptions.
Susan Pendergrass (18:38):
Sure. Okay.
Andrew Biggs (18:54):
I could give you a whole variety of reasons why this doesn’t work, but one macro point that’s come to me: I’ve been doing Social Security for a long time. I worked in the Bush administration in 2005 when they tried and failed to do Social Security reform. One of the problems we face today is that your elected officials understand Social Security policy much less well than they did 20 years ago. They just don’t understand how the system works. Going back to the Moreno-Warren idea of applying the payroll tax to all earnings,
Susan Pendergrass (19:22):
Yeah.
Andrew Biggs (19:37):
okay, you’re adding 12 percentage points to your top tax rate. There’s a reason Sweden and France and others don’t do this anymore. They used to have incredibly high tax rates. They don’t now. We would end up in many cases with a higher tax rate than most European countries. We have some philosophical dedication to small government and things like that. They don’t. And so if they’re not doing it,
Susan Pendergrass (19:43):
Yes. Yeah, yeah.
Andrew Biggs (20:02):
it’s because there’s a practical reason this isn’t a good idea. The same applies to wealth taxes. That’s been tried in Europe. They’re like, yeah, we’re not doing that anymore because it doesn’t work. But your average senator now
Susan Pendergrass (20:14):
It is happening around the country, the billionaire tax. What happens in 2032 if no one is either brave enough or smart enough to take this on in the next six years?
Andrew Biggs (20:17):
They’re just not aware of these policy issues, and that’s a real problem. It’s like having a guy fix your car who doesn’t know how to fix cars. 2032 is the date. If you have a recession, it might be 2031. It’s not certain, but it is certain it’s happening soon.
Susan Pendergrass (20:47):
Yeah. Okay.
Andrew Biggs (20:53):
There’s a literal reading of the law, which is that Social Security can’t pay out benefits it doesn’t have dedicated resources for. Once the trust fund runs out, the only dedicated resources are mostly the payroll tax, plus a little bit of money from income taxes levied on retirement benefits. And those were cut as part of the One Big Beautiful Bill. So if the trust fund runs out, they’d have to rely on the money they have on hand, which implies around a 22% benefit cut.
A lot of times people assume that benefit cut has to be across the board. If you did it that way, you’d throw a lot of people into poverty. I did some work a year or so ago with a lawyer in DC named Kristen Shapiro, and what we found is that the legal precedent shows the executive branch, meaning the president working through the Social Security Commissioner, would have some discretion. What we found is you could maintain full benefits for about 50% of people, the poorest 50% of seniors, and then cap benefits above that. If you cap the maximum benefit at about $24,000 per year for a single person or $48,000 for a couple, that is enough to make Social Security solid without raising taxes. So the point is simply you have some discretion.
The reality is Congress isn’t going to allow big benefit cuts, for political reasons. On the other hand, are they willing to have the size of tax increases needed, all in one go, to keep Social Security paying full benefits? I don’t think they want that either. So the reality is probably they’re going to borrow a lot of the money. And that’s where you get to the issue of how much more borrowing the financial markets will swallow. We effectively borrow from the public to repay the Social Security Trust Fund, but there’s an end to that. You say, okay, 2032, we have to do something. We have to raise taxes or cut benefits. If in 2032 the stated policy of the federal government is, well, we’re just going to keep borrowing to pay Social Security even though we have no prospect of paying it back, you wouldn’t blame some big market players for saying, yeah, I’m out, because you don’t want to lend money at low interest rates to someone who says they can’t pay it back. Then you start getting a couple of things. One is more federal borrowing squeezes out capital in the rest of the economy, and so interest rates naturally rise.
Susan Pendergrass (23:18):
Right.
Andrew Biggs (23:31):
But then there’s a second element: if you’re afraid the federal government can’t pay you back, over and above that natural increase in the interest rate, you’d apply a risk premium to treasury debt. You’d say, look, Treasury is not this rock-solid investment anymore. It’s more like a junk bond, or like borrowing from Illinois, and you make them pay a premium. That’s going to drive up
Susan Pendergrass (23:43):
US government borrowing. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Andrew Biggs (24:01):
interest rates, and that makes it tougher not just for the federal government but for everybody. If you want to buy a car or a house, all your interest rates rise. There’s also going to be real temptation to inflate away the debt. The federal government doesn’t want to default on its debt, but
Susan Pendergrass (24:24):
Yeah, yeah.
Andrew Biggs (24:25):
historically the way you deal with this is inflation. Think about all the debt we took on during COVID, shoveling money out the door to everybody, and then we had massive inflation after it. A lot of those people who bought treasury debt didn’t get a good deal, because if you get 20% inflation on
Susan Pendergrass (24:34):
Absolutely. Yeah.
Andrew Biggs (24:47):
a treasury bond with a nominal fixed interest rate, that’s a real problem. So inflation becomes increasingly tempting. You look at this scenario and you’re like, can’t anybody here play this game? Every other country is not going bankrupt. We just have to do what they do.
Susan Pendergrass (24:51):
Yeah, yeah. So could we, if we really got our heads around it and started today or next year, incrementally raise the 12.4%, or incrementally get people used to lower benefits after a certain income or wealth level?
Andrew Biggs (25:18):
Sure. Yes. The way I think about it, there are two ways people think about it: the wrong way and my way. The wrong way is, let’s just pick from this menu of options to make Social Security solvent. We can raise the payroll tax a bit, raise the retirement age a bit, cut cost-of-living adjustments a bit, raise the tax cap a bit, and do these things until the system is solvent.
Susan Pendergrass (25:34):
Yes. Yeah.
Andrew Biggs (25:54):
That’ll get you a solvent program, but it won’t be a program that particularly works very well or is good for the economy. A more effective way is to ask, what do we want this system to do? If you talk about Social Security reform, what you hear is that it’s a social insurance program, a safety net, an anti-poverty program. Okay, it has to do that. And that part is really very cheap, because we don’t literally have that many poor seniors, their benefits aren’t very high, and it’s not a problem to maintain benefits for low-income seniors. When you ask what Social Security should do, nobody is saying we need to be paying high-income seniors $100,000 a year. There’s no public purpose for it. Nobody thought it out in advance. It was simply an unintended consequence. So if you’ve got things that are really costing a lot of money and have no public purpose, and those people can save for retirement on their own, you start scaling that back. The distinction I’m making is between policy changes simply for the purposes of keeping Social Security solvent, and policy changes for the purpose of making Social Security do what it needs to do, the real public purpose, and not doing things that serve no public purpose. My point is the things I’m talking about are things you should do whether Social Security is insolvent or not.
I’ll give you an example: Australia’s retirement system. Australia is a lot like us, not particularly more conservative or liberal, just sort of normal. Their Social Security program essentially is targeted at eliminating poverty in old age. It’s actually a better safety net than Social Security provides, but the benefits decline down to zero once you get above the poverty level. And to help people above that level save for retirement, everybody is enrolled in a 401k-type account. What that says is, if everybody’s participating in retirement plans as they should, the government’s job becomes easier. Their Social Security system costs about two percent of GDP. Ours costs about six percent. It’s a third as costly, provides a better safety net, and it comes because they’re actually thinking about what they’re doing.
Susan Pendergrass (28:18):
Mm-hmm.
Andrew Biggs (28:26):
We’re literally not thinking about what we’re doing. There’s a saying in business: the worst reason to do something is because we’re already doing it. That is literally how Social Security policymaking works. Nobody knows why our benefit formula is what it is or why the tax max is what it is. It’s all just stuff we inherited from the 1970s from people who were not in any way thinking clearly about what they were doing. It was people in the 70s trying to win elections, and we end up with the bag.
Susan Pendergrass (28:52):
Speaking of 2005, there was an attempt to offload a small portion of people’s contributions into the market, right? That failed.
Andrew Biggs (29:09):
That was the Bush proposal. I was in the White House then, kind of in a number-cruncher role, so I knew that stuff pretty well. I did a lot of events with President Bush around the country. When we came up on the 20th anniversary of Bush’s proposal in 2025, I started thinking to myself, what if his plan had passed? What would have happened? So I built a model. Back then they were saying, okay, you’re going to have some reductions in traditional Social Security benefits for middle and high-income people, and then you’re going to have a personal account where you can invest part of your existing payroll tax in stocks and bonds. The total benefit you get at retirement is a combination of those two. People were speculating. Well, we don’t know what the stock market’s going to do. But 20 years later, we’ve got some data, so let’s just see what happened. The results were that for people
Susan Pendergrass (30:01):
Now we do.
Andrew Biggs (30:07):
retiring today, low and middle-income people would have had higher total benefits by a little bit. The very highest-income people, their benefits would be down by a couple percent because the cuts to their traditional benefits would be larger than the gains from their personal account. But even they would be fine; it’s not a big deal. Going forward, it looked like people would do a little bit better with the Bush plan than with the traditional system. But here’s the important thing: the traditional system is broke. We just talked about how it goes broke in 2032, with huge deficits. The Bush proposal wouldn’t have made Social Security totally solvent, but it would have addressed half or two-thirds of the long-term funding gap. So you’d get a system that would have paid you benefits around the same as, or maybe a little bit better than, Social Security, but would be in much more solid financial shape. Today the times are different, and I don’t think personal accounts are really viable. But the point is, if they had done something back then, everything could be easier today. But members of
Congress were just too afraid. Republicans were afraid of taking the political hit. For Democrats, it was too tempting to give the political hit. They knew they had to do something, but they couldn’t swallow hard and say, look, let’s just go in on this thing together. They didn’t want to give Bush the win because by that point Iraq was going badly and they really didn’t like him. So they beat him up. But the problem is Bush served his term and is happily retired in Texas. The people who really got screwed were the ones who depend on Social Security, because we didn’t fix it. And you just hope that’s not what we do again.
Susan Pendergrass (31:42):
Yeah. Somebody not us in 2045 could be having the same conversation, right? Like, if only in 2025 or 2026 we’d gotten serious. And I do think people mix up the trust fund with the whole program. A lot of people think all of Social Security is going to be bankrupt in six years, versus the reality that we’re still taking in a trillion dollars, we just need about 22% more than what we’re taking in.
Andrew Biggs (32:14):
Yeah. If you go back 20 or 25 years, there were all these arguments about whether the trust fund is real or fair or whatever. The trust fund is essentially IOUs written from one side of the government to the other. I thought at the time the trust fund is not real in an economic sense. It doesn’t make it easier for the government to pay Social Security benefits. It is a pledge that we will pay them, but it doesn’t make it easier to pay them. But here’s the interesting thing:
Susan Pendergrass (32:25):
Right. Al Gore. The lock box.
Andrew Biggs (32:50):
if having a trust fund doesn’t make it easier to pay benefits, then not having a trust fund doesn’t make it harder. The trust fund runs out, we still have taxes coming in, we can still pay 80% of what is owed. If we retarget that, you can maintain the safety net. It’s not like you’re totally insolvent or broke. All those long debates over whether the trust fund is real get resolved because the trust fund itself is gone in six years. So that doesn’t matter very much anymore. But I do hope that, as you said, we’re not in 2045 looking back on a solution of just borrowing $500 billion a year or whatever it’s going to be. People in 2045, when the federal government is bankrupt, the dollar is dropping, and all these financial crisis things we think only happen to other countries are happening to us, they would look back and say, I wish those people were more responsible. The Social Security problem, in a sense, if we went back 25 or 30 years ago, was a manageable problem. The real issue is not the demographics or the benefit growth or whatever. The real issue is just poor stewardship of this program by Congress and respective presidents. It is absolutely a governance problem. It is not a problem of economic or demographic fundamentals. All of that can be handled.
Susan Pendergrass (34:19):
Everyone wants to be Santa Claus, right? No one wants to be the Grinch.
Andrew Biggs (34:22):
It’s very true, but leadership is about giving people bad news. Good news kind of tells itself. Bad news has to be told and people have to be convinced that this is going to hurt, but we’ve got to do it. And we just didn’t have the willingness. President Clinton in the late nineties tried to do some stuff, but he didn’t deliver much bad news because we had surpluses. President Bush was willing to tell people, okay, look, you’re not going to get every penny you’ve been promised. Beyond that, the level of leadership has been very poor.
Susan Pendergrass (35:01):
Hasn’t been good. All right, well, next year when the trustees report comes out, come back and give us more bad news.
Andrew Biggs (35:09):
Yeah, until then, things are looking up. But no, it’s something people want to be aware of, and I think that’s the key thing.
Susan Pendergrass (35:13):
Well, I think one of the more important things you said is that no one understands it. People are upset and arguing over something they don’t understand the mechanics of. I do know people who think they have an account with their name on it that their Social Security taxes went into, and they’re just going to start taking the money out.
Andrew Biggs (35:23):
I have some bad news for that. Your taxes go into Social Security and go straight out the door to pay for your grandmother’s benefits. If you want to know where your taxes are, they’re in your grandmother’s bank account. So go ask her.
Susan Pendergrass (35:45):
That’s right. That’s right. All right, thank you so much. I really appreciate the time.
Andrew Biggs (35:51):
Thank you, Susan. It’s a pleasure to be with you.
The Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) reports that 188 of 518 school districts will be operating on a four-day school week (4dsw) during the upcoming school year.
The figure below shows the rapid growth of the 4dsw since the 2010–11 school year.
Source: DESE
Missouri is not alone in this phenomenon. The 4dsw is increasingly popular across the country, especially in rural districts. Even though 36 percent of Missouri school districts use a 4dsw, they cover only 13 percent of students because rural districts are smaller. However, it is notable that the Independence School District in Kansas City, with over 13,000 students, is also on a 4dsw.
Districts typically adopt a four-day calendar in hopes of improving teacher recruitment and retention and, in some cases, reducing costs. In 2024, Senate Bill 727 included a modest financial incentive for districts to have at least 169 instructional days to encourage districts to remain on a five-day schedule. Nevertheless, the use of the 4dsw continues to expand.
My colleague James Shuls and I authored a series of papers examining the effects of the 4dsw on academic achievement, district finances, teacher retention, and parental satisfaction:
Across these reports, we found that the 4dsw was harmful for student achievement, with stronger negative effects for non-rural students. We found that the 4dsw either had no meaningful effect on finances, or that a decrease in costs was almost entirely offset by a decrease in revenues. For teacher retention, the results were mixed. We found that parents had a slight preference for the five-day school week (with those using a 4dsw as the strongest supporters, and those concerned about childcare as the strongest opponents).
Since our papers were published, several newer studies have been published, though the number of rigorous, quantitative studies on the effects of the 4dsw is still limited.
A 2024 study from the Center for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research (CALDER) found “small negative or statistically insignificant effects on teacher recruitment and retention outcomes.”
Similarly, a 2025 CALDER study used Missouri data and “found no evidence that the 4dsw improves teacher recruitment or retention,” despite educators and school leaders believing it does. My colleague, Cory Koedel, was one of the study’s coauthors and wrote about the findings in greater detail here.
The 4dsw is not a loophole that saves money and improves teacher retention at no cost to students. In fact, the available evidence suggests that, on average, it is harmful to students while nothing changes for retention and finances.
This does not mean that a 4dsw could never be successful. A district that adopts a 4dsw as part of an innovative educational model could potentially unearth new benefits. However, that is not why most districts switch. School leaders and policymakers should familiarize themselves with the research and approach the continued expansion of the 4dsw with greater skepticism.
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