When I was a guest on Sarah Steelman’s radio show on Thursday, a person called in to ask what would happen to the people who work at Ford’s Claycomo plant if it were to close. This is a common concern raised when discussing the fate of struggling industries, and it is designed to tug at our emotions. Those who employ this argument intend to makes us feel sympathy for the people who are in danger of losing their jobs, and open our collective wallets to save them. I explained on the air that the workers’ skills would not disappear when the door to the plant closes permanently, and that many of them will be able to find work elsewhere in the economy by performing a task that is demanded. The caller didn’t seem to be convinced by my argument. “Tell that to Detroit,” he said. After thinking more about the subject, I realize that there are other additional arguments that I could have made that may be more convincing.

First, I realize that the caller suffers from “make-work bias,” a concept developed by Bryan Caplan, a professor of economics at George Mason University, in his book The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. In an excerpt published in Reason, “The 4 Boneheaded Biases of Stupid Voters,” Caplan writes (emphasis mine):

The public often literally believes that labor is better to use than conserve. Saving labor, producing more goods with fewer man-hours, is widely perceived not as progress but as a danger. I call this the make-work bias, a tendency to underestimate the economic benefits of conserving labor. Where noneconomists see the destruction of jobs, economists see the essence of economic growth: the production of more with less.

Second, I failed to point out that the caller focuses on the needs of a select group rather than those of everybody in the economy. This is a common error that people make when evaluating policies, as Frédéric Bastiat discussed in “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen.” On the subject of subsidizing employment, Bastiat writes (emphasis mine):

[I]t is clear that the taxpayer who will have been taxed one franc will no longer have this franc at his disposal. It is clear that he will be deprived of a satisfaction to the tune of one franc, and that the worker, whoever he is, who would have procured this satisfaction for him, will be deprived of wages in the same amount.

Let us not, then, yield to the childish illusion of believing that [a vote in favor of subsidy] adds anything whatever to national well-being and employment. It reallocates possessions, it reallocates wages, and that is all.

When arguing in favor of tax incentives for the Claycomo plant, the radio caller considered only the benefit to the 3,700 plant workers who will keep their jobs. He doesn’t consider the unseen cost that, if the state legislature approves the proposal to provide $150 million in tax credits, the rest of the tax base (a much larger group) will be $150 million poorer. This policy doesn’t increase income; it merely displaces it. As a related unintended negative consequence, the organizations that may have employed these factory workers, had they been laid off, will be restricted in their growth because they would face a smaller supply of labor.

This brings me to my third point. Subsidizing the Claycomo plant would contribute to a higher level of unemployment in the long run, negatively affecting all of the workers in the Claycomo region. Caplan explains this too:

The hard lesson to learn is that giving people “rights to their jobs” is a drain on productivity—and makes employers think twice about hiring people in the first place.

The fact that Claycomo Ford plant will close if unsubsidized indicates that the area no longer has a comparative advantage in manufacturing Ford cars. The area would be better off if its resources — human and otherwise — were employed in activities that do not require subsidies. As a direct consequence, the region would have the capacity to produce more, and the individuals in the market would be able to keep a greater percentage of their income.