Sun Fresh Failed Because of Subsidies, not Despite Them

On August 12, KCUR ran a story with the headline A troubled Kansas City grocery store has closed, despite $18 million in city investments.” I take a different view: the evidence suggests that Sun Fresh may have failed because of city investment—not despite it.

For more than a decade, Kansas City leaders treated Sun Fresh at 31st and Prospect as both a grocery store and a public policy tool to address food access and economic development. According to KCUR, the city has invested  $17 to $21 million since 2015, plus a $750,000 operating and security appropriation in May 2025. Yet customer traffic reportedly fell from about 14,000 a week to roughly 2,000–4,000 by mid-2025 (sources differ by date and estimate). According to The Washington Post, the store’s insurance costs rose 45% year-over-year, thefts mounted, and by this summer the store’s shelves were bare. Less than three months after the latest infusion of taxpayer money, the store closed.

This should not have been a surprise. I wrote as early as 2015 that the effort would fail. I saw this not because I’m imbued with a mystical power of prediction, but because I’m roughly familiar with some basic economic principles.

Friedrich Hayek described the price system as “a mechanism for communicating information” that enables millions of separate decisions to coordinate without central control. Prices, sales, and profit margins signal what customers want and whether a business can supply it sustainably. Subsidies blur those signals. Falling sales normally push owners to change their product mix, improve service, or close. If government funds fill the gap, a business may avoid—or delay—those choices until the underlying problems are too great to fix. This is exactly what happened with Sun Fresh.

Ludwig von Mises argued that without real market prices, decision-makers cannot allocate resources rationally. A subsidized store like Sun Fresh is insulated from these tests. Are prices too high? Is the product selection wrong? Are operating costs out of line? In a subsidy environment, these questions may go unanswered because survival depends more on political approval than on customer satisfaction.

And what do politicians want?  Ribbon cuttings and pretty pictures. Sound economics doesn’t photograph so well.

Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, warned that the interests of producers and the public often diverge. A subsidized grocery may fulfill a political need to “do something” about food access, but it may not deliver what shoppers actually want at prices they will pay. If a store cannot sustain itself even with taxpayer support, the model—not the market—is the likely problem.

Supporters of the subsidies might argue that they were necessary to correct a market failure, and that the store’s closure proves even more support was needed. But the record suggests the opposite: prolonged subsidies masked underlying weaknesses, delayed inevitable closure, and diverted resources from other food-access efforts such as mobile markets, independent co-ops, or smaller-scale grants. Subsidies likely harmed other grocery stores as well, such as an ALDI on Prospect within about 1.5 miles.

Markets provide important information that no city hall central plan can replicate. Public funds cannot replace this information; they can only distort it. It’s true of sports stadia, entertainment districts, and the hotel industry. When those signals are ignored, the cost falls not only on taxpayers but also on the communities policymakers aim to help.

Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, this debacle is an example not only of the city doing what it shouldn’t, but also failing to do what it should. Many of the challenges the shopping center endured—theft, prostitution, open drug use, and violence—were the result of the city failing to do something we (should) all agree is a basic function of government: public safety.

Even if one believes subsidized stores could work, nothing can succeed amid the bedlam surrounding this store.

I wrote of this project in 2015: “When [the grocery store] fails, the city and its residents will be no better off than before, just poorer. And the infrastructure, crime, and education issues that really need to be addressed will be that much worse.” This is exactly where we are now.

What the New Federal K-12 Tax Credit Program Could Mean for Missouri

One of the most notable policies in the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB) is the establishment of the first-ever federal K-12 tax credit program, which could strengthen educational choice in Missouri and states across the nation. This new program allows taxpayers to donate to a scholarship-granting organization (SGO) that will distribute funds to families, who in turn can use them for private school tuition, special needs services, textbooks, tutoring, and more.

This is not a new concept for Missourians familiar with our similar state-level program, MOScholars.

How the Program Works

Each taxpayer can direct up to $1,700 of their federal tax liability to an SGO in any state rather than sending it to the IRS. While donor contributions are capped, there is no federal limit on the amount an eligible student may receive, or how many students are funded. SGOs determine funding allocation based on pre-set rules (evenly, tiered by income, etc.).

Participating SGOs must be federally recognized, legitimate nonprofits (not private foundations), and the governor or another state authority must approve the list of eligible SGOs. In Missouri, the State Treasurer’s Office approves organizations for MOScholars, so it may also have this role for the federal program as well.

State Participation

The federal program requires states to opt in to this new program. I expect Missouri will, but we have not declared our intent to participate at this point. The tax credit is slated to become available beginning in 2027.

If Missouri opts out, Missouri SGOs would not be eligible to receive or distribute federal funds. This means no Missouri students could benefit from the program. However, Missouri residents could still claim the federal credit by donating to an SGO in another participating state.

Participating in this program would complement MOScholars and bring even greater choice, flexibility, and opportunity to families around the state.

Let’s Celebrate (and learn from) State Tech, One of the Best Technical Colleges in the Country

State Tech in Linn bills itself as “Missouri’s premier technical college, dedicated to providing hands-on, industry-driven education that prepares students for high-demand careers.” External rankings back up the claim—for example, Wallethub regularly lists State Tech among the best two-year technical colleges in the country.

I was interested, but skeptical. After all, many universities seem to be highly rated somewhere. Is State Tech really that good? In a 2024 article, I worked with two University of Missouri graduate students, Maxx Cook and Michael Reda, to find out. We examined State Tech’s impact on student graduation and earnings.

It quickly became apparent that State Tech students had better outcomes in the data, which is consistent with what they report on their website. However, we weren’t sure whether this was because of State Tech’s superior educational programming, or just because it attracts stronger students in the first place.

We used two strategies to sort this out. First, we used detailed data from the Missouri Department of Higher Education and Workforce Development to compare students who attended State Tech with students who had similar pre-college qualifications but attended other two-year colleges in Missouri. Second, we used econometric tools to isolate a group of students who attended State Tech only because it happened to be near where they lived, rather than for other reasons. We then compared these students to otherwise similar students who happened to live farther away. This strategy helps remove a lot of potential confounding factors that might make State Tech look better than it really is.

Our findings confirm that State Tech is the real deal. It increases associate degree attainment by more than 20 percentage points compared to other two-year colleges in Missouri, and State Tech students graduate faster. It also increases earnings (measured six years after initial enrollment) by over $11,000 annually. Importantly, State Tech students outperform both non-technical and technical students elsewhere in Missouri.

We should celebrate the presence of such an excellent institution in our great state. We should also try to learn from State Tech to replicate its success. If this were any other industry, competitors would be flocking to Linn to figure out the secret sauce. But based on my years of experience studying education, I doubt this is happening. Why not? Because there is no competitive incentive to do so. In business, an exceptional company forces rivals to adapt or close. In public education—K–12 or higher ed—the risk of closure due to poor performance is almost nonexistent.

This means Missouri’s other public two-year colleges have little reason to put in the work required to emulate State Tech. It’s a missed opportunity, but we can still appreciate State Tech’s success and be proud to call it our own.

Crime, Public Safety, and Perception in St. Louis with Braxton Steele

Susan Pendergrass speaks with Braxton Steele, intern at the Show-Me Institute and student at Missouri State University, about his summer research on crime and public safety in St. Louis. They discuss his personal experiences living in the city, how crime in St. Louis compares to other Missouri cities and peer cities across the country, the gap between reported crime data and public perception, and more.

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Timestamps

00:00 Introduction to Public Safety in St. Louis
01:01 Braxton’s Experience Moving to St. Louis
04:06 Crime Statistics and Perceptions
06:08 Comparative Analysis of Crime Rates
08:48 Motor Vehicle Thefts and Clearance Rates
11:10 Unreported Crime and 911 System Issues
13:05 Public Perception vs. Reality of Crime
14:39 Conclusion and Future Directions

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

More Big Beautiful Medicaid Changes

Missouri’s Medicaid enrollment is up by almost 400,000 recipients since 2019, but how many of those newly on the rolls are legally eligible to be there? As of now it’s hard to say, but before too long we’ll likely have a better answer.

Several weeks ago I started my deep dive into the many healthcare reforms included in the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB), specifically focusing on Medicaid. This week, I’ll discuss three of the bill’s provisions that are intended to improve program integrity and reduce waste.

  1. Increasing Redetermination Frequency: Instead of the current practice of checking each recipient’s eligibility once per year after they enroll in Medicaid coverage, the OBBB requires states to start doing so every six months. This provision isn’t solely about cutting costs, though Medicaid’s out of control spending should be reined in. It’s also about making sure that taxpayers are only covering the high cost of healthcare for those that really need it.
  2. Reducing Retroactive Eligibility: In the past, Medicaid would cover medical bills for new recipients up to 90 days prior to their joining the program. The OBBB shortens this window to 30 days in an effort to incentivize those who are truly eligible for the program to maintain their enrollment or enroll while they are healthy. If successful, this provision should improve program integrity and help lower costs by treating recipients earlier, before their ailments become more costly.
  3. Reversing Recent Actions: Toward the end of the Biden administration, several new Medicaid rules and regulations were promulgated that would significantly increase the program’s costs without much evidence of benefiting the health of recipients. The OBBB rolls back many of these rules, specifically one that would drastically raise the cost of nursing home care.

Taken together, the reforms contained in the OBBB represent a forward-thinking evolution of the Medicaid program. By focusing on clearer eligibility requirements, more practical retroactive coverage, and a scale back of burdensome regulations, these changes could strengthen Medicaid, making it more sustainable and better equipped to provide essential healthcare services for those who depend on it.

In my next blog post on the OBBB topic, I’ll dive into some of the healthcare reforms that will impact the entire sector, not just Medicaid.

Municipalities Should Not Be Commercial Landlords (I’m Looking at You, Chesterfield)

Chesterfield, which is poised to be the largest city in St. Louis County, is attempting to get into the commercial real estate business. I mean that literally. The city is planning to purchase a commercial property building and operate it as a landlord. I can’t believe this has to be said, but municipalities have no business being in the commercial property business. I don’t think you have to be a libertarian extremist to believe that. The more extreme position is actually that owning and operating a commercial office building—or any business, really—is, in fact, the proper role of government. (In fairness to the city, they do plan to hire a property manager for the building.)

I attended the city council meeting where the relevant bill was introduced. Supporters of the proposal offered two different reasons why this was a good move for the city. First, supporters said the leases for the businesses in the building would pay the costs of the purchases, so the city would come out ahead. According to the Chesterfield city manager, the current leases “would mean the building would create no annual cost for the city.” This reminds me of the famous story of when former St. Louis Mayor Vince Schoemehl told some veteran members of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen that the new convention center downtown would not cost the city anything, and longtime alderman Red Villa responded with, “Well then, why don’t we build two of them?”

The other reason why supporters like the purchase is because Chesterfield could use some of the building for its own future needs, such as a police substation, civic center, or parks department headquarters (all these examples were given at the meeting). But here is the problem: If you use the building for city offices or needs (which may be the more defensible position), then you don’t have the paying tenants who will cover the price of the purchase for the city. Yes, the building’s parking lot would come in handy for some events at the nearby park, but, as opponents noted, that is just a few events each year.

Then there is the belief by the city that they won’t have to pay property taxes on the building, leading to a higher profit margin for the city (stated by a member of the board and elsewhere). That is a very dubious argument. There is plenty of case law that says if a tax-exempt entity owns property but that property is not used for tax-exempt purposes that property taxes are still owed. (Scroll down here for citations.)

If one believes that buying and operating a commercial office building is the proper role of local government, then I wonder what limits there would possibly be on the role of government? If a municipality can do this, what can’t it do? That’s the scary part.

How Often Should Schools Close?

I’ve been writing a lot lately about the poor performance of Missouri’s schools; for recent examples, see here and here. I don’t enjoy being all doom and gloom, but I worry that many Missourians don’t grasp the scale of the problem. I can give plenty of examples of schools and districts in our state where most students are not testing at grade level, and many are not even testing within a year of grade level.

Yet these schools and districts rarely face meaningful consequences and there is virtually no threat that they will close, which raises an interesting question: How often should schools close? Frequent closures would clearly be disruptive, but too few could also be a problem. In a healthy education ecosystem, schools that consistently underperform should be replaced with better alternatives. That’s what would happen if the public school system operated like a market.

However, public schools rarely close. And when they do, it’s usually due to declining enrollment or budget cuts, not poor performance. As a result, even schools that fail year after year remain open and funded.

All of this points to a perverse indicator of the effectiveness of expanded school choice: more school closures. This may seem counterintuitive, but if charter and private schools close at higher rates than traditional public schools, it suggests they operate in a system where failure has consequences. That’s a good thing. Replacing inferior providers with stronger providers, through competition, helps make markets more efficient.

Given this background, I enjoyed reading this recent study by Doug Harris and Valentina Martinez-Pabon. It puts hard numbers on school closures nationally. The authors estimate that just 0.9 percent of traditional public schools in the United States closed annually between 2014 and 2018. In contrast, closure rates were 2.9 percent for private schools and 5.1 percent for charter schools—roughly three and six times higher, respectively. The higher closure rates are a sign of a healthier market.

It may feel like a foregone conclusion that failing public schools will always persist, but it doesn’t need to be. Infusing more competition into our education system will push all schools to perform better. And for low-performing schools that cannot figure out how to improve, it will force them to close, making way for new, higher-quality providers. These changes would benefit all children, but especially those who are currently trapped in persistently ineffective schools.

 

Understanding the Decline in Student Test Scores with Jim Wyckoff

Susan Pendergrass speaks with Dr. Jim Wyckoff, professor at the University of Virginia and director of the Education Policy Ph.D. program, about the long-term decline in student academic achievement. They discuss how national test scores, especially for the lowest-performing students, began falling well before the pandemic, why the usual explanations like COVID or Common Core miss the bigger picture, and what states can do to reverse the trend, and more.

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Timestamps

00:00 Understanding Declining Academic Achievement
02:47 Historical Context of Academic Performance
05:43 The Impact of Policy Changes
08:31 Exploring Causes of Decline
11:14 Success Stories and Lessons Learned
13:51 The Role of State Legislation
16:49 Future Directions and Solutions

Episode Transcript

(Download)

Susan Pendergrass (00:00)
Thanks so much for joining us on the podcast, Professor Wyckoff of the University of Virginia. So you have a recent paper that really caught my eye. I’m puzzling over declining academic achievement in this country. And it’s something that I’ve been thinking about a lot. And sort of as a companion issue, I work in Missouri and I’ve been talking for a long time that Missouri enrollment’s been declining and folks are like, well, yeah, the pandemic—the pandemic, kids left public schools, but they’ll probably come back. And I’m like, no, no, we had our largest kindergarten class in 2013. Any data forecaster, demographer would see this coming. This is not a pandemic problem. And I think it exacerbated it, but I think this has happened with basic student test scores in this country, where people are like, well, the pandemic caused it, and we’re gonna come back out of this.
You have a paper that’s out recently on the fact that maybe the pandemic didn’t cause it and it predated it. So I’d love it if you could just tell me a little bit about what you found looking back and why, in my opinion, it’s a bigger problem than many folks are thinking it is.

Jim Wyckoff (01:03)
Sure. So I’ve been following sort of NAEP trends, as a lot of people do, because NAEP is an incredibly reliable source of information about academic achievement at certainly the national and the state levels, and to some extent at certain large districts, the TUDA districts. And so I’ve been noticing this trend for several years now where NAEP scores have been declining—predating the pandemic by a number of years. And these declines have gotten large by almost any metric we might use to measure student achievement.
A lot of people saw the very large declines that occurred during the pandemic. And again, there was lots of discussion in both achievement and political terms about what this meant and how we were going to attribute these losses.
Last fall, I started to get more serious about wanting to understand these trends. Quite honestly, it came from a place of having some ideas, but really wanting to figure it out. The title of the article is “puzzling” because I spent a lot of time trying to better understand these trends—how large are they, when did they begin—and asking questions to help make sense of what’s going on.
One of the more surprising conclusions was that the losses that had been occurring prior to the pandemic were about half as large as the total loss that occurred by 2024. And that surprised me a little.

Susan Pendergrass (02:55)
Yeah, so we were on a bit of an upward trajectory during the era that a lot of people didn’t like, but No Child Left Behind caused a lot of anguish. I remember my oldest was in third grade the first year of No Child Left Behind testing in Virginia—SOLs—and it caused a lot of problems. But it did have results, right? No Child Left Behind, this high-accountability, high-stakes testing that people don’t like, actually improved test scores, right?

Jim Wyckoff (03:28)
Yeah, I think there are, as you suggested, large increases in NAEP scores from the early 1990s to around 2009. These increases were large by almost anyone’s standards—over 50 percent of a standard deviation, which translates to nearly two years of learning. So these were consistent, large increases.
Around 2009, the scores leveled off and then began to decline. During that 1990 to 2009 period, a number of policies played a role. NCLB began in 2002 and ran its course until around 2013 before ESSA replaced it in 2015. The best evidence we have suggests that math scores improved as a result of NCLB. Not by as much as the broader achievement gains, but still meaningful increases.

Susan Pendergrass (04:50)
Yeah. And I think it should be pointed out that in the ’90s, governors all met—actually at the University of Virginia—and there was a broader push around academic achievement. For our listeners, Missouri tracks exactly with the national results. We peaked in 2009 and have been steadily declining ever since.
Last year in Missouri and nationally, four out of ten fourth graders were essentially not literate. They didn’t reach the “basic” level in reading. We don’t know where they are between zero and basic, but they didn’t register on the scale—they’re essentially illiterate. And that, to me, is a crisis. I don’t hear it being talked about like a crisis the way it was in the ’90s after a number of major government studies. But that’s where we are. We’re back to square one, essentially—long-term NAEP trends put us back to the 1970s.

Jim Wyckoff (05:51)
Yeah, certainly for the lowest-performing kids, the decline has wiped out gains made since 1990. As you’re suggesting, these results have important implications.
Since NCLB and other developments in the 2000s, I think there’s been less emphasis on academic achievement. Other issues have come forward. People have denigrated test scores to the point where we’ve missed opportunities to understand what’s going on.
And NAEP is a low-stakes, low-accountability test—nothing really rides on it. That’s why we believe it’s a strong signal of what kids are actually learning. And what they’re learning has declined significantly, as you’re pointing out.

Susan Pendergrass (06:52)
Let’s talk about your speculation as to what’s causing this. I’ve heard a lot about smartphones in classrooms, and states are starting to get active on that. You suggest it might be part of the problem. How so?

Jim Wyckoff (07:07)
Yeah, not just me—others have made this connection. Smartphones and social media really took off around 2009. Their use became much more widespread between 2009 and 2020. If you look at the data, smartphone and social media saturation grew rapidly in that period.
There’s evidence suggesting kids have become less engaged in school. That’s led to regulations about phone use in classrooms. But the problem extends beyond school—kids are less engaged with schoolwork outside the classroom too.
It’s hard to definitively link smartphone use to declining achievement, but there’s reason to believe it’s a contributing factor. Still, I don’t think any one issue—phones, NCLB, whatever—can account for the full decline. It’s likely a combination of multiple factors that vary by place and time.
And I think we’re not good at nuance in education. But we need a comprehensive, systematic approach to address this. There’s no single fix.

Susan Pendergrass (09:08)
We have some states—people are calling them “Southern miracles”—like Mississippi and Louisiana, that are doing much better in reading. But it’s not nationwide. We have broad declines, and then these little pockets of success. What does that mean going forward?

Jim Wyckoff (09:27)
I’m not sure we’ll ever come up with a good causal understanding of what caused these declines nationally. But I do think places like Mississippi give us reason for optimism.
In 2013, Mississippi got serious about the science of reading and implemented it rigorously, with supports to help teachers. If you look at their data, they improved reading scores during a period when national scores were declining. In math, they at least held steady.
Now, their scores haven’t continued rising as they did before 2009, but they’ve fared better than most. So while the science of reading isn’t a silver bullet, it’s part of the solution.
States have a real opportunity here. That includes focusing on accountability, proven policies like science of reading, and funding.
Many states cut education funding after the 2008 recession and didn’t return to pre-recession levels, inflation-adjusted, until recently. Teacher salaries fell and in some places still haven’t recovered.
Teacher quality, especially in low-performing schools, matters a lot. And demographics play a role too—we don’t measure poverty depth well, and English language learners are increasing in number.
We need state- and district-level analysis to understand what’s going on and invest in the things that work.

Susan Pendergrass (13:22)
My biggest concern is the fourth-grade scores. These kids are probably in sixth grade now, and one day they’ll go to high school unable to read their textbooks.
We’re creating an underclass that’s not going to catch up. While overall test scores are down, the steepest declines are among the lowest 10 percent of performers. I don’t know how we catch those kids up.
We’re seeing a smaller student population and a higher percentage of students who can’t read or do math. What kind of workforce will we have in ten years?
We’re dabbling in the science of reading, but accountability has dropped. Do you think Common Core contributed to this decline—or at least gave accountability a bad name?

Jim Wyckoff (14:35)
Yeah. Common Core got incredibly politicized—as a sort of top-down mandate—when in fact it came from organizations like the National Governors Association that were pushing for rigorous curriculum.
The underlying concept was good. Many states still use Common Core-style standards, even if they don’t call it that anymore.

Susan Pendergrass (15:05)
Missouri is one.

Jim Wyckoff (15:05)
Exactly. And the evidence linking Common Core to achievement declines is very thin. I don’t think it played a significant role. But like you said, these issues often get politicized and take on a life of their own.

Susan Pendergrass (15:32)
Your paper has great graphs showing projections of where we should be if we stayed on the pre-2009 trajectory. Have you done projections from 2009 forward? Because it doesn’t look good to me.

Jim Wyckoff (15:53)
If we continue the trajectory we’ve been on since 2009—or 2013—about half the decline we saw between 2019 and 2024 could’ve been predicted even without the pandemic.
So the pandemic worsened the problem, but it didn’t cause it. I see no reason to believe the decline would’ve stopped.
Unless we make serious changes, the downward trend is likely to continue. Especially for the lowest-performing group, there’s little evidence of any turnaround.
Among students at the median or higher levels, there is some evidence of recovery in math. But reading remains a problem across the board.

Susan Pendergrass (17:17)
So what should we do? I work at the state level a lot—what should state legislatures or education agencies do?

Jim Wyckoff (17:35)
This is a real opportunity for state leaders—governors and legislatures—to act.
We’re on the cusp of seeing real consequences in the workforce and higher ed outcomes. Governors could champion this issue. Academic achievement isn’t the only thing we care about in schools, but it’s a top priority.
We need to move past the cultural wars of the last decade. Most parents still care deeply about academic outcomes.
For kids from low-income families, education is their path to a better life—and we’re not serving them well right now.
This should be a bipartisan issue. Conservatives and progressives should be able to rally around this.
I know there are institutional barriers and some bureaucracies may not want the changes required, but I hope we see leadership from some states. And when we see success, others can follow.

Susan Pendergrass (19:52)
Yeah, and I really appreciate your scholarly approach to something I’ve been speculating about. This goes way back before the pandemic.
If we blame it on COVID, we’ll keep talking about “pandemic learning loss” when the issue runs much deeper.
We need to acknowledge the path we’ve been on and chart a better course. Where can people find your article or get in touch with you?

Jim Wyckoff (20:23)
The article is forthcoming in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. My email is [email protected].
I appreciate your interest in this topic and would love to see more people dig into it. What I’ve done is just the beginning.

Susan Pendergrass (20:48)
I couldn’t agree more. We’ve got to keep puzzling through these issues. Jim, thank you so much. Take care.

Jim Wyckoff (20:57)
Okay, thank you, Susan.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

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