Data center headlines have been filling newspapers each and every week. Among the myriad proposed developments across the state, one project in Ferguson stood out.

Ferguson officials recently rejected a tax subsidy proposal that would have granted substantial incentives for a data center project at the former Emerson campus. Specifically, the package included up to 15 years of tax abatements on real estate, personal property, and sales taxes.

Rejecting this tax subsidy for the development was the right decision. I want to stress that the Ferguson City Council did not reject the data center; it rejected the requested tax subsidy only.

For years, Show-Me Institute writers have been noting the problems with economic development subsidies. Governments should not be picking winners and losers, and data centers are no different.

However, many ignore these arguments and think that using incentives to attract a project could bring substantial jobs, invite tourism, and boost public morale. While maybe (strong emphasis on maybe) some could argue this about other projects, these arguments don’t apply to data centers.

The Emerson Campus formerly employed more than a thousand workers manufacturing automation products and providing engineering services. Modern data centers simply do not require that scale of employment.

At the same time, the concerns over electricity, water, and sound from data centers are well-known.

However, despite this, data centers can still provide a major benefit: significant tax revenue. They can provide so much revenue that local residents could see property tax cuts.

That is precisely why offering large tax abatements for these projects is especially misguided. Along with the cyber and electronic services we all use, tax revenue is the core benefit a data center can bring to a community. If local governments dramatically reduce those revenues through incentives, they are asking residents to absorb a lot of costs with little benefit.

A data center project at the Emerson campus could still be successful and economically beneficial without requiring massive local tax incentives. But too often, Missouri communities negotiate as though they have little to offer unless subsidies are attached.

They should think bigger than that. I wrote a recent op-ed on this very topic.

As debates around data centers continue across Missouri, policymakers should carefully weigh both the benefits and drawbacks these projects bring. Local governments should not rush to give away the primary benefit data centers can provide: tax revenue. Ferguson made the right decision.

The post Ferguson Denies Incentives for Data Center Project appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

I’ve argued for years that Kansas City’s lavish subsidies distort the market while failing to deliver on economic promises. New reporting from the Kansas City Business Journal suggests the process itself may be just as broken.

Reporter Thomas Friestad reconstructed negotiations among Kansas City Public Schools (KCPS), PortKC, and Gillon Property Group over incentives tied to Country Club Plaza. The emails, obtained through an open-records request, depict a rushed and opaque decision-making process worthy of public distrust.

The original proposal reportedly included roughly $309 million in incentives over 30 years. KCPS officials objected not only to the size of the package, but also to shifting valuation methods that obscured the true public cost. The district also sought protection for voter-approved bond revenues and more time to evaluate major revisions before approval by PortKC.

That timeline is the real story.

The emails show negotiations continuing until the night before a scheduled PortKC meeting. KCPS officials argued they were being asked to evaluate a substantially revised proposal in just two business days. One consultant for the district described the timeline as “concerning even with the highest level of independent analysis.”

This is a recurring problem in Kansas City’s incentive culture. Complex tax arrangements are negotiated behind closed doors and then presented to affected taxing jurisdictions with little time for meaningful scrutiny. The result is confusion over the true public cost and distrust among taxpayers expected to finance these deals.

Kansas City has seen this pattern before. Similar concerns surrounded the Power & Light District and continue to emerge in discussions over a proposed downtown ballpark. Political machinations routinely take precedence over transparency and accountability.

Notably, KCPS did not oppose subsidies outright. District officials simply asked for clear terms, accurate projections, and adequate time to evaluate a deal that could affect school finances for decades. The fact that negotiators appeared unwilling to provide sufficient time to evaluate the deal speaks volumes.

Kansas Citians have grown understandably skeptical of these taxpayer-funded deals. Too many projects promised economic transformation and delivered little beyond long-term public cost. The Country Club Plaza negotiations are, at best, an example of rushed incompetence. At worst, they suggest an effort to push a massive subsidy package through before taxpayers and public schools could fully evaluate it.

The post Country Club Plaza Subsidy Deal Reveals What’s Broken in Kansas City appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Avery Frank, Elias Tsapelas, and David Stokes join Zach Lawhorn to break down the final week of the 2026 Missouri legislative session. They discuss the constitutional amendment heading to voters that would begin the process of eliminating Missouri’s state income tax, where property tax reform efforts stand heading into the final days, the early literacy bill’s uncertain path through the Senate, the legislature’s approach to A through F school report cards, what the state budget does and does not get right, the Ferguson city council’s rejection of a major data center tax subsidy, and more.

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Episode Transcript

Zach Lawhorn (00:00): Welcome to the Show-Me Institute podcast. I’m Zach Lawhorn from Show-Me Opportunity. Today I’m joined by Avery Frank, Elias Tsapelas, and David Stokes from the Show-Me Institute. It is the last week of the 2026 Missouri legislative session. Today we’re going to go through what has crossed the finish line, mostly what has not crossed the finish line, and see what these guys think about the possibility of that happening here in the home stretch. Elias, we’ll begin with something that has crossed the finish line, and that is the start of a discussion about phasing out Missouri’s state income tax. Legislation did pass. It goes to the governor, and he gets to decide when it goes on the ballot. So what do we know right now, what passed, and what are Missouri voters going to be asked sometime in the fall?

Elias Tsapelas (00:50): By May 22nd, the governor needs to decide whether this constitutional amendment will go on the August or November ballot. What it says, essentially, is to Missouri voters: do you want to start the process of getting rid of Missouri’s income tax? It comes with three main components. The first piece is the legislature will be required to enact legislation that would get rid of the state’s income tax based on revenue growth. Once that income tax is gone, it cannot be reinstituted. Previous versions of this bill had some details lined out about how the income tax rate would be cut based on revenue growth, but in later versions this was stripped back to just the legislature will decide this later. The other two pieces say you will also be authorizing the legislature to expand the state sales tax base, meaning the things the state sales tax applies to. This could also involve changing the rate, because right now Missouri’s constitution does not allow the state legislature to expand the sales tax to anything that was not taxed in 2015. But this does come with a guardrail: if the legislature does change the state sales tax, it has to be done in a revenue neutral fashion. So expanding the sales tax base or raising the rate to bring in additional tax revenues has to go towards lowering the state income tax. That gives the legislature the authority to change how much revenue comes in, which would speed up the process for getting rid of the income tax. The last piece is a component for local governments. If the state changes the number of things that the sales tax applies to, this would also increase revenues to local governments. Those additional revenues would have to go towards a list of other taxes that would be lowered. In places like St. Louis and Kansas City, that would go towards lowering the earnings tax. For other local governments, they get to choose whether it goes towards lowering the sales tax, property tax, personal property taxes, or real property taxes. The key piece being revenue neutral. This is not going to be a windfall for anyone. It is basically the start of a discussion, because they don’t say what the rate might need to go to, what the sales tax could be expanded to, or what revenues would trigger income tax elimination or cuts. This is just the start of the discussion, giving the legislature the authority to keep moving in the direction we started around 2014.

Zach Lawhorn (03:57): Taking those a piece at a time: the first one, if it passes and the income tax is eliminated at some point, it cannot come back. That seems pretty straightforward. The next two seem like responses to opposition that we hear on a regular basis. The first being the revenue triggers, which seem designed to prevent what we often hear about with Kansas, where they cut the income tax without cutting spending, leading to revenue shortfalls. And the expansion of the sales tax base seems like protection against having to raise the sales tax rate on goods. Do I have that right?

Elias Tsapelas (04:40): Yes. The revenue trigger piece is basically what Missouri has been doing for a while, waiting to see how much revenue we have before lowering the income tax by that amount. We’ve been doing that for over a decade now and have lowered the top individual income tax rate from 6% to 4.7%. We’re just continuing down that path to be sure we don’t create some enormous budget hole. Now, when you look at the sales tax, Missouri has a very complicated, out-of-date sales tax system. The state sales tax rate is 4.225%, but when you go to the store you’re paying something significantly higher, largely due to local governments and a lot of special taxing districts. Missouri also has a lot of sales tax exemptions. Missouri really needs a full look at its entire sales tax system. But economically, when thinking about switching a state from being primarily funded by income taxes to something closer to sales taxes, the best way to fund a state is to tax as broad a base as possible so you can have the lowest rate possible. You want to be taxing final consumption, not business inputs. As we start the idea of transferring to more of a consumption tax in Missouri, the goal is to make sure it doesn’t become a tax increase for some people while things change elsewhere. It’s trying to keep it level the whole way, and at least right now it seems like a pretty neutral proposal going forward.

Zach Lawhorn (06:24): David, for people who don’t think about taxes as a corresponding tax system, can you explain the idea of local governments rolling back certain taxes and how people might experience that on their property tax bills or personal property tax bills?

David Stokes (06:44): It’s trickier than you might think, but it’s vital that it be done right. If you expand the sales tax base at the state level, as Elias discussed, you don’t want local governments to start collecting significantly more sales tax revenue for no reason. At the state level we’ll do something good with that and phase out the income tax, but at the local government level we don’t want just more revenue with nothing to spend it on. You need tax relief for citizens, which is why they’re going to require rollbacks. They’ve given local governments some options in how you roll that rate back, which is a good thing, but they need to give them a few more options. For example, they said you could roll back property taxes, real property taxes, personal property taxes, or sales taxes. A few things that need to be considered: many municipalities don’t have a property tax, so they won’t be able to roll back the property tax. And it’s trickier to roll back sales taxes than you might think. Unlike property taxes and income taxes, which can be reduced in small increments, sales taxes have to be done in set increments. You can’t go from a 1% sales tax to a 0.92% sales tax. It’s just not allowed and would be incredibly difficult for retailers to implement. So local governments need even more flexibility in how they roll back taxes. I would say the utility tax, which just about every county imposes, is a great option to add to the choice mix for rollbacks. These are the sales taxes that can be placed on utilities, which unlike other sales taxes can be rolled back in small increments. That’s a very good option. The biggest challenge of all, though, is the special taxing districts that Elias mentioned earlier, such as transportation development districts and community improvement districts. These usually only have sales taxes and nothing else. You have to address what they do if their sales tax collections go up 30% and they have no legal way to roll it back by that same amount. So we need to adjust that. I would also hope that part of this whole deal would be a substantial cap on how these special taxing districts like TDDs and CIDs operate in the first place, to really restrict their continued expansion in Missouri, which has been very harmful. Those are just a few ideas out of many in how local governments are going to have to address this.

Zach Lawhorn (09:59): Finally, Elias, as you said, it’ll be on the ballot sometime in the fall. But between now and either August or November, people interested in this topic are going to see a lot of data, modeling, estimates, and projections. We want to be honest about what we can know and what we cannot know. With the legislation that has passed now, what should people keep in mind when they see some of these estimates or models or projections this summer?

Elias Tsapelas (10:39): The first thing is, if you see anything claiming this is going to generate a tremendous budget shortfall or major harm to local governments, this thing is set up to be revenue neutral. This is not something that is going to create enormous holes. Most of the time, estimates that reach that conclusion assume this would work in an entirely different way than what is allowed. So that is something you don’t necessarily need to worry about. What people are more reasonably worried about is: if you empower the legislature to expand or raise the sales tax, how is that going to impact everyone? Missouri’s state and local combined sales tax rates are relatively high already. The state’s portion is pretty low, but combined it’s relatively high. So what the state decides to do in terms of how much it expands the sales tax base, whether that involves more services versus goods, will impact different people differently, in different parts of the state and at different income levels. Anything right now that says this is definitely going to be bad for X person, we just can’t know that, because there’s not enough information out there. Everyone should keep an open mind and also recognize that the reason for this amendment and this proposal is that Missouri’s economy is falling behind. We are falling behind our neighbors in terms of tax competitiveness, and the only way to change that is to improve Missouri’s tax standing. Our sales tax system is incredibly broken, so this is something that is going to need to be fixed. At least right now we are at the point of asking: do we want to go down this path? Let’s hope the legislature does a good job. We’ll be shining a light on whatever they do, but we can’t know some of the things that people are warning about right now.

Zach Lawhorn (12:50): David, after the legislature got the income tax bills out the door, they shifted to talking about property taxes, which is something we hear a lot about. People want property tax reform. With only a few days left in the session, where do those efforts stand and what are your thoughts?

David Stokes (13:11): Unlike a lot of the property tax changes of the past few years, I actually like the property tax changes being proposed this year. At least one property tax bill is in conference committee being debated between the House and Senate right now. Another major bill has passed out of the Senate but hasn’t made it through the House yet. I’m told there are going to have to be some compromises on both sides to get a bill across the finish line, and there’s nothing wrong with that. The biggest change this year, which seems very much in the weeds but is significant, would take the way property taxes are imposed in St. Louis County and apply it to the rest of the state. St. Louis County has different tax rates for all the different types of property: residential, agricultural, commercial, and personal property, which includes your car, boat, farm equipment, livestock, and the like. Those rates adjust differently as assessments go up and down each year. This approach was originally intended to be extended to the rest of the state about 20 years ago when they did it in St. Louis County, but the following year they came back and said the rest of the state didn’t have to do it. It’s a good idea. It might sound strange to some people, but a good example of why it would be beneficial came from stories in the St. Louis Business Journal about the real decline in commercial property values in the city of St. Louis over the past year. Because they set one tax rate measured under one unified property value, residential homeowners in St. Louis end up making up with their taxes for the decline in commercial property. In St. Louis County, with the siloed tax rates, if commercial property goes down, the commercial property tax rate will go up to offset that instead of passing it on to homeowners. In rural Missouri, which has so much agricultural property, this would allow agricultural property tax rates to increase to fund goods in rural areas without as dramatically impacting commercial and residential property. I think this is a good idea and I hope it passes. There are also some good amendments that would put taxpayer protections in place to avoid the temptation of local officials to target commercial property with these new different tax rates. It’s in the weeds, but I think these are good changes this year.

Zach Lawhorn (16:24): That sounds like the other side of the coin from what’s happened in Jackson County, where over the last few years people have been very upset that their assessments have gone up by more than 20% and residential homeowners have seen gigantic leaps in their property taxes. Is this kind of like having to turn one knob one way and another knob the other way?

David Stokes (16:55): Sort of. The tricky part is that the situation in Jackson County for the past 10 years has been so bad, it’s hard to compare it to other counties. It’s been uniquely horrible for the people of Jackson County. But it does start with one basic truth: 15 to 20 years ago, Jackson County was under-assessed. The assessor was ordered to increase the valuations because they were improperly low, and probably artificially and intentionally low. The right approach would have been to raise those assessed valuations to more accurate totals while lowering the rates at the same time to avoid crushing people with higher taxes. But Jackson County’s taxing entities have not really done that, starting with the Kansas City 33 school district, a very large school district in Kansas City, which is the only taxing body in Missouri exempt from rolling back rates as values increase. So you’ve seen these giant increases within that school district and they don’t even have to roll back rates. They just get to keep their same rates, as they have frequently over the past 10 years. So people are getting walloped. And then you throw in the fact that the Kansas City Assessor’s Office has done a terrible job managing the process year after year, not hitting deadlines for notifying people about changes and not properly running the appeals process. It’s just been a terrible system in Jackson County, and almost uniquely so.

Zach Lawhorn (18:30): All right. Before we have Elias read the budget line by line, Avery, I want to get an update on the education items here in the last week of the session. Early literacy, the reading bill, we’ve been talking about it all session long. How’s it looking?

Avery Frank (18:47): When it first passed out of the House before spring break, 131 to 10, I was genuinely excited. It wasn’t necessarily that it passed so early; it was that it passed with such little resistance and such bipartisan support on both sides of the aisle. Teaching our students how to read, giving every student the best chance to become a confident, capable reader, that seems like common sense and a goal that everyone wants to work toward to help our state improve and perhaps become the next Mississippi. It looked that way before spring break, but the Senate version of the early literacy bill got filibustered and set aside. The House bill has made it through the process and is on the informal calendar for third reading, so it could be taken up at any time. If it does pass the Senate, I anticipate it would easily pass the House again. But that is the problem with a lot of education legislation: can it pass the Senate? There have been different concerns about the early literacy bills. Some people are concerned that the MAP test, or the Missouri Assessment Program, which we use to test all of our students, is not a good measure and we shouldn’t be basing anything on it. Some are concerned with third-grade retention and whether it actually helps, looking at states like Mississippi and noting that while fourth-grade scores are great, eighth-grade scores have only improved a little. Those are the main pushbacks we’re seeing. I would still say this is something we really need to do. The early literacy bill is built on two different pillars. The first is a mandatory third-grade retention policy. Missouri already tests all K through third-grade students with a reading screener to see how they’re doing with reading. What this bill would do is set a passing score for those screeners. If students don’t meet that score, they would be retained in third grade, because reading is such a foundational skill. If you don’t know how to read, that’s something worth holding back for, to make sure students get it down before moving on for the rest of their educational career. Students would still have the opportunity to retake the screener, and there would be good-cause exemptions for students with disabilities, for students who have been held back previously, and for English language learners. The second main pillar is reforming our teacher preparation programs. In 2023, the National Council on Teacher Quality conducted a survey of all of our universities and teacher preparation programs and found that half of them received an F in teaching the science of reading, which is the best evidence-based way to teach students to read. The early literacy bill would align our teacher prep programs with those best practices. If they don’t do it, they can’t certify teachers. You can see how there could be pushback and reason why people would filibuster or not want it to come to the floor. That’s where it stands right now. I’m hoping people set aside their objections and recognize that this is a great first step to get Missouri back on track. Our reading scores have been really poor, especially after the pandemic. They continue to decrease and have not bounced back at all. They’re lower now than they were the first year after the pandemic, and we have to turn things around. These early literacy bills, I hope people see the common sense in them.

Zach Lawhorn (22:30): It’s not even the perfect being the enemy of the good. It’s just people being afraid to push back against the status quo. Missouri has fallen back in reading test scores, and other states, most notably Mississippi, have found ways to improve. I don’t think it’s helpful to frame this as some kind of radical moonshot. In the final days of the session, the urgency cannot be overstated. The other thing we’ve talked about a lot this session is A through F report cards, a transparency measure. Governor Kehoe issued an executive order before the session started. What’s the status of the legislature trying to adhere to the governor’s executive order?

Avery Frank (23:19): The legislature has tried to legislate its own way into how the executive order gets implemented, because DESE, the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, could implement it in their own way. The legislature wants to determine how things are going to be scored instead of letting DESE make that decision. There’s been a lot of back and forth, and a lot of different interested parties. Not to get too in the weeds, but some districts really want academic achievement, their base score on the Missouri Assessment Program, to be weighed the most heavily because that would give them the highest score. Some want growth to be weighed the most heavily for the same reason. Some want basically no grades and a lot more qualitative information. There are a lot of different factors. The best vehicle for A through F report cards right now looks like Senate Bill 1351, which continues the long legacy of education omnibus bills used in recent years in Missouri. It combines the report card, limits on screen time for young students, and a couple of other things. I’m not sure if that’s going to make it past, to be honest. People are still concerned about whether the Missouri Assessment Program is something they want to base all of this on. Personally, I think the executive order is better than the legislation as it currently stands. They got rid of one aspect I liked as a researcher: in Governor Kehoe’s executive order, there was a penalty if districts didn’t report their data properly. In the current legislation, Senate Bill 1351, if districts don’t report sufficient data, it’s just written as an aside, basically saying they have to note on their report card that there is not sufficient data, and then they’re not included in the ranking as much. I don’t like that. It gives districts, especially poorly performing ones, an incentive not to report their data so they can have this qualifier on all of their report cards. I also don’t like it because, from all the education research I’ve been doing, we really do have a data reporting problem and we need to be a lot better about transparency. I hope we get some good report cards, because right now at the Show-Me Institute we do our best with the data we have, but we have to work with unsuppressed data, meaning we don’t have data that could potentially identify certain students. So there are some districts we have no data on because they’re so small. But DESE and the state have the best data possible. They could make a really good report card even better than we could, because they have better data than we do. That’s why I’m really hoping we get a good report card, because it would be very helpful for all the parents, legislators, and researchers across the state to see which districts are doing well and learn from them, and which ones are doing poorly and need more support.

Zach Lawhorn (26:42): Let’s talk about the budget. Elias, the legislature passed the budget a little early this year. They beat the deadline by a couple of days, right?

Elias Tsapelas (26:53): They finished early, which is a little bit different than the last few years.

Zach Lawhorn (26:56): Are we spending more or less money than last year?

Elias Tsapelas (27:01): Spending less, but I’m not throwing them a party. There’s just a lot less federal money going around. There was a lot of COVID money in recent years, and Missouri hasn’t spent all of it. The current budget this year is about $54 billion. What the legislature passed is a little bit less than $50 billion, depending on whether you count different construction items. But there was a lot of federal money in that total. At the end of the day, what we’re looking at is a budget that is still going to spend more general revenue, where our income and sales tax dollars go. It’s still going to spend more than we expect to bring in. So we’re still going to exhaust all of our surplus that we built up over those years. There were some positive things that happened this year, but ultimately part of how they got the budget done early was by spending just a little bit more, so they left some of the good on the table.

Zach Lawhorn (28:20): So we’re spending the surplus, as you’ve been warning about for several years, the federal money is drying up, and to circle back to the opening segment, I think part of the trust the legislature is going to have to build this summer is demonstrating we’re getting spending under control. You said you’re not throwing them a party. But is this reduction, whatever the reason, directionally good enough for the legislature to say they’re working on the spending side of things, or is it just not good enough?

Elias Tsapelas (29:00): I think I’ll know a lot more going into next year, because there were a lot better discussions this year, especially looking at spending incentives. As was mentioned, DESE is going to have a new funding formula, or at least the governor has a task force working on one. The way education is funded for K through 12 is going to change. There was also a big fight this year about how to fund higher education. What seemed to me like a common sense idea, essentially having the legislature fund colleges based on how many students are enrolled, turned out to be considered too radical and was pushed off for the future. But there’s talk of coming back with a performance funding measure going forward. There’s also some movement on changing how the state does its IT work. There are a lot of IT changes coming, including things affecting Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. Missouri has a very bad track record with IT. Part of this budget moves some IT resources over to the Department of Social Services to support getting things going there, because most IT for the state of Missouri is currently consolidated in the Office of Administration. While that can seem efficient because every state department doesn’t need its own IT department, it also makes it a lot harder to hold people accountable. There has been a big issue recently with the state’s accounting software, where a contract is millions of dollars behind schedule and not working. The budget tries to get at that too, and it raises this major incentive question: are the people in charge of implementing new IT going to do their best at something that will ultimately try to eliminate their job? I think the legislature is finally starting to deal with that. Ultimately, if we go down the path of a more efficient government and a better tax system, that may mean fewer state employees, and that is something that hasn’t come up much but I think the legislature is finally starting to look at. Pushing toward better funding models, a better state workforce, all those type of things, is moving in the right direction as opposed to how it has been, where the budget just grows larger every year. They’re looking in the right direction. I would have liked to see more, but I think we’ll know a lot more in the next year, especially because the federal COVID funding will essentially be gone.

Zach Lawhorn (32:12): Our final topic, partly so we can put it in the title of the episode for clicks, but also because it seems like every week there’s a story from across the country or across the state about data centers and communities pushing back for a lot of reasons. The most recent one was Ferguson in the St. Louis area. David, can you catch us up on what was on the table for this data center in Ferguson and what happened?

David Stokes (32:40): The vote that the Ferguson city council took last week was strictly on a tax subsidy, I believe about $1.8 billion in tax abatements and various subsidies for the project. It was not a vote on approving the data center itself. This was a commercially zoned area, so it didn’t need any permission to put a data center there, and that’s a good thing. But the city nonetheless rejected the tax subsidy, which I thought was the right call. These data centers are very profitable and important, and I’m certainly not anti-data center. But the demand that they get enormous subsidies everywhere they seem to be going is improper. Festus was right to approve the data center operation there, but I think very much wrong to approve the enormous tax subsidy the city granted, which I believe was about a half a billion dollars. Avery can correct me if I’m wrong on that exact number. I like what Ferguson did, and I hope the data center moves into the old Emerson complex there nonetheless. We need data centers. Data centers produce so much tax revenue that they can generate their own tax cuts, and I don’t mean a special subsidy for the data center itself. I mean they go into a city or a small area, generate so much revenue, and you can cut taxes for everybody in that community, including the data center itself. I think that’s the road to follow, and hopefully that’s what we’ll have in Missouri. I also think we need to change the way data centers are taxed in an upcoming legislative session, taxing them a little more like utilities to reduce the incentive for one city or county to hand out a big subsidy and instead spread those tax benefits around a little more.

Zach Lawhorn (34:46): Avery, are you heartened by this rejection? Because as David said, we need the data centers, but we really want to avoid this new layer of corporate welfare that could pop up everywhere. So how do you feel about it?

Avery Frank (35:00): I’m actually very excited by the rejection in Ferguson. I’ve talked to a lot of people on both sides of the data center debate, those who have gone to the meetings and stayed up until 3 a.m. and protested, and those who want them. When I look at this Ferguson project specifically, the numbers David was talking about involved granting up to 15 years of tax abatements on real estate, personal property, and sales tax for a data center project. When I see something like that, it gets at what David was talking about. The only true significant benefit of a data center is the tax revenue it could bring. It doesn’t bring a lot of jobs. It takes a lot of electricity and a lot of water. It generates noise. It already makes a lot of people upset, and there are concerns about housing values and everything else. So if you’re not getting any tax revenue, there really is no strong incentive to have a data center project. That Emerson complex in Ferguson had thousands of employees. A data center does not take very many employees at all. So when you have people coming up and saying this data center project won’t succeed unless we get all these tax subsidies, I say that’s fine and I hope you don’t build a data center there, because the tax revenue is really the only benefit you’re getting from it. One of the bigger things is just something about Missouri in general. I’m from Tennessee and there are a lot of concerns there about having too much growth. Missouri sometimes feels like the opposite of Tennessee. We’re so desperate for growth that we’re willing to hand out a bunch of money. We don’t have enough pride. This Emerson complex is a good building and a good place. Ferguson has a STEM high school that produces very high test scores and graduates people who can work in the tech industry or an engineering industry. We shouldn’t waste a good building and a good workforce on a project that’s going to get all these tax subsidies and not bring a lot of jobs. The same thing happened over in Independence, where they gave out billions in subsidies for a data center project. Whenever I see that, I think we have to have a little bit of pride in Missouri. We can’t just be giving out all this money to get anyone to come. We have a good parcel of land, a good workforce, a lot of water, and a central location in the country. We can attract good projects, data centers or not, without giving out a bunch of subsidies. We need to understand what the benefits and costs of a data center are and what data center developers are actually looking for. They have a lot of money already. If you give them a good workforce, a place to build, and community support, I think they’ll come, even without a bunch of money.

Elias Tsapelas (38:28): I was really hoping this was the discussion we were going to have this year in Missouri’s legislature, because it started off so well with the discussion of how to get rid of the income tax and everything that goes with that. Talking about the income tax is really about how you make your state more desirable and how you grow faster. But Missouri for so long has just said: we want this industry or this type of business, so let’s give it an economic development tax credit. Let’s give out a billion dollars worth of those. Let’s give out sales tax exemptions. As far as I know, data centers in Missouri already get state and local sales tax exemptions. We just give those out. If we’re really going to start thinking about how to make the state the most desirable place, how to grow the fastest and be the most desirable for families and businesses, that’s really more about making the tax climate the best for everyone, not constantly picking winners and losers. Unfortunately, the budget didn’t see as many cuts as I had hoped. As we go into the last few days of the legislature, there are plenty of tax credit bills waiting to pass. The film tax credit is back and there’s talk of extending the sunset on it. There are other tax credits. We’re still going down that path. There are still more sales tax exemptions being considered. Missouri just needs to decide what direction we want to go, because ultimately if we do get rid of the income tax, a lot of these economic development incentives don’t even really work anymore. You have to look at different things. You have to look at what is really the criteria for families and businesses. States across the country are dealing with these issues, changing their economic conditions, their tax policy, and people are moving there. We know people are leaving Missouri. We know income is leaving Missouri. We need to change things. The status quo is not going to work going forward, and I was hoping that would have sunk in a little bit more this year than it did.

Zach Lawhorn (40:37): We will leave it there this week. We’ll talk to everyone again after the session ends over the next few days and see how everything turned out. As always, plenty more at showmeinstitute.org. David, Avery, and Elias, thank you very much.

The post Missouri’s 2026 Legislative Session Final Week appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Susan Pendergrass speaks with Aaron Renn, author and consultant, and David Stokes, Director of Municipal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, about the recurring debate over whether the city of St. Louis should rejoin St. Louis County. They explore what city county mergers have actually accomplished in places like Indianapolis, Louisville, Nashville, and Lexington, why a full merger in St. Louis would be extraordinarily difficult to pull off, and whether the benefits would even outweigh the costs. They also discuss St. Louis’s demographic challenges, what the Pittsburgh model might offer as a path forward, the cultural barriers that make it hard to attract and retain people from outside the region, and more.

You can find Aaron’s work here.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:05): Welcome back, Aaron Renn, to the podcast. So happy to have you and David Stokes, our own expert on cities and counties and all things municipal. I appreciate you coming on, Aaron. There have been murmurings around St. Louis again on a topic that we have revisited for probably a hundred years: should the city of St. Louis be a separate county from St. Louis County?

Before we get to that, I want to ask you something because I was reading the news this morning, and I know that you’ve written about city county mergers before, like cities that are kind of dying and then either pulling in parts of their closest suburbs to sort of make everything look better, broaden their tax base, make their crime numbers look better. I was reading something you wrote a year or two ago about that, and you said that Louisville is a failed example of that. Is that right, basically?

Aaron Renn (01:01): Yeah, I’m a little skeptical of how these things have worked out in practice.

Susan Pendergrass (01:05): Yeah, in terms of losing the flavor and the coolness of the city. Literally this morning I saw an article about how Louisville is having a renaissance and these young professionals are all moving there because they didn’t tear down all their beautiful old Victorian homes, so you can still get one for close to a million dollars. They’ve got a cool art scene and a bourbon scene. So it sounds like maybe Louisville did not lose its personal flavor in the merger. I would be curious to know what you think of that.

Aaron Renn (01:33): Well, I like to put St. Louis in context. I’m glad you mentioned Louisville because many of these river cities have similar characteristics. I like to look at St. Louis as well as three cities in the Ohio Valley: Louisville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. All of them heavily German Catholic in their demographics. All of them are very geopolitically fragmented with many small tiny suburbs throughout. They all have very fragmented neighborhood systems as well, where everybody has a strong sense of neighborhood identity. Where you go to high school is a big social marker. They all have phenomenal collections of urban assets and great historic buildings. They all still have their own unique character in a country where that has sort of bled away.

Aaron Renn (02:31): And they also have curiously underperformed demographically and economically in terms of growth. They’re slow growth places. So one thing I always encourage people is to pan back the lens and don’t just look at St. Louis in isolation. Look at it in comparison or dialogue with some of these other places and see what you can learn from them.

Louisville is actually a quite troubled city in important ways. From a white collar employment perspective it’s doing well, from a blue collar perspective less so. It’s one of the 10 least educated major metros in the country. I don’t want to spend too much time on Louisville, but I want to talk about the city county merger, which is distinct from recombining the city and the county. This has been considered urban planning best practice for 30 or 40 years. There was a book written by David Rusk called Cities Without Suburbs. The idea is that cities that were able to expand their boundaries through either annexation or city county mergers were prospering, whilst cities that did not, like the Clevelands, the Cincinnatis, and the St. Louises, were struggling. So the idea is we need big box government.

Indianapolis, where I live now, had a city county merger in 1970. Louisville did a city county merger, I grew up near Louisville. Jacksonville, Florida, Lexington, Kentucky, and Nashville, Tennessee did as well. What I would say is a few things. Merger is not necessarily bad. For Indianapolis, merger did prevent the city from essentially going down the tubes in important ways. So it really was a win in important ways.

But it did not prevent the historic city from going into the exact same demographic decline as St. Louis. The historic city of Indianapolis has lost almost exactly the same share of its population since 1970 as St. Louis has. Secondly, these are very politically difficult to pull off. They take enormous effort. They often fail multiple times. Louisville had multiple failures.

The most precious resource is always management time and attention. Is this where you want to put all your political chips? And in order to get it passed politically, what happens invariably is that most entities are actually not consolidated. In Louisville, none of the existing incorporated suburban governments were in fact merged. In Indianapolis, the school districts weren’t merged.

This means you don’t necessarily get all of the benefits you think from consolidation, because many things are excluded. And then unlike a corporate merger, where there’s typically a lot of downsizing and cost rationalization, in city county mergers nobody ever loses their job and salaries and benefits might even be harmonized upward to the high watermark. So don’t expect it to save any money. Personally, city county merger might have some benefits for St. Louis. I’m not saying it would have no benefits, but in my opinion it’s not going to be a needle mover and most likely it would be extraordinarily politically difficult and uncertain to pull off.

Susan Pendergrass (06:00): Yeah, no question. It’s been very politically difficult. People don’t want to do it. However, we do have these little tiny school districts and police districts. We have, I don’t know, 28 911 systems. We have a lot of what looks like bureaucratic waste and red tape. To the extent that doesn’t get resolved in a merger, then what’s the point? But I do think, you know, we’ve been talking about the demographics of St. Louis. There were over 800,000 people in the city once. Now there are maybe 280,000 and declining, and we’re in the death spiral of more people dying than being born. We’ve been in that for a while. And I guess it brings up the question of what is St. Louis to do if we are in this death spiral? We’re not having the babies. We’re having fewer babies than we did 15 years ago. So school enrollment is only declining. What is the prescription in that situation?

I’ve been to Cincinnati quite a bit. They’re trying to get people downtown with sports stadiums. It doesn’t really work. Louisville has sports stadiums downtown. I don’t know if people really want to move down there. I don’t see it working in St. Louis. So what is a city in that situation to do?

Aaron Renn (07:18): It’s going to be challenging in a sense because your problems are a little over determined. St. Louis was once a regional capital city, much like a Dallas or an Atlanta or a Denver or a Minneapolis. And it lost a lot of those functions. Many of its headquarters have left. It used to have a lot of professional services firms like ad agencies that did business all over the country, not just for the local market. Now St. Louis, although it’s still bigger than Indianapolis, looks a lot more like an Indianapolis or a Columbus, Ohio, where you have fewer corporate headquarters and most of the service firms are just there to serve the local market. St. Louis has essentially shrunk a little bit in relative importance, and it’s hard to get that back.

The demographics are also quite difficult and create a situation where it’s hard to attract business when you have a shrinking labor force, weak demographic growth, and a weak ability to bring people in from the outside. So it’s a very complicated situation and I don’t think there’s any silver bullet for St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (08:39): That’s what I’m asking you for. You have the answers. What’s the silver bullet?

Aaron Renn (08:43): So here are the things I would look at if I were in St. Louis. One of the clear issues that affects all of these river cities is that their wonderful, unique local cultures come with a downside, which is an extreme parochialism that has two negative effects. One, it makes it difficult for the communities to cohesively work together, which I’m not telling you anything you don’t already know. City-suburb divides tend to be bigger. In Indianapolis, regional leadership is mostly all on the same page about the big issues. Same with Columbus, Ohio. Secondly, it makes it very difficult to attract people from out of town because they come there and they can’t make friends, they can’t penetrate the social networks.

Susan Pendergrass (09:15): 100%, yes.

Aaron Renn (09:40): You hear it over and over again in places like St. Louis, Cleveland, even Minneapolis, Minnesota. There are some sayings there. If you want to make friends in Minnesota, go to kindergarten, because that’s when everybody makes their friends. Or Minnesotans will give you directions anywhere but their house. They’re never going to invite you over. St. Louis has that reputation. I don’t think it’s just a reputation. And I know you just had Ness Sandoval on.

Susan Pendergrass (09:53): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (10:08): He’s talking about you need to get better on migration. Migration isn’t going to improve if migrants are not going to be able to join the social networks here. And that’s not even just international migration, that’s domestic migrants. So I think that’s a huge issue for the city. Cultural issues are hard to solve, but maybe less intractable than infrastructure.

The other thing is looking at Pittsburgh as a sort of model. Pittsburgh hasn’t solved really most of its problems by any means, but it has been able to regenerate in the city a sort of high value economy around Carnegie Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. It’s done quite well. Many Silicon Valley firms have set up shop there. What’s happened in Pittsburgh, although it’s still a demographic decline story, is there’s been a demographic transition in the city. Pittsburgh went from one of the least educated cities in America to now one of the youngest and most educated. Part of it is old people moved and died off and young educated people replaced them. So the total number of people in the city was declining, but there was a churn happening underneath. And the same thing is already happening in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (11:13): How did they do that?

Aaron Renn (11:33): College degree attainment in the city is now well north of 40%. So the people who live in the city of St. Louis are very educated. That demographic churn has raised educational attainment and thus incomes in the city a lot. Now Pittsburgh was different because it was an almost entirely white city. There’s a racial divide in St. Louis and gentrification concerns become more salient. But St. Louis is now an educated city. This is not an old post-industrial blue collar city. The city of St. Louis itself is very educated. And also being very small, it doesn’t necessarily need a massive change to move the needle. In Indianapolis we have a population of over 900,000. Moving that behemoth takes a lot. St. Louis now being smaller has a situation where there could be a big impact from lower numbers of things. So I think a knowledge economy built around Washington University and your medical centers has some possibilities, somewhat similar to Pittsburgh.

Susan Pendergrass (12:45): So much medical.

Aaron Renn (12:58): Carnegie Mellon’s engineering and computer science areas will be a little different. I might also look at Vanderbilt, what’s going on there? What are some peer schools you could watch to see what’s going on? But I think there are actually some reasons to think that the city of St. Louis, believe it or not, could be sort of turning a corner. It has now demographically renewed itself to a higher educational attainment state. Being small, it probably doesn’t have that much further to fall, and you can start building from there. Obviously there are governance challenges, but looking at the Pittsburgh model, studying similar complexes around peer schools, and addressing the culture issues is where I’d look.

David Stokes (13:33): Hopeful.

Susan Pendergrass (13:47): So as a spokesperson for St. Louis, what do you see for the future?

David Stokes (13:52): Well, I would be curious to get Aaron’s thoughts on that size question, about how the city of St. Louis has in fact gotten so small. It’s about 10% of the metro area. How does that affect the pros or cons of any type of a merger? These would not be a merger of equals. St. Louis County would almost subsume St. Louis City into it. How do you think that would affect things for better or worse?

Aaron Renn (14:28): Well, that was the critique of the Louisville merger by two academics at the University of Louisville. I mentioned the book Cities Without Suburbs. They wrote an academic paper called Suburbs Without a City, which basically said if the merger passed in Louisville, it would essentially mean the suburbs take over the city, not the city taking over the suburbs, because the old city of Louisville only had about 260,000 people and the suburbs would numerically dominate. The same thing would certainly happen in St. Louis. If there were a merger, suburban St. Louis County would control the city in essence.

Another consideration, and this is a Cincinnati issue, I interviewed about 15 years ago the mayor of Cincinnati, John Cranley. Here’s what he said, and I think this is an important point. He said, 30 years ago, city county merger was the thing because cities were in decline and you wanted to tap that suburban tax base to fund the city. But now it’s reversed. Now the cities are coming back and it’s the inner suburbs that are actually going down the tubes. And so in Cincinnati today, we have all the corporate headquarters, we have the universities and the medical centers, and we don’t have to share our tax revenue with anybody. If we were merged with the county government, we’d have to prop up all these failing suburbs. And so I think you’re in a similar situation in St. Louis, where the high value activity, not all of it is in the city of St. Louis because of Clayton and so on, but the St. Louis County suburbs are mostly places that are themselves on negative trajectories. Merging the city, which may be on the cusp of being able to bottom out and turn around, with all of these still declining inner suburban areas, might actually be an albatross around the city’s neck.

Susan Pendergrass (15:16): What would that mean?

David Stokes (16:37): I just think one of the differences between St. Louis and Cincinnati, and I don’t know the property tax base of Cincinnati, is that so much of the city of St. Louis is tax exempt right now. Between Washington University, Saint Louis University, and all the government entities, there’s just so much of it. I say that as somebody who supports property tax changes to make them pay something towards it. But I just don’t think the Cincinnati argument applies to the city of St. Louis right now. That property tax exemption part is a huge factor because the most growing, thriving part of it is the entire giant Barnes-WashU-Cortex complex, and the amount of property taxes they pay is miniscule.

Susan Pendergrass (16:38): Hmm.

Aaron Renn (17:26): Well, some of that is a planning issue. And I think the reality is, when you have a complex like that, are all these people going to move to St. Charles? Maybe not. I’ll tell you, I live in the suburb of Indianapolis named Carmel, and a lot of the hospitals and things have been opening facilities here. When these nonprofit hospitals come up here, we will not approve zoning changes for those hospitals unless they agree to make payments in lieu of taxes. You want to come up here and you want a zoning change, you’re going to have to pay. We were actually quite prescient in that one of the local hospital chains opened a for-profit hospital. As part of the approval deal, we said, if you ever convert to nonprofit status, you will continue paying property taxes. And we did that.

So I think there probably is leverage from the city over some of these entities. You don’t have a lot of leverage over a corporation deciding where to put their office, but that’s not a tax exempt situation. The stuff at Cortex is probably not going to leave if you make them pay a little money the next time they come to you for a zoning approval. I think you need to start looking at how to get more money out of these entities that are nonprofits in name only. These universities and hospitals are effectively gigantic hedge funds. Their executives are extremely well compensated and billions of dollars are flowing through there. Undoubtedly the better solution there is to figure out how to tax them rather than figure out how to tax the soon-to-be-dead mall in the suburb over the border.

David Stokes (19:24): Well, yeah, and that’s sort of the trade off, unfortunately, is that they do pay earnings tax. The employees, many of them very highly compensated, pay the earnings tax. And that’s what makes the city more dependent on local income taxes, not less, because they’re either tax exempt or in the case of Cortex, have tax abatements that make them essentially tax exempt.

Susan Pendergrass (19:25): We do have earnings taxes, right? So the folks who work there have to pay an earnings tax.

Aaron Renn (19:53): Yeah. Again, I don’t know exactly the fiscal architecture there. But I would say you don’t want to do a merger simply to do a tax dollar grab. The lesson of Indianapolis is we did that. We grabbed suburban tax dollars and we used it to rebuild our downtown successfully. But here we are 50 years later, and now we have enormous tracts of decayed suburbia that are an enormous problem. Our entire core county is now in a sense the inner city. We have big challenges because we were not able to invest in ways that allow those suburban areas to retain their allure over the long term.

And I’m not saying that’s impossible, but any short term juice you get, cities always rise and fall. Core cities have proven more resilient and more able to regenerate themselves than suburbs. Part of it is because state governments cannot afford to let their state’s largest city or major urban center go down the tubes.

Susan Pendergrass (21:06): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (21:16): Missouri cannot let St. Louis and Kansas City implode. Michigan cannot just write off Detroit and say who cares. But these suburban areas have proven a lot tougher to save. We don’t have a good model. We’ve spent decades thinking about how to rebuild cities and build districts. There are certain things you can pull off in a city around conventions, civic events, gathering spaces, museums, and government that are very hard to translate to suburban settings. So there’s not a great playbook, especially in declining markets, for renewing suburbs. The playbook for suburban renewal, if you want to call it that, is places like Carmel, Indiana, which are growing and affluent, and therefore can build large mixed use centers, new urbanist developments, trails, and parks. The suburbs of St. Louis County are probably tremendously deficient in infrastructure as we would understand it today.

So again, there may actually be some benefits in having St. Louis City rejoin the county in a sense, because then the county functions are spread and amortized across a larger population.

Susan Pendergrass (22:45): It would immediately improve our murder rate because we would be mixing it in.

Aaron Renn (22:48): Yeah, there is some of that. The murder rate is an artifact of the size of the city more than anything. There are places in Chicago with higher murder rates. A former colleague of mine at the Manhattan Institute, Rafael Mangual, did an analysis of Chicago. He said there are areas on the South Side of Chicago that are larger and have more people than St. Louis with far higher murder rates than St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (22:56): We get called out because of the small denominator.

Aaron Renn (23:17): And so there is that. The other thing is Chicago is a good example. New York City was essentially a city county merger. In 1898, the five counties that are the five boroughs of New York were consolidated into one city. Philadelphia was also a city county consolidation from the 19th century. But what happens when you create a very large city of say a million people or more is you really have to scale up your government. You have to have a government that operates at that scale.

What happened with Indianapolis was we merged city and county government, but we didn’t really have a government that could effectively manage this new larger territory. It never built out the infrastructure in the suburbs. In New York, the Bronx has subways, great parks, everything built out with proper infrastructure, because it was part of New York and New York had to expand governance to become a city of eight million. Chicago got big in the 19th century and built a city government that could run a city of three million people. And some of the stuff that gets critiqued there, for example, is a lot of city services were organized by ward or city council district. There are 50 city council districts and every city councilor is sort of a little mini mayor of their district. The alderman essentially has veto power over any zoning changes. It’s called aldermanic privilege. So there are a lot of constraints there.

But if it’s just one mayor and one city council trying to think about a huge city of 77 neighborhoods and three million people, they can’t keep that much in their head. All they can think about is downtown. And that’s what happened in Indianapolis. The mayor and city council can really only think about downtown. We should have built out structures in townships throughout the city so that you had leadership focused on that area and money focused on that area. That’s what made the suburbs work really well. A suburb like Carmel is basically township sized. We have 100,000 people, big enough to do things, but not so big that our mayor and council can’t keep the whole city in their head and plan and manage the whole city.

So if you merge with the county government, you’re going to have to create an entirely new government structure that allows you to essentially manage every sub area of the whole thing and bring it all up to a standard of services. That’s the other thing they often did in Louisville and Nashville. They merge, but they have a two tier service system where there’s an urban services district for the old city which gets more services, and then the others get less. They didn’t do that in New York. There’s one standard of service in New York, one in Philadelphia, one in Chicago. So if you can’t commit to a single standard of service, you’re basically creating a bogus merger in my opinion. If you’re going to do a merger, you need to obliterate every government and entity in St. Louis County and city, merge them all into one with one standard. That’s not going to happen.

Susan Pendergrass (26:35): That’s not going to happen. What do you think, David?

David Stokes (26:37): Yeah, that’s not going to happen.

Aaron Renn (26:43): So you end up with a lot of problems. Louisville didn’t merge any fire departments. Imagine a city that doesn’t have a consolidated fire department. Imagine a city without a single police department. That was actually Indianapolis. When we merged, the Indianapolis Police Department still patrolled the old city, but the new parts of the city that were consolidated in from the county were still controlled by the sheriff.

Susan Pendergrass (27:13): That is 100% what would happen in St. Louis. Everyone would retain their school system and their police department and their fire department. I lived for a long time in Fairfax County, Virginia, which is a single county government. It’s massive, 150,000 students in their school system. It seems to function with a single police department and fire department. But I don’t think you can backwards engineer that into a place that for hundreds of years has been operating as it has been operating.

Aaron Renn (27:43): Lexington, Kentucky worked pretty well because one, the schools were already consolidated, as in the South it’s typically county school districts. Secondly, there were no other government entities, no township governments, no other incorporated municipalities. So it merged everything. And they were sort of able to solve the urban services district issue because the outer areas of Fayette County were horse farms. They actually put in a kind of green belt rule, you can’t develop out there, because they wanted to protect these scenic landscapes. So there was actually a good reason to treat that differently, because it was a very unique American landscape. Lexington, I think, was pretty successful.

Susan Pendergrass (28:15): They are. I appreciate it when I drive across Route 64.

Aaron Renn (28:39): Lexington was pretty successful and wasn’t especially controversial when they did it, in part because there weren’t all these entrenched interests like there are in other places. If you look at places that did the mergers, they weren’t the Cincinnatis and Pittsburghs. They’ve been talking about consolidation in Pittsburgh forever. It was very hard. And Louisville did it, but it was one of the least consolidated so-called consolidated governments. What the Louisville merger functionally did was dissolve the city of Louisville and reorganize county government. The county government now has a mayor and a council instead of the old fiscal court with the judge executive and all that.

Susan Pendergrass (29:21): That’s kind of what would happen in St. Louis, right?

Aaron Renn (29:36): That’s essentially what they did. They basically dissolved the city and the county government was reorganized, but nothing was merged.

Susan Pendergrass (29:43): Did you have a question?

David Stokes (29:45): I want to get back to the fire district point. We’re talking about why this would be so hard. There’s actually a law in St. Louis that only applies in St. Louis County that makes it impossible to consolidate fire districts. Even if a modest mid-sized suburb annexes an unincorporated part of town, they’re not allowed to provide fire services to that new annexed area, or they can, but they have to pay so much to the old unincorporated fire district that it makes it impossible to do so. That’s just one example of how even if you wanted a full scale merger, it would just be impossible to actually carry through.

Susan Pendergrass (30:34): Why do you think people float this idea, David? Why does it come back every couple of years?

David Stokes (30:38): You know, it’s the old line. I remember a study I read about Pittsburgh and St. Louis many years ago. The question was, are the St. Louis and Pittsburgh areas really inefficient with all the fragmented government? And the conclusion was, well, you would never design a metro area like this, but they’ve both made it work over the last century better than you would think. The conclusion was that St. Louis and Pittsburgh aren’t actually as inefficient as you might assume when you run the numbers.

I think people have trouble accepting that. People look at so many small municipalities, many of them dysfunctional, many of them until recent times funded themselves primarily with traffic tickets, which is a terrible way to fund local government, and that’s not even an exaggeration. And there’s just this fundamental belief that if you can just plan it better you’ll create a better place. I just think it fails.

One of the reasons it would fail, going back to what Aaron led this conversation off with, is that if St. Louis County and St. Louis City joined together, they’re not actually going to lay any government employees off to save any money. St. Louis City government is not going to fire city employees. It’s never going to happen. So you’re not going to save any money and it’s all just going to collapse.

Aaron Renn (32:12): Yeah, New York City and large governments are not more efficient.

I look at it and say, look, I think merger is a solution for failed states, if you want to call them that, in the St. Louis suburbs. Take some micro-suburb that’s a complete scam or is bankrupt and merge it in with its neighbor. Do some consolidation like that, that probably needs to be led by state government, almost like a receivership sort of thing. That’s just kind of good government as you work through it. But I just don’t think the benefits you would gain from trying to do a complete governmental merger of St. Louis City with St. Louis County would outweigh the opportunity cost of how much time and effort you spend on it, when you could be spending that on other things that I think will actually move the needle more.

The downsides are arguably as high as the upsides. There’s no guarantee it’s even net positive in this environment. The time to have merged was when Indianapolis did it in 1970, not in 2026. Nashville did it in the 60s. Jacksonville did it a long time ago.

And then I think it doesn’t fix the fundamental issues around the culture. You’ve got to take a hard look at that and say, it’s maybe very difficult to change. The idea that people who aren’t from here have to be able to move here and get connected and feel like they belong in the city. There’s a couple we know who lived in St. Louis. The wife taught in St. Louis public schools. They’re big urban people. The husband was from St. Louis, and they moved here to Carmel, Indiana.

Susan Pendergrass (33:47): Tell me more about that.

Aaron Renn (34:10): Basically they said, man, people are just so much friendlier here. They make better eye contact, they engage more. It’s just so much more welcoming than it was in St. Louis, even though they were actually in a sense connected because the husband was from there.

So when even people who lived in St. Louis and liked it notice a difference when they leave, that is a killer when you’re already struggling demographically. I had a guy who owned a business in Cleveland who said to me one time, I learned the hard way never to recruit anyone from out of town to work for my company unless that person or their spouse is from Cleveland, because otherwise they will never stay. When that’s where you are as a place, that is just rough. I think that is one of the killers for these river cities.

Susan Pendergrass (35:16): Yeah, what’s the fix for that? I don’t know what the fix is.

Aaron Renn (35:38): I think the optimistic case for St. Louis, and I actually tweeted this a year or two ago, is that St. Louis City educational attainment is really high now. In a sense, it’s a small, highly educated city that is probably going to continue growing more educated. So I think the Pittsburgh option looks viable in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (36:00): And certainly great medical care. I know that the average age is getting older in St. Louis. I think within 10 years, one in four people will be over the age of 65. But we also have an Alzheimer’s research center and access to medical care, which as you get older gets more important. I do think there’s an opportunity to lean in to the medical services that are available, as the country as a whole gets older. I think St. Louis looks more attractive for that reason. So I think you’re right that with universities and medical centers, there’s an opportunity.

Aaron Renn (36:35): Yeah, I think if America’s demographics keep on this trend, a lot of other places are going to get to where St. Louis is. And the thing to be careful of is that when you’re in a declining market, that often prompts centralization of activity and population. What happened with Japan is that once Japan’s population started falling, everybody started moving to Tokyo. It’s Tokyo and a handful of other cities where everything is concentrated, and they literally have ghost towns there.

I don’t think it’s any accident that Indianapolis’ growth really took off once the Rust Belt era and deindustrialization hit the state. Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio have grown in large measure through drawing people out of the rest of the state as those states declined. Huge numbers of people move from Cleveland to Columbus every year.

Missouri is a little different than that. One of your challenges is that St. Louis does not draw people from rural Missouri. When I looked at the data, it’s not like there’s a massive flow into St. Louis from the rest of the state. So you don’t have that siphon bringing people in.

Susan Pendergrass (37:55): There are public safety issues around that, but yes.

Aaron Renn (38:00): And the issue we have is that we’ve now eaten our seed corn. There’s not going to be next generations of children in the towns I grew up in in rural Indiana to move to Indianapolis anymore. The cohort sizes are going to be smaller. So that pump, even Tokyo is declining now in population. That siphon is draining the water table. We can only rely on that so long.

But I think this is the risk for St. Louis in that kind of environment. People with opportunity might avoid or flee St. Louis and go to Austin, Texas or Nashville. They go to the handful of places in America that are really still growing. That’s a threat even for Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio. In a declining market, it’s very hard to get people to want to come to a shrinking city because the opportunity space is shrinking. St. Louis’s opportunity space has been shrinking because you’re losing corporate headquarters and your working age population is declining. That dynamic is really going to be a challenge. But within that, the city of St. Louis might end up doing okay. Again, being small actually helps it here.

Susan Pendergrass (39:25): Any closing thoughts on that, David?

David Stokes (39:27): Just that the part of Missouri that is definitely still growing, and that probably is attracting those young rural people who are moving to a city, is going into southwest Missouri, the Springfield-Branson area. That’s absolutely the growing part of the state. And even Kansas City is growing certainly more than St. Louis is.

Aaron Renn (39:48): Yeah, it’s not a culturally cohesive state. Springfield and that area are definitely growing, and growing despite the fact that they have nowhere close to the urban assets of a St. Louis. It’s interesting to watch, and we’ll just have to see what happens.

Susan Pendergrass (40:05): It is. I think about it a lot. I’ve been talking about this in terms of school enrollment for years and years, where you could see the biggest kindergarten cohort was after the Great Recession of 2009. You know that that’s the biggest kindergarten cohort for the last 15, 16, 17 years. We do nothing but build schools and hire teachers. We are slow to catch on to these things happening. But I think your perspective is certainly very interesting. On the question of the merger, it’s not worth the cost for whatever benefits there might be. But it still gets talked about, so I appreciate you coming and giving us your thoughts on it. Maybe we’ll have to have you back to talk about it again.

David Stokes (41:02): And Aaron, I want you to come back. I want to find out how we get more roundabouts in Missouri. I love roundabouts. I go to Carmel it seems like once a year for these gigantic youth sports tournaments up at Westfield, just a little bit north of you. My kids’ sports take me there. And I love the roundabouts. You cannot get enough of them.

Aaron Renn (41:09): I’d love to talk about that. My favorite topic.

Aaron Renn (41:24): Yeah, it’s great. We hardly ever have to stop. There are barely any stoplights or stop signs left in our city. It’s amazing. We’re one of the few growing places in America where traffic is better today than it was 20 years ago.

Susan Pendergrass (41:32): They’re awesome.

David Stokes (41:45): People don’t realize how good that is for air quality and everything. You just keep moving along, not stop and start. We need 100 times more roundabouts in this area.

Susan Pendergrass (41:55): Are you pretending that people stop at stop signs in St. Louis? Because let’s be honest, people don’t stop at stop signs.

David Stokes (42:00): Well, they roll them, but it’s still wrong when they roll them. Maybe all the people blowing red lights on Kings Highway at 50 miles an hour are just being environmentally conscious. I need to give them more of the benefit of the doubt, I guess.

Susan Pendergrass (42:12): That’s exactly right. All right, thanks so much. I really appreciate it.

Aaron Renn (42:19): Thank you.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post The St. Louis City-County Merger with Aaron Renn and David Stokes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Missouri House Speaker Jonathan Patterson suggested to Fox4 news in Kansas City that Missouri’s contribution to a Royals stadium could reach around $700 to $900 million. Patterson said:

“I think if you look at the numbers, and there was an audit in 2023, the teams generate almost $60 million, and so if you take half of that, then it would be $30 million, then times 30 years, it could be that number. I think those are good estimates that you’re working with.”

That number is way off.

In 2025, during a special legislative session, the House and Senate passed, and the governor signed, Senate Bill (SB) 3, the Show-Me Sports Investment Act. While the bill does not specify a bonding formula, it does set limits: that state spending “shall be no greater than . . . baseline year state tax revenues,” that appropriations may “not exceed thirty years” and that “the net bond proceeds . . . shall not exceed fifty percent of the total costs of the project.” In setting those boundaries, the bill also limits revenue to that “derived directly from the facility.”

Patterson’s estimate of stadium revenue is from a 2023 Jackson County Sports Complex audit, which reports $55 million in tax revenue generated by both teams (the Chiefs and the Royals). But that figure includes all tax revenue collected by state, county, and local jurisdictions. Of that $55 million, only $34,929,233 went to the state—which is what SB 3 covers.

But SB 3 further limits potential support for the Royals to revenue generated only at Kauffman Stadium. Let’s assume half that number, $17 million, is from the Royals’ Kauffman Stadium,* which aligns with estimates provided by Governor Mike Kehoe. If that entire amount were bonded at 6% interest over 30 years, Missouri would be able to give the Royals $234 million.

Another news outlet assumed a 4.5% interest rate over 30 years and concluded the state would be able to give the Royals about $274 million.

Either way, it’s a far cry from $900 million.

There is a lot more to learn about this deal, but SB 3 provides real constraints on what can be counted and borrowed against. Based on the legislation, the 2023 Jackson County audit, and different interest rates, Missouri could contribute roughly $234 to $274 million toward a downtown ballpark. That’s a lot, but only a small portion of what many believe to be a nearly $2 billion project.

*Note: Although the Royals play more games at their stadium than the Chiefs, Arrowhead Stadium has a larger capacity and also hosts concerts for musicians such as Taylor Swift.

The post By the Numbers: What Missouri Might Give the Royals appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Now that the champagne corks have popped at Crown Center over the plans to build a ballpark there, it’s worth considering what comes next for Missouri and Kansas.

On the Missouri side, Kansas City ordinance 260339, passed on April 9, instructs the city manager to move ahead on all sorts of things regarding the deal. Section 7 provides for up to $250,000 for, among other things, “professional services, including but not limited to economic advisory services, financial advisory services, bond advisory services, legal services . . .”

That means the city is going to seek professional opinions on the deal’s feasibility. Who the city hires will tell us a lot about how committed it is to protecting taxpayers. As one person told me, “if they hire an architectural firm, we’ll know they’re not serious.”

The city has a history of relying on conflicted organizations to conduct studies, as it recently did with the World Cup. In 2016, the city paid CDFA—a trade group formed “to promote the common interest of Development Finance Agencies with respect to public policies and programs”—to measure the effectiveness of Kansas City’s subsidy culture. The laughable conclusion was “each incentive dollar invested generated $3.83 in additional tax revenue.”

In Kansas, taxpayers are still waiting on two things. First, they don’t know how big the STAR bond district will be. Previous reporting was a 293-square-mile district encompassing Wyandotte County and the western half of Johnson County. But it could be much, much bigger to make the deal pencil out. Once the district is set, the secretary of commerce is empowered to make it larger whenever he would like (see page 1) to capture more tax revenue.

Second, taxpayers are also waiting on Kansas to determine the base year, which is the year in which the state sales tax revenue is fixed, diverting every additional dollar within the district to the Chiefs’ developments. You might expect the base year to be 2026, when the legislature endorsed the measure, or whenever the project breaks ground. Or perhaps 2025, when the deal was agreed to.

But the deal actually allows the secretary of commerce to set the base year whenever he wants (see page 22). It could be set at 2015, meaning every state sales tax dollar generated over the amount collected in 2015 would go to the Chiefs.

In a deal this expensive for Kansas, the size of the district and the base year are likely to reignite howls of protest from all quarters.

As elected leaders in Topeka and Kansas City throw themselves self-congratulatory parties, the rest of us are faced with the bar tab. And the hangover.

The post Next Up on Chiefs and Royals Stadium Saga appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

I wrote recently that in the lead up to the public vote, even earnings tax defenders could not defend the earnings tax. Despite urging yes votes, they conceded many, if not all, of my claims that the tax makes for bad policy.

Now we might be seeing this story repeat itself with stadium subsidies. It’s being reported that Kansas City’s package of subsidies for a downtown baseball stadium includes bonds issued by the city—and backed by them. This means that if the stadium fails to generate enough revenue to pay the bonds, city taxpayers will make up the difference. This is exactly the type of deal that requires the city to direct over $10 million each year to cover Power & Light District debts.

The Kansas City Business Journal reports city leaders are aware of that same risk with a downtown ballpark for the Royals. They concede:

. . . estimates for Power & Light District sales and economic activity tax generation proved “spectacularly wrong.” The entertainment hub’s annual bond gaps have required about $10.5 million a year from the city’s general fund and $199 million total to date.

City leaders now say they’re being more careful — even as they plan to support as much as two times the district’s original debt for a stadium at Washington Square Park.

How times have changed. Twenty years ago then-Mayor Kay Barnes told a columnist for The Kansas City Star, regarding her deal on the Power & Light District:

“We’re going to look like geniuses” in five or 10 years, Barnes said. The city is paying low interest rates for projects that are capable of paying off the debt, she added.

Barnes could not have been more wrong. (Though she was named the 2018 Kansas Citian of the Year by the Chamber of Commerce, which says more about the chamber than it does Barnes.)

Public subsidies for private interests such as a baseball stadium is still bad policy. They don’t benefit taxpayers. But it’s some comfort that at least Kansas City leaders are capable of learning from their mistakes—right?

Right?

The post Another Policy Concession from Kansas City—Kind of appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

For some reason, film tax credits remain popular in Jefferson City. They are much less popular with economists.

Missouri lawmakers are once again debating whether to extend the state’s film tax credit program. Earlier this month, I testified against legislation that would continue the subsidy. For those who don’t remember, this is a debate the state has already had.

Missouri operated a film tax credit program before ending it more than a decade ago. In 2010, the state’s Tax Credit Review Commission examined the program and concluded it served too narrow an industry to justify its cost to taxpayers. Lawmakers shut it down soon after. The idea never fully disappeared, though, and in 2023 the subsidy returned, this time with the promise of better results. The current program allows up to $16 million per year in credits for film and television productions.

So far, there is little evidence that anything has changed. Supporters point to production spending as proof that the program works. The Missouri Film Office reports that productions spent more than $40 million in the state in 2025 while receiving roughly $15.7 million in credits. But production spending is not the same as fiscal return. Much of that activity consists of temporary wages, lodging, equipment rentals, and other short-term expenses tied to a shoot. When filming ends, much of that spending leaves with it. What matters for taxpayers is how much tax revenue actually makes its way back to the state.

On that measure, film subsidies perform poorly almost everywhere they have been tried. Research summarized by the Tax Foundation estimates governments recapture between eight and twenty-eight cents in new tax revenue for every dollar of credit issued. Even Georgia, often cited as the model for film incentives, struggles to demonstrate that the program pays for itself. A 2020 performance audit by the Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts found that tax revenue generated by film production activity fell well short of the credits the state awarded.

There is also a basic budget reality lawmakers should keep in mind. Film tax credits are sometimes treated as something different than spending because the state only grants them after a production films in Missouri. But the fiscal effect is the same. Each credit issued is a commitment to collect less revenue in the future.

Meanwhile, the productions most closely associated with Missouri often film somewhere else entirely. A new HBO series set in St. Louis, DTF St. Louis, was filmed in Georgia. The Netflix series Ozark, which was set at Missouri’s Lake of the Ozarks, was also largely filmed in Georgia.

Though it should go without saying, Missouri’s lawmakers should be focused on using state tax dollars as effectively as possible. And there’s no disputing that film tax credits have repeatedly failed that test. Extending the credit today would mean ignoring the state’s past experience and choosing to repeat it.

The post Missouri’s Film Tax Credits Still Don’t Add Up appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A version of the following commentary appeared in the Columbia Missourian.

As technology companies try to meet the skyrocketing demand for AI-specialized computing capacity, they are dotting the country with data centers to the dismay of some and the delight of others. As is all too often the case in Missouri, many of these companies are being offered taxpayer-supported subsidies or tax exemptions.

For example, Independence, Missouri, is giving Nebius more than $6 billion in tax breaks over the next 20 years for a “hyper-scale” data center, and Montgomery County has offered Amazon hundreds of millions in tax abatements to build a data center near New Florence. But why would subsidies be needed when it seems like data-center developers have money to burn and are desperate for suitable building locations?

Recent actions of data-center developers suggest that it is not the cost of building and operating those facilities that is the barrier; the main problems appear to be finding pathways to secure reliable energy generation and getting their centers online smoothly and quickly (speed-to-operation).

These two obstacles are so serious that the major technology companies (Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, etc.) recently met with President Trump and signed the “Ratepayer Protection Pledge” to supply and pay for their own power for their AI data centers.

Why would these companies agree to take on this expense? Because their constraint is not cash. For these firms, time is money. The costs of delays in permitting and interconnection outweigh the value of a local tax incentive.

The negative effects of economic development subsidies and tax breaks are well known. When local officials offer these incentives, they diminish positive benefits that could come from a new data-center development: increased property-tax revenue to fill in the gaps for local services or be used to lower the overall tax rate of the community.

With all of this in mind, rather than just doing what most other states do (handing out checks or tax exemptions) Missouri should work on policies that actually deliver what these companies need most: pathways to secure and reliable energy generation, regulatory certainty, and speed-to-operation.

For local communities, this means they should not offer taxpayer dollars. Even with big tech agreeing to pay for their own power, many municipalities will still try to lure projects with incentives. No doubt the companies will take whatever money is offered to them, but subsidies are unlikely to significantly drive their decisions about where to locate.

Instead, local communities should offer a stable, predictable permitting environment and a suitable location to build. That would help address the greater desire for certainty and speed-to-operation.

And at the state level we should think even bigger. Policies like consumer-regulated electricity (CRE) could help make Missouri a true hub for data center development—without using unnecessary subsidies.

CRE would enable private electricity providers to serve large, energy-intensive customers independent of the existing, permission-heavy grid structure by allowing them to build their own power plants. Rather than spreading the costs for this infrastructure, CRE would create a “parallel path to energy abundance” —one financed by the large customers who demand the power.

CRE would allow these data centers to work with a private partner to meet their own energy needs, with less red tape, more certainty, more control, and more freedom to innovate. These benefits are likely to be more appealing than subsidies.

Unfortunately, offering subsidies seems to be a reflexive reaction in Missouri when there is an opportunity to attract a new business. But especially in this case, Missouri would be better off focusing on what the data center sector really needs. Efficient regulatory and permitting policies (like CRE), a predictable and stable environment in which to construct, and abundant energy would be far better suited to attracting and improving data center development than taxpayer dollars.

The post Why Hand Out Subsidies to Data-Center Developers? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A version of the following commentary appeared in the Mound City Messenger.

A bad idea doesn’t get better with age. Bad ideas aren’t wine, jeans, or your high school memories. The tax subsidies for the Post-Dispatch building redevelopment in downtown St. Louis were a bad idea back in 2019 when the development was proposed, and they are a bad idea now.

Using tax subsidies for economic development rarely benefits the public. Instead, it lowers the risk and increases the returns for private investors. Under a capitalist system, the relationship between risk and reward for investors can be a wonderful thing, but in recent decades the government has somehow decided the public should get involved in private business dealings through tax subsidies and incentives. Taxpayers in St. Louis were left holding the bag for the failed St. Louis Marketplace tax increment financing (TIF) plan, the tax subsidy package for the Renaissance Hotel that was literally sold on the courthouse steps, and numerous other failed, subsidized enterprises. Most economic development schemes are like an expensive game of musical chairs in which the taxpayer is always the one with nowhere to sit.

The tax subsidy package for the old Post-Dispatch building at 900 N. Tucker on the northern edge of downtown St. Louis was approved by the Board of Aldermen in 2019. It primarily consisted of a $12 million TIF package. The summary included with the legislation featured the normal jargon required for such bills, and it included a statement that the development “will have approximately 1,250 jobs with an average salary of $76,500.”

How has that jobs promise worked out? Well, OK at first. The most recent annual TIF report (2024) filed by the developers with the state auditor repeated the same number of 1,250 estimated jobs created. It also listed 830 jobs created so far. There are two ways to look at that number, and both are accurate. The first is that, once again, developers exaggerated their job creation in order to get the subsidies they wanted. That often happens, and it may have happened here. The second is that getting to two-thirds of the promised jobs is actually better than many other subsidized developments, and maybe the developers deserve some credit. Not enough credit to justify all the subsidies in the first place, but, you know, some.

Except that recent actions indicate that the development is highly unlikely to ever get to 1,250, and it may quickly move in the other direction. The largest tenant in the redevelopment at 900 N. Tucker is Block, formerly known as Square. As you may have read, Block recently announced that it was laying off 4,000 people companywide, almost half of its total workforce. How many of those layoffs will be in St. Louis in unknown at this time, but the company previously announced much smaller layoffs in Missouri in both 2024 and 2025, so it seems unlikely that its St. Louis office will be unscathed.

I am not judging the company about the layoffs. If artificial intelligence is making some employees obsolete (the company’s stated reason for the move) then those people should be let go so they can do something else with their lives. That’s the creative destruction of capitalism. But this situation is a perfect example of why cities and counties should not give subsidies to private companies based on promises of employment, growth, renewal, or whatever the vibe of the moment is.

Numerous economic studies have disproved the belief that tax subsidies lead to economic growth. If tax subsidies worked, the City of St. Louis would already be awash in riches. Tax incentives have been piled on top of tax subsidies under every acronym under the sun for decades. None of it has worked. The city should focus on keeping tax rates level and low for everyone, not high for most and low (because of special exemptions) for the politically connected. A reliance on subsidies rewards cronyism, over-promising, and political grandstanding, but it doesn’t lead to real economic success. Just ask the Block employees who may be laid off soon.

The post Tax Subsidies Are a Mistake We Can’t Seem to Learn From appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Patrick Tuohey and David Stokes join Zach Lawhorn to break down the key issues Missouri voters will decide on April 7th. They discuss whether local elections should stay in April or move to November, property tax limit votes happening in more than 90 counties, new fire district sales tax authority and what it means for taxpayers, the 1% earnings tax renewals in Kansas City and St. Louis, and Springfield’s convention center lodging tax returning to the ballot after voters already rejected it. They also discuss use taxes, senior property tax freezes, the economic development sales tax on the ballot in O’Fallon, and more.

Listen on Spotify

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Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post Missouri’s April 7 Ballot Breakdown with David Stokes and Patrick Tuohey appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The package of subsidies offered to the Kansas City Chiefs by the Missouri Legislature during last year’s special session was bad.

But that bill was not nearly as bad for taxpayers as what is being offered to the team by our neighbors in Kansas. House Bill 2793—the Kansas Sports Authority Act—offers the team, well, it seems, everything.

The bill sets up a Sports Authority to administer the site of a new stadium. That in and of itself is not unique. The Truman Sports Complex, in which the Chiefs and Royals currently play, is administered by the Jackson County Sports Complex Authority. But the power and portfolio of what is being considered in Kansas is breathtaking. Consider the following:

• The authority board includes “a representative of the professional sports team” using the facility as a voting member. This means the Chiefs would have a vote on such things as negotiating its lease, financing, and operations. Having the team oversee itself is a crazy conflict of interest and uncommon in other similar authorities if not absolutely unique, for obvious reasons.
• But the Chiefs aren’t merely one of several votes on the authority. The bill allows additional sports facilities to be placed under the authority if the governing body requests it and the Chiefs also recommend it—giving them an unusual role in expanding the authority’s jurisdiction. This provision may exist because team ownership wants to make sure nobody else can siphon away public funds.

• The authority’s powers “shall not be exercised in a way that conflicts with the terms and conditions set forth in the STAR bond agreement dated December 22, 2025.” This means the authority is locked into the already-negotiated agreement with the team, limiting its ability to adjust terms later.

The three items hand the Chiefs an incredible amount of power. The bill gives the Chiefs a voting seat on the governing authority, binds that authority to the STAR bond agreement the Chiefs negotiated, and gives the team an effective veto over whether additional sports facilities are added to the authority.

But wait, there’s more!

• Contractors must use competition only “to the extent reasonable and practicable in the authority’s sole discretion.” This is a significant weakening of competitive bidding requirements, increasing the risk of opaque contracting and favoritism.

• The authority is exempt from multiple statutes including the Kansas Civil Service Act and the Kansas Administrative Procedure Act, removing the standard hiring, rulemaking and administrative oversight safeguards that normally apply to public entities spending public funds.

• The authority must submit annual reports and testify if legislative committees request it. But this so-called oversight is largely after-the-fact reporting, with no routine legislative approval required for major contracts, bonds or development agreements.

• You read that correctly: the authority may issue special-obligation bonds for stadium construction and infrastructure. Although not legally state debt, political pressure often arises if revenues underperform, creating potential taxpayer exposure. If you doubt this, read up on the fiasco over Platte County and the Zona Rosa shopping center.
• In addition to capturing the increase in sales taxes in the approximately 300-square mile STAR bond district, the authority will be exempt from paying state and local sales and use taxes on purchases of materials, machinery, and services used to construct or equip the facility.

• “Insofar as the provisions of this act are inconsistent with the provisions of any other law, whether general, specific or local, the provisions of this act shall be controlling.” Yeah, that’s in the bill. The authority’s statute is designed to override conflicting state or local laws, potentially weakening local regulatory control.

• And what happens when the stadium is completed and paid for? Nothing. The statute does not include a sunset provision or dissolution trigger. That means the authority could become a permanent quasi-government entity in perpetuity.

• But at least the authority’s power is limited to the stadium, right? Nope. The authority’s purpose includes not just sports facilities and infrastructure used for it, but any “civic, community, athletic, educational, cultural and commercial activities.” “Commercial activities” seems like something that could cover, well, anything.

Kansas State Senator Mike Thompson claims that this measure will set up an unaccountable  “shadow government.” That seems like an over-the-top claim, but the provisions of this bill suggest he is at least directionally correct.

The post Kansas Sports Authority Lets Chiefs Play as Home Team, Referee and Rulebook appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

When Congress created Opportunity Zones in 2017, the goal was simple: use tax incentives to steer private investment into distressed communities. Investors could defer or eliminate capital-gains taxes if they reinvested those gains in designated census tracts.

The hope was that these incentives would spur development and expand opportunity in struggling neighborhoods. But new research suggests the program may suffer from the same problems as Tax-Increment Financing (TIF).

In a recent paper from the National Bureau of Economics, “Understanding the Employment Effects of Opportunity Zones,” the authors examine employment outcomes through 2023. They find that jobs located within Opportunity Zones did increase modestly. But most of those gains appear to come from nearby communities rather than representing new economic activity. Sound familiar?

The authors estimate that job growth inside Opportunity Zones is largely offset by job losses in adjacent low-income tracts. Their overall conclusion is that the program mainly results in a “spatial reallocation of jobs and households” rather than broad economic gains.

The distribution of those jobs also matters. Most of the new positions in Opportunity Zones are filled by workers who live outside the zones—often in more affluent neighborhoods. Meanwhile, the economic circumstances of existing residents show little improvement. Employment among residents rises slightly, but median earnings and poverty rates do not change significantly.

These results should sound familiar to longtime readers of the Show-Me Institute. I’ve argued that programs like TIF often fail to generate new economic growth. Instead, they tend to shift development across neighborhoods or municipalities. Projects still get built, but just in a different place.

The evidence on Opportunity Zones suggests something similar may be happening at the federal level.

Investment incentives can influence where development occurs. But that does not necessarily mean they create new economic opportunities for the people policymakers mean to help.

TIF is TIF is TIF, even at the federal level.

The post Are Opportunity Zones Just Federal-Level TIF? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Thomas Friestad at the Kansas City Business Journal wrote recently that an engineering firm (Gannett Fleming TranSystems, formerly GFT) is moving its offices to the H&R Block building in downtown Kansas City.

Longtime Show-Me Institute readers will recognize H&R Block as a poster child for the false claims that economic development subsidies drive job creation. But this latest news only makes the point more relevant.

The TIF project was adopted in July 2006 and will last for 23 years, through 2029. For the duration of that time, all the additional property taxes and half the increase in sales and income (earnings) tax generated at the site are returned to the developer to offset the costs of developing the site. According to the latest report from the Missouri Auditor’s office, as of April 2023, this subsidy has redirected $23.5 million in property taxes and another $73.4 million in sales and earnings taxes away from the basic services they would have otherwise supported (schools, roads, libraries, etc.), instead sending the money back to the developer.

GFT moving into the H&R Block building means that a portion of the taxes it pays, most notably the 1% earnings taxes levied on each employee, will now also be redirected away from basic services to the developer to pay down the cost of the H&R Block building.

A lot of time is spent talking about how Kansas City loses revenue when businesses leave the city. We need to remember that due to our generous subsidy culture, we often lose revenue even when companies remain.

Side note: One can immediately imagine a scenario wherein developer landlords in TIF districts lower their rents because they know they will capture the additional tax revenue, thus undercutting properties that actually pay taxes. These deals are no way to run a city.

The post The TIF that Keeps Taking appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Youth sports centers have been exploding around Missouri for two decades and, unfortunately, tax subsidies seem to go hand-in-glove with them. Let’s make one thing clear at the start: these aren’t parks. These aren’t public facilities where any kid or family can go and play or picnic or fly a kite with a delightful, singing nanny. These are businesses aimed at youth travel sports clubs, which are private, expensive teams. I like club sports (if my kids’ coaches are reading this, please don’t bench them). I just don’t think they fit any definition of a public good. These private facilities have no business being subsidized by taxpayers; if there is a market for them (there is), then they will succeed on their own.

Here is a brief listing of some of the major youth sports facilities that received taxpayer funds of various types (grants, incentives, special sales taxes, etc.) by various governments:

• Springfield heavily subsidized the Sports Town project.
• St. Louis County had trouble deciding which of multiple youth sports projects to ultimately fund (it eventually subsidized both).
• A baseball complex in Lake of the Ozarks has seen multiple battles over tax incentives.
• O’Fallon just rejected subsidies for another complex (yeah!), but then turned around one week later and approved them (boo!).

This is just a short list. I am sure there are more. The first policy change we need is to remove the ability of cities to make these decisions. At a minimum, counties should make all of these tax subsidy decisions. County officials are at least answerable to the voters for their choices. Municipalities routinely grant tax subsidies to businesses where the immediate impact to the city is limited but the harm to the school district, library district, and other entities that rely on tax revenue is substantial. Yet voters in those other districts often don’t live within the municipality and can’t hold anyone responsible with their votes.

Beyond that, we need local municipal officials to better understand basic economics and think both long term and regionally. I am not holding my breath.

The post What’s the Deal with the Tax Subsidies for Youth Sports Centers? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In a column for The Kansas City Star, I challenged the rosy claims of the alleged economic windfall from hosting the World Cup. Every group I contacted indicated they got the number from someone else. When I finally found the organization that generated the number, it did not respond.

That seems to be the standard procedure.

The Kansas City Business Journal tried to dig into how Kansas City’s tourism bureau concluded that 650,000 visitors would descend on the region. Thomas Friestad wrote: “Visit KC declined to share its specific methodology for estimating visitors, saying it is proprietary information.”

Blaise Mesa, writing for The Beacon, examined the economic impact claims being made by proponents of a new Chiefs stadium in Kansas. He ran into the same wall, writing, “The Beacon contacted the firm that calculated economic development data on the stadium, but they didn’t reply to requests for comment.”

It should be a red flag for even the most diehard supporters of these deals that those who promote the claims refuse to answer basic questions.

The post Extraordinary Economic Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence—Sports Edition appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

How has the project worked out? Did the promises of redevelopment of this part of the city and a great return on the public tax investment pan out? Or did the warnings and concerns of people like Institute analyst Audrey Spalding prove correct?

Of course, Northside has been a total failure, and Audrey and others were correct.

The latest update on almost 20 years of policy failure is that a batch of McKee’s properties (which taxpayers bought for him) is being seized by the city via eminent domain. More of his properties may face the same fate soon. In this particular case, the properties are needed for the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) project, so the eminent domain seizures are for legitimate public use. The city tried to buy these properties from McKee, but no agreement could be reached on price, so the city is taking them. The final price paid for them will almost certainly be determined by a court.

Everything you need to know about why economic development using subsidies is a road to failure is wrapped up in this story. The entire project began not based on market forces, but on the forces of lobbyists, lawyers, and politicians. It was sold as a way to save parts of north St. Louis from decades of poverty and blight—conditions that were created in part by government policy in the first place. The entire Northside redevelopment project has been a colossal failure from the start, and the city and state should never have authorized tax subsidies for it. In the state’s case, it created a brand new law just for McKee to do this.

I would hope the city and state would learn a lesson from the failures of tax incentives and subsidies from this project. I doubt very much that they will. As Orwell said, to see the things in front of one’s nose requires a constant struggle—a struggle that politicians rarely have any incentive to engage in.

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David Stokes, Elias Tsapelas, and Avery Frank join Zach Lawhorn to break down Governor Mike Kehoe’s State of the State address, including what we know so far about his plan to eliminate Missouri’s income tax, proposals to modernize Missouri’s tax system, and the need to rein in state spending. They also discuss open enrollment legislation, the new Missouri Advanced Nuclear Task Force and AI strategy executive order, the push to privatize downtown St. Louis convention center operations, what the Dome’s history says about stadium subsidies, Kansas City’s stadium debate, what they are watching in Jefferson City, and more.

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Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

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