The city is suffering under a $55 million operating deficit. The mayor pointed out in a 2023 budget letter that “The demands of a City this size in square miles and infrastructure age far exceed affordable options for residents and available resources.”

What to do? The answer is obvious: dedicate more public tax dollars to private corporations. And not just baseball, but women’s soccer, too!

Kansas City leaders are once again proposing public subsidies for a sports facility. This time, the beneficiary is the Kansas City Current and the continued development of the Berkley Riverfront.

According to reporting by The Kansas City Star, the city may create a new tax-increment financing (TIF) district and issue up to $235 million in bonds to support expansion of CPKC Stadium and surrounding development. The project would increase stadium capacity from 11,500 to 18,000 seats and add parking, retail, and mixed-use development to the riverfront.

Why? Why is it the responsibility of taxpayers to fund this? Projects like this can be good. They can even be great! But it’s not on par with, say, public safety or infrastructure, or education—which will all lose money because of the subsidy.

Supporters of the proposal point to the team’s success. Lucas told Fox4 that Kansas City must position itself for future events such as a potential Women’s World Cup and noted that there are limits to what an 11,500-seat stadium can host. He also emphasized that the proposed financing would not come from the city’s general revenue fund.

Let’s be careful about that last point. TIF does not create money out of thin air. Without a deal, the Current owners would pay taxes on their development—just like you and me. The proposal is to change that and let them keep that money. Money that we are told the city doesn’t have enough of.

Perhaps the most revealing thing is that Lucas can’t even be bothered to make a coherent defense of this spending. When asked about public subsidies for the Current, he told Fox4, “We’ve been through this before with another professional team that plays in Kansas City.”

But in an April 17, 2026, live interview with the Kansas City Stack Substack, Lucas said about public financing for a Royals ballpark: “this is like the incentive arrangements that we’ve done in other places. Probably the most stadium-like discussion is the stadium we built on the riverfront for the Kansas City Current. That, of course, was an incentive arrangement where you had votes at city council at one of our incentive agencies, that being the Port Authority, and you had state participation. I expect that to be the same.” [3:36 mark]

In other words, we’re giving public money to the Current because we’re giving money to the Royals because we gave money to the Current. That’s his argument.

I was reminded recently of other reporting from Fox4 in which Lucas defended himself for accepting secret gifts from the Royals, among others, to pay for tuxedos and trips to the Super Bowl. He said, “my goal is always to save taxpayer dollars.”

Lucas may have lots of reasons for accepting gifts. But given his willingness to spend public funds on stadiums, it’s hard to believe he cares about saving taxpayer dollars.

The post Kansas City Mayor’s Circular Reasoning on Stadium Subsidies appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Let’s say this is an April election. What happens in the initial petition process is not that the City Council just sits around and twiddles its thumbs, right? We can pass ordinances just like broadly the public can through an initiative petition process. All of these words I’m saying is, no, this will not thwart development of Kansas City Royals stadium.

We’ve actually thought about all of this. We’re going to get the necessary deals done expeditiously to make sure that the Royals can be prepared to open the stadium by opening day of 2030. That requires, I think, dirt moving really by the end of this year at least on the demolition process or very early in 2027. And if you’re looking at it, it takes about 30 days to the election authorities anyway to get the election certified. So, you know, this is not a threat to that.

He made similar comments to The Beacon. It seemed weird to me that, once a petition has been validated, a legislative body like the council could just rush through all sorts of things before the vote, and then tell petitioners, “Hey, sorry. You’re too late.” I’m not alone in thinking this; Dave Helling wrote something similar on the Kansas City Stack.

And, if one cares about the Missouri Supreme Court, the court thinks similar conduct at the state level is weird, too. The Supreme Court didn’t just find it weird—it found it unconstitutional!

In February 2015, the court ruled in Earth Island Inst. v. Union Elec. Co. that the state legislature cannot tweak things to effectively eviscerate a pending vote. They wrote:

The only issue is whether the legislature may negate in advance an initiative petition that has been approved for circulation but prior to the time it is adopted by the people at an election.  It may not.  If a proposed initiative is adopted by the people at an election, then a statute enacted by the legislature during the interim between the initiative’s approval for circulation and its passage is impliedly repealed to the extent of any conflict between the two measures.

It would seem that if such a petition can repeal “a statute enacted by the legislature during the interim between the initiative’s approval for circulation and its passage,” then won’t it repeal a contract or financial agreement enacted by a city council in the same circumstance?

That same decision cited an earlier 1922 Missouri Supreme Court case, State ex rel. Drain v. Becker:

There, while the proposed referendum was pending but before it had been voted on by the people, the legislature purported to repeal the legislation that was the subject of the referendum and to enact a new statute that retained the essential terms of the former legislation. It then argued that this new statute could take effect, regardless of what the people voted on the matter referred, because it was later adopted and was not itself subject to the referendum.

This Court properly rejected this attempt at an end run around the referendum. It held that, once the right of referendum has been invoked, the legislature “is divested of all power in regard to the matter referred until the action of the people has been exercised by a vote upon same.”

That last sentence is the kicker. The court has held that, pending a vote of the people, the legislative body is powerless on that particular matter. So yes, Mayor Lucas, the council may be twiddling its thumbs while the petition process plays out.

The real impact of the petition, however, may not be on the council. I can easily imagine an attorney for a builder, lender, or investor advising their client to steer clear of the project until the petition matter is resolved either by a vote of the people or by months or years of litigation. What company wants to find itself attached to a financing package that voters may yet reject? And the city would be foolish to sign contracts that it may not be able to live up to because of the results of a vote.

It would not surprise me if, despite his dismissive language now, Lucas and the current council vote to put the petition on the ballot themselves, arguing that any delay will just add to the cost of the project. They’ll count on the Royals and their supporters to fund another political campaign. The question then becomes: Are John Sherman and the Royals ownership willing to risk another election defeat?

The post No, Kansas City Cannot Rush Royals Financing to Beat a Petition Vote appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

According to The Kansas City Star, the city has not yet formally applied for funding under Missouri’s Show-Me Sports Investment Act. State participation is a central piece of the financing plan, and city officials are already considering ways to secure up to $600 million in local support.

Negotiations of this scale are complicated. City, state, and team officials may simply still be working through the details. But the delay raises an obvious question. If the public financing package is as straightforward as supporters suggest, why are the numbers still unavailable? (The same could be asked of the Chiefs deal in Kansas.)

One possibility is that the arithmetic is becoming more difficult as officials move from press announcement to actual financing plans.

When the stadium was announced, the Royals indicated that roughly 60% of the project’s estimated $1.9 billion cost would come from public sources. That implies well over $1 billion in taxpayer support. Yet the Show-Me Sports Investment Act places meaningful limits on state assistance. As I noted previously, available estimates suggest the state’s contribution may be closer to $250 million than the much larger figures that have circulated publicly.

If state support is lower than hoped, the remaining public contribution would need to come from Kansas City taxpayers through various tax diversions and subsidies. It won’t be cheap.

The political environment may become even more challenging if voters get a chance to weigh in. Opponents of the project have submitted signatures seeking a public vote on the city’s participation. That effort remains uncertain, but financing proposals acceptable to elected officials may not be acceptable to the public—as we learned in 2024.

To make matters more confusing, the Star previously reported:

Mayor Quinton Lucas told reporters that the city has projections for how much tax revenue a new stadium could generate based on what Kauffman Stadium in the Truman Sports Complex produces now — which city officials say is roughly $5 million a year.

That $5 million is currently going into the city’s coffers and used to fund police, infrastructure, and other public goods. Moving the team downtown and then returning that money to the Royals is not a wash—it’s a $5 million hit to the budget each year. And that does not include the cost to the city if the stadium fails to generate enough money to cover the bond payments—because the city will issue the bonds and back them up.

This project is bad for taxpayers and bad for the city. The delay from the city and the state in providing financing details suggests that elected leaders are beginning to understand exactly how bad it will be.

The post Kansas City Mum on Royals Ransom appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Listen to the segment: 

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On June 5, Patrick Tuohey, senior fellow at the Show-Me Institute, guest-hosted Mundo in the Morning on KCMO Talk Radio, where Terrence Wise of the Missouri Workers Center announced the organization had collected over 4,500 signatures, more than double the roughly 2,000 required, to force a public vote on any taxpayer subsidy of the proposed downtown Royals ballpark. The city clerk has 10 days to validate the signatures, after which the city council has 60 days to act, with a public vote expected in November.

Listen to the full show here. 

The post Kansas City Voters May Get a Say on the Royals Downtown Stadium appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Missouri House Speaker Jonathan Patterson suggested to Fox4 news in Kansas City that Missouri’s contribution to a Royals stadium could reach around $700 to $900 million. Patterson said:

“I think if you look at the numbers, and there was an audit in 2023, the teams generate almost $60 million, and so if you take half of that, then it would be $30 million, then times 30 years, it could be that number. I think those are good estimates that you’re working with.”

That number is way off.

In 2025, during a special legislative session, the House and Senate passed, and the governor signed, Senate Bill (SB) 3, the Show-Me Sports Investment Act. While the bill does not specify a bonding formula, it does set limits: that state spending “shall be no greater than . . . baseline year state tax revenues,” that appropriations may “not exceed thirty years” and that “the net bond proceeds . . . shall not exceed fifty percent of the total costs of the project.” In setting those boundaries, the bill also limits revenue to that “derived directly from the facility.”

Patterson’s estimate of stadium revenue is from a 2023 Jackson County Sports Complex audit, which reports $55 million in tax revenue generated by both teams (the Chiefs and the Royals). But that figure includes all tax revenue collected by state, county, and local jurisdictions. Of that $55 million, only $34,929,233 went to the state—which is what SB 3 covers.

But SB 3 further limits potential support for the Royals to revenue generated only at Kauffman Stadium. Let’s assume half that number, $17 million, is from the Royals’ Kauffman Stadium,* which aligns with estimates provided by Governor Mike Kehoe. If that entire amount were bonded at 6% interest over 30 years, Missouri would be able to give the Royals $234 million.

Another news outlet assumed a 4.5% interest rate over 30 years and concluded the state would be able to give the Royals about $274 million.

Either way, it’s a far cry from $900 million.

There is a lot more to learn about this deal, but SB 3 provides real constraints on what can be counted and borrowed against. Based on the legislation, the 2023 Jackson County audit, and different interest rates, Missouri could contribute roughly $234 to $274 million toward a downtown ballpark. That’s a lot, but only a small portion of what many believe to be a nearly $2 billion project.

*Note: Although the Royals play more games at their stadium than the Chiefs, Arrowhead Stadium has a larger capacity and also hosts concerts for musicians such as Taylor Swift.

The post By the Numbers: What Missouri Might Give the Royals appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Now that the champagne corks have popped at Crown Center over the plans to build a ballpark there, it’s worth considering what comes next for Missouri and Kansas.

On the Missouri side, Kansas City ordinance 260339, passed on April 9, instructs the city manager to move ahead on all sorts of things regarding the deal. Section 7 provides for up to $250,000 for, among other things, “professional services, including but not limited to economic advisory services, financial advisory services, bond advisory services, legal services . . .”

That means the city is going to seek professional opinions on the deal’s feasibility. Who the city hires will tell us a lot about how committed it is to protecting taxpayers. As one person told me, “if they hire an architectural firm, we’ll know they’re not serious.”

The city has a history of relying on conflicted organizations to conduct studies, as it recently did with the World Cup. In 2016, the city paid CDFA—a trade group formed “to promote the common interest of Development Finance Agencies with respect to public policies and programs”—to measure the effectiveness of Kansas City’s subsidy culture. The laughable conclusion was “each incentive dollar invested generated $3.83 in additional tax revenue.”

In Kansas, taxpayers are still waiting on two things. First, they don’t know how big the STAR bond district will be. Previous reporting was a 293-square-mile district encompassing Wyandotte County and the western half of Johnson County. But it could be much, much bigger to make the deal pencil out. Once the district is set, the secretary of commerce is empowered to make it larger whenever he would like (see page 1) to capture more tax revenue.

Second, taxpayers are also waiting on Kansas to determine the base year, which is the year in which the state sales tax revenue is fixed, diverting every additional dollar within the district to the Chiefs’ developments. You might expect the base year to be 2026, when the legislature endorsed the measure, or whenever the project breaks ground. Or perhaps 2025, when the deal was agreed to.

But the deal actually allows the secretary of commerce to set the base year whenever he wants (see page 22). It could be set at 2015, meaning every state sales tax dollar generated over the amount collected in 2015 would go to the Chiefs.

In a deal this expensive for Kansas, the size of the district and the base year are likely to reignite howls of protest from all quarters.

As elected leaders in Topeka and Kansas City throw themselves self-congratulatory parties, the rest of us are faced with the bar tab. And the hangover.

The post Next Up on Chiefs and Royals Stadium Saga appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

I wrote recently that in the lead up to the public vote, even earnings tax defenders could not defend the earnings tax. Despite urging yes votes, they conceded many, if not all, of my claims that the tax makes for bad policy.

Now we might be seeing this story repeat itself with stadium subsidies. It’s being reported that Kansas City’s package of subsidies for a downtown baseball stadium includes bonds issued by the city—and backed by them. This means that if the stadium fails to generate enough revenue to pay the bonds, city taxpayers will make up the difference. This is exactly the type of deal that requires the city to direct over $10 million each year to cover Power & Light District debts.

The Kansas City Business Journal reports city leaders are aware of that same risk with a downtown ballpark for the Royals. They concede:

. . . estimates for Power & Light District sales and economic activity tax generation proved “spectacularly wrong.” The entertainment hub’s annual bond gaps have required about $10.5 million a year from the city’s general fund and $199 million total to date.

City leaders now say they’re being more careful — even as they plan to support as much as two times the district’s original debt for a stadium at Washington Square Park.

How times have changed. Twenty years ago then-Mayor Kay Barnes told a columnist for The Kansas City Star, regarding her deal on the Power & Light District:

“We’re going to look like geniuses” in five or 10 years, Barnes said. The city is paying low interest rates for projects that are capable of paying off the debt, she added.

Barnes could not have been more wrong. (Though she was named the 2018 Kansas Citian of the Year by the Chamber of Commerce, which says more about the chamber than it does Barnes.)

Public subsidies for private interests such as a baseball stadium is still bad policy. They don’t benefit taxpayers. But it’s some comfort that at least Kansas City leaders are capable of learning from their mistakes—right?

Right?

The post Another Policy Concession from Kansas City—Kind of appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The package of subsidies offered to the Kansas City Chiefs by the Missouri Legislature during last year’s special session was bad.

But that bill was not nearly as bad for taxpayers as what is being offered to the team by our neighbors in Kansas. House Bill 2793—the Kansas Sports Authority Act—offers the team, well, it seems, everything.

The bill sets up a Sports Authority to administer the site of a new stadium. That in and of itself is not unique. The Truman Sports Complex, in which the Chiefs and Royals currently play, is administered by the Jackson County Sports Complex Authority. But the power and portfolio of what is being considered in Kansas is breathtaking. Consider the following:

• The authority board includes “a representative of the professional sports team” using the facility as a voting member. This means the Chiefs would have a vote on such things as negotiating its lease, financing, and operations. Having the team oversee itself is a crazy conflict of interest and uncommon in other similar authorities if not absolutely unique, for obvious reasons.
• But the Chiefs aren’t merely one of several votes on the authority. The bill allows additional sports facilities to be placed under the authority if the governing body requests it and the Chiefs also recommend it—giving them an unusual role in expanding the authority’s jurisdiction. This provision may exist because team ownership wants to make sure nobody else can siphon away public funds.

• The authority’s powers “shall not be exercised in a way that conflicts with the terms and conditions set forth in the STAR bond agreement dated December 22, 2025.” This means the authority is locked into the already-negotiated agreement with the team, limiting its ability to adjust terms later.

The three items hand the Chiefs an incredible amount of power. The bill gives the Chiefs a voting seat on the governing authority, binds that authority to the STAR bond agreement the Chiefs negotiated, and gives the team an effective veto over whether additional sports facilities are added to the authority.

But wait, there’s more!

• Contractors must use competition only “to the extent reasonable and practicable in the authority’s sole discretion.” This is a significant weakening of competitive bidding requirements, increasing the risk of opaque contracting and favoritism.

• The authority is exempt from multiple statutes including the Kansas Civil Service Act and the Kansas Administrative Procedure Act, removing the standard hiring, rulemaking and administrative oversight safeguards that normally apply to public entities spending public funds.

• The authority must submit annual reports and testify if legislative committees request it. But this so-called oversight is largely after-the-fact reporting, with no routine legislative approval required for major contracts, bonds or development agreements.

• You read that correctly: the authority may issue special-obligation bonds for stadium construction and infrastructure. Although not legally state debt, political pressure often arises if revenues underperform, creating potential taxpayer exposure. If you doubt this, read up on the fiasco over Platte County and the Zona Rosa shopping center.
• In addition to capturing the increase in sales taxes in the approximately 300-square mile STAR bond district, the authority will be exempt from paying state and local sales and use taxes on purchases of materials, machinery, and services used to construct or equip the facility.

• “Insofar as the provisions of this act are inconsistent with the provisions of any other law, whether general, specific or local, the provisions of this act shall be controlling.” Yeah, that’s in the bill. The authority’s statute is designed to override conflicting state or local laws, potentially weakening local regulatory control.

• And what happens when the stadium is completed and paid for? Nothing. The statute does not include a sunset provision or dissolution trigger. That means the authority could become a permanent quasi-government entity in perpetuity.

• But at least the authority’s power is limited to the stadium, right? Nope. The authority’s purpose includes not just sports facilities and infrastructure used for it, but any “civic, community, athletic, educational, cultural and commercial activities.” “Commercial activities” seems like something that could cover, well, anything.

Kansas State Senator Mike Thompson claims that this measure will set up an unaccountable  “shadow government.” That seems like an over-the-top claim, but the provisions of this bill suggest he is at least directionally correct.

The post Kansas Sports Authority Lets Chiefs Play as Home Team, Referee and Rulebook appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Across Missouri, public officials routinely delay, dodge, or deny access to information that taxpayers are entitled to. They charge outrageous fees, cite vague exemptions, lose track of requests, or hide behind non-disclosure agreements, treating transparency as a nuisance rather than a requirement.

Years ago my colleagues wrote about the prohibitively high fees municipalities sought just to turn over the most basic financial data—the city checkbook. That’s just the beginning.

Consider Kansas City’s downtown ballpark negotiations. Mayor Quinton Lucas indicated he was willing to share details, so I took him up on it. I filed an open records request through the city website. Having received no response for almost two weeks (state law requires action be taken within three days), I followed up only to be told that the request had been wrongly assigned and had been sitting idle. A city employee resolved the issue, adding, “Let’s keep our fingers crossed” that it works this time. Two weeks later I was emailed: “All responsive records pertaining to this request are closed records pursuant to Sec 610.021(12) because such records are related to negotiations for a contract prior to its execution.”

The Kansas City Star reports that the city is again in negotiations with the Royals to subsidize a downtown park. Elected leaders are apparently eager to make sure the deal is not only kept secret, but also that it avoids any public vote.

In August 2025, I asked the Kansas City Streetcar Authority for records about the construction costs of its new Main Street extension—reported to be the most expensive streetcar line in the country at over $100 million per mile. My request was redirected to city staff who told me the matter was under review. I followed up in late October and was told the city would contact me by the end of that week. It’s been almost three months with no update.

In one recent case, a state employee told me the data I needed would take just 20 minutes to find—but only after a formal Sunshine Request was submitted and processed. This person did not know how long that would take. I got the information five days later, and I was grateful. But it underscored a troubling reality: a process meant to promote transparency is now often used to delay it.

Then there are the NDAs. The director of Missouri’s Department of Economic Development signed one with both the Royals and Chiefs—and indicated in a legislative hearing that she may not be able to answer questions. PortKC even requires companies sign an NDA in its application. While sealed bids may serve public interest in competitive contracting, secrecy around subsidies undermines the very idea of public oversight.

Missouri’s Sunshine Law could be a valuable tool, but it needs to be refreshed and its exceptions narrowed. Doing so would not merely combat waste, fraud, and abuse, but would also encourage better public policy.

The post Missouri’s Sunshine Law Needs More than Good Intentions appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In St. Louis County, parts of the county are still recovering from the tornado, the county executive is under indictment (everyone is innocent until proven guilty), and county government’s 2026 budget forecast says there is an $80 million budget shortfall. The last part is the focus of this post.

Every government budget can be cut, and in every government budget there is enough waste and fat to be trimmed to make a difference. That said, cutting government spending is hard (I wish it weren’t). County governments in Missouri are not bloated bureaucracies wasting money hand over foot. They tend to operate fairly efficiently, at least by government standards. So, while making cuts should be the highest priority for the budget shortfall, I doubt that there is $80 million in waste and fraud to be trimmed. Some tough choices are going to have to be made. So, beyond cutting all the waste that it can, what should St. Louis County do?

First, if you are in a hole, stop digging. St. Louis County continues to inexplicably grant tax abatements and other subsidies that never live up to their promises. If these subsidies worked—and by “worked” I mean generated long-term revenues that outweighted the short-term costs—then St. Louis County wouldn’t be in this predicament in the first place. St. Louis County needs to stop giving away taxpayer money as part of a delusion that government planning grows the economy. And yes, this includes getting rid of the senior property tax freeze among other subsidies.

Privatization and outsourcing some services are always an important option for local governments. St. Louis County’s options here are limited, in that the county doesn’t operate any public utilities and it already provides many services via outsourcing. (This is, of course, all a good thing.) The biggest mistake county government has made in recent years is the debacle with the animal shelter. The county should never have taken the animal shelter back in-house. St. Louis County officials should admit their mistake and once again outsource management of the animal shelter.

One of the reasons St. Louis County is in this situation is that it has gone over a decade without a qualified county auditor catching mistakes and making suggestions for fiscal improvements. Hopefully, the recently hired county auditor can change that.

Now let’s talk about the revenue side. Nobody likes tax increases, but sometimes they are necessary. If the county were to consider raising taxes, what taxes should it either institute or increase?

St. Louis County voters have rejected a use tax several times, most recently in April, 2022. A use tax (which is a sales tax on online purchases) is probably the best tax option for the county from a revenue perspective. Two other options could be imposing a small county gas tax to help fund roads or a modest property tax increase. Both of these would be politically complicated.

Beyond all of this, cuts will have to be made. Those may be cuts to services people like, such as the police department or highway projects. But elected officials are there to make hard choices.

The post What Should St. Louis County Do about Its Budget Shortfall? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Excessive use of economic development subsidies enriches developers at the expense of taxpayers, schools, and other public services.

The Solution

Eliminate or substantially reduce the use of economic development subsidies by local governments, including tax-increment financing (TIF), community improvement districts (CIDs), transportation development districts (TDDs), and the use of subsidies for professional sports franchises.

Key Facts

• The border war truce legislation between Missouri and Kansas expired in 2025.

• Five counties in Missouri now use county-level TIF commissions instead of municipal TIF commissions.

An Abysmal Track Record

Subsidies like TIF rarely deliver promised economic benefits. Research shows that 84% of firms would choose the same state no matter what subsidies and incentives were offered by other states. Nationwide studies show that these subsidies typically fail to keep their promises of job creation and economic growth.

The Border War

In 2019, Missouri passed legislation that renewed the agreement with Kansas limiting the use of tax subsidies by both states in the Kansas City metropolitan area. The agreement expired in 2025. The use of tax subsidies to lure businesses across state lines had been shrinking the tax base of the region without leading to any economic growth (as happens with almost all subsidies). The truce, which was first passed in 2014 and renewed in 2019, had been a success. Despite Kansas’s recent, awful decision to use subsidies to lure the Chiefs and Royals across the state line (which was a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement), Missouri should still renew the border war truce legislation. (If Kansas chooses not to renew its part of the deal, then Missouri’s renewal does not go into effect anyway, and both sides will lose out.)

It would be appropriate for Missouri to clarify that the Chiefs, Royals, and other professional sports teams are included in the border war truce legislation as part of this renewal.

Change the Decision-Making Process

A major flaw in the TIF process is that in most cases, cities decide on tax subsidies that affect other taxing districts. Cities can approve a TIF project or property tax abatement that may benefit the city but is harmful to other taxing districts, such as schools. School districts should be able to opt out of TIF just as fire and ambulance districts can. One way to address this problem is to move such decisions to county TIF commissions, where the county appoints most of the members. County officials are more likely to weigh the costs and benefits of the proposed subsidy for the entire region. Currently, there are county TIF commissions in five Missouri counties. That number should be much larger.

It is too easy to create a new TDD or CID. Currently, property owners (often just one) can vote by signature to create a district or create one through a simple court filing. The public can be excluded from the entire process by drawing CID or TDD districts that have no residents. With such little oversight and public involvement, malfeasance runs amok with these taxing districts.

Policy Recommendations

• Renew RSMO §135.1670 (the border war truce legislation), which expired in 2025.

• Move TIF decision-making to the county level in many more counties around Missouri and allow school districts to opt out of TIF and other tax-subsidy programs as fire districts are allowed to.

• Require actual public votes by the entire city or county when new TDDs or CIDs are proposed and refrain from using state or local tax dollars for sports stadiums.

The post Economic Development Subsidies appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Secrecy isn’t standard practice. The Economic Development Corporation—which oversees the TIF Commission and other incentive bodies—does not require NDAs.

These agencies also hold more public meetings, solicit community input, and include representation from schools and libraries. Mayoral appointments to the TIF Commission must be confirmed by the city council. In contrast, the mayor appoints PortKC board members unilaterally.

This lack of transparency disserves the public. While developers might prefer NDAs when pursuing public subsidies—which is a separate concern—here, it’s the public agency itself insisting on secrecy. That’s even more alarming.

PortKC has other problems, some of which I detail in a recent column for The Kansas City Star:

A series of audits from 2021 through 2024 flagged serious internal control problems, including one where the finance director had full authority over journal entries, deposits and account reconciliation — with no oversight. Port KC has repeatedly promised to fix these issues and repeatedly failed to act.

PortKC’s transparency problem is compounded by persistent failures in oversight. A string of audits from 2021 through 2024 flagged major internal control issues. In one case, the finance director had sole authority over journal entries, deposits, and account reconciliation with no checks in place. PortKC acknowledged the problem and pledged reform but never followed through.

The 2024 audit revealed yet another compliance failure: the agency hadn’t verified whether its development partners were barred from receiving federal funds—a basic federal requirement known as “Suspension and Debarment.” Given PortKC’s increasing intake of federal money, this oversight is especially serious.

These aren’t isolated lapses. PortKC also failed to properly vet Lux Living in 2022. The pattern is clear and ongoing. With long-standing problems still unaddressed, the question is no longer whether something will go wrong, but when.

These issues matter more than ever. At the time of my Star column, I noted PortKC might be involved in financing a downtown park for the Royals. That’s now more likely: the Kansas City Business Journal reports that tax-free bonds via PortKC are under discussion.

Meanwhile, city officials are exploring ways to approve deals without a public vote. Combine that with PortKC’s built-in secrecy, and the result is troubling: public funds deployed without public oversight.

The post Why Is PortKC Keeping Secrets? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Startling to me, anyway. None of the legislators on the committee seemed bothered.

Is there any public benefit to this secrecy?

There can be when vendors are bidding competitively for a state contract—say, road construction. Protecting proprietary financial or technical details in that context may encourage better bids and serve the public interest.

But stadium subsidies are different—there’s no obvious reason why secrecy is necessary or helpful. When public officials negotiate deals to hand out taxpayer money, the public deserves transparency. Teams may want discretion. State representatives may want to negotiate without tipping off competing states. But neither, in my opinion, is a good enough reason to give it to them.

Yet secrecy has become the norm. Kansas City Mayor Quinton Lucas won’t release the city’s proposal for a downtown stadium to the Royals—even though Clay County released its proposal. The city also kept its 2017 Amazon HQ2 bid under wraps, while many other cities disclosed theirs.

Judging by the lawmakers’ lack of reaction, non-disclosure agreements are now standard operating procedure. They shouldn’t be. Even if elected officials are fine being left in the dark, the public shouldn’t be.

The post Why Is the Department of Economic Development Keeping Secrets? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

On June 10, 2025, Patrick Tuohey, senior fellow at the Show-Me Institute, testified before the Missouri House Economic Development Committee during a special session focused on proposed stadium subsidies for the Kansas City Chiefs and Royals. In his testimony, Tuohey argued that the proposed funding package is based on a false sense of urgency, fueled by non-competitive offers from Kansas and a misleading June 30 deadline. He questioned the economic value of the proposed subsidies, highlighted concerns about taxpayer risk, and warned against allowing professional sports teams to play local governments against each other.

Read his submitted testimony here: https://bit.ly/4kXtdII

See the recording of the full hearing here: https://house.mo.gov/MediaCenter.aspx

The post Testimony of Patrick Tuohey Before the Missouri House Economic Development Committee June 10, 2025 appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

There wasn’t anything new in the testimony. It included romantic nostalgia for bygone players and the pride we have in our teams, claims about all the economic impacts that these subsidies will drive, and, of course, fears that the teams will leave if we don’t give them what they want.

Toward the end of the supporters’ testimony, Wes Rogers, a Kansas City councilmember and former state legislator, rose to speak in favor. His remarks included the following:

I make my living selling and leasing commercial dishwashers to restaurants. Already, no matter where the Royals and Chiefs go, Kansas is kicking our butt. I install more dishwashers in the state of Kansas than I do in the state of Missouri, period. And there’s a whole bunch of reasons for that I’m happy to talk about later. But I promise you this, if we put this stadium or the Chiefs stadium in Kansas, my guys are going to be to Kansas more than they are to Missouri and that’s going to continue. And so we can say this doesn’t have an economic impact. I know it does because I’m paying 20 guys to go to Kansas instead of Missouri to work and that number is going to increase.

This is odd testimony in favor of subsidies as a source of economic development because the Chiefs and Royals already have stadia in Missouri. Yet (despite this?) he argues “Kansas is kicking our butt,” and he is seeing more business on the Kansas side. Redirecting taxpayer dollars toward new or refurbished facilities won’t change that.

I suspect Rogers knows that the real reasons for Kansas outperforming Missouri are the “whole bunch of reasons” he alludes to. For example, the high tax rate and low level of services Kansas City provides—in large part because of taxpayer-funded subsidies, such as those for sports teams, being such a huge drain on city coffers.

Earlier in his testimony, Rogers offered, “I’m actually reading economic studies about baseball, which I’ve never done before.” This is good news, but if the statement above is a reflection of his grasp of the material so far, he needs to do more reading—and rereading.

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In this episode, Susan Pendergrass speaks with Patrick Tuohey, senior fellow at the Show-Me Institute, about Missouri’s upcoming special legislative session, slated to begin on June 2, and the debate over taxpayer subsidies for stadiums. They discuss why stadium subsidies often fail to deliver promised economic benefits, how billionaire sports team owners leverage public funds for private gain, and the potential impact of a $50 million annual giveaway to the Kansas City Chiefs and Royals. Tuohey explains the flawed logic behind the argument that Missouri must compete with Kansas in a “race to the bottom” and argues that the state should instead focus on core services like public safety, education, and infrastructure. They also cover the broader implications of using taxpayer dollars to benefit wealthy team owners, the political dynamics driving these proposals, and what citizens and lawmakers should consider as the special session begins.

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Timestamps: 

00:00 Introduction to the Special Session
01:59 Stadium Subsidies: The Chiefs and Royals
05:35 Economic Impact of Stadium Subsidies
09:43 Political Dynamics of the Special Session
12:34 Public Sentiment and Legislative Challenges
16:29 Conclusion and Future Implications

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post Missouri’s Special Session and Giveaways to Billionaires with Patrick Tuohey appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Royals, who have spent more than three years insisting they will vacate the K after their lease expires in 2030, face a conundrum: they have no new stadium site selected, no clear funding source, and no legislative momentum. Missouri lawmakers are on track to adjourn without approving any stadium funding bills. Kansas, meanwhile, has not yet extended the STAR bonds meant to lure the team across the border.

The Royals’ 2024 pitch for an East Crossroads stadium fell apart when Jackson County voters overwhelmingly rejected a new 40-year sales tax. Since then, the team has gone quiet. They have options—North Kansas City, Washington Square Park, and previously Overland Park—but each presents new complications. Land assembly, tax votes, and public skepticism loom large.

According to Friestad, the Royals do have the option to extend their lease at Kauffman for up to 10 additional years, through 2041. The provision, part of their 2006 lease, only requires 12 months’ notice and a clean track record with the Jackson County Sports Complex Authority.

That means the team isn’t nearly as cornered as some may think. And as experts in Friestad’s piece explain, the ticking clock shouldn’t pressure local officials into bad deals.

“This point just means your current agreement ends,” said Geoffrey Propheter, a University of Colorado-Denver professor who studies sports economics. “Nothing bad happens at this point.”

Indeed, Propheter compares it to a standard lease renewal in the housing market—if both parties want to keep the arrangement, they’ll find a way. That’s an important reminder in Kansas City, where both major sports franchises have long benefited from generous public terms. Royals critics, such as former City Councilwoman Becky Nace, argue that the team already enjoys the best deal they’re likely to get: a dedicated sales tax for stadium maintenance and operations, covering hundreds of millions in costs. Proposals in Kansas and downtown Kansas City would cover only construction, not ongoing upkeep.

The article also touches on the broader context. MLB relocations are rare and messy. Nashville, Salt Lake City, and Las Vegas are often floated as threats, but relocating to any of those locations would involve significant political or financial headwinds. Economist Victor Matheson called such leverage “overstated,” pointing to the Oakland A’s relocation saga—the team is now stranded in a minor league stadium with uncertain funding for a Vegas move.

What emerges is a portrait of slow-motion bargaining. The Royals’ ownership may still prefer a new stadium, but they’re learning what voters and lawmakers have long suspected: urgency doesn’t equal necessity, and options, while limited, do exist.

Kansas City Mayor Quinton Lucas has floated a revised package between $1.2 billion and $1.4 billion for either a new stadium or a Kauffman renovation, though specifics remain scarce. Meanwhile, voter fatigue and fiscal realism continue to grow.

The takeaway is clear: a looming lease expiration should not be confused with a deadline for action. Kansas Citians rejected a rushed deal last year. If there’s a better one to be had, it will take time, transparency, and trust to get there.

The post Royals May Stay at Kauffman Amid Stadium Inertia appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

On August 7, Patrick Tuohey joined Mundo in the Morning on KCMO to discuss the recent Missouri elections and whether they have any impact on the Kansas-Missouri border war over stadium subsidies for the Chiefs and Royals.

The post Do the Election Results Change the Border War? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In this episode, Susan Pendergrass speaks with Patrick Tuohey, Senior Fellow at the Show-Me Institute, about the Missouri-Kansas border war over economic development incentives. They discuss how the Kansas City Chiefs and Royals reignited the subsidies battle between the states, the history of the feud, the effects on local economies, and more.

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Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post The Chiefs and Royals Restart the Border War with Patrick Tuohey appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The reality is starkly different, and we shouldn’t be surprised. Historically, the economic benefits of hosting the Olympics have been dubious, and Paris is proving no exception. Despite the €7.5 billion investment, tourism has slumped, with travelers avoiding the city due to expected overcrowding. The author of the Telegraph piece writes:

Judging by the experience of other cities, many of those supposed benefits never materialise and the host is stuck with a series of expensive developments that no one can find a use for. To take just one example, the London Stadium, constructed for the 2012 games, makes a decent ground for West Ham, but it is hard to understand why taxpayer’s cash was needed to build it.

I share this in the hopes that seeing the failed promises of big sporting events overseas will make the argument at home more palatable. These investments just don’t pan out for taxpayers, be they for the Olympic Games, the Royals, Chiefs, or Cardinals. And yes, as my colleague David Stokes wrote 14 years ago, “there is a big difference between hosting an event for which you have to build facilities, like the Olympics, and hosting an event for which you already have the requisite facilities for other purposes.” But the impact, or rather the lack thereof, remains.

Given these challenges, the author suggests a permanent home for the games. Perhaps Greece. Establishing a permanent venue could drastically reduce costs, simplify organization, and minimize corruption.

That may be a viable solution for the Olympics, but for those of us stateside, the lesson needs to be learned. These events, be they Olympics or political conventions, don’t drive meaningful economic activity. They aren’t worth expending public funds on.

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