Susan Pendergrass speaks with Andrew G. Biggs, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, about the Social Security trustees’ latest report and what it means for the program’s future. They discuss the projected 2032 insolvency of the retirement trust fund, why the trustees’ birth rate assumptions may be too optimistic, the proposed Moreno-Warren plan to eliminate the payroll tax ceiling, the Cassidy-Kaine plan, and why pension experts oppose it, what would actually happen if the trust fund ran out, and more.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:00):
I feel fortunate to have grabbed some of your time. Andrew Biggs from the American Enterprise Institute, I appreciate you coming on to talk to us. Social security has been nothing but in the news recently, and you know more than anyone else. So thank you for taking the time.

Andrew Biggs (00:14):
That’s why I’m so cheerful. The more you know about Social Security, the happier you are. But thanks for having me, Susan. It has been busy. I’m really happy to be with you today.

Susan Pendergrass (00:16):
I’m in my sixties. I see something about Social Security running out of money and I pay attention. So just to bring us all up to speed: in the last week, there was a news flash that Social Security is going to run out of money sooner. What does it really mean?

Andrew Biggs (00:39):
Every year the Social Security trustees, which is mostly members of the cabinet, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Social Security Commissioner, and so on, come out with a report projecting the program’s financial health, both in the short term and the long term. That happens every year, and it’s been getting worse every year. In this year’s report, they projected that the retirement trust fund will go insolvent, or run out of money, in 2032. They also projected a significantly larger long-term funding gap in the years thereafter, and this is worth explaining.

When the trust fund runs out, it doesn’t mean there’s zero money to pay benefits. As long as we’re paying a trillion dollars a year in payroll taxes, there will be money to pay benefits. But when the trust fund runs out, it means benefits will be cut, and their projection is somewhere around 22%. The size of that long-term funding gap dictates how big the cuts are going to be in the years thereafter. The trustees lowered their projections for birth rates, and they found that the One Big Beautiful Bill has worsened Social Security’s finances. A variety of things made this long-term funding gap worse. It’s really hard to paint a happy picture. The trust fund can be running out in about six years, and the funding gap and the benefit cuts in years thereafter are going to be larger. It’s a sobering picture.

Susan Pendergrass (02:16):
I’m not trying to pile on, but I think I saw that they extended the time when they expect birth rates to bounce back. Is that true? Because I have not seen anything anywhere, and I’ve spoken to some demographers, to suggest birth rates are ever going to bounce back.

Andrew Biggs (02:35):
Here’s the interesting thing. If you look at the Congressional Budget Office or the US Census Bureau, right now the fertility rate is about 1.6 children per woman on average, and both the CBO and the Census project that’s going to remain pretty much steady, declining a little bit over coming decades. Social Security had a very different picture. As of last year, they thought the birth rate, which is 1.6 now, was going to immediately start rising and go back up to 1.9 children per woman in the next several decades. That makes Social Security’s finances better. More kids being born means more people paying into the system. What they did in this year’s report is moderate a bit on fertility. They said, okay, it’s not going to rise back to 1.9, it’ll rise back to 1.75. So they are still over-optimistic. I’ve talked to some demographers and economists who’ve really focused on the birth rate, and they described the trustees’ assumptions as, quote, fanciful, meaning they just weren’t plausible. Now they’re somewhat more plausible, but they still tend

Susan Pendergrass (03:32):
Okay.

Andrew Biggs (03:48):
to be more optimistic than other agencies. And to me, frankly, this is a concern. You really want the people who are the scorekeepers, the umpires, to be playing it as straight as they possibly can. We know that these guesses are going to be wrong because this stuff is impossible to predict with certainty, but most demographers think the best guess is we’ll stay around 1.6 going forward. You’ve seen a decline, and a good predictor of birth rates is religiosity, the level of religious belief in a country. The US has typically been much more religious than Western Europe, and that’s played into fertility. There has been a big decline in religious belief, particularly among younger Americans, along with all the other pessimism you see among younger people. When people are pessimistic, they tend not to have a lot of kids. So the best guess is we’re going to stay about where we are.

I wrote something the other day saying the bad news in this trustees report is even worse than last year’s, but it could have been even worse. They project a long-term funding gap above 4.4 percent of payroll. What that means is if you took the 12.4% payroll tax today and raised it immediately and permanently by 4.4 percentage points, from 12.4 to 16.8, that would in theory keep the trust fund solvent for 75 years. But a better guess would be a funding gap of around 4.8 to 5 percent. This is real money. For years, people on the left have said, well, okay, we know Social Security has a solvency problem, but it’s a manageable issue. They were saying that when the funding gap was 2% of payroll. Now you’re looking at four to five percent. That’s a lot of money, at a time when a lot of other things are making claims on the budget. We have some difficult choices to make and we really have to start thinking hard about this.

Susan Pendergrass (06:09):
Okay, so what about this idea that’s been floated in the last week of getting rid of the payroll cap? First of all, explain the payroll cap, and then this idea of getting rid of it.

Andrew Biggs (06:17):
Sure. Social Security has a 12.4% payroll tax, half paid by you and half paid by your employer. That applies only to wages up to $184,500. That’s called the payroll tax ceiling, or the tax max. That dollar figure goes up every year, but this year it’s $184,000. You only pay taxes on those wages, and you also earn benefits only on those wages. People say, well, Bill Gates doesn’t pay more taxes than that. But he doesn’t earn any benefits either. So you’re capping both the taxes and the benefits.

To fast forward a little bit: there’s an op-ed in the Washington Post this week from Senator Bernie Moreno, a Republican from Ohio, and Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat from Massachusetts. They say it’s just common sense to eliminate that cap and tax all earnings for Social Security. The interesting thing is how uncommon that would actually be. Our payroll tax ceiling is $184,000. Almost every other country has a ceiling on their payroll taxes for their pension system, and in almost every other country that ceiling is lower. In Canada, you only pay taxes and earn benefits up to around $60,000 in earnings. In the UK it’s about $70,000. In Germany it’s about $70,000. We are already an outlier for how high up the income ladder we tax people. To eliminate the cap entirely is a big deal. It’s effectively a 12 percentage point increase in the top marginal tax rate. I pulled an example of somebody living in New York City. A high-income person already pays 37% in federal income taxes, plus regular Medicare taxes, the additional Medicare tax, state taxes, and city taxes. If you add another 12 percentage points on top of that, their marginal tax rate would be in the mid-60s. And that’s before we’ve fixed Medicare or done anything else. The federal budget is still broke, and you’ve taxed these people as high as you possibly can. So these things that look like common sense, why don’t we just tax everybody,

Susan Pendergrass (08:37):
Right, right.

Andrew Biggs (08:46):
look, there are reasons for that.

Susan Pendergrass (08:49):
And were they suggesting that if I make $300,000 and I pay my 6.2 percent, totaling 12.4 with my employer, on my entire salary, that my Social Security benefit one day would be higher? Are they talking about capping the benefit or just getting rid of the cap on contributions?

Andrew Biggs (09:06):
They haven’t been very specific. They say Social Security would continue to be an earned benefit, which kind of implies you would continue to earn benefits on the additional taxes you would pay. Let’s say if we uncap the payroll tax and base your taxes on your total earnings, you’d also base your benefits on your total earnings. What you get then is, okay, you’re getting all this money from people in the short term, but you have to pay them higher benefits in the long term. That offsets some of the savings. And this morning I was running some numbers looking back to the 1970s. We had a huge run-up in benefit levels from Social Security in the 1970s. The benefit formula we have today is not the one FDR invented. It really happened in the 1970s, where they jacked up benefits in a really foolish way, and then to help pay for it, they increased the payroll tax ceiling. Right now you pay taxes on earnings up to $180,000. If we had just kept the tax max from 1970 and indexed it to wages, it would have been only $95,000. So they essentially doubled the wages on which you pay Social Security taxes. But what happens is they also doubled the wages on which people earn benefits. I’ve highlighted the point that if you have a high-income

Susan Pendergrass (10:38):
Mm-hmm.

Andrew Biggs (10:43):
couple retiring today, they could get almost $100,000 in total benefits, which is absurd. There’s no reason a government program should be paying anybody that amount. If you want that kind of income in retirement, you save more in your 401k. It’s better for you, better for the economy. But it was a result of this short-term step they took in the 70s. They said, hey, we raised benefits too high, let’s jack up the tax max. And they didn’t worry about the fact that in the future you’d have to pay benefits on that. Well, the future is today.

Susan Pendergrass (11:05):
Okay.

Andrew Biggs (11:13):
Now we’re broke again, we need extra money again, and these guys say, well let’s just jack up the tax max. But then you’ll pay extra benefits in the future. It becomes this chasing-your-tail kind of thing.

Susan Pendergrass (11:16):
Yeah. Yeah.

Andrew Biggs (11:25):
And the problem when you do it is there’s no country on earth paying $100,000 a year from a social insurance program, except for us. And the reason we do is these stupid historical decisions. If you’ve got this high-income couple in the US retiring today, they can get almost $100,000 from Social Security. If they lived in Canada, they’d get like $35,000. And that’s perfectly fine. Nobody’s starving to death in Canada in retirement. They just save more on their own.

Susan Pendergrass (11:35):
I’ll say.

Andrew Biggs (11:55):
The irony is that we think of ourselves as a free-market, small-government country, and our Social Security program is enormous, primarily because we’re paying benefits to people that other countries say, yeah, we don’t need to pay benefits to these guys.

Susan Pendergrass (12:11):
And yet people say, I put my money in, I get my money out.

Andrew Biggs (12:14):
Yeah, and I understand it. When I say we shouldn’t be paying $100,000 a year to a high-income couple, you get the email saying, well, I paid in. And if you paid in, you feel you have this moral claim on benefits. The problem is Social Security is still broke. We still need higher taxes or lower benefits. The idea that you’re just going to get your full benefits with the taxes you paid doesn’t work because the system can’t afford to do it. So you have to make the choice: do I want to pay higher taxes or get lower benefits? I’ve got to pick my poison. Most high-income people would prefer to get lower benefits. They care more about their taxes than their benefits. But people are still living in this dream world where this system, which is $30 trillion in the hole, is somehow going to pay them everything they’ve been promised and just screw somebody else. Everybody thinks they’re the guy who’s going to get everything and somebody else is going to get screwed.

Susan Pendergrass (13:14):
Yeah. I definitely hear people saying today, maybe I should go ahead and take it early and then I’ll get grandfathered in and my benefits won’t get lowered.

Andrew Biggs (13:26):
It probably won’t make a difference. In general, the Social Security benefit formula works based on your birth cohort, the year in which you’re born, not really the year in which you claim benefits. And people who are going to do Social Security reform understand the incentives. They don’t want to make it easy for people to game the system. So Social Security reform will probably work itself out in such a way that

Susan Pendergrass (13:42):
Right.

Andrew Biggs (14:03):
you can’t get some big advantage by claiming early. I could think of some conceivable possibilities, but I still would not encourage people to claim early.

Susan Pendergrass (14:14):
Okay, I want to talk about two more things I read in the last week. One was a letter from Tim Kaine about his idea with Senator Cassidy. What’s that idea for fixing it?

Andrew Biggs (14:24):
The interesting thing is people say Social Security reform has to be bipartisan. So we have two bipartisan ideas. We have Moreno and Elizabeth Warren, a Republican and a Democrat. They’ve got one idea, eliminating the payroll tax ceiling.

Susan Pendergrass (14:39):
Third rail.

Andrew Biggs (14:49):
Cassidy, a Republican from Louisiana, and Tim Kaine, a Democrat from Virginia, they’ve got a bipartisan plan. And guess what? Their plan is also terrible. If there’s any lesson from this, it’s that bipartisan doesn’t mean good.

Susan Pendergrass (15:00):
Bipartisanly terrible.

Andrew Biggs (15:04):
Yeah. Look, ultimately Social Security reform is going to have to be bipartisan, given the way the political system works. On the other hand, there is some lesson that if both Republicans and Democrats can agree on something, it might be a terrible idea. With Cassidy and Kaine, they are explicitly, and Cassidy said this, solving a political problem. The political problem is that neither Republicans nor Democrats want to vote for either tax increases or benefit cuts. You’d think Democrats want to raise your taxes and Republicans want to cut your benefits. The reality is they don’t want to do either of those things because they realize both are politically unpopular, which is why we’ve gone 40 years literally doing nothing. So their solution is that we don’t have to make these difficult votes. Instead, the federal government will borrow about $2 trillion, invest that money

Susan Pendergrass (16:02):
Tough.

Andrew Biggs (16:04):
in stocks and private equity, high-risk, high-return stuff. Then they claim they’re going to hold this fund for 75 years so it can build up value. In the meantime, when Social Security’s trust fund runs out in 2032, the federal government will borrow against the assumed gains on this investment fund.

Susan Pendergrass (16:06):
Right. Mm-hmm.

Andrew Biggs (16:29):
They say the borrowing will be at a lower rate because it’s the federal government. And they say after 75 years, all the gains in this investment fund will pay back all the borrowing and we’re all good. And let me count the ways there are problems with that. If you work at the state level,

Susan Pendergrass (16:45):
It’s just kicking the can.

Andrew Biggs (16:52):
state-based think tanks almost know more about this than federal people. A lot of underfunded state pension systems do things called pension obligation bonds. Their pension system is underfunded, they don’t want to raise contributions or cut benefits, so they borrow and invest in the stock market and hope it works. The pension obligation bond is the hallmark of a poorly funded, poorly run pension system. Think New Jersey, Illinois, things like that.

Susan Pendergrass (17:21):
Yeah.

Andrew Biggs (17:23):
There’s a national group of state budget officers that has come out and basically said as an institution, don’t do this. Borrowing for your pension is a bad idea. So it really is fitting for the times that the Cassidy-Kaine plan says, let’s take this worst idea from state and local government

Susan Pendergrass (17:45):
Yeah.

Andrew Biggs (17:47):
employee pensions, which has been condemned as bad practice, and put it on steroids and do that for Social Security. And what it really gets to is they just don’t understand the finances of it. And to be frank, they won’t listen. They have talked to every pension expert I know, and this Social Security world is pretty small. We all know each other on both sides. We may not agree on everything. Literally every pension expert I know says this is a terrible idea.

Susan Pendergrass (17:54):
Yeah.

Andrew Biggs (18:17):
But their political considerations are more important than policy, and that’s the problem with all of them.

Susan Pendergrass (18:24):
I mean, it feels free. They’re basically saying it’s like a timeshare. It just feels free right now. We just borrow the money. Okay, so

Andrew Biggs (18:31):
It’s been pointed out to them that if you can fund Social Security this way, you could fund the entire federal government this way and never collect any taxes. At one point Senator Cassidy was quoted in a newspaper article saying, well, yeah, sure, in theory you could. And I’m like, if something implies there’s a free money machine, maybe you need to question your assumptions.

Susan Pendergrass (18:38):
Sure. Okay.

Andrew Biggs (18:54):
I could give you a whole variety of reasons why this doesn’t work, but one macro point that’s come to me: I’ve been doing Social Security for a long time. I worked in the Bush administration in 2005 when they tried and failed to do Social Security reform. One of the problems we face today is that your elected officials understand Social Security policy much less well than they did 20 years ago. They just don’t understand how the system works. Going back to the Moreno-Warren idea of applying the payroll tax to all earnings,

Susan Pendergrass (19:22):
Yeah.

Andrew Biggs (19:37):
okay, you’re adding 12 percentage points to your top tax rate. There’s a reason Sweden and France and others don’t do this anymore. They used to have incredibly high tax rates. They don’t now. We would end up in many cases with a higher tax rate than most European countries. We have some philosophical dedication to small government and things like that. They don’t. And so if they’re not doing it,

Susan Pendergrass (19:43):
Yes. Yeah, yeah.

Andrew Biggs (20:02):
it’s because there’s a practical reason this isn’t a good idea. The same applies to wealth taxes. That’s been tried in Europe. They’re like, yeah, we’re not doing that anymore because it doesn’t work. But your average senator now

Susan Pendergrass (20:14):
It is happening around the country, the billionaire tax. What happens in 2032 if no one is either brave enough or smart enough to take this on in the next six years?

Andrew Biggs (20:17):
They’re just not aware of these policy issues, and that’s a real problem. It’s like having a guy fix your car who doesn’t know how to fix cars. 2032 is the date. If you have a recession, it might be 2031. It’s not certain, but it is certain it’s happening soon.

Susan Pendergrass (20:47):
Yeah. Okay.

Andrew Biggs (20:53):
There’s a literal reading of the law, which is that Social Security can’t pay out benefits it doesn’t have dedicated resources for. Once the trust fund runs out, the only dedicated resources are mostly the payroll tax, plus a little bit of money from income taxes levied on retirement benefits. And those were cut as part of the One Big Beautiful Bill. So if the trust fund runs out, they’d have to rely on the money they have on hand, which implies around a 22% benefit cut.

A lot of times people assume that benefit cut has to be across the board. If you did it that way, you’d throw a lot of people into poverty. I did some work a year or so ago with a lawyer in DC named Kristen Shapiro, and what we found is that the legal precedent shows the executive branch, meaning the president working through the Social Security Commissioner, would have some discretion. What we found is you could maintain full benefits for about 50% of people, the poorest 50% of seniors, and then cap benefits above that. If you cap the maximum benefit at about $24,000 per year for a single person or $48,000 for a couple, that is enough to make Social Security solid without raising taxes. So the point is simply you have some discretion.

The reality is Congress isn’t going to allow big benefit cuts, for political reasons. On the other hand, are they willing to have the size of tax increases needed, all in one go, to keep Social Security paying full benefits? I don’t think they want that either. So the reality is probably they’re going to borrow a lot of the money. And that’s where you get to the issue of how much more borrowing the financial markets will swallow. We effectively borrow from the public to repay the Social Security Trust Fund, but there’s an end to that. You say, okay, 2032, we have to do something. We have to raise taxes or cut benefits. If in 2032 the stated policy of the federal government is, well, we’re just going to keep borrowing to pay Social Security even though we have no prospect of paying it back, you wouldn’t blame some big market players for saying, yeah, I’m out, because you don’t want to lend money at low interest rates to someone who says they can’t pay it back. Then you start getting a couple of things. One is more federal borrowing squeezes out capital in the rest of the economy, and so interest rates naturally rise.

Susan Pendergrass (23:18):
Right.

Andrew Biggs (23:31):
But then there’s a second element: if you’re afraid the federal government can’t pay you back, over and above that natural increase in the interest rate, you’d apply a risk premium to treasury debt. You’d say, look, Treasury is not this rock-solid investment anymore. It’s more like a junk bond, or like borrowing from Illinois, and you make them pay a premium. That’s going to drive up

Susan Pendergrass (23:43):
US government borrowing. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Andrew Biggs (24:01):
interest rates, and that makes it tougher not just for the federal government but for everybody. If you want to buy a car or a house, all your interest rates rise. There’s also going to be real temptation to inflate away the debt. The federal government doesn’t want to default on its debt, but

Susan Pendergrass (24:24):
Yeah, yeah.

Andrew Biggs (24:25):
historically the way you deal with this is inflation. Think about all the debt we took on during COVID, shoveling money out the door to everybody, and then we had massive inflation after it. A lot of those people who bought treasury debt didn’t get a good deal, because if you get 20% inflation on

Susan Pendergrass (24:34):
Absolutely. Yeah.

Andrew Biggs (24:47):
a treasury bond with a nominal fixed interest rate, that’s a real problem. So inflation becomes increasingly tempting. You look at this scenario and you’re like, can’t anybody here play this game? Every other country is not going bankrupt. We just have to do what they do.

Susan Pendergrass (24:51):
Yeah, yeah. So could we, if we really got our heads around it and started today or next year, incrementally raise the 12.4%, or incrementally get people used to lower benefits after a certain income or wealth level?

Andrew Biggs (25:18):
Sure. Yes. The way I think about it, there are two ways people think about it: the wrong way and my way. The wrong way is, let’s just pick from this menu of options to make Social Security solvent. We can raise the payroll tax a bit, raise the retirement age a bit, cut cost-of-living adjustments a bit, raise the tax cap a bit, and do these things until the system is solvent.

Susan Pendergrass (25:34):
Yes. Yeah.

Andrew Biggs (25:54):
That’ll get you a solvent program, but it won’t be a program that particularly works very well or is good for the economy. A more effective way is to ask, what do we want this system to do? If you talk about Social Security reform, what you hear is that it’s a social insurance program, a safety net, an anti-poverty program. Okay, it has to do that. And that part is really very cheap, because we don’t literally have that many poor seniors, their benefits aren’t very high, and it’s not a problem to maintain benefits for low-income seniors. When you ask what Social Security should do, nobody is saying we need to be paying high-income seniors $100,000 a year. There’s no public purpose for it. Nobody thought it out in advance. It was simply an unintended consequence. So if you’ve got things that are really costing a lot of money and have no public purpose, and those people can save for retirement on their own, you start scaling that back. The distinction I’m making is between policy changes simply for the purposes of keeping Social Security solvent, and policy changes for the purpose of making Social Security do what it needs to do, the real public purpose, and not doing things that serve no public purpose. My point is the things I’m talking about are things you should do whether Social Security is insolvent or not.

I’ll give you an example: Australia’s retirement system. Australia is a lot like us, not particularly more conservative or liberal, just sort of normal. Their Social Security program essentially is targeted at eliminating poverty in old age. It’s actually a better safety net than Social Security provides, but the benefits decline down to zero once you get above the poverty level. And to help people above that level save for retirement, everybody is enrolled in a 401k-type account. What that says is, if everybody’s participating in retirement plans as they should, the government’s job becomes easier. Their Social Security system costs about two percent of GDP. Ours costs about six percent. It’s a third as costly, provides a better safety net, and it comes because they’re actually thinking about what they’re doing.

Susan Pendergrass (28:18):
Mm-hmm.

Andrew Biggs (28:26):
We’re literally not thinking about what we’re doing. There’s a saying in business: the worst reason to do something is because we’re already doing it. That is literally how Social Security policymaking works. Nobody knows why our benefit formula is what it is or why the tax max is what it is. It’s all just stuff we inherited from the 1970s from people who were not in any way thinking clearly about what they were doing. It was people in the 70s trying to win elections, and we end up with the bag.

Susan Pendergrass (28:52):
Speaking of 2005, there was an attempt to offload a small portion of people’s contributions into the market, right? That failed.

Andrew Biggs (29:09):
That was the Bush proposal. I was in the White House then, kind of in a number-cruncher role, so I knew that stuff pretty well. I did a lot of events with President Bush around the country. When we came up on the 20th anniversary of Bush’s proposal in 2025, I started thinking to myself, what if his plan had passed? What would have happened? So I built a model. Back then they were saying, okay, you’re going to have some reductions in traditional Social Security benefits for middle and high-income people, and then you’re going to have a personal account where you can invest part of your existing payroll tax in stocks and bonds. The total benefit you get at retirement is a combination of those two. People were speculating. Well, we don’t know what the stock market’s going to do. But 20 years later, we’ve got some data, so let’s just see what happened. The results were that for people

Susan Pendergrass (30:01):
Now we do.

Andrew Biggs (30:07):
retiring today, low and middle-income people would have had higher total benefits by a little bit. The very highest-income people, their benefits would be down by a couple percent because the cuts to their traditional benefits would be larger than the gains from their personal account. But even they would be fine; it’s not a big deal. Going forward, it looked like people would do a little bit better with the Bush plan than with the traditional system. But here’s the important thing: the traditional system is broke. We just talked about how it goes broke in 2032, with huge deficits. The Bush proposal wouldn’t have made Social Security totally solvent, but it would have addressed half or two-thirds of the long-term funding gap. So you’d get a system that would have paid you benefits around the same as, or maybe a little bit better than, Social Security, but would be in much more solid financial shape. Today the times are different, and I don’t think personal accounts are really viable. But the point is, if they had done something back then, everything could be easier today. But members of

Congress were just too afraid. Republicans were afraid of taking the political hit. For Democrats, it was too tempting to give the political hit. They knew they had to do something, but they couldn’t swallow hard and say, look, let’s just go in on this thing together. They didn’t want to give Bush the win because by that point Iraq was going badly and they really didn’t like him. So they beat him up. But the problem is Bush served his term and is happily retired in Texas. The people who really got screwed were the ones who depend on Social Security, because we didn’t fix it. And you just hope that’s not what we do again.

Susan Pendergrass (31:42):
Yeah. Somebody not us in 2045 could be having the same conversation, right? Like, if only in 2025 or 2026 we’d gotten serious. And I do think people mix up the trust fund with the whole program. A lot of people think all of Social Security is going to be bankrupt in six years, versus the reality that we’re still taking in a trillion dollars, we just need about 22% more than what we’re taking in.

Andrew Biggs (32:14):
Yeah. If you go back 20 or 25 years, there were all these arguments about whether the trust fund is real or fair or whatever. The trust fund is essentially IOUs written from one side of the government to the other. I thought at the time the trust fund is not real in an economic sense. It doesn’t make it easier for the government to pay Social Security benefits. It is a pledge that we will pay them, but it doesn’t make it easier to pay them. But here’s the interesting thing:

Susan Pendergrass (32:25):
Right. Al Gore. The lock box.

Andrew Biggs (32:50):
if having a trust fund doesn’t make it easier to pay benefits, then not having a trust fund doesn’t make it harder. The trust fund runs out, we still have taxes coming in, we can still pay 80% of what is owed. If we retarget that, you can maintain the safety net. It’s not like you’re totally insolvent or broke. All those long debates over whether the trust fund is real get resolved because the trust fund itself is gone in six years. So that doesn’t matter very much anymore. But I do hope that, as you said, we’re not in 2045 looking back on a solution of just borrowing $500 billion a year or whatever it’s going to be. People in 2045, when the federal government is bankrupt, the dollar is dropping, and all these financial crisis things we think only happen to other countries are happening to us, they would look back and say, I wish those people were more responsible. The Social Security problem, in a sense, if we went back 25 or 30 years ago, was a manageable problem. The real issue is not the demographics or the benefit growth or whatever. The real issue is just poor stewardship of this program by Congress and respective presidents. It is absolutely a governance problem. It is not a problem of economic or demographic fundamentals. All of that can be handled.

Susan Pendergrass (34:19):
Everyone wants to be Santa Claus, right? No one wants to be the Grinch.

Andrew Biggs (34:22):
It’s very true, but leadership is about giving people bad news. Good news kind of tells itself. Bad news has to be told and people have to be convinced that this is going to hurt, but we’ve got to do it. And we just didn’t have the willingness. President Clinton in the late nineties tried to do some stuff, but he didn’t deliver much bad news because we had surpluses. President Bush was willing to tell people, okay, look, you’re not going to get every penny you’ve been promised. Beyond that, the level of leadership has been very poor.

Susan Pendergrass (35:01):
Hasn’t been good. All right, well, next year when the trustees report comes out, come back and give us more bad news.

Andrew Biggs (35:09):
Yeah, until then, things are looking up. But no, it’s something people want to be aware of, and I think that’s the key thing.

Susan Pendergrass (35:13):
Well, I think one of the more important things you said is that no one understands it. People are upset and arguing over something they don’t understand the mechanics of. I do know people who think they have an account with their name on it that their Social Security taxes went into, and they’re just going to start taking the money out.

Andrew Biggs (35:23):
I have some bad news for that. Your taxes go into Social Security and go straight out the door to pay for your grandmother’s benefits. If you want to know where your taxes are, they’re in your grandmother’s bank account. So go ask her.

Susan Pendergrass (35:45):
That’s right. That’s right. All right, thank you so much. I really appreciate the time.

Andrew Biggs (35:51):
Thank you, Susan. It’s a pleasure to be with you.

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The post The Social Security Crisis Is Worse Than You Think with Andrew G. Biggs appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Of course, the answer is obvious if you know anything about how educator pensions work in Missouri.

Missouri’s teacher pension system creates strong incentives for educators to retire as soon as they hit their pension’s peak benefit. This doesn’t mean they’re ready to stop working; it just means that staying on the job in Missouri would financially penalize them compared to retiring and working elsewhere. This system is problematic because it pushes experienced teachers, principals, and superintendents out of Missouri’s schools when they still have a great deal to offer.

When Missouri educators retire early, they take with them years of expertise and leadership. Instead of keeping our best and most experienced educators in Missouri classrooms, our pension system encourages them to leave for neighboring states. This harms our schools and weakens the overall quality of education available to Missouri students.

To fix this, we need pension reform. We should develop a retirement system that rewards long-term service without forcing educators into an artificial retirement timeline. Instead of a system that penalizes continued work, we should create one that allows educators to gradually phase into retirement, perhaps by working part-time or taking on mentorship roles while still accruing meaningful benefits.

Other states, such as Washington, have reformed their pension systems to better retain educators. Missouri should do the same. We cannot afford to keep losing our best teachers and leaders simply because our pension system makes it financially advantageous for them to retire and work elsewhere.

It’s time to change the incentives. Let’s keep our educators in Missouri, where they belong.

The post Missouri Pension System Pushes Out Another Great Educator appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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If only someone had warned them about this years ago. Oh, that’s right . . . we did.

The topic of public-employee pension reform has long been important to Show-Me Institute writers. Back in 2013, for example, Andrew Biggs wrote Public Employee Pensions in Missouri: A Looming Crisis. The report did not specifically analyze St. Louis’s teacher pension fund, but the point about the pending crisis applied nonetheless.

When we call attention to impending problems, we are often called alarmists. I have twice had teacher groups circulate action alerts warning members not to respond to my requests for information regarding pensions. It was so bad we actually recorded a podcast telling people we were not trying to take away their pensions. The pushback we received led me to ask, “can we have meaningful dialogue on pension reform?”

So—what changed?

Now, it is the educators themselves raising the alarm. In the KSDK report, Byron Clemens, with the American Federation of Teachers in St. Louis, and his brother, state representative Doug Clemens (D-72nd District), are both quoted on the matter. They highlight how the underfunding of pension systems is harming retirees.

Unfortunately, the Clemens brothers do not call for significant pension reform. They see the symptoms of the problem, but rather than address the structural issues that got us to this point they seem to argue for policies that would only treat the symptoms.

St. Louis’s pension system is underfunded because of the program’s design. Missouri needs to explore new options, such as defined-contribution and hybrid plans, to provide retirees a safe and secure retirement.

The post Rising Concerns about St. Louis’s Teacher Pension Fund appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The problem is that allowing retired teachers to come back to the classroom does nothing to address the problem. Let me be clear on what I mean by “the problem.” I am not talking about the problem of teacher recruitment and the number of people entering the profession. I’m talking about the teacher pipeline problem caused by the retirement system itself. It is a system that pushes people out. It incentivizes teachers, principals, and superintendents to retire in their mid-50s. This new provision does not address that issue; instead, it makes it worse.

Researchers have long known that defined-benefit pensions, such as those used in the Missouri teaching profession, have two key effects on the labor market. They provide a pull for workers to stay until the peak benefit period, then they push workers out. If a teacher begins working in Missouri right out of college around the age of 22, they will likely hit their peak benefit period around the age of 53.

If lawmakers truly want to keep great late-career teachers in the profession, they should revise the system that pushes them out in the first place. The best way to do this would be to move to a new type of pension system where teachers’ retirement plans would continue to accrue wealth as they continue to work through their 50s.

If we view Senate Bill 75 as a temporary fix (it does have a sunset built in) to address an immediate issue of teacher shortages, then the bill is fine. It is not, however, a fix to a teacher pension system that pushes out individuals who have so much more to give.

The post A Bandage Approach: Teaching after Retirement appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

If I offered you $100,000 a year for the rest of your life to retire from your current job, would you take me up on the offer? What if I said you could have the money and also get a different job if you wanted? If you would answer yes to these questions, you have gone a long way toward understanding why turnover is high among public school superintendents. We financially incentivize them to “retire.”

Take a look at the recent article from Springfield News-Leader’s Claudette Riley, in which she discussed the problem of superintendent turnover. Nearly every person cited in the report was a superintendent who has retired and is working another job. Doug Hayter retired as superintendent of Branson Public Schools; he now draws his retirement benefit and serves as the executive director of the Missouri Association of School Administrators (MASA). Kelly Hinshaw and John Jungman, also quoted in the report, are retired administrators who now work for MASA.

Given the rules of our current state pension system, it makes financial sense to do just as these folks have done. Consider some of the other retiring superintendents listed in Riley’s report. Shawn Randles is retiring from the Logan-Rogersville School District. After a 31-year career, he’s eligible to draw 75 percent of his final average salary of $152,002 for the rest of his life. Depending on the payout he chooses, this could be as much as $114,000 a year. According to Riley, Randles “plans to start a second career in an education-related field.”

Chris Ford, Fordland’s “retiring” superintendent is in a similar position. He’s eligible to draw $108,000 a year for the rest of his life while continuing to work. He has taken a position at Evangel University.

We are told turnover among superintendents is high because the job is stressful. It is curious then that many retire and take up similar positions in other states. Take Crane’s retiring superintendent, Chris Johnson, who has accepted the superintendent post in Prairie View, Kansas.

Stress may be a factor, but the truth is that superintendent turnover is high because our state’s pension system makes it financially beneficial for our veteran administrators to leave. They can earn more by retiring than they could if they kept working.

As Riley’s piece explained, superintendents are eligible to retire after 30 years of service in the profession or after their years of service plus their age equal 80. This means that someone who starts teaching right out of college could be eligible for retirement by their mid-50s. These individuals can then draw their pension and take on new roles, as long as those roles are not covered by Missouri’s Public School Retirement System.

We should applaud efforts to mentor and train superintendents, but if we truly want to reduce turnover the solution is clear—we must change our retirement system. This does not have to mean abandoning the current defined-benefit pension system, though offering a defined-contribution option is something that should be considered. The solution could be as simple as allowing superintendents to draw early disbursements from their pension fund while retaining their current jobs. This would diminish the financial pull to retire and take up a new job in another state or outside of PSRS.

As long as we continue to make it financially lucrative to retire, we will continue to see our best educational administrators retire shortly after they hit year 30.

The post To Reduce Superintendent Turnover, Change the Pension System appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Daniel DiSalvo is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a professor of political science in the Colin Powell School at the City College of New York–CUNY.

Read Big City Pensions and the Urban Doom Loop here.

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This isn’t that complicated. The new St. Louis city fireman’s pension board was created because the old one was dominated by union interests who made it incredibly generous for firemen and civilian employees of the department. One of those civilian employees received a half-million-dollar (!!!) cash payout upon her retirement, on top of her generous pension. As this recent Post-Dispatch story explains, the union trustees on the new board have implemented draconian changes to the pension funds, things such as cancelling the annual pension board training trip to Key West. Cue the outrage; from the Post story:

Paul Payne, the city’s budget director, said going to an industry conference in South Florida looked less like education than vacation. And he told Kenny Mitchell, a firefighter trustee who wanted to go, just that.

Meeting minutes relay what happened next: “Trustee Mitchell responded to Trustee Payne with a profane remark.”

I’ve been to Key West many times. It is uniquely wonderful for many things. Pension board training is not one of them.

The St. Louis Board of Aldermen just passed, once again, a bill to return the pension plan to the control of the fireman’s union instead of the new city board that runs it for the benefit of both firemen and taxpayers. That means having a pension system that pays fireman what they deserve, but also considers the interests of the taxpayers at the same time. It doesn’t mean pension training trip to Key West, nor does it mean half-million-dollar cash payouts on top of the pensions. What does St. Louis City’s budget director think it means?

The [proposed] move will consolidate pension oversight under a firefighter-run board that spent double what a city-run panel paid for administration last year. And Budget Director Paul Payne says it would be a first step toward taking the pension system back to where it was a decade ago, when years of rubber-stamping benefit increases led to a budget crisis and forced painful cuts.

“Their history,” Payne said of the firefighters, “is not one of saving money.”

Mayor Jones has vetoed the legislation, just as Mayor Krewson vetoed it previously, and as Mayor Slay would likely recommend after having spent considerable time, effort, and political capital during his term making these necessary reforms in the first place. Good for Mayor Jones. Pension funds should be run for the benefit of those government employees promised good benefits in accordance with the overall fiscal health of the city and its taxpayers, not just one of them.

The post Taxpayers Getting Burned appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

When you write an op-ed, you are often constrained by word count. Newspapers have limited space and often like guest editorials under 600 or 700 words. This means I couldn’t say all the things I wanted to say. In my op-ed, I focused on critical thinking and media literacy. Here, I would like to talk about civility and meaningful dialogue.

I have been writing for the Show-Me Institute for nearly a decade. I began writing about pensions early on. In all that time, I have been invited to debate or discuss ideas with Missouri’s educators exactly zero times. Instead, educators and the leadership of their organizations have attempted to shut down debate. They do this overtly, as in when they send out legislative alerts or emails from superintendents warning teachers to not take my survey, and they do this covertly with the language they use.

Instead of having a debate on the issues of pension reform or even school choice, they suggest I and the Show-Me Institute are enemies who want to “dismantle” the pension system and that we are “privatizers” who want to destroy public education. It’s smart really if the goal is to stifle debate. When you set someone up as your enemy who is out to destroy you, you have little incentive to engage them in a meaningful dialogue.

Dismissing our rivals by name calling and refusing to engage, however, is terrible if you believe the best way to the truth is by discussing and debating ideas.

Like it or not, there are some important policy discussions that we should wrestle with when it comes to Missouri’s teacher pension systems. What should we do about the three separate systems that place St. Louis and Kansas City at a competitive disadvantage? Should we be concerned about the large unfunded liabilities of these systems? Should we care that the systems are designed in a way that favors wealthy school districts and increases inequity?

We cannot have those conversations when one side simply wants to shut down the discussion.

I believe we should engage with the best arguments of our opponents. And I am more than willing to engage with any group of educators who would like to seriously discuss these issues.

The post Can We Have Meaningful Dialogue on Pension Reform? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Less funny are the continuing efforts by the St. Louis City fireman’s union to return to the extremely generous and biased-against-taxpayers pension system of the past. After years of political fighting, the Slay administration successfully revised the fireman’s pension system in 2012. The new plan put control of the fireman’s pension under a board of city appointees— under the old system, the pension was run by the fire department and the union itself. What was wrong with the old system? Well, nobody was watching out for the taxpayer’s interests, and they are the ones who paid for everything.

Ever since those changes were made, the union has been “never stopping” in its efforts to get the old system back. How generous was the old system? Well, the former director of the fireman’s pension system, Vicky Grass (who was subsequently elected to the board of aldermen), received a cash payout of $579,000 when she retired in 2015, on top of her monthly $4,870 monthly pension. That’s $579,000 in taxpayer dollars! What did Ms. Grass think of the changes to the new system?

“The new system is not as good as the one we had,” Grass said.

Well, I would think not if you were enjoying the benefits of the old system.

But the city and taxpayers are not being exploited by the union now, and firemen are still receiving the fair benefits and pension that we all agree they deserve. How much money has city government been able to save with the pension reform? This article from 2015 documents the savings the city experienced shortly after making the pension changes:

The city pays when there is a shortfall. In 2013, the city pumped $20 million into the system. Pension reforms have since reduced the city’s liability. Paul Payne, the city’s budget director, said the city paid $1 million into the system in 2015. And it’s not expected to pay anything in 2016.

Mayor Krewson vetoed the attempt last year to change the pension system back to the old system, and hopefully Mayor Jones will do the same if it comes to that. Honestly, it should not come to that at all, but this is a classic example of a special interest group carrying outsized influence with elected officials—in this case, members of the board of aldermen the union helped put into office in the first place. Controlling pension costs for public employee unions is a key responsibility of local government. The City of St. Louis deserves credit for the reforms it made, and those reforms need to be kept in place.

The post The Fireman’s Union Never Stops Never Stopping appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In the 2021–22 school year, 39 percent (yes 3-9 percent) of education dollars will be spent on pensions. While education spending has grown 17 percent since 2000, teacher and administrator pension costs have risen 458 percent. 458 percent!

When the pension part of the state spending pie grows, the other slices of the pie shrink. That means that money that could be going to today’s teachers is going to yesterday’s.

Pensions are a perfect storm for governmental jiggery-pokery. The bill for bad decisions doesn’t come due for years after most of the people making decisions are out of office. The benefits are clear to those receiving them but are opaque to taxpayers (who tend to focus on metrics like teacher salaries, not total teacher compensation). Legislators can hide behind actuarial alchemy to obfuscate the magnitude of their decisions. Everyone wants teachers to have a safe and solid retirement, so quibbling with how much is spent can come off as teacher bashing.

Thankfully, Missouri is not nearly in the dire straits that Illinois is. Now, Missouri pensions are unfair. They invest in riskier assets to chase higher returns when they are underperforming. And, they are a bad deal for most teachers. But Illinois still serves as a cautionary tale for us.

And ballooning pension costs are bad for everyone (except, to be fair, those who are receiving them). It is bad for current teachers and students, who miss out on funding that could be used to support them. It is bad for current legislators, who have less money to spend on higher education, healthcare, roads and bridges, and more. And it is bad for future teachers, students, and legislators, who will be hemmed in by the decisions that their forebears made.

The great political philosopher Edmund Burke argued that the social contract is “a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.” Irresponsible pension policy violates that social contract and should be roundly criticized. Well done to the good folks at Illinois Policy for doing so.

The post Why We Need to Take Pension Costs Seriously appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In a recent article in the journal Perspectives on Politics, Sarah Anzia and Terry Moe examine whether pension plans that have pension beneficiaries serving on the board are more likely to underfund their pension systems. In the paper, they explain the logic behind underfunded pensions:

Another basic feature of pension politics is that public workers and their unions have incentives to support the chronic underfunding of their own pensions. Due to state statutes, constitutions, and judicial decisions, pensions promised by state politicians are backed by strong legal protections almost everywhere; and public workers thus know they will eventually get what they are promised even if their pension plans are currently underfunded. Indeed, because full funding on a regular schedule would be tremendously costly for state (and local) budgets— crowding out other services, forcing higher taxes, making the true costs of pensions painfully transparent to citizens —public workers and their unions have incentives to prefer that their pension plans be underfunded. Underfunding enables the fiscal illusion that pension benefits are much less expensive than they really are. If public workers and their unions want increasingly generous benefits in future years, they need to convince the public that these benefits are not costly to provide. At the same time, underfunding keeps employee contributions to their own pension funds at low levels; and by keeping contributions by their employers down, they are freeing up public money for other government services, keeping public workers employed—and providing funds for their own salaries and raises.

Each of Missouri’s three teacher pension systems (Kansas City, St. Louis, and Public School & Education Employee Retirement Systems of Missouri (PSRS)) have board members who are also members of the pension system. In St. Louis, the system is currently funded at 78.1%, the lowest funded ratio since 1992. Kansas City’s funded ratio is just 66.2%. PSRS, the system which covers teachers throughout the rest of the state, has the highest-funded ratio, 84.4%. These figures, of course, rely on the pension plan’s rosy assumptions. More conservative (and arguably more realistic) estimates put the funded ratios for each of the plans below 60%.

Overall, support among teachers for Missouri’s teacher pension systems is high. But would teachers continue to support the pension plan if they had to increase their contributions to fully fund their plan? 

The post Why Are Public Pensions Often Underfunded? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Advocates for Missouri’s current defined-benefit pension system argue that this type of system, where teachers are promised a generous and guaranteed pension once they retire, is needed because it increases teacher retention. Yet, there is little evidence that this type of system is a cost-effective method for increasing teacher retention. Rather, the example of these superintendents demonstrates how the system pushes out high-quality individuals. It does the same for teachers (teachers and superintendents are in the same pension system). When teachers hit 30 or 31 years, regardless of their quality or their desire to continue teaching, the financial incentive of the pension pushes them out.

Recently, Gov. Parson asked school superintendents to come up with a plan to increase teacher pay. One solution, which I have little hope will ever be recommended by the superintendents, is to change how we compensate teachers. A pension is basically a form of delayed compensation. We require teachers and their districts to contribute 14.5% of their salary to the pension system (the numbers are different in St. Louis City and Kanas City). That’s 29% of a teacher’s salary that is going into a pool that they may have access to if they make it to retirement.

We could give teachers in Missouri a 10% raise next year, with minimal cost to the state, if we just change this system.

Currently, teachers in the Public School Retirement System (PSRS) do not contribute to Social Security. The pension system is their only required retirement savings. In this proposed scenario, the teacher would receive a 10 percent raise on his or her salary. The teacher would begin contributing to Social Security (6.2 percent from the individual and the employer) and would be eligible for Social Security benefits. Additionally, the teacher and his or her employer could contribute a combined 5 percent of salary to a defined-contribution retirement account, such as a 401k or a cash balance plan. Of course, with a smaller raise the teacher could contribute more to retirement. 

There are numerous benefits to this proposal. First, teachers would own their retirement accounts. They would not lose any money if for some reason they do not vest at five years. They could also continue to work past 31 years and their accounts would not lose value. Teachers could also choose to invest more in their account, as many do now in 403b accounts.

The biggest benefit is that teachers would have higher salaries today. If we want to keep our best teachers and superintendents, higher salaries are a much more effective tool than outdated pension systems.

The post We Could Give Teachers a Ten Percent Raise Next Year appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Not so in the public sector, where 84 percent of employees can still expect to retire at a relatively early age (55 or so) and get a paycheck (and possibly health insurance) until they die. A bill to allow Missouri public school teachers to decide for themselves whether they wanted a traditional pension or a 401(k) type retirement benefit was filed in Jefferson City last week and immediately attacked by both the Missouri State Teachers Association (the teachers union) and the Missouri Retired Teachers Association.

These two associations claim their main mission is advancing the best interests of teachers. But which teachers? It’s estimated that nearly 4 in 10 Missouri teachers won’t get to the five-year vesting requirement to receive any employer benefits. Furthermore, because Missouri’s system is so backloaded that teachers have to stay in the system for 26 years just to break even, only about 38 percent will even hit that point.

So the Missouri teachers union and the retired teachers association are sounding the alarm about “harmful retirement legislation” being filed. But they apparently are not considering the best interests of young teachers who would prefer contributing 5 percent of their salary towards retirement instead of nearly 15 percent. They apparently are not considering anyone who leaves before vesting and would like to take with them what their employer has been contributing on their behalf for 3 or 4 years. And they apparently are not considering teachers who leave before their breakeven point and end up getting less in retirement than what they contributed.

Defined benefit pension plans are expensive, unsustainable, and antiquated. Yes, they work great for teachers who hit the “Rule of 80”—years of work, plus age (retire at 53 with 27 years of service). What are the chances that our best and brightest college graduates see that as their future? Shouldn’t we at least give them some options? Shouldn’t we let them have some control over their careers and earnings?

The post Support for Teachers? Or Just Some Teachers? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Learn more about pension reform at showmeinstitute.org

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The post Public Employee Pensions in Missouri: A Looming Crisis appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Missouri’s largest teacher pension fund, the Public School Retirement System (PSRS), has already begun to recognize the improved mortality rates of teachers. A PSRS report on contribution rates for 2017-2018 notes that the system has already begun updating the plan’s mortality assumptions:

People are living longer. Mortality is improving, not just in Missouri, but also across the nation. As a result, actuaries are utilizing updated mortality tables, which reflect this trend. PSRS/PEERS conducted Actuarial Experience Studies to compare our actuarial assumptions to the actual experience of the Systems. In other words, are members living as long as we assumed they would, or are they actually living longer?

According to the internal PSRS analysis, people are living longer than the plan had assumed. Adjusting for greater longevity led to a tremendous increase in the plan’s liabilities. According to PSRS board chairman Aaron Zalis, “the revised mortality assumptions better reflect PSRS/PEERS’ actual experience, which results in an increase of over $2.1 billion in liabilities to the Systems.”

Teachers in PSRS are eligible to retire with full benefits after 30 years of service, and there are also early retirement options. This means a teacher may retire by 55 with 30 years of service. Given the new mortality tables from the SOA, a large subset of teachers might be expected to live beyond 90 years old, drawing a pension for 35 years or more.

It is unclear if the SOA’s updated mortality tables for teachers will encourage PSRS or Missouri’s other two pension plans to once again change their assumptions. If they do, we can assume the financial health of the plans will decline.

Let’s process what that means for a second. Some teachers in the past did not put enough into the retirement system to cover their own benefits. As a result, the pension plan will become increasingly underfunded. To make up for this, the plan will have to increase contributions for new members, hold down retirement benefits for retirees, or seek higher returns on investments (Read: “risky investments”). None of this is good for teachers of today or tomorrow.

So teachers, keep this in mind when you sign that contract. You are agreeing to fund the benefits of those who went before you. You may be striking a bargain that you end up regretting.

The post Teachers Live Forever appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The St. Louis Public School Retirement System (STLPSRS) has its own problems—it was just 64 percent funded in 2016, with 5,000 current teachers supporting 4,600 retirees. Teachers have been contributing 5 percent of payroll, with St. Louis Public Schools (SLPS) and charter schools making up the rest of what the annual actuarial analysis determines is necessary to keep it funded at least 70 percent. As a result, the bill for SLPS and the charter schools has climbed to over 15 percent and, in 2018, the actuarial analysis determined it needed to be 19 percent. However, difficulty keeping up with increasing costs led SLPS to request that the Missouri state legislature cap their contribution rate at 16 percent. In addition, teacher contributions would climb by one-half percent each year until they reach 9 percent (new teachers in fall 2018 will immediately begin paying 9 percent). According to STLPSRS, that would leave them with a $192 million shortfall within 15 years, so they’re suing SPLS and the St. Louis charter schools.

Economic conditions, unaffordable benefit promises, and an unwillingness to use realistic investment return assumptions have resulted in precarious fund positions, lawsuits, and attempts to balance the books on the back of the youngest workers. Does it have to be this way? No. Many states are moving away from defined-benefit plans (pensions) and toward defined-contribution plans [like 401(k), cash-balance, or hybrid plans]. In some cases, all new employees are placed in the new plans; in others, they can choose between the state defined-benefit plan or the new options.

We’re also seeing teacher retirement benefit innovation from within public education. In 19 states, charter schools may choose whether or not to participate in their states’ pension plans. A recent analysis of charter school participation in five states that make participation optional found that the schools most likely to opt out of the state plan are urban, elementary schools, and those that are managed by charter networks. Most of the opt-out charter schools offer their teachers 401(k) or 403(b) plans, and the teachers are vested in less than one year. The reasons given for choosing this path were mostly that the schools wanted to lower their estimated costs, give teachers a wider range of investment options, and make their teacher benefits more portable. For today’s youngest teachers, this is an important point. Most of them will not meet a vesting period of ten years in one state and, when that happens, they lose the amount that their employer contributed for them.

The good news for teachers and taxpayers is that there is time to protect current and future retirees before the system is bankrupt. The building isn’t on fire yet. However, those of us who pay close attention to this complicated topic are starting to see smoke under the door. It’s time to start talking about how to stabilize Missouri’s teacher pension systems.

The post A Retirement House of Cards appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Consider the costs to taxpayers. As of 2018, the plan has assets equal to less than 70 percent of their liabilities and—just to maintain that level of funding—the Missouri state government will have to contribute nearly 20 percent of its total employee payroll to the plan this year. In addition, employees hired after 2011 contribute 4 percent of their paychecks to the system. Imagine a private-sector benefit that cost nearly one-quarter of employee salaries but was considered so sacrosanct as so be untouchable. The hard truth is that we’re going to have to start talking about policy changes aimed at averting a funding crisis. Biggs’s essay explores various options, including grandfathering current plan participants and designing a new system for future employees.

Of course, MOSERS is just one of many public pension plans in the state. The pension systems for teachers aren’t any better.  Teachers argue that they work for low salaries and, in exchange for their sacrifice, they are “taken care of” with generous retirement benefits. But that is only true for those teachers who start their teaching career right out of college and work in the same state for at least twenty-five years. In fact, an analysis of the Missouri Public Schools Retirement System (PSRS)—the plan that covers all Missouri teachers other than those in Kansas City or St. Louis—found that a teacher in the Springfield district would have to work for 26 years in order to hit the “crossover” point at which their total retirement benefit is worth more than what they contributed.

Imagine that! Working for 26 years before your retirement plan is worth more than you put in.

While the PSRS is in better financial health than MOSERS, total annual contributions to the plan are 29 percent of payroll (with 14.5 percent coming from the teacher and 14.5 percent from the school district). This is only likely to get higher because there are now 78,000 teachers (active members) supporting 60,000 retired teachers. In 2000, roughly the same number of active teachers supported just 25,000 retirees. In addition, while the plan is currently nearly 84 percent funded, it has an unfunded liability of more than $7 billion and its administrators continue to assume that the plan will earn a 7.6 percent return on its investments every year, indefinitely. You don’t have to be a math teacher to know those numbers just don’t add up.

The post Public Employee Pensions: Time to Get Our Heads Out of the Sand appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

According to a 2017 asset/liability analysis commissioned by KCPSRS, the system only has enough money in the bank to pay 64 percent of what it owes to current and future retirees. We’ve written about this problem before, but it’s worth repeating. The fund needs to earn at least 5 percent per year, every year, for the next 20 years, or they’ll be out of money. That’s right—no money left in the fund. (For reference, between 1998 and 2018 the annualized Dow-Jones Industrial Average inflation-adjusted return was 5.528 percent.) Not surprisingly, the KCPSRS has requested increases to the school contribution rate over the next few years from the state legislature. So, Kansas City Public Schools and Kansas City charter schools will have to take another chunk of their revenue out of the classroom to send to KCPSRS.

STLPSRS was also just 64 percent funded (see p. 11) in 2016 and has almost as many retirees as active teachers. An annual analysis by actuaries determines how much SLPS and the St. Louis charter schools have to contribute to the fund each year. However, difficulty keeping up with increasing costs led SLPS to request that the state legislature cap their contribution rate at 16 percent, and they did. Unfortunately, STLPSRS looked at how that cap would affect the fund and determined that it would leave them with a $192 million shortfall within 15 years, so they’re suing SLPS and the St. Louis charter schools.

Economic conditions, unaffordable benefit promises, and an unwillingness to use realistic investment return assumptions have resulted in shaky fund positions, lawsuits, and balancing the books on the back of the youngest workers. What’s worse is that in 2017, the average pension payment took about $1,200 per student out of the classroom.

Does it have to be this way? No. We’re actually seeing teacher retirement benefit innovation from within public education. In 19 states, charter schools may choose to participate in their state’s pension plans or not. A recent analysis of charter school participation in five states found that the schools most likely to opt out of the state plan are urban schools, elementary schools, and those that are managed by charter networks. And new schools in high-cost states like California are much less likely to join than they were just five years ago.

Most of the opt-out charter schools offer their teachers 401k or 403b plans in which the teachers are vested in less than one year. The reasons given for choosing this path include wanting to lower their estimated costs, giving teachers a wider range of investment options, and making their benefits more portable.

For today’s youngest teachers, this is an important point. Most of them will not meet a vesting period of ten years in one state, which means they will lose the amount that their employer contributed for them. Even if they stay, Missouri teachers have to work for 26 years before their contributions are higher than their expected benefit. When you take nearly 10 percent off the top of a teacher’s salary, plus another 6 percent for Social Security, you have to wonder why anyone would want to be a public school teacher in Kansas City or St. Louis.

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