TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Elias Tsapelas, and I’m the Director of State Budget and Fiscal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, Missouri-based think tank that advances sensible, well-researched, free-market solutions to state and local policy issues. The ideas presented here are my own and are offered in consideration of proposals that will affect tax credits in Missouri.

Senate Bill 1079 consolidates Missouri’s existing film and series production tax credit sub-caps into a single $16 million pool for both, leaving the state’s total commitment the same. The only substantive effect of the bill would be to give the Film Office more flexibility in how the same dollars are allocated. That flexibility does not address the fundamental problem with this program.

Current and Past Tax Credit Failures

Despite the Missouri film tax credit’s recent revival, our state has a long history with this troubling incentive. Until its sunset in 2013, Missouri’s previous iteration made promises similar to what supporters are touting today. Missouri’s own Tax Credit Review Commission recommended the credit be eliminated because it served too narrow an industry and failed to provide a positive return on investment.¹

Research confirms that pattern holds nationally. Film tax credits have not resulted in job growth, have not affected market share or industry output, and have produced only short-term wage gains for those already in the industry.² Credits in many states generated just cents on the dollar. As one Tax Foundation analyst notes, “non-favored activities and businesses remain on the hook to bear the full impact of the state’s tax code.”³

The Missouri Film Office has pointed to the number of projects approved and production spending in the state as evidence the program is working, but that is not the right measure for determining whether the program is a good investment for state taxpayers.⁴ The relevant question is how much the state receives back in tax revenue and broader economic activity—and by that measure, the research is consistent: film tax credits do not generate a positive return.

The Competitiveness Argument Doesn’t Hold

Supporters of SB 1079 argue that pooling the sub-caps will make Missouri more competitive for productions. Even setting aside the ROI question, that argument doesn’t hold.

Steven Conrad, the showrunner who created a new HBO series set in St. Louis and filmed it entirely in Atlanta, recently suggested that governments may not be well-served by chasing the film industry at all.⁵ His observation reflects a structural reality: Georgia has spent two decades building the studios, crews, soundstages, and production infrastructure that make large productions possible. Missouri has not. No reallocation of $16 million changes that.

Georgia’s own state auditor found that even Georgia’s fully developed, deeply established program returned just 10 cents to the state for every dollar of credit granted, producing a net revenue loss of $602 million in a single year.⁶ If one of the most mature film-incentive programs in the country cannot generate a positive return on investment, a program at a fraction of its scale operating in a state without comparable infrastructure has no prospect of doing so.

Targeted Credits Are Poor Economic Policy

Targeted economic development tax credits are just another way for lawmakers to pick winners and losers, a job that is better left to consumers in the market. When tax breaks are given to some, other taxpayers have to make up for the lost revenue. The impulse to do something to support an industry is understandable, but tax credits are a poor substitute for the conditions that make industries thrive organically. A dollar of film tax credits reduces state revenue by exactly the same amount as a dollar of direct appropriations—the difference is that credits bypass the appropriations process and receive less scrutiny.

Prioritize Tax Relief That Benefits All Missourians

Missouri is already a national leader in state spending in the name of economic development. Over the past few decades, Missouri has forgone billions in state tax revenue in favor of a host of narrow incentives that have consistently shown poor results. In FY2025 alone, Missouri redeemed more than $961 million in tax credits—nearly double the $521 million redeemed in 2010.⁷ The General Assembly is simultaneously weighing whether to eliminate the state income tax, a reform that would deliver broad economic benefits to every Missourian. The legislature should consider whether a growing tax credit portfolio is consistent with that goal. Expanding targeted credits that erode the income-tax base works against broad-based tax relief, and Missouri would be better served by pursuing the latter.

The film tax credit is a small program, but it exemplifies the approach to tax policy that makes comprehensive reform harder to achieve. Tax credit programs have not been successful in Missouri in the past, there is little evidence to suggest the film tax credit is succeeding now, and there is no reason to believe this program will perform differently under a restructured allocation. If increasing economic opportunity is the goal, the research is clear: Instead trying to manufacture more opportunities at the expense of taxpayers, lawmakers should provide broad-based tax relief to every Missourian.

NOTES

1. “Report of the Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission.” Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission. 2010; https://www.semissourian.com/files/tcrcfinalreport113010.pdf.
2. “Lights, camera and no action: How state film subsidies fail.” USC Press Release. August 18, 2016; https://pressroom.usc.edu/lights-camera-and-no-action-how-state-film-subsidies-fail.
3. Loughead, Katherine. “Illuminating the Hidden Costs of State Tax Incentives.” Tax Foundation. 2021; https://taxfoundation.org/state-tax-incentives-costs.
4. “Made-in-Missouri Film and TV Productions Spent $40.7 Million in 2025.” Missouri Department of Economic Development. February 2026; https://ded.mo.gov/press-room/made-missouri-film-and-tv-productions-spent-407-million-2025.
5. Neman, Daniel. “HBO’s DTF St. Louis has a dream cast, but it wasn’t shot here.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. February 26, 2026; https://www.stltoday.com/life-entertainment/local/movies-tv/article_cfa2d34c-435a-40fd-9fa5-75933d716915.html.
6. “Impact of the Georgia Film Tax Credit.” Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, Performance Audit Division. Report No. 18-03B. January 2020; https://www.audits.ga.gov/ReportSearch/download/23536.
7. “Fourth Quarter Tax Credit Report, Fiscal Year 2025.” Missouri Department of Revenue. 2025; https://dor.mo.gov/public-reports/documents/Fourth-Quarter-FY25-Tax-Credit-Report.pdf.

The post Senate Bill 1079: Film Tax Credits appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Elias Tsapelas, and I’m the Director of State Budget and Fiscal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, Missouri-based think tank that advances sensible, well-researched, free-market solutions to state and local policy issues. The ideas presented here are my own and are offered in consideration of proposals that will affect tax credits in Missouri.

House Bill 2142 consolidates Missouri’s existing film and series production tax credit sub-caps into a single $16 million pool for both, leaving the state’s total commitment the same. The only substantive effect of the bill would be to give the Film Office more flexibility in how the same dollars are allocated. That flexibility does not address the fundamental problem with this program.

Current and Past Tax Credit Failures

Despite the Missouri film tax credit’s recent revival, our state has a long history with this troubling incentive. Until its sunset in 2013, Missouri’s previous iteration made promises similar to what supporters are touting today. Missouri’s own Tax Credit Review Commission recommended the credit be eliminated because it served too narrow an industry and failed to provide a positive return on investment.¹

Research confirms that pattern holds nationally. Film tax credits have not resulted in job growth, have not affected market share or industry output, and have produced only short-term wage gains for those already in the industry.² Credits in many states generated just cents on the dollar. As one Tax Foundation analyst notes, “non-favored activities and businesses remain on the hook to bear the full impact of the state’s tax code.”³

The Missouri Film Office has pointed to the number of projects approved and production spending in the state as evidence the program is working, but that is not the right measure for determining whether the program is a good investment for state taxpayers.⁴ The relevant question is how much the state receives back in tax revenue and broader economic activity—and by that measure, the research is consistent: film tax credits do not generate a positive return.

The Competitiveness Argument Doesn’t Hold

Supporters of HB 2142 argue that pooling the sub-caps will make Missouri more competitive for productions. Even setting aside the ROI question, that argument doesn’t hold.

Steven Conrad, the showrunner who created a new HBO series set in St. Louis and filmed it entirely in Atlanta, recently suggested that governments may not be well-served by chasing the film industry at all.⁵ His observation reflects a structural reality: Georgia has spent two decades building the studios, crews, soundstages, and production infrastructure that make large productions possible. Missouri has not. No reallocation of $16 million changes that.

Georgia’s own state auditor found that even Georgia’s fully developed, deeply established program returned just 10 cents to the state for every dollar of credit granted, producing a net revenue loss of $602 million in a single year.⁶ If one of the most mature film-incentive programs in the country cannot generate a positive return on investment, a program at a fraction of its scale operating in a state without comparable infrastructure has no prospect of doing so.

Targeted Credits Are Poor Economic Policy

Targeted economic development tax credits are just another way for lawmakers to pick winners and losers, a job that is better left to consumers in the market. When tax breaks are given to some, other taxpayers have to make up for the lost revenue. The impulse to do something to support an industry is understandable, but tax credits are a poor substitute for the conditions that make industries thrive organically. A dollar of film tax credits reduces state revenue by exactly the same amount as a dollar of direct appropriations—the difference is that credits bypass the appropriations process and receive less scrutiny.

Prioritize Tax Relief That Benefits All Missourians

Missouri is already a national leader in state spending in the name of economic development. Over the past few decades, Missouri has forgone billions in state tax revenue in favor of a host of narrow incentives that have consistently shown poor results. In FY2025 alone, Missouri redeemed more than $961 million in tax credits—nearly double the $521 million redeemed in 2010.⁷ The General Assembly is simultaneously weighing whether to eliminate the state income tax, a reform that would deliver broad economic benefits to every Missourian. The legislature should consider whether a growing tax credit portfolio is consistent with that goal. Expanding targeted credits that erode the income-tax base works against broad-based tax relief, and Missouri would be better served by pursuing the latter.

The film tax credit is a small program, but it exemplifies the approach to tax policy that makes comprehensive reform harder to achieve. Tax credit programs have not been successful in Missouri in the past, there is little evidence to suggest the film tax credit is succeeding now, and there is no reason to believe this program will perform differently under a restructured allocation. If increasing economic opportunity is the goal, the research is clear: Instead trying to manufacture more opportunities at the expense of taxpayers, lawmakers should provide broad-based tax relief to every Missourian.

NOTES

1. “Report of the Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission.” Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission. 2010; https://www.semissourian.com/files/tcrcfinalreport113010.pdf.
2. “Lights, camera and no action: How state film subsidies fail.” USC Press Release. August 18, 2016; https://pressroom.usc.edu/lights-camera-and-no-action-how-state-film-subsidies-fail.
3. Loughead, Katherine. “Illuminating the Hidden Costs of State Tax Incentives.” Tax Foundation. 2021; https://taxfoundation.org/state-tax-incentives-costs.
4. “Made-in-Missouri Film and TV Productions Spent $40.7 Million in 2025.” Missouri Department of Economic Development. February 2026; https://ded.mo.gov/press-room/made-missouri-film-and-tv-productions-spent-407-million-2025.
5. Neman, Daniel. “HBO’s DTF St. Louis has a dream cast, but it wasn’t shot here.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. February 26, 2026; https://www.stltoday.com/life-entertainment/local/movies-tv/article_cfa2d34c-435a-40fd-9fa5-75933d716915.html.
6. “Impact of the Georgia Film Tax Credit.” Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, Performance Audit Division. Report No. 18-03B. January 2020; https://www.audits.ga.gov/ReportSearch/download/23536.
7. “Fourth Quarter Tax Credit Report, Fiscal Year 2025.” Missouri Department of Revenue. 2025; https://dor.mo.gov/public-reports/documents/Fourth-Quarter-FY25-Tax-Credit-Report.pdf.

The post House Bill 2142: Film Tax Credits appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Elias Tsapelas, and I’m the Director of State Budget and Fiscal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, Missouri-based think tank that advances sensible, well-researched, free-market solutions to state and local policy issues. The ideas presented here are my own and are offered in consideration of proposals that will affect tax credits in Missouri.

House Bill 2058 consolidates Missouri’s existing film and series production tax credit sub-caps into a single $16 million pool for both, leaving the state’s total commitment the same. The only substantive effect of the bill would be to give the Film Office more flexibility in how the same dollars are allocated. That flexibility does not address the fundamental problem with this program.

Current and Past Tax Credit Failures

Despite the Missouri film tax credit’s recent revival, our state has a long history with this troubling incentive. Until its sunset in 2013, Missouri’s previous iteration made promises similar to what supporters are touting today. Missouri’s own Tax Credit Review Commission recommended the credit be eliminated because it served too narrow an industry and failed to provide a positive return on investment.¹

Research confirms that pattern holds nationally. Film tax credits have not resulted in job growth, have not affected market share or industry output, and have produced only short-term wage gains for those already in the industry.² Credits in many states generated just cents on the dollar. As one Tax Foundation analyst notes, “non-favored activities and businesses remain on the hook to bear the full impact of the state’s tax code.”³

The Missouri Film Office has pointed to the number of projects approved and production spending in the state as evidence the program is working, but that is not the right measure for determining whether the program is a good investment for state taxpayers.⁴ The relevant question is how much the state receives back in tax revenue and broader economic activity—and by that measure, the research is consistent: film tax credits do not generate a positive return.

The Competitiveness Argument Doesn’t Hold

Supporters of HB 2058 argue that pooling the sub-caps will make Missouri more competitive for productions. Even setting aside the ROI question, that argument doesn’t hold.

Steven Conrad, the showrunner who created a new HBO series set in St. Louis and filmed it entirely in Atlanta, recently suggested that governments may not be well-served by chasing the film industry at all.⁵ His observation reflects a structural reality: Georgia has spent two decades building the studios, crews, soundstages, and production infrastructure that make large productions possible. Missouri has not. No reallocation of $16 million changes that.

Georgia’s own state auditor found that even Georgia’s fully developed, deeply established program returned just 10 cents to the state for every dollar of credit granted, producing a net revenue loss of $602 million in a single year.⁶ If one of the most mature film-incentive programs in the country cannot generate a positive return on investment, a program at a fraction of its scale operating in a state without comparable infrastructure has no prospect of doing so.

Targeted Credits Are Poor Economic Policy

Targeted economic development tax credits are just another way for lawmakers to pick winners and losers, a job that is better left to consumers in the market. When tax breaks are given to some, other taxpayers have to make up for the lost revenue. The impulse to do something to support an industry is understandable, but tax credits are a poor substitute for the conditions that make industries thrive organically. A dollar of film tax credits reduces state revenue by exactly the same amount as a dollar of direct appropriations—the difference is that credits bypass the appropriations process and receive less scrutiny.

Prioritize Tax Relief That Benefits All Missourians

Missouri is already a national leader in state spending in the name of economic development. Over the past few decades, Missouri has forgone billions in state tax revenue in favor of a host of narrow incentives that have consistently shown poor results. In FY2025 alone, Missouri redeemed more than $961 million in tax credits—nearly double the $521 million redeemed in 2010.⁷ The General Assembly is simultaneously weighing whether to eliminate the state income tax, a reform that would deliver broad economic benefits to every Missourian. The legislature should consider whether a growing tax credit portfolio is consistent with that goal. Expanding targeted credits that erode the income-tax base works against broad-based tax relief, and Missouri would be better served by pursuing the latter.

The film tax credit is a small program, but it exemplifies the approach to tax policy that makes comprehensive reform harder to achieve. Tax credit programs have not been successful in Missouri in the past, there is little evidence to suggest the film tax credit is succeeding now, and there is no reason to believe this program will perform differently under a restructured allocation. If increasing economic opportunity is the goal, the research is clear: Instead trying to manufacture more opportunities at the expense of taxpayers, lawmakers should provide broad-based tax relief to every Missourian.

NOTES

1. “Report of the Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission.” Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission. 2010; https://www.semissourian.com/files/tcrcfinalreport113010.pdf.
2. “Lights, camera and no action: How state film subsidies fail.” USC Press Release. August 18, 2016; https://pressroom.usc.edu/lights-camera-and-no-action-how-state-film-subsidies-fail.
3. Loughead, Katherine. “Illuminating the Hidden Costs of State Tax Incentives.” Tax Foundation. 2021; https://taxfoundation.org/state-tax-incentives-costs.
4. “Made-in-Missouri Film and TV Productions Spent $40.7 Million in 2025.” Missouri Department of Economic Development. February 2026; https://ded.mo.gov/press-room/made-missouri-film-and-tv-productions-spent-407-million-2025.
5. Neman, Daniel. “HBO’s DTF St. Louis has a dream cast, but it wasn’t shot here.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. February 26, 2026; https://www.stltoday.com/life-entertainment/local/movies-tv/article_cfa2d34c-435a-40fd-9fa5-75933d716915.html.
6. “Impact of the Georgia Film Tax Credit.” Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, Performance Audit Division. Report No. 18-03B. January 2020; https://www.audits.ga.gov/ReportSearch/download/23536.
7. “Fourth Quarter Tax Credit Report, Fiscal Year 2025.” Missouri Department of Revenue. 2025; https://dor.mo.gov/public-reports/documents/Fourth-Quarter-FY25-Tax-Credit-Report.pdf.

The post House Bill 2058: Film Tax Credits appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Startling to me, anyway. None of the legislators on the committee seemed bothered.

Is there any public benefit to this secrecy?

There can be when vendors are bidding competitively for a state contract—say, road construction. Protecting proprietary financial or technical details in that context may encourage better bids and serve the public interest.

But stadium subsidies are different—there’s no obvious reason why secrecy is necessary or helpful. When public officials negotiate deals to hand out taxpayer money, the public deserves transparency. Teams may want discretion. State representatives may want to negotiate without tipping off competing states. But neither, in my opinion, is a good enough reason to give it to them.

Yet secrecy has become the norm. Kansas City Mayor Quinton Lucas won’t release the city’s proposal for a downtown stadium to the Royals—even though Clay County released its proposal. The city also kept its 2017 Amazon HQ2 bid under wraps, while many other cities disclosed theirs.

Judging by the lawmakers’ lack of reaction, non-disclosure agreements are now standard operating procedure. They shouldn’t be. Even if elected officials are fine being left in the dark, the public shouldn’t be.

The post Why Is the Department of Economic Development Keeping Secrets? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

It is first worth noting that job creation figures from economic development agencies are often misleading, with creative accounting used to inflate the numbers. And the numbers almost never account for the possibility that these “created” jobs would have happened with or without subsidies. Numerous academic studies have shown that economic development programs rarely work as advocates claim.

But just for the sake of argument, let’s take the numbers at face value. If we divide the jobs created by the incentives provided, the cost amounts to roughly $49,500 in taxpayer money for each job. Is that expense worth it?

Consider this: according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Table 6), Missouri’s economy added 589,337 jobs in calendar year 2023.* In other words, the ordinary functioning of the state’s economy produced roughly 125 times more jobs than the Department of Economic Development’s incentive programs. The DED’s contribution is a tiny fraction of the state’s overall job creation—and it comes at a substantial cost.

The price tag goes beyond the incentives themselves. The total department budget for salaries is $14.6 million for approximately 202 full time employees, meaning taxpayers not only footed the bill for the incentives but also paid for the administrative costs of distributing them. It’s an expensive way to do something the broader economy already does more effectively.

Perhaps it’s time to rethink the role of the Missouri DED. Those funds could be redirected to areas that deliver tangible benefits to all Missourians, like roads, schools, or public safety. Instead of propping up a costly system that yields meager results, Missouri could invest in the essentials that make the state a better place to live and work.

*NOTE: The BLS statistics I cite offer both gross job gains and gross job losses. I cite only the gross gains. A fair-minded person might suggest a more accurate approach is to calculate net job gains by subtracting gross job losses from gross job gains. I would agree with that in most cases. However, economic development professionals do not make a habit of acknowledging job losses. For example, it is often the practice to count as “new” a job that may have only changed location. Until economic development advocates provide a more rigorous accounting of jobs “created,” using BLS numbers on gross job gains is the best comparison.

The post Missouri Economic Development Incentives Aren’t Worth It appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

For those who don’t remember, last year, Missouri’s general assembly made the unfortunate decision to revive the state’s film tax credit program. After the program sat dormant for a decade due to prior poor performance, and despite the wealth of evidence from across the country showing that the program is a bad investment, our elected officials were somehow convinced that the program would work better this time.

While it’s still too early to evaluate the performance of Missouri’s revived film credit, a recently completed audit in the state of Georgia can offer some insight into what Missouri should expect. Unsurprisingly, the results show that the return on investment (ROI) for Georgia taxpayers is less than $0.20. This means that for each tax dollar devoted toward the program, at least 80 cents are lost.

If you have been following this issue for a while, these findings aren’t surprising, as they are in line with much of the past research on the topic. Study after study shows film tax credits are a ridiculously bad investment of state taxpayer dollars. Prior to our state shuttering the program, the Missouri Department of Economic Development found the program’s ROI to be a paltry $0.15. Previous Peach State audits found the ROI to be even lower—around $0.10. Louisiana’s program wasn’t much better, with an ROI of $0.15. And Pennsylvania (Missouri’s entertainment industry tax credit is modeled on the Pennsylvania program) found its film subsidies produced an ROI of only $0.13.

Of course, these aren’t the only metrics where the tax credit program fails to perform. In state after state, the film tax credit falls short of the jobs and economic activity promised. According to a 2019 study that compared film tax credit data from across the country, the author found the incentives have no meaningful effect on employment or wages and suggested the “incentives are generally ineffective at creating industry clusters or inspiring economic development.” Nevertheless, the majority of states keep giving out these subsidies.

At this point, I’m not sure how many more audits or studies need to be published before policymakers will be convinced that a film tax credit program isn’t worth having. But if there’s one thing Missouri lawmakers ought to learn from Georgia (besides that our state’s program should be ended again), it’s that frequent audits of these costly tax incentives are a good thing. Further efforts to improve transparency on Missouri’s numerous tax credit programs should be encouraged.

The post Another Opportunity to Learn appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Perhaps people are upset that the hit Netflix show Ozark and the Oscar-nominated film Three Billboards Outside Ebbing, Missouri were filmed elsewhere in the United States. Whatever the reason, some Missourians are now deliriously calling for the reinstatement of film tax credits to draw filmmakers to the Show-Me State.

Film tax credits can be summarized as state governments paying a portion (usually about 25-40%) of a filmmaker’s costs in order to attract them to do business in the state. In theory, the economic activity generated by the film production will be enough to offset the cost of taxpayer dollars, providing a positive boost to the economy.

Missouri film credit advocates have repeatedly claimed that Gone Girl made $7.9 million off a $2.36 investment. But this is simply not the case. The $7.9 million was not profit or revenue for the state, but “economic activity” (salaries, hotel rooms, dining, etc.). But even that figure is exaggerated, as most of the newly created jobs funded out-of-state employees and all in-state workers were part-time (most work as extras). Out-of-state production companies like to retain their own workers; the number of Missouri editors, producers, actors, and directors actually declined over the Missouri film-credit era.

Additionally, opportunity cost cannot be ignored. Opportunity cost can be defined as the loss of benefits (time, enjoyment, profit) that could have been received from an alternative strategy. Therefore, when you read articles promoting economic tax credits, you shouldn’t compare supposed “boosts” in economic activity to $0, but to what the same millions of dollars could have produced instead, such as infrastructure, public safety, or tax rebates for Missouri citizens.

Film tax credits will not provide Missouri or its citizens with gains in the long run. Independent studies find that states typically recapture only 8 to 28 cents per dollar spent on film credits. Missouri terminated the film credit program partly due to its economic failures, as the Missouri Department of Economic Development found that the program allowed the government to recapture only 15 cents per dollar spent.

Be careful about the spread of Hollywood fever. Instead of paying for films to come to our state, why don’t we improve our state with those funds so filmmakers will have more reasons to come? That would make our state more attractive for all businesses and citizens, not just Hollywood accountants.

The post Hollywood Fever Hits Missouri appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

State and local government

Missouri has received roughly $2.096 billion for state and local government relief. $521 million of that must be distributed to counties and cities with populations under 500,000 within ten days of Jefferson City receiving the funds. St. Louis County has also received roughly $173.5 million and Jackson County $122 million. The money is to be used for non-budgeted coronavirus-related expenses.

Community health centers

Twenty-nine community health centers have received a total of $29.8 million for testing, treatment, and continuing primary care.

Education

Missouri’s Department of Elementary and Secondary Education has filed the appropriate paperwork to receive $208.4 million from the Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief Fund. Further, the governor has announced that $54.6 million from the Governor’s Emergency Education Relief Fund will also arrive to assist with K-12 and higher education, as well as $117 million from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to help provide school lunches. Senator Roy Blunt has announced that Missouri will receive $206 million for colleges and universities, half of which will be immediately available for institutional and student use, as well as $66.5 million through the Child Care and Development Block Grant for early childhood education needs.

Transportation

The Missouri Department of Transportation has received $61.7 million from the CARES Act to be used for operating expenses and capital assistance for 30 rural agencies. Additionally, Missouri has received $152.4 million to be used for revenue assistance at 75 airports across the state.

Housing

$57.7 million in Community Development Block Grants are reported as being available to a combination of 16 Missouri cities, counties, and state government by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. This money is supposed to be used as block grants, emergency solution grants, and housing opportunities for persons with AIDS. The Missouri Department of Economic Development has announced that it will receive $13.6 million of that total.

Unemployment

The Missouri Division of Employment Security has used more than $66 million in federal funds to provide additional unemployment compensation, although more compensation will be distributed once the state determines how to process workers in the “gig” economy.

Emergency management

Missouri can apply for roughly $1.86 million to assist with emergency management procedures ranging from data collection and sharing to response plan development. A 50 percent match in state funding for the program is needed to receive funding.

Public safety

The cities of Joplin and St. Joseph have received funds to assist with public safety expenses for a combined total of $170,000. Overall, $5.5 million is available for 28 Missouri county and city agencies and $11.6 million for state agencies, should they choose to apply for these funds.

Small business loans

Over 46,000 Missouri businesses have received loans from the Paycheck Protection Program, totaling slightly more than $7.5 billion.

Summary

Received: $10.201 billion

Expected: $710.2 million

Available through application: $18.79 million

If you add these sums together you get $10.918 billion. This is what we know so far. More dollars may arrive in the future, boosting the totals for many—if not all—categories.

The post Federal Stimulus Money in Missouri: What We Know So Far appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Kansas City region is unlike many in the United States in that the metropolitan area is divided almost exactly in half by the state line. The older and more urban part of region, Kansas City, sits in Missouri. The newer and more suburban post-war developments rest in Kansas. So the traditional urban-suburban economic wars seen across the country have an additional component: state interests. According to the Hall Family Foundation, the two states spent $335 million in the past decade trading employers only to see Kansas win a slight 1,200 net gain of jobs.

While the state action is welcome, the truce deal does not include all the various localities on either side of the state border. Cities may continue to offer incentives or other financial packages to lure existing businesses into their domain. While Kansas City, Missouri has pledged to honor the agreement, smaller suburban communities on the Kansas side have not. As demonstrated by the USDA’s recent announcement that it has chosen a site on the Missouri side to relocate some of its workforce, the two states will continue to fight an expensive war among themselves to bring jobs from afar. The Kansas City Area Development Council—a private non-profit which seeks to attract jobs to the region—still operates as a double-dealing promoter in the regional jobs Fight Club, collecting dues from both sides of state line and then repeatedly pitting them against each other.

Many of the individuals and organizations who profited handsomely from the years of combat have come out in favor of the deal. Sort of. The CEO of the Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce—a chamber whose portfolio includes both sides of the state line—recently told a local radio host, “I think it forms a new way to think about how we’re going to grow Kansas City where we really are looking to grow it in a net new way, not just moving companies from one side of the city to the other.” But moving companies and jobs from one side of the city to the other is exactly the economic development policy the Chamber has championed in the past and will likely champion in the future (e.g. a downtown baseball stadium for the Kansas City Royals).

Part of the problem seems to be that the folks who run such economic development programs are able to use questionable data in order to proclaim job growth and presumably justify their own budgets. For example, Waddell & Reed, a financial services firm originally located in Missouri but that crossed state line years ago in exchange for such incentives, started its incentives negotiations to return to Missouri just before the Border War truce was announced. In exchange for $62 million in Missouri incentives, it will move 1,000 jobs from Kansas. A spokeswoman for the Missouri Department of Economic Development heralded the move as good for the region, apparently unaware the jobs were already well within the region. One can be confident they will claim those jobs and new in their reporting documents.

Perhaps most notable of all is that the truce lacks precise language to describe exactly what it is prohibiting. Kansas Governor Laura Kelly’s executive order seems to restrict incentives to projects that create “net new” jobs. But that term is not defined. Could a growing Missouri firm already planning to make a few new hires take that plan to Kansas and seek incentives — using those “net new jobs” as leverage? How will Kansas assess whether those “net new jobs” were due to the incentives themselves?

Knowing the degree to which job creation or private investment is due to incentives has been a point of contention all along. Policymakers and developers point to all the new property development as proof of efficacy, but the vast majority of the economic research literature indicates that such development likely would have happened anyway, and that the return on investment of public dollars is small if anything at all. Private companies have learned how to game the system through a combination of over-promising, threats of relation, and fanciful accounting.

It is heartening to learn that other regions may be examining the Missouri/Kansas deal to see if it might work for them; the goals are laudable. But if policymakers are serious about ending these types of economic development incentive wars, all levels of government in the region need to be a party to it and the terms must be precisely defined. The allure of ribbon cuttings and claiming to be job creators is too great to leave to vague promises.

The post Skepticism Is Warranted on Missouri/Kansas Border War Truce appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Tax Foundation’s rankings are a composite based on each state’s corporate, individual income, sales, property, and unemployment insurance taxes. Missouri ranks in the top ten for three of the taxes (corporate, unemployment insurance, and property), but 25^th for the remaining two (individual income and sales).

Despite the generally favorable ranking of Missouri’s tax climate from the Tax Foundation, the state’s economic growth continues to lag. In 2017, Missouri was ranked 37th among states with a paltry 1.1 percent real Gross State Product (GSP) growth rate, while the average growth over the previous ten years is even worse at only 0.48 percent. The tax climate is certainly not the only contributor to economic growth, but the difference in state rankings raises the question of whether the Tax Foundation’s index may be missing something.

To evaluate the applicability of the ranking results to Missouri, it is helpful to consider what makes a business climate attractive to new businesses, and whether the index attempted to capture those criteria. Studies show the main determinants of business climate are the tax and regulatory burdens each business must bear. From the outset, the Tax Foundation index does not measure regulatory burden, and also excludes most local taxes from their calculations. If the Index is missing several important components, should the state’s Department of Economic Development be touting the results?

The Tax Foundation’s rankings offer valuable information about Missouri’s business tax climate, but should not necessarily be the basis for future policymaking. If lawmakers are serious about improving Missouri’s business climate, reducing the regulatory burden and reforming local taxes should be part of the discussion.

The post Is Missouri’s Business Tax Climate Competitive? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Sure enough, my mom started on the first knot, then the second and third, and once done, she started to knit. A pattern soon formed – a big, beautiful sweater with a daisy in the middle. At that point my grandmother turned to her and said “That sweater was in there the entire time—you just didn’t know where to look.”

Show-Me Institute writers regularly advocate eliminating or reducing the tangle of economic development credits that so often waste taxpayer money without providing the promised benefits. However, we also understand that such an endeavor can seem overwhelming, and that problems can easily become knotted together. To simplify such a convoluted mess, it can help to break the work into small chunks and work on it a bit at a time.

The Missouri Department of Economic Development’s 2015 Annual Report lists the amounts issued for every incentive issued in Missouri. Instead of looking at ways to eliminate such incentives or even cap the total amount issued, another option could be to tackle these incentives one at a time. Policymakers can start with the incentive with the smallest amount issued and work up, or they can tackle the largest ones, like the Historic Preservation Credit, and work their way down. The important thing is to focus on each issue separately before moving on to the next one.

In 2010, a state tax credit review commission considered ways to create greater efficiency and return on investment through tax credit programs. In its report, the commission listed 28 programs that do not create “a justifiable benefit in relation to their cost to taxpayers.” This recommendation could mark a good place to start unraveling. The state tax revenue recovered by eliminating ill-advised credits could allow for a proven economic growth plan: a broad and fair tax cut.

The post One Knot at a Time appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

According to Missouri’s Department of Revenue, in 2015 H&R Block reported 2,211”new jobs” created at their Kansas City World Headquarters as a result of their TIF deal. A reasonable person might conclude that this means that there are 2,211 new jobs in addition to those that already existed, and those new jobs are the result of the taxpayer-subsidized construction. That does not appear to be the case. An April story in The Kansas City Star reports,

A year ago at this time, the company reported 90 staff cuts, mostly at its Kansas City headquarters, a result of business being down early in that year’s tax season. It had 2,200 full-time employees at the end of tax season a year ago. This round of layoffs leaves it with 1,735 full-time employees.

Block doesn’t have 2,211 “new jobs,” it has (or rather, had) 2,200 total jobs. It also claims to have retained none of the 1,493 jobs it projected it would retain. How these jobs are counted is a mystery. According to a Missouri Department of Economic Development official, the job numbers are, “self defined and self reported.” The Department of Revenue does not audit the claims. We don’t know how Block came up with their numbers. 

We looked around for other ways to measure job growth. HOK, the group that designed the Block building, report on their website that,

H&R Block’s headquarters consolidates 1,600 employees from six locations into a 17-story high-rise in downtown Kansas City.

From about 2006 through 2016 Block went from 1,600 employees to 1,735; a net gain of 135 “new jobs.” It’s likely that modest job growth would have happened without the shiny new building. Remember, taxpayers are forgoing 23 years of tax revenue, “covering 95 percent of the H&R Block headquarters project’s $308 million cost.”

That’s a lot of money to spend for a net gain of 135 jobs. Defenders of the Block deal may respond that the country has undergone a Great Recession and online tax filings have likely impacted Block’s business performance. This only underscores the reason why municipalities—led by elected officials who may have no background in investing—should not be betting taxpayer dollars in speculative developments.

Ten years after making a huge commitment of public funds, Kansas City is left with an underutilized building housing a business with anemic job growth. There are rumors that H&R Block may soon be sold to another company that could move it out of the city altogether, as happened with other subsidized companies Applebees and Freightquote. That is not an economic development track record of which anyone should be proud.

The post Counting Economic Development Jobs appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Are you listening, Missouri lawmakers? This is the Ghost of Christmas Past. I am calling on you to mend your ways and adopt a whole new set of economic policies to replace the failed policies of the past two decades.

Yes, my friends, it is time for you to admit that what you have been doing—in spending billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money to subsidize commercial projects for the benefit of big, cash-rich companies such as Boeing, Cerner, Capri Casinos, Wal-Mart, and Whole Foods—has been a ghastly mistake.

In the 16 years from 1997 through 2013, Missouri has trailed every other state in the nation but one in average annual economic growth. Missouri ranked 49th out of the 50 states in growth of state gross domestic product—just ahead of bottom-dwelling Michigan.

And that is despite (or, I would say, because of) the fact that you have turned Missouri into one of the nine states considered the “corporate welfare kings of America.” According to the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Missouri has committed more than $5.2 billion in state and local subsidies to private businesses over the past two decades. That is more than all but eight other states.

What else can I say to convince you of the urgent need for change? Well, perhaps some specific suggestions would help.

Here are five New Year’s resolutions for making Missouri a better place to live and work and grow a business:

• Stop putting the public sector cart in front of the private sector horse. That is to say, begin with the recognition that all the private sector really needs to create wealth and jobs is competition and freedom of choice. It doesn’t need central planning and controls, which have the opposite effect of stifling individual initiative and economic growth.
• Abolish the Missouri Department of Economic Development (DED) and return the money that the DED passes out in targeted tax credits for economic development (about $400 million a year) to everyone (not just the politically selected few) through broad-based cuts in the state income tax for individuals and businesses.
• Take advantage of a wealth of opportunities across the state to enlarge the private sector and shrink the public sector through privatization. That is what Arnold did recently in selling its publicly owned and operated sewer system to a private contractor for $13.2 million—allowing the city of 20,000 people to pay off $8 million in sewer bonds and devote another $5.2 million to other public improvement. Better yet, under private ownership, the sewer system will go on the tax rolls and help pay for schools and other public services.
• Make greatly increased use of tolls on Hwy. 70 and other major roadways and bridges. Tolls are an extremely efficient tax, and—as a result of new technology—they are readily collectible without toll booths or other inconvenience to people using the roadways. In fact, through variable tolls, the Missouri Department of Transportation could—at minimal cost—guarantee drivers congestion-free traffic flows at all hours of the day on major roadways and bridges.
• Finally, look to what neighboring states are doing in reorienting their tax structures and put Missouri in the forefront of states that are pursuing pro-growth, pro-economic freedom reforms.

In the Christmas spirit, I urge you to make all those changes—knowing that you will wake up shortly wanting to fix the problems that have kept Missouri from reaching its full potential.

Andrew B. Wilson is a resident fellow and senior writer at the Show-Me Institute.

The post New Year’s Resolutions for Missouri Lawmakers appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Last fall, when Gone Girl began production, Cape Girardeau descended into a starstruck madness. All talk focused around the movie and the stars; Facebook and Instagram became flooded with celebrity sightings. I don’t blame locals for their enthusiasm of hosting a movie star like Ben Affleck and being the center of a major film production, but I do think it is more than a little ridiculous that Missouri taxpayers will be stuck with a $2.36 million tax bill to pay for this fleeting moment in the presence of Hollywood stars.

Taking advantage of the Department of Economic Development’s (DED) Film Tax Credit program before it expired in November 2013, the producers of Gone Girl received $2.36 million in tax credits from the state to offset the cost of production and taxes on income and payroll. Tax credits are dollar-for-dollar reductions in a tax filer’s tax liability, meaning that every dollar of “credit” given by the state for projects like Gone Girl ultimately results in a dollar less in revenue to the state, which could pay for schools and other taxpayer needs.

Don’t be fooled by reports that these credits pay for themselves. The truth about film tax credits is that they bleed taxpayers to subsidize an industry that last year brought in $36 billion in revenue worldwide.

Take, for example, the $3,262 in DirectTV charges for the installation of satellite TV in the hotel rooms of Affleck, director David Fincher, and other highly paid Hollywood producers. Or try the subsidization of a movie star’s hotel room. Then there is the $70 massage Rosamund Pike received courtesy of taxpayer dollars. And, my personal favorite, $650 for an espresso maker for the cast and crew. Agreeing to these tax credits means taxpayers end up paying for outlandish expenditures that benefit Hollywood rather than Missourians.

Despite the ridiculous expenditures subsidized with taxpayer dollars, tax credits still don’t meet the basic tenets of their purpose. Take the promise of job creation for example. At the price of $2.36 million, each of the 116 Missourians hired for the production of Gone Girl should have a job that pays $20,344 for an entire year. Looking at the payroll of the production, none of these reported job positions were full-time or high-paying, and not a single Missourian is still employed in the same capacity. Furthermore, a closer look at their payroll reveals that many of the “jobs” created by the film went to out-of-state employees, businesses, and contractors—not Missourians.

Why doesn’t this tax credit work? Because Missouri does not have the proper infrastructure to support film production. Missouri has to compete with the 40 other states that have similar programs, but with much higher tax incentives. When faced with competition from states like New York and Louisiana who have hundreds of millions of dollars in film tax credits, Missouri can’t afford to compete in this race to the bottom.

Having lived in Southeast Missouri for the majority of my life, I can understand the thrill that the production of Gone Girl brought to the area. But the ugly truth is that these film tax credits don’t provide the jobs and economic growth that Cape Girardeau and Missouri need. Let’s leave Hollywood in California so that Missourians don’t have to finance celebrities’ espressos or massages and focus on attracting businesses and investors to Missouri that won’t leave taxpayers to foot the bill.

Jessica Stearns is an intern at the Show-Me Institute.

The post A Look Past Gone Girl Excitement Reveals a Raw Deal for Missourians appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

For universal Pre-K supporters, this was a major loss, but for Missouri taxpayers, our “failure” to get the grant is actually a win. Federal grants have a history of costing states more over time—Race to the Top is a recent education-related example.

Missouri already has doubled its expenditures toward expanding early childhood education. The Department of Economic Development (DED) made $10 million available to promote the expansion of public Pre-K programs just last year.

Preschool education is where Missourians already have the most school choice. Expanding public options will only duplicate existing services, likely shifting some students from the private to the public sector, where there is no guarantee the services will be better.

Nationally, 74 percent of four-year-olds already are enrolled in Pre-K or home-based programs. Using listings from Great Schools, the table below highlights the number of private Pre-K options versus public ones in several of Missouri’s cities.

Research on the benefits of early childhood education has yielded mixed results. Even those studies showing significant benefits of preschool expansion touted by Gov. Jay Nixon as “proven” are subject to criticism. One comprehensive study on the effects of Head Start showed there was no long-term increase in cognitive abilities of children who participated in the early education program. Yet, Nixon gave the organization $7 million just last year.

Missouri taxpayers should not pay for services that already exist, especially if the research backing those services is shaky. There are better solutions to addressing the educational needs of children in poverty, ones that don’t include government mandates.

The post If You Like Your Preschool, You’ll Be Able to Keep-Not Again! appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

“‘I can think of no better place to host the Super Bowl than Kansas City, the best football town in America,’ [State Senator Paul] LeVota said in a statement. ‘We’ve got incredible fans and a city more than capable of handling such a huge event.’

“Not only would the fans love it, but the economic impact would be enormous, he said.”

Ah, there is that elusive term, “economic impact.” It is thrown about to justify all sorts of government spending, but it is little examined by media and little understood by the taxpayers whose money will be used. We recently reviewed similar claims about Kansas City’s effort to attract the GOP convention. In that piece, we cited a Daily Beast story about the recent Super Bowl in New Jersey:

“So, there’s no economically sound way to predict a Super Bowl’s impact before the event and those that try have been proven wrong again and again. But don’t expect that to stop the cheering from the few with the most to gain. When asked for a more detailed analysis of Super Bowl XLVIII, the host committee demurred, but assured in a statement, ‘Super Bowl XLVIII is expected to be an economic boom [sic] for the region.'”

A 2006 study conducted by the College of the Holy Cross, “Mega-Events: The effect of the world’s biggest sporting events on local, regional, and national economies,” analyzes past Super Bowl impacts. The report concludes with a sobering warning to those who would embark on such expenses:

“The most important piece of advice that a local government can take regarding mega-events, however, is simply to view with caution any economic impact estimates provided by entities with an incentive to provide inflated benefit figures. While most sports boosters claim that mega-events provide host cities with large economic returns, these same boosters present these figures as justification for receiving substantial public subsidies for hosting the games. The vast majority of independent academic studies of mega-events show the benefits to be a fraction of those claimed by event organizers.”

Hosting a Super Bowl in Kansas City would be a great opportunity to show off our city to the rest of the world. Afterall, the term “Super Bowl” was coined by Chiefs owner and American Football League founder Lamar Hunt. But regional boosters need not wear blinders. At what cost does such an event cease to be worthwhile, especially when so many basic services in Kansas City already seem to be falling by the wayside? If we’re going to bring people to the City of Fountains, let’s at least make sure we can afford to operate the fountains.

The post Of Super Bowls and Economics appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

One of the development projects that indicated the streetcar was a “key reason” for their development was the Centric Projects Headquarters, and the project is listed at $2 million. According to Centric’s website, it is a general contracting firm. Kansas City Mayor Sly James appointed the founder, Richard Wetzel, to the streetcar advisory group to consider the Country Club Right of Way. In a blog post on the Centric website, Wetzel wrote, “For years, I have been an advocate of fixed-rail transit in Kansas City.” Wetzel is not a disinterested party; he is a self-described advocate for the streetcar.

As for the so-called economic development that Centric and Wetzel provided Kansas City, for which the streetcar was a “key reason,” it’s not so impressive. The Kansas City Business Journal reported on May 22, 2013, that:

Centric Projects LLC is moving its offices two blocks up Main Street to accommodate rapid growth at the Kansas City commercial general contractor.

The 3-year-old firm is moving from its current 3,000 square feet of space at 2024 Main St. to a new 5,500-square-foot space at 1814 Main St. by the end of July.

The building was previously occupied by Western Blue, which left Kansas City for Kansas City, Kan., in 2010, and is undergoing $1.5 million worth of renovations ahead of the relocation.

So there you have it. Centric’s $2 million economic impact supposedly due to the streetcar is a $1.5 million remodel to a space that likely would have required remodeling regardless who, or why, it was occupied. The company moved two blocks up Main, meaning that they didn’t even move to the streetcar line from somewhere outside the Transportation Development District (TDD). They simply moved to a different point on it. Kansas City officials want you to think this is all due solely to the uncompleted downtown streetcar.

It gets better. That same Business Journal piece goes on to state that Centric is receiving tax incentives for staying in Kansas City, Mo.:

Centric also is receiving tax credits from Missouri for keeping jobs in the state. Kounkel did not say how the tax credits are oriented but said the credits are tied to the number of employees the firm hires and will help “offset expenses.”

Representatives of the Missouri Department of Economic Development, which typically handles the state’s tax credit programs, were not immediately available for comment.

Whatever the amount, the money was wasted, as Centric’s founder said they never considered a move out of state:

“We never considered a move to another state or municipality,” Richard Wetzel, partner at the firm, said in a release. “While we do work all over the metropolitan area, Kansas City, Missouri — and specifically the Crossroads (Arts District) — is where we want to continue to hang our shingle.”

Centric’s example only serves to confirm the Show-Me Institute’s claim that there is no evidence that streetcars alone lead to economic development. Centric did not move from outside the streetcar taxing district so there is no net new development. The $2 million (actually $1.5 million) economic impact it claims would likely have been required of anyone who occupied the space, and Centric received other economic incentives to relocate within the TDD.

We learned all of this in the course of a few hours searching online. Is Kansas City really this inept at calculating economic development, or is this a concerted effort to mislead voters?

The post Kansas City Streetcar Economic Development Claims Don’t Add Up . . . Literally appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

What did the auditors find? A lot. For starters, HPTC tax credits have cost the state nearly $600 million over the last five years alone and more than a billion dollars over the last 10. Missouri leads the country in “qualified rehabilitation expenses” (QRE) for historic preservation, which relates to the expenses against which the HPTC could be applied. Broadly speaking, the higher the QRE that rehabbers claim under the HPTC, the more money the state will be spending on it.

So, how big is Missouri’s QRE lead? Check out this chart from page 8 of the audit.

For perspective, Massachusetts, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York are all original U.S. colonies. Are we to believe that Missouri should have been subsidizing preservation spending at almost twice the rate as the next closest state… and not only that, subsidizing it at that level for more than a decade?

I can appreciate that we love our old buildings in Missouri, but if anything and everything can get the stamp of being “historic,” then we degrade the things that are, in fact, historic and waste limited taxpayer resources in the process. Could some projects be worthy of taxpayer support? Possibly, but those cases would be an exception, not a billion dollar rule.

To name a fraction of the examples that underscore this reality, Norwood Hills Country Club should not have received taxpayer money. A whole host of private mansions that the HPTC subsidized should not have received taxpayer money. Check out this story, from the audit:

In 2011, the DED issued about $296,000 in credits to an applicant who renovated a 3-story, 5,400 square foot home in an affluent neighborhood in a metropolitan area. The applicant purchased the home in 1993 for nearly $300,000 and reported about $1.2 million in qualified rehabilitation expenditures. The home has a fair market value of approximately $434,000.

So the owner buys a $300,000 house, drops $1.2 million into it, gets nearly $300,000 (almost what he paid for the house originally!) in credits from the state, and the value of the house rises… about $130,000? On what planet does subsidizing a private residence in a wealthy neighborhood make any sense for taxpayers? Why did Missourians have to effectively reimburse this person the purchase price of their home? Who’s looking out for the taxpayers here? And who in their right mind and looking at the numbers thinks this is a good “investment” for the state?

The HPTC is a mess of a program. The least the legislature could do is set a date for this madness to end.

The post State Audit Recommends Sunset Of Historic Preservation Tax Credit appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In 2006 and again in 2010, Money Magazine cited Lee’s Summit as one of the 100 Best Cities in the United States. The Lee’s Summit Chamber of Commerce boasts on its website: “Lee’s Summit is an ideal place to live and work, providing a desirable lifestyle that everyone can enjoy — high-quality, affordable housing in safe neighborhoods endowed with fine schools and excellent health care facilities.”

So why in the world is the Lee’s Summit City Council rushing to adopt an economic development program aimed at blighting large swaths of the city?

There is only one possible answer: The city council has been bitten by the same parasitical EEZ bug (Enhanced Enterprise Zone) that has attached itself to other cities and counties across Missouri.

In fact, almost a third of our state has been officially declared “blighted” as a result of the widespread use of EEZs, TIFs (Tax Increment Financing), TDDs (Transportation Development Districts), and other such programs that combine local subsidies for commercial development with the use of eminent domain — enabling developers to force residents out of their homes and small business owners out of their shops and offices.

On April 11, we presented testimony to the city council on the efficacy — or, more accurately, the inefficacy — of Enterprise Zones in Missouri. The Show-Me Institute had recently conducted a study comparing the economic performance of two groups: (1) eight Missouri counties that employed Enterprise Zones, and (2) 12 neighboring and economically similar counties that did not. We found that economic growth in the two groups was almost identical.

In other words, there was no evidence that Enterprise Zones had any positive impact on economic growth or employment. They seemed to be a waste of time and money.

Our statements to the Lee’s Summit City Council made this perfectly clear, and none of the economic development officials, city staff, or consultants at the meeting made an effort to argue otherwise.

Yet it was a clear that most members of the city council, along with the consultants and development staff, had already made up their minds: They wanted to move ahead as quickly as possible in setting up an EEZ.

One reason for the rush is the fear that the 2010 Census numbers, which are still being finalized, will show that poverty and unemployment rates in Lee’s Summit have dropped since the previous Census — which could have the effect of making Lee’s Summit ineligible for the subsidies from the Missouri Department of Economic Development (DED).

Not that Lee’s Summit was any kind of an economic basket case 10 years earlier. Based on the 2000 Census, the median income for a family in Lee’s Summit was $70,702, or close to double the median family income for the state as a whole.

Nor does Lee’s Summit suffer from a lack of growth. Between 2000 and 2010, the population of Lee’s Summit grew from 70,700 people to 91,364 — an increase of 29 percent.

But neither prosperity nor rapid growth has dampened the enthusiasm of some city council members at the thought of spending some easy money.

On the night that we testified, one member of the city council argued that because the DED is giving the money away, Lee’s Summit might just as well take it. The proposed EEZ for Lee’s Summit is a particularly egregious example of throwing away taxpayer money for no good cause — in promoting a solution for a problem that does not exist.

Patrick Tuohey is the western Missouri field manager and David Stokes is a policy analyst at the Show-Me Institute, which promotes market solutions for Missouri public policy.

The post Lee’s Summit EEZ: A Solution In Search Of A Problem appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

We provide Residential Development Consulting services to both non-profit and for-profit organizations. We provide expertise in structuring developments utilizing a variety of public and private resources, including federal CDBG and HOME funds; tax-exempt bond financing; and low income housing tax credit, historic tax credit and new markets tax credit transactions.

That probably should have come up at least in the author’s bio. Unfortunately, it did not.

While we are discussing the RHCDA’s portfolio of tax credit expertise, it should be noted that the Associated Press made this revelation about the New Markets tax credit program just this weekend (emphasis mine):

Missouri has authorized more than $120 million of tax credits through a program intended to entice wealthy investors to pour money into businesses in low-income areas, but the initiative has yet to produce even half the jobs that were anticipated, according to state figures provided to The Associated Press….

At the request of the AP, the state Department of Economic Development compiled a spreadsheet documenting every New Markets tax credit that has been authorized. The 9,679 “anticipated jobs” associated with the tax credits far exceeds the 823 “actual new jobs” and 3,141 “jobs retained” under the program, though those numbers could continue to rise.

This “tax credit job-shortfall” storyline is not unique. Indeed, the AP report on the New Markets program follows earlier, similar revelations about the Quality Jobs tax credit program, which I testified about earlier this year. In the case of the Quality Jobs program, 45,000 jobs were promised; according to state records, only about 7,000 jobs were created in reality. As I said then (emphasis mine):

In practice, there is no particular consequence to the state and its public officials claiming that new jobs will be coming, even if the jobs never materialize. That may explain the difference between the number of jobs state officials promise when a tax credit project is announced and the number of jobs actually created when the project winds down. To some officials, big tax credit promises look better than small tax credit promises, even if those promises do not pan out.

The same can be said of the consultants who go to bat for these credits. Acree even has the audacity to claim that the historic preservation tax credit is “Missouri’s most useful economy-boosting program.” A program that returns 23 cents on the dollar is our “most useful economy-boosting program”?! Does this suggestion horrify anyone else?

I have a better idea: Cut taxes with the money instead and let taxpayers invest their money themselves in their own businesses. Better yet, eliminate a tax or two instead of underwriting the projects of the politically well-connected. Missouri’s most useful economy-boosting program is the hard work and innovation of its taxpayers, not some bloated, special-interest government handout.

As story after tax credit story bears out, tax credit proponents/consultants have a terrible track record of substantive, sustainable, and enduring successes. The historic preservation tax credit is a central player in this ongoing, budget-busting, decade-long state development debacle. Suffice to say, I am looking forward to the findings of the state audit of the program, due to come out later this year.

The post Nota Bene: Historic Preservation Tax Credit ‘Consultant’ Supports Historic Preservation Tax Credit appeared first on Show-Me Institute.