This is just the latest example over the years of City Hall favoring wealthy, connected corporations with taxpayer subsidies and special treatment.

Port KC CEO Jon Stephens framed the incentives as a “small, supportive element” aimed at ensuring Kansas City retains high-quality jobs. The project promises to add 150 jobs with an average salary of $126,000 while retaining 600 current employees. Yet no precise value for the tax exemptions was disclosed. Its not clear if PortKC attached performance requirements to the deal, but Friestad indicates there was no such discussion of it among the commissioners when the subsidies were approved.

Readers may recall Stephens backed subsidies for an independent baseball team in Kansas back when the team couldn’t pay its utilities. If nothing else, he is consistent in his apparent desire to redirect taxpayer money to private corporate interests

Such a deal is nothing new for JE Dunn. The company received a lucrative incentive package when building its headquarters in 2009. That project fell under the East Village tax-increment financing plan, redirecting $19 million in public funds for a parking garage, demolitions, and blight removal.

This latest deal follows a familiar script in which major corporations, including Cerner, H&R Block, Burns & McDonnell, and Commerce Bank have secured public funding for their private office projects. Research has indicated for years that such incentives do not significantly impact corporate decisions on location.

Port KC has repeatedly played a central role in funneling public dollars into private hands. Its recent involvement with JE Dunn reflects a long history of negotiating deals that often leave taxpayers holding the bag, such as the millions each year taxpayers must fork over to cover bond payments on the Power & Light District owned and operated by Cordish Company. (Stephens is a former manager of that project.)

As Kansas City grapples with persistent infrastructure needs, ballooning public debt, and limited funding for essential services, its continued reliance on subsidies for corporate renovations raises questions about priorities. For now, Kansas Citians can only watch as the city’s public funds are diverted to underwrite private gains.

The post KC’s Corporate Welfare: JE Dunn’s HQ Renovation Gets Public Support appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

It is, alas, same as it ever was. Cordish Cos. is again pushing Kansas City for more taxpayer-funded subsidies. This time, it’s for its $156 million, 24-story Four Light luxury apartment tower. And it is already laying the groundwork for a fifth (Four Light would be the fourth luxury apartment for Cordish Cos.). The catch? Cordish Cos. wants to declare part of the Power & Light District an “undeveloped industrial area” to qualify for incentives—an absurd claim for property it controls.

These developer handouts are draining the city of the resources it needs to provide basic public services. This isn’t about revitalizing a struggling neighborhood—it’s about maximizing profits for wealthy and well-connected developers at the public’s expense.

Kansas City needs to end this cycle. If Cordish believes there’s demand for Four Light, let it fund it privately. If the city thinks there is too much regulation or taxation, leaders should reduce it for everyone, not a select few.

The post K.C. Subsidies Stop Making Sense appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In 2014, Cerner received the largest economic development project subsidy in the state’s history. The company pledged to add 16,000 *new* jobs in Kansas City in exchange for substantial taxpayer subsidies to construct its new headquarters. However, by 2019, Cerner had only managed to expand its workforce to 14,000 total, and not all the jobs were in Kansas City proper. Cerner fell short of its promise. Now, under Oracle’s ownership, the local employee headcount has been nearly halved to a mere 6,400. This is far from the 26,000 jobs—the 16,000 new plus the 10,000 Cerner had at the time—that were supposed to be in place by this year.

The issue runs deeper than just the numbers; it’s more about the impact on the local economy and the trust that was placed in these corporations. The Kansas City region was promised significant economic growth and job creation. Taxpayers delivered, but Cerner, and now Oracle, have failed to keep their promises.

Just like the Power & Light District, and the proposed downtown stadium, the Cerner project reveals the misplaced faith in economic development incentives. Time and again, we see that these incentives often fail to deliver. Instead, they serve as generous gifts to corporations, paid for by taxpayers, with little to no accountability.

The Cerner deal has been an abject failure. All city and state leaders who cheered this project should be held to account.

Current and future Kansas City leaders must learn from these missteps. They must scrutinize these large-scale economic development projects more rigorously and demand transparency and accountability. Tax incentives and subsidies, if issued at all, should include meaningful and measurable outcomes, strict legal standards for what constitutes a new job, and oversight from a clearly defined agency that will monitor the subsidy recipient over time. Holding corporations accountable for their promises will not only protect taxpayers; it may reduce the demand for subsidies in the first place.

The April 2 stadium outcome showed that voters demand more details and accountability from those who seek public funds. Leaders must provide them.

The post Kansas City Must Learn Lessons from Cerner Failure appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

That said, I should make and reiterate a few points about the Royals’ stadium issue, now that it’s back in the news.

• The stadium renderings are cool. It’s easy to poo-poo big-dollar construction proposals as being sales jobs of dubious eventual reality, but that doesn’t make the prospect of something new any less interesting. The eventual financing plan for the stadium will likely be bad policy, but it’s understandable why people might get excited at what a future ballpark might look like. That’s obviously why they had the press conference this week: to stoke support and excitement.
• But cool renderings don’t change the fact that taxpayers shouldn’t pay for professional sports stadia. The renderings for these stadia could have put a helicopter port on the roof, a rocket ship in the parking lot, and a theme park in center field, but a cool drawing doesn’t make giving tax dollars to rich baseball tycoons an appropriate “investment” by the public. Developments like this generally do not expand the pie of disposable income in a region; instead, they tend to redirect spending that was previously being spent by consumers at other restaurants and entertainment options in the region. Ask bar owners in Westport what they think the immediate impact of the Power & Light District was on their traffic and you’ll get a sense of the potential risks of subsidizing new competition to existing businesses this time around.
• The “$2.8 billion” construction impact figure presented by the Royals is not a game changer. As I told KMBC 9, I believe that the Royals believe their numbers and that stadium construction would create “$2.8 billion” in economic activity in and around the ballpark. But what’s that really mean, other than to repeat the obvious? When the team is promising $1 billion in private financing to go along with $1 billion in public support, yeah, those are two giant wheelbarrows of cash being dumped into one spot that get you pretty close to the headline number. But that doesn’t change the fact that half of the spending would be coming from the public to create a district that would compete with other entertainment districts, including Westport and the Power & Light District.
• And speaking of the taxpayer-subsidized Power & Light District, it hasn’t and won’t ever pay for itself. One of the biggest public spending projects in the last couple of decades was the Power & Light District in Kansas City’s downtown. From the beginning, the city was on the hook to pay off the bonds for the property if tax revenue from the district wasn’t high enough. The result? Over the last 16 years, Kansas City taxpayers paid the nearly $170 million gap between what the district costs and what the district generates in tax revenue to pay the bonds. It’s easy to make promises of success when the cost of failure is borne by someone else, and there’s no guarantee taxpayers—whether in Jackson County or Clay County—won’t get soaked this go-around, too.

There is a bit of deja vu here, of course; about this time in 2022, I was talking about a potential move for the Chiefs, whose lease at the Truman Sports Complex ends when the Royals does. But the takeaway now with the Royals is the same as it was with the Chiefs—sports teams should pay for their playthings themselves. The Royals may be the kings of Kauffman, but when it comes to sovereign action in the real world, public officials should reject spending tax dollars on anything but legitimate responsibilities of government. Subsidizing sports teams isn’t one of those responsibilities.

The post Hey! Hey! Hey! Hey! Pay for Your Own Stadium appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Baltimore’s population has been steadily declining in the past few years. It stands at about 610,000 today—down from 620,000 in 2010 and 650,000 in 2000—and its height of 950,000 people in 1950. Like Kansas City and St. Louis, it has struggled with a high homicide rates, coming in second behind St. Louis in 2017 and ahead of fifth-ranked Kansas City. Like Kansas City’s moniker ‘Killa City,’ Baltimore’s homicide rate earned it the nickname ‘Bodymore, Murderland.’ Baltimore students are some of the worst served in the country.

No one can accuse Baltimore of doing nothing to reverse its fortunes. In fact, Baltimore seems to have done everything that developers and urban planners recommend. Consider the following amenities paid for in part with city and state subsidies:

• Power Plant Live! entertainment district (developed by Baltimore-based The Cordish Companies, developers of Kansas City Power & Light District and St. Louis Ballpark Village)
• Rail transit such as the Baltimore Metro and LightRail Link
• A downtown baseball stadium, Oriole Park at Camden Yards
• The National Aquarium
• The Baltimore Convention Center, first renovated in 1996 and now considering another renovation and expansion; the convention center is connected by rail to . . .
• Baltimore Washington International Airport (BWI), including recent renovations and new concourses
• Baltimore even has a waterfront development!

These are developments that would make any recent Kansas City or St. Louis mayor salivate. And yet none would want to turn their cities into Baltimore. Why?

Maybe it is because we all understand—whether we admit it or not—that cities need to get the basics right. Cities should prioritize basic infrastructure, public safety, and tax policy done well before they splurge on expensive baubles. Kansas City and St. Louis do not yet have the basics right, and nothing should distract us from fixing it.

The post Baltimores on the Missouri? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

KSHB TV, WDAF TV and The Kansas City Star reported on the matter. The latter quoted Kansas City’s Mayor James saying, “I’m not asking the state legislature to do anything other than leave us alone.” (This is usually the Mayor’s response unless he is looking for more money from state government, such as in tax credits or state funds.)

The Star reports,

And if the city imposes a new 1 cent sales tax for the Central Business District—part of a deal it struck last month with Power & Light District developer Cordish to help pay for parking garages—the cumulative rate would be 13.6 percent.

You don’t need to be an anti-tax ideologue to wonder if there is a point at which sales taxes are just too high.  Back in 2014, Steve Vockrodt of The Pitch asked, “City Hall rationalizes these incentive deals by saying they boost the local economy and expand the tax base. But if that’s true, then why do all these tax proposals keep coming up?” That was back when the sales tax at the Power & Light District topped out at 11.1 percent.

If Kansas City is undergoing revitalization—as city leaders claim—then why are we still raising taxes for the many to give tax breaks to the few? If this is success, it appears taxpayers can’t afford much more of it.

The post Should Five Percent Appear Too Small… appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The bill in question was SB 859, which was heard by the Senate Economic Development Committee on February 20. A copy of my own testimony is here. The bill is fairly straightforward; it would limit the circumstances under which TIF can be used and would require a third-party analysis of the need for a taxpayer subsidy.

Opponents of the bill included members of the Economic Development Corporation of Kansas City, whose budget is dependent upon fees generated by the TIF projects they oversee. In fact, EDC staff once received bonuses because the group received so much money from TIF fees. The two officials testifying for the EDC offered anecdotal evidence of TIF success, highlighting two or three projects. But there are at least as many projects in which TIF has been abused, including the world headquarters buildings of Burns & McDonnell and H&R Block, along with other failures such as the Power & Light District and the never-actually-built Citadel. In fact, I am confident that in a battle of anecdotes opponents of TIF would win handily.

Other opponents of reform at the hearing included representatives from a few businesses that have benefitted from these taxpayer subsidies. They urged legislators to “be careful” lest reform hinder Missouri’s ability to fight a subsidy border war with Kansas (a border war, incidentally, that is a “financial folly for taxpayers”). If only those same businesses urged local officials to be careful with the TIF subsidies they give out so easily.

But good public policy ought not be based on mere anecdotes. Even if you don’t care what the research indicates, good policymaking is dependent on good information. And the research on TIF is clear: It doesn’t work at spurring investment or creating jobs. If you don’t want to depend on Show-Me Institute research, you can look at a UNC-Chapel Hill study on Chicago, or to the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research for nationwide data analysis. You can even turn to a study conducted for the St. Louis Redevelopment Corporation on the TIF subsidies that the corporation itself recommends and administers! This is the testimony that should matter.

Legislators should be wary of testimony from people with a vested financial interest in a bill’s outcome, or of testimony that amounts to little more than cherry-picked anecdotes. They should seek out broad research from disinterested parties—which, in the case of TIF, tells us that these subsidies are a waste of taxpayer money.

The post What I Saw at the TIF Hearing appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Anecdotally, it appears that TIF doesn’t really create jobs. As we’ve written about the H&R Block TIF and the Power & Light District, TIF doesn’t really create jobs. At most it just moves them from elsewhere in the area. Byrne wondered,

If the number of jobs created by TIF, as reported by TIF administrators, is a true economic impact, then the number of reported jobs should have a positive impact on county employment as measured by the BLS.

Anyone familiar with research on TIF (and not everyone cares about the research) will not be surprised by the results. Byrne concludes,

This paper’s results indicate that the number of jobs supported by TIF, as reported by local economic development agencies in Missouri, does not have a significant positive effect on county employment as measured by the BLS. The lack of a positive impact of reported jobs on employment suggests that TIF-supported jobs either come at the expense of other areas in the county or would have located in the county regardless of the existence of Missouri’s TIF districts.

TIF diverts a lot of money from municipalities that would otherwise go to support schools and basic services. Research from all over the country tells us that it does not create jobs, does not spur investment, and does not mitigate blight. It’s time for reform or elimination altogether. 

The post TIF Doesn’t Create Jobs appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Last year, Ameren filed for approval to install six charging stations between St. Louis and Jefferson City along 1-70 in order to alleviate the “range anxiety” EV drivers suffer with the current number of stations available.  Instead of approving or denying the request, the Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) postponed its decision on the matter because it was unsure of whether it even had jurisdiction to regulate the emerging technology.

Some background: utilities such as electricity are often delivered to consumers through monopolies because of how expensive competing delivery infrastructure would be—it is rarely feasible for a startup to lay new pipes or string new wires.  To keep current monopolies in check, regulatory bodies (like the PSC) monitor and approve the prices utilities can charge to cover expenses while still protecting consumers from exorbitant prices.

Many private citizens and businesses already own and operate charging stations, so approving Ameren’s expansion into the market is controversial.  Daniel Hall, the PSC’s chairman, said “. . . it’s unclear whether or not it should be a regulated industry or whether it should be an open, unregulated, competitive market. . . . Where there is a competitive market, I’m not sure that that is a role for the commission.”

Hall’s uncertainty about the PSC’s role makes sense.  If the PSC were to approve Ameren’s project, it’s possible that all of Ameren customers (whether they own an electric vehicle of not) would have to chip in to cover the cost of construction for the new stations. 

Communities around the nation are debating whether the public-utility model would stifle competition, or if it is a necessary kick-start to EV adoption. Kansas’ regulatory body recently denied Kansas City Power & Light’s request to charge ratepayers for a $5.6 million charging station initiative, arguing the proposal was anti-competitive and that it would be unfair to require all ratepayers to subsidize a handful of EV drivers.   Meanwhile, Oregon has ruled (see p. 8) that utilities may own charging stations and cover costs through all ratepayers if they prove an area is in need and would not otherwise receive investment.

Ameren is proposing to construct stations in an area that is currently underserved, but electric cars are relatively new, and technological improvements could soon make them more prevalent than they are today. Missouri’s PSC has been confronted with a difficult decision, and they deserve credit for not blindly jumping into the unknown.  If a free-market model could improve customer choice and spur innovation, then we should be wary of expanding a monopoly where it may not be necessary.

The post Policymakers Wisely Look Before They Leap appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Back when City leaders referred to themselves as “geniuses,” City Hall was handing out subsidies to everyone. H&R Block kicked off the feeding frenzy with their downtown office building, followed by the financially disastrous Power & Light District deal that has taxpayers footing the bond payments. In recent years taxpayers have chipped in for wealthy corporate headquarters for Burns & McDonnell and Cerner, and subsidized luxury high-rise apartment buildings. Even The Star itself has received a tax abatement. Once taxpayers and parents raised an objection to a subsidy for architectural firm BNIM to build in a hip part of town, the Council considered some reforms. Mayor Sly James would have none of it and complained that “we may as well put up a sign that says Kansas City is once again closed for business.”

Obviously, James is wrong. As Kansas City contemplated subsidizing a Hyatt hotel downtown, Marriott was building two on their own dime a few blocks away. The owners of Ward Parkway Mall are building a restaurant plaza without any subsidies. And now we learn of this proposed 13-story, 257-unit apartment building just west of Country Club Plaza. This is great news, not just because someone wants to invest in Kansas City, but because they are willing to invest their own money rather than seek taxpayer subsidies.

As Show-Me Institute writers have pointed out for years, not only do subsidies starve cities, counties, schools, and libraries of the revenue they need to provide basic services, subsidies also pervert developers’ incentive structure. And all this for projects that research shows likely would have been built anyway.

Real private investment—without taxpayer subsidies—is a true sign of economic health. City leaders need to put the brakes on handing out subsidies and let more private investment come.

The post Development Can Happen without Subsidies appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

This shouldn’t be surprising. Much of the claims and the reporting on downtown development, the streetcar, TIF subsidies, and the like make the same mistake. They’re based on the assumption that a development that occurred after a subsidy occurred because of the subsidy. It’s a common logical fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc, (after therefore because of). And Kansas City is rife with it.

Consider the recent construction of a new Burns & McDonnell world headquarters building at Wornall and Bannister in Kansas City. In order to believe that economic development incentives were responsible for this project being undertaken, you have to believe that without taxpayer subsidies, Burns & Mac would never have developed the land, which sat on property adjacent to their existing headquarters and which their partner, VanTrust, already owned. Yet that is what we’re asked to believe.

Similarly, Rose and others point to the new buildings downtown and talk of a Renaissance. But the Power & Light District has not resulted in a net increase of jobs, businesses or tax revenue. H&R Block, whose building kicked off the downtown development binge, seems to be a study in obfuscation and failure. Not only is the streetcar a drain on resources, but according to Jackson County, the aggregate market value in the area around the streetcar is actually lower today than it was in 2012 and growing more slowly than the County as a whole.

The impacts of these investments are very real, resulting in the diversion of hundreds of millions in property tax revenue over the past decade away from taxing jurisdictions such as schools, libraries, and mental health funds, all of which are denied the money they need to operate. But the promised return on those investments never materializes.

As I told Rose when he said he didn’t care, if you don’t care about the research, we can’t have a discussion. Policies must demonstrate some sort of return: increased tax revenue, more jobs, an increase in population. Otherwise we’re just relying on the word of people who are lining up to take our money—and guess what they’re telling us? They want more, more, more.

The post “I Don’t Care What the Research Tells You” appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In making the case for expanding the streetcar, Kansas City officials have claimed that the streetcar (despite the fact that it only recently opened) has spurred development within the rail’s transportation development district (TDD). But the data on the market value of property within the TDD tell a different story. In fact, as the chart below shows, property values within the streetcar’s TDD follow largely the same trajectory as property values did in the county as a whole. According to data provided by Jackson County, market values grew in the early 2000s, fell during the recession, and began rising again in 2014. While the market value of property within the TDD has grown faster than values in Jackson County as a whole from 2000 to 2015, that growth occurred before the TDD’s creation, and is mainly due to the construction of the Power and Light District (which opened in 2007).

If we simply look at market values after the streetcar’s TDD was finalized in 2012, Jackson County as a whole performed better than the TDD. This directly contradicts the idea that the Kansas City Streetcar is boosting development downtown:

So why the disconnect between city hall’s streetcar rhetoric and the actual property data? Findings from the latest report from the Federal Transit Administration on streetcar development may shed some light on the situation:

Almost all [civic] representatives interviewed believed that streetcars positively affected the built environment, particularly in attracting new development or enhancing revitalization, although the degree of impact varies. Few systems, however, reported the types of ancillary changes in the built environment, such as reduced parking garage construction, increased pedestrian or bike lane investments, or explicit parking reductions that often are associated with light rail systems. Few, if any, streetcar system operators seek information on their impact on economic activity, although most interviewed consider economic-related questions to be vital and desire further research on this topic. [emphasis added]

Put another way, never let the truth get in the way of a good story.  

The post Is the Streetcar a Development Magnet? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

So where does bad policymaking come from? Sometimes it comes from getting so caught up in the debate that we don’t examine the facts we’re dealing with. Today’s example comes from the December 10 Kansas City Council’s business session. The topic was the airport. And as he seems to do every time he talks about the airport, the Mayor offered up statements he must know are not true. At least three times he made the same mistake:

[2:28:55] “The cost is in the airport, the region has nothing to do with it. All of the costs are in the airport and come from the airport. There’s not tax money that comes from Johnson County or Wyandotte County or Clay or Platte or Cass. Its all airport money. It’s in the airport; stays in the airport; and gets recycled.”

[2:30:29] “Airport revenue can only be used for airports. Money that is generated in the airport stays in the airport.”

[2:30:58] “You can’t take any money from the airport and use it for sewers or sinks or anything else.”

This is not the first time the Mayor has made this claim. He’s done it in interviews and in his state of the city speech.

We know this is not true because we have a city ordinance that authorized the city to move funds from the Aviation Department to the Finance Department. We know because while James was mayor the city renegotiated the debt to give them more time to pay it off. We know because the Mayor’s own submitted budget for 2015-16 includes it as a line item.

Perhaps most strikingly, we know because earlier at the very same December 10 business meeting, aviation consultant Sheri Ernico said:

[35:47] “There was an instance, which is very unusual for airports in this country, where the [Kansas City] general fund borrowed some money from the airport in 2008, but it had to be repaid with interest.”

What makes the Mayor’s stubborn memory lapse most worrying is that the loan was made to cover losses the city incurred in bad tax increment financing deals for things such as the Power & Light District.

What hope can we have for good public policy when mistakes are papered over with denied consequences?

The post How Bad Policy Survives appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

It appears that, unlike most TIF projects, the developers want 100 percent of incremental economic activity taxes, including sales taxes and the earnings tax. Page 11 of the MOU states,

The City will . . . redirect through its annual budget the City’s portion of the Project TIF for a period of 23 years and Super TIF for a period of 30 years generated from the Project’s tax revenue sources . . .

In  other words, they want the half that they get from the TIFs directly, and then they want the city to give them the rest through the appropriations process. Here is the tax revenue the developers want to keep:

• Tax Increment Financing (TIF): as mentioned above, all economic activity taxes collected by and for the county, school district, library district, and the zoo will be redirected back to the project for 23 years.
• A Super TIF that collects for 30 years the tax not captured in the TIF above, including the convention and visitors tax, and redirects it to the developers.
• A 100 percent exemption on sales taxes on construction materials and real/personal property taxes.
• The creation of a 1 percent Community Improvement District (CID) tax that will then be redirected back to the developers.

Here are some extra freebies the developers want:

• A cash contribution of $35 million.
• The city’s portion of the land, valued at $13 million.
• Fees generated by zoning, permits, inspections, etc., capped at $800,000.
• A management fee to the hotel for catering amounting to $62,363,816 over 15 years. Should the event fees be insufficient to cover this, the city will pay, “from any legally available city funds,” just like we do with the Power & Light District.

Here are some possible problems for the city, based on past issues:

• The “City will maintain the existing Convention Center to its current standards. . . .” Isn’t this exactly what the city failed to do with Kemper Arena?
• The MOU says that the city won’t be responsible for cost overruns, “except to the extent intentionally caused by the City without Good cause.” I’m guessing there will be an attorney whose full-time job it is to find ways to sue the city over this, just like Cordish sued Jackson County over its assessment.

Not mentioned in the MOU is any exemption from the streetcar Transportation Development District (TDD). Apparently, funding the downtown streetcar is more important than funding the city, county, schools, libraries, and zoo. What does that say about the City Council’s view of the rest of Kansas City?

The post The Convention Hotel’s Tax Breaks and Gimmes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

• Cordish, the company that brought us the Power & Light District then sued to lower their county property taxes, says that the downtown investment has been a success! But apparently the success wasn’t great enough to forgo further subsidies for two more residential buildings.
• The Port Authority in Kansas City recently announced that they will be using public dollars to subsidize the construction of luxury residential condominiums along Kansas City’s riverfront. There is great demand they say, but apparently not enough to avoid the use of public underwriting.
• A Crossroads hotel has received TIF subsidies, and an apartment building in the same area is receiving a property tax abatement and a $1 million exemption in sales taxes.

When will the public subsidies end? How do we know when we’re done? Is there any incentive for developers to say they do not need public subsidies? (The answer to that last question is no.) This is important because every subsidy means less money for city and county services; every abatement means less money for schools, less money for libraries. Right now, at least $93 million of city revenue is redirected each year to these developers. That doesn’t include the new projects for Cordish, Burns & McDonnell, and Cerner. Developers shouldn’t be encouraged to build skyscrapers while digging taxpayers into a hole.

The post Kansas City Builds by Digging Itself into Holes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Kansas City leaders want to point to downtown as a great monument to government planning. Look at the revitalization, they say. But given the high cost of the investment and the low return in jobs and businesses, taxpayers should be wary of this so-called success.

We’ve written recently on the premise underlying the investment of downtown and found it lacking. The very notion that those sought-after millennials are moving to urban areas is contested. That they are doing so in Kansas City in any fashion worthy of public cost is demonstrably false. That the city is seeing any financial benefit to the development is likewise risible.

Even the Kansas City Star, which has championed the profligate spending downtown, had to report on the failure:

Nick Benjamin of Cordish, executive director of the Power & Light District, thinks the debt shouldn’t overshadow all the positives, and in other ways the city’s investment has more than paid for itself.

“The point of Power & Light and the city’s investment wasn’t solely for Power & Light,” he said. “It was to revitalize downtown. It’s hard to argue that’s not happening.”

It’s happening? Certainly, the city has paid for very expensive buildings that weren’t there before, but what about this “revitalization”? We wondered if there was any way to justify the expenditures for the Power & Light District based on the number of entertainment venues or jobs or the tax revenue they generated. Given that the city is on the hook for $15 million each year to cover business losses, any increase would have to be substantial. Unfortunately, there appears to be no growth in any of our measures.

According to the city’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR), tax revenue from hotels and restaurants grew 16.56 percent, from 2006 to 2014. According to the inflation calculator at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, inflation for that same period was 17 percent—meaning revenue growth from Kansas City hotel and restaurant tax was exactly flat.

In response to a Sunshine Request to the Regulated Industries Division in Kansas City, we learned that from 2007 to 2014 the number of businesses possessing licenses to sell liquor dropped over 13 percent from 870 to 769. Likewise, the number of employee liquor permits, such as those required of bartenders, dropped 7.5 percent from 11,767 to 10,937. In both cases these declines were slow and steady over time.

Kansas City did not get a hockey team or a basketball team out of the downtown development. It did not get a concert venue that it didn’t already have in Kemper. It did not see a net gain in jobs or businesses. It did not see an increase in tax revenue. However, it did get more debt to be paid out of city coffers—meaning less money for roads, parks, and public safety. And the city will be paying that debt for a long time. According to the same Star piece:

Even with a double-digit bump in sales, it’s not nearly what was anticipated in 2004, when consultants projected that new city and state tax revenues paid by the district’s residents and businesses would be able to cover the debt.

“I don’t think there will be a point at any time in the foreseeable future, probably the next 20 years, where it actually pays for itself,” acknowledged City Manager Troy Schulte.

Back in April 2006, the Kansas City Star quoted then-Mayor Kay Barnes:

“We’re going to look like geniuses” in five or 10 years, Barnes said. The city is paying low interest rates for projects that are capable of paying off the debt, she added.

Whoops! If this is genius and the downtown development is a success, it is the sort of genius and success that Kansas City cannot afford.

The post A Tale Full of Power & Light, Signifying Nothing appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

For those unfamiliar with the Kemper situation, the shortest of the short stories is one of a contract dispute. The American Royal—a century-old nonprofit and scholarship-granting organization focused on agriculture—has a lease with Kansas City to use Kemper but doesn’t think the city has maintained the facility at the level the city promised.

Why the city would neglect Kemper is straightforward enough; the arena has operated in the red for years now, and with the Sprint Center now online downtown, the public face of the city for many concerts and sporting events is no longer in the Bottoms, but on the Bluff. Rather than continue to operate in what it says is a poorly maintained facility, the Royal wants the arena bulldozed and replaced with a new facility that more closely accommodates the Royal’s mission and substantively fulfills the requirements of their lease, which extends amazingly until 2045.

In light of the maintenance requirements and duration of the lease, how much does the Royal say the city is liable for?

Based on the numbers that the American Royal received and validated with the city, [American Royal attorney Chase] Simmons said, the city has $150 million worth of obligations to the organization, on top of the $2.5 million it’s losing on average each year.

In other words, this was a dumb lease by the city for an older facility, whose subsidies we have criticized before. Our longstanding objections to city-ownership of sports stadiums still stands, but it’s accentuated here by what has happened in Kansas City with Kemper Arena. The city has a money pit on its hands and, on top of that, appears to have done a poor job of honoring its remaining lease obligations.

But that doesn’t make the American Royal a victim or a hero in all of this. (Disclosure: I am a Governor with the American Royal.) When the city balked at the Royal’s plan to bulldoze the arena, another group proposed turning Kemper into a multipurpose community sports facility, leveraging . . . historic preservation tax credits. Just two years ago I criticized not only Missouri’s practice of throwing historic preservation incentives around, but I was specifically critical of throwing them at Kemper Arena. The “Foutch Plan” (as it was called) was an alternative, and as a matter of policy it wasn’t “better,” but it did have the positive effect of forcing the Royal to try to make its proposal more attractive.

When it appeared the city may accept the Foutch Plan over the Royal’s, the Royal did something really, really sad—it floated the possibility that it would move out of Kansas City entirely, a nuclear option presumably intended to shock the city back to the Royal’s side. In my view, an American Royal outside the West Bottoms is not the American Royal, and I think most civic leaders would agree with that view. In any case, such a move by the Royal would almost certainly rely on subsidies provided by someone else in the region, probably in Kansas, which would  run afoul of Show-Me’s longstanding opposition to border war incentives.

Ultimately the idea of moving didn’t tip the scale to the Royal, but litigation threatened by the organization against Foutch did, and Foutch dropped its proposal. That threat, while effective in pushing out the competing plan, exacerbated the PR nightmare that got rolling after the Royal’s leadership threatened it could move. But that’s where things stand today: The Royal’s plan appears on track to prevail, and Kemper appears on track to be bulldozed.

The most basic reaction we would offer here is that Kansas City shouldn’t have been in the arena business anyway. Moreover, the overly generous terms of the lease goes to show that trusting government to act as a fiduciary for taxpayers in financial matters is hardly ever prudent. We rejected historic preservation tax credits to save Kemper and also reject border war incentives that would subsidize the Royal so that it could possibly move out of Kansas City.

However, we support contract rights, and to the extent that an agreement was made between the Royal and the city, the terms of that agreement have to be substantively performed. Taxpayers deserved a better deal than the one the city made, but they got a lot of bull instead. And like the city’s predicament with the money-hemorrhaging Power & Light District, what taxpayers deserve does not change what taxpayers are on the hook for. Yes, the Royal may eventually “win” the question of what happens to the Kemper Arena property, but that win will have come at a price—for the organization, and for the city.

There has to be a fundamental shift in the political and policy culture of Kansas City if we are to avoid debacles like this in the future, and that means fighting bad ideas before they are implemented and educating taxpayers about better development strategies that will make them, their families, and their communities better off by empowering them, not the government.

The post The Beef With Kemper Arena appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Any airport revenue that’s earned by the airport must stay on the airport to run, operate, maintain that airport…. What they can’t do is take airport revenue and, say, send it down and help operate the city water department. That would be revenue diversion. The money has got to stay there at the airport.

Two days later, Kansas City Mayor Sly James took to the radio to say the same thing.

[Fees] that are generated at the airport stay in the airport, to take care of the needs of the airport… The money from the airport can’t be used for streets and sewers and none of that… Airport money stays with the airport. If you don’t spend it on the airport, it doesn’t get spent.

This is demonstrably untrue; Kansas City does spend airport money on non-airport items. On July 1, 2010, the Kansas City City Council passed Ordinance 100525, which permitted the transfer of $10.2 million from the Kansas City Aviation Department to the Finance Department. This was originally set to be paid back, with interest, by July 1, 2013.

This is legal, we don’t suggest otherwise. But it makes hollow the claim that there is some sort of “firewall” between airport funds and city funds. According to the original Memorandum of Understanding between the aviation and finance departments, the funds were to cover “historical liabilities associated with various TIF projects.” The city was borrowing from the airport to cover tax-funded investments that failed to pan out.

Even worse, the memorandum was changed on April 4, 2013, to give the city more time to repay the loan and therefore incur greater repayment costs. The deadline moved from 2013 to 2016.

New terminal supporters will respond that they mean that the $1.2 billion raised through bonds cannot be used for city projects. This is meaningless. If the Aviation Department goes ahead with its proposal, there’s no barrier from the city taking a future diversion loan. However, the odds are that the airport will be so burdened with debt that not only will it not be able to divert loan money to the city, it may not even be able to cover its own obligations. And that is when the new terminal will look like so many other Kansas City financial misadventures, such as Power & Light and the Citadel, siphoning off the general fund.

Whether the airport diverts money to the city or loans the city funds is largely academic. The point is that Kansas City benefits most from an efficiently run, debt-free airport. That is pretty much what we have now, that is what we ought to keep.

The post Yes, Kansas City Government Uses Airport Funds appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

As with many of the arguments in favor of building a new $1.2 billion terminal, it’s true . . . sort of.

In July and August of 2010, the Kansas City Aviation Department gave $10.2 million to the city of Kansas City in the form of an interdepartmental loan with an interest rate of 3 percent. The initial Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) indicated the loan was “for the use by Finance in connection with the historical liabilities associated with various TIF [Tax Increment Financing] projects” and would be paid back by July 1, 2013. Not surprisingly, the city later renegotiated and the debt won’t be fully paid until 2017, at the earliest.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) says that such loans are legal as long as they are at the prevailing rate of interest (see page 7,720 of the Federal Register). The 3 percent the city is paying is within the prevailing rate of interest.

What is troubling is that the loan from the Aviation Department was going to cover TIF payments the city couldn’t otherwise afford to make. In other words, Kansas City is borrowing money from the airport, with interest, to cover losses it incurred in tax abatements to things such as the Power & Light District. (Gamblers Anonymous includes this activity as one of many signs of addiction.)

A $1.2 billion new terminal will upset an already out-of-balance apple cart. Consider the following:

• MCI is already relying on federal funds to cover losses;
• Federal programs aimed at subsidizing airports are drying up;
• The increased fees and ticket prices that are needed to fund an airport bond will make the airport less attractive to airlines and passengers; and
• If the airport cannot generate enough money to repay its bonds, the city will almost certainly dip into the general funds to cover the payments, just as it has done elsewhere, even when the city is not technically on the hook.

Not only is building a new terminal a bad idea on its merits, but it puts at risk a source of money the city is using to cover losses on all its other bad ideas. Worse yet, a new terminal may turn the Aviation Department from a source of funds for the city to another drain on resources.

The post About Those Aviation Department Funds… appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Kansas City’s recent past is full of rosy development projects that did not pan out; KCP&L (Kansas City Power & Light) is chief among them. As a result, the city — and the taxpayers who fund city operations — are on the hook for about $13 million each year. Funds used to support the project are being diverted from other worthy causes.

Aviation Department Administrator Mark VanLoh says: “One common misconception the city must overcome: People think Kansas City will have to raise taxes to pay for a new terminal. It will not.” Maybe, maybe not.

Let’s review airport revenue. Dave Helling wrote in the Kansas City Star about how a new terminal would struggle to raise revenue:

There aren’t a lot of ways airport users could generate that kind of revenue. Ticket sales are already taxed, and air travel here is slumping. The airlines could pay more in rent, but other airports would pounce if the cost at KCI gets too high.

Indeed, VanLoh has admitted in press interviews that airports in Branson, Mo., and Wichita, Kan., are already taking market share from Kansas City because they are paying airlines to land there. Increasing rents or landing fees are not a realistic option.

If the airport is unlikely to be able to generate the revenue needed to support those bonds, can’t we turn to the federal government for help? VanLoh says “no,” telling the Star that large-scale federal participation in the project faces headwinds.

If the city were to issue $1.5 billion in revenue bonds in order to pay for the new terminal, it certainly would require a vote of the people. (Note that the $1.5 billion they are now considering is already a 25 percent increase over where we started, at $1.2 billion.) But what of Kansas City’s 2nd District City Councilman Ed Ford’s assertion in November that the project is “going to happen regardless of whether our citizens want it to happen”?

It turns out that not all bonds require voter approval. These bonds, known as Special Obligation Bonds, are not considered debt in the same way as other bonds and therefore require no public vote. Kansas City uses them all the time, and in fact is preparing to issue some this year to pay for the streetcar. Special Obligation Bonds were created to address a city’s immediate need — say, a broken water main — when it does not have the resources to fix it or the time to seek a vote. Kansas City issued two such bonds in 2012 amounting to $75 million that funded computer upgrades for the city’s revenue collectors, garages, and the refinancing of the ill-fated Citadel Plaza project.

Unlike revenue bonds, which do require a public vote, these bonds are normally secured by property. In this case, the Aviation Department may secure the $1.5 billion debt with the airport itself. While the city may not have to raise taxes, as VanLoh says, it is well within reason that the city will have to cover those bond payments from the general fund just like we cover KCP&L.

Welcome to the Kansas City Power and Flight District.

The post Kansas City’s Power And Flight District appeared first on Show-Me Institute.