I’ve argued for years that Kansas City’s lavish subsidies distort the market while failing to deliver on economic promises. New reporting from the Kansas City Business Journal suggests the process itself may be just as broken.

Reporter Thomas Friestad reconstructed negotiations among Kansas City Public Schools (KCPS), PortKC, and Gillon Property Group over incentives tied to Country Club Plaza. The emails, obtained through an open-records request, depict a rushed and opaque decision-making process worthy of public distrust.

The original proposal reportedly included roughly $309 million in incentives over 30 years. KCPS officials objected not only to the size of the package, but also to shifting valuation methods that obscured the true public cost. The district also sought protection for voter-approved bond revenues and more time to evaluate major revisions before approval by PortKC.

That timeline is the real story.

The emails show negotiations continuing until the night before a scheduled PortKC meeting. KCPS officials argued they were being asked to evaluate a substantially revised proposal in just two business days. One consultant for the district described the timeline as “concerning even with the highest level of independent analysis.”

This is a recurring problem in Kansas City’s incentive culture. Complex tax arrangements are negotiated behind closed doors and then presented to affected taxing jurisdictions with little time for meaningful scrutiny. The result is confusion over the true public cost and distrust among taxpayers expected to finance these deals.

Kansas City has seen this pattern before. Similar concerns surrounded the Power & Light District and continue to emerge in discussions over a proposed downtown ballpark. Political machinations routinely take precedence over transparency and accountability.

Notably, KCPS did not oppose subsidies outright. District officials simply asked for clear terms, accurate projections, and adequate time to evaluate a deal that could affect school finances for decades. The fact that negotiators appeared unwilling to provide sufficient time to evaluate the deal speaks volumes.

Kansas Citians have grown understandably skeptical of these taxpayer-funded deals. Too many projects promised economic transformation and delivered little beyond long-term public cost. The Country Club Plaza negotiations are, at best, an example of rushed incompetence. At worst, they suggest an effort to push a massive subsidy package through before taxpayers and public schools could fully evaluate it.

The post Country Club Plaza Subsidy Deal Reveals What’s Broken in Kansas City appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Thomas Friestad at the Kansas City Business Journal wrote recently that an engineering firm (Gannett Fleming TranSystems, formerly GFT) is moving its offices to the H&R Block building in downtown Kansas City.

Longtime Show-Me Institute readers will recognize H&R Block as a poster child for the false claims that economic development subsidies drive job creation. But this latest news only makes the point more relevant.

The TIF project was adopted in July 2006 and will last for 23 years, through 2029. For the duration of that time, all the additional property taxes and half the increase in sales and income (earnings) tax generated at the site are returned to the developer to offset the costs of developing the site. According to the latest report from the Missouri Auditor’s office, as of April 2023, this subsidy has redirected $23.5 million in property taxes and another $73.4 million in sales and earnings taxes away from the basic services they would have otherwise supported (schools, roads, libraries, etc.), instead sending the money back to the developer.

GFT moving into the H&R Block building means that a portion of the taxes it pays, most notably the 1% earnings taxes levied on each employee, will now also be redirected away from basic services to the developer to pay down the cost of the H&R Block building.

A lot of time is spent talking about how Kansas City loses revenue when businesses leave the city. We need to remember that due to our generous subsidy culture, we often lose revenue even when companies remain.

Side note: One can immediately imagine a scenario wherein developer landlords in TIF districts lower their rents because they know they will capture the additional tax revenue, thus undercutting properties that actually pay taxes. These deals are no way to run a city.

The post The TIF that Keeps Taking appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In a column for The Kansas City Star, I challenged the rosy claims of the alleged economic windfall from hosting the World Cup. Every group I contacted indicated they got the number from someone else. When I finally found the organization that generated the number, it did not respond.

That seems to be the standard procedure.

The Kansas City Business Journal tried to dig into how Kansas City’s tourism bureau concluded that 650,000 visitors would descend on the region. Thomas Friestad wrote: “Visit KC declined to share its specific methodology for estimating visitors, saying it is proprietary information.”

Blaise Mesa, writing for The Beacon, examined the economic impact claims being made by proponents of a new Chiefs stadium in Kansas. He ran into the same wall, writing, “The Beacon contacted the firm that calculated economic development data on the stadium, but they didn’t reply to requests for comment.”

It should be a red flag for even the most diehard supporters of these deals that those who promote the claims refuse to answer basic questions.

The post Extraordinary Economic Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence—Sports Edition appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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That result should raise alarms—but not eyebrows. Set-aside requirements like this often function less as solutions and more as stumbling blocks. Rather than spur construction, Kansas City’s policy has become something to work around. Developers have leaned on other incentive-granting agencies or opted for minimal in-lieu payments instead. Meanwhile, regulation continues to inflate costs and suppress supply. As I’ve written before, regulation can be a root cause of unaffordability.

The KCBJ analysis looked at 114 development incentive applications since 2021. None resulted in affordable units under the set-aside rule. Many projects qualified for exemptions—using low-income housing tax credits (LIHTCs), being historic rehabs, or receiving incentives from agencies outside the city’s economic development corporation (EDCKC).

Examples:

• Of six qualifying EDCKC projects since August 2022, just one plans to meet the 20% set-aside (16 of 78 units at 60% MFI).
• Larger developments often went through the Port Authority of Kansas City (Port KC) or other entities, thereby sidestepping the requirement entirely.

The result is a policy with good intentions but poor results—and plenty of incentive for developers to seek workarounds.

Two themes stand out.

First: Incentives, not mandates, are doing the real work. Port KC has become the go-to agency for developers. Since mid-2023, it’s reviewed 17 housing proposals totaling over 5,000 units and $2.6 billion in investment. Because Port KC isn’t bound by the set-aside ordinance, many developers simply pay a lower in-lieu fee and move forward. A city spokesperson even admitted that some of these workarounds were done “at the request or with the blessing of city leaders.”

Second: Regulation continues to push costs up. Developers cited permitting delays, costly energy codes, and other burdens as key barriers. As one put it, requiring reduced rent on top of high costs is a “double negative.”

This tracks with previous findings: When regulation increases costs, it restricts the market’s ability to deliver lower-priced housing. If the goal is more affordability, then cities must lower the baseline costs—not just impose mandates.

The post Shocker! Kansas City’s Affordable Housing Set-Asides Nets Zero Housing Units appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Secrecy isn’t standard practice. The Economic Development Corporation—which oversees the TIF Commission and other incentive bodies—does not require NDAs.

These agencies also hold more public meetings, solicit community input, and include representation from schools and libraries. Mayoral appointments to the TIF Commission must be confirmed by the city council. In contrast, the mayor appoints PortKC board members unilaterally.

This lack of transparency disserves the public. While developers might prefer NDAs when pursuing public subsidies—which is a separate concern—here, it’s the public agency itself insisting on secrecy. That’s even more alarming.

PortKC has other problems, some of which I detail in a recent column for The Kansas City Star:

A series of audits from 2021 through 2024 flagged serious internal control problems, including one where the finance director had full authority over journal entries, deposits and account reconciliation — with no oversight. Port KC has repeatedly promised to fix these issues and repeatedly failed to act.

PortKC’s transparency problem is compounded by persistent failures in oversight. A string of audits from 2021 through 2024 flagged major internal control issues. In one case, the finance director had sole authority over journal entries, deposits, and account reconciliation with no checks in place. PortKC acknowledged the problem and pledged reform but never followed through.

The 2024 audit revealed yet another compliance failure: the agency hadn’t verified whether its development partners were barred from receiving federal funds—a basic federal requirement known as “Suspension and Debarment.” Given PortKC’s increasing intake of federal money, this oversight is especially serious.

These aren’t isolated lapses. PortKC also failed to properly vet Lux Living in 2022. The pattern is clear and ongoing. With long-standing problems still unaddressed, the question is no longer whether something will go wrong, but when.

These issues matter more than ever. At the time of my Star column, I noted PortKC might be involved in financing a downtown park for the Royals. That’s now more likely: the Kansas City Business Journal reports that tax-free bonds via PortKC are under discussion.

Meanwhile, city officials are exploring ways to approve deals without a public vote. Combine that with PortKC’s built-in secrecy, and the result is troubling: public funds deployed without public oversight.

The post Why Is PortKC Keeping Secrets? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Royals, who have spent more than three years insisting they will vacate the K after their lease expires in 2030, face a conundrum: they have no new stadium site selected, no clear funding source, and no legislative momentum. Missouri lawmakers are on track to adjourn without approving any stadium funding bills. Kansas, meanwhile, has not yet extended the STAR bonds meant to lure the team across the border.

The Royals’ 2024 pitch for an East Crossroads stadium fell apart when Jackson County voters overwhelmingly rejected a new 40-year sales tax. Since then, the team has gone quiet. They have options—North Kansas City, Washington Square Park, and previously Overland Park—but each presents new complications. Land assembly, tax votes, and public skepticism loom large.

According to Friestad, the Royals do have the option to extend their lease at Kauffman for up to 10 additional years, through 2041. The provision, part of their 2006 lease, only requires 12 months’ notice and a clean track record with the Jackson County Sports Complex Authority.

That means the team isn’t nearly as cornered as some may think. And as experts in Friestad’s piece explain, the ticking clock shouldn’t pressure local officials into bad deals.

“This point just means your current agreement ends,” said Geoffrey Propheter, a University of Colorado-Denver professor who studies sports economics. “Nothing bad happens at this point.”

Indeed, Propheter compares it to a standard lease renewal in the housing market—if both parties want to keep the arrangement, they’ll find a way. That’s an important reminder in Kansas City, where both major sports franchises have long benefited from generous public terms. Royals critics, such as former City Councilwoman Becky Nace, argue that the team already enjoys the best deal they’re likely to get: a dedicated sales tax for stadium maintenance and operations, covering hundreds of millions in costs. Proposals in Kansas and downtown Kansas City would cover only construction, not ongoing upkeep.

The article also touches on the broader context. MLB relocations are rare and messy. Nashville, Salt Lake City, and Las Vegas are often floated as threats, but relocating to any of those locations would involve significant political or financial headwinds. Economist Victor Matheson called such leverage “overstated,” pointing to the Oakland A’s relocation saga—the team is now stranded in a minor league stadium with uncertain funding for a Vegas move.

What emerges is a portrait of slow-motion bargaining. The Royals’ ownership may still prefer a new stadium, but they’re learning what voters and lawmakers have long suspected: urgency doesn’t equal necessity, and options, while limited, do exist.

Kansas City Mayor Quinton Lucas has floated a revised package between $1.2 billion and $1.4 billion for either a new stadium or a Kauffman renovation, though specifics remain scarce. Meanwhile, voter fatigue and fiscal realism continue to grow.

The takeaway is clear: a looming lease expiration should not be confused with a deadline for action. Kansas Citians rejected a rushed deal last year. If there’s a better one to be had, it will take time, transparency, and trust to get there.

The post Royals May Stay at Kauffman Amid Stadium Inertia appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Spoiler alert: It’s taxpayers. Taxpayers foot the bill.

The scale of these data centers is staggering. As Friestad reports, the energy demand from these facilities is equivalent to 100 Walmarts or 40 hospitals​. Their massive electricity needs—driven in part by artificial intelligence—have led Evergy, the regional utility provider, to plan two new natural gas plants and expand renewable energy production by 3,000 megawatts over the next decade​.

While Evergy insists that existing customers won’t subsidize these projects, some experts aren’t convinced. The Missouri Office of Public Counsel warns that the increased demand could drive up energy prices across the region​. Even if Evergy builds enough capacity, ratepayers may still bear the costs of maintaining infrastructure that primarily benefits tech giants.

Kansas City approved up to $8.2 billion in tax incentives for Meta alone, a package more than three times the city’s annual budget​. Google has also secured generous tax benefits, though the full scope is still unclear​.

These incentives were pitched as a way to boost local schools and communities. But as Friestad’s reporting shows, and as regular readers of this blog have come to expect, the expected windfalls have been slow to materialize. The Smithville School District, which was promised rising tax revenues, has instead seen a fraction of what was projected. In 2024, Meta paid just $86,839 in property taxes to the district—far short of the more than $1 million in annual payments initially forecast​. Construction delays and city permitting issues have further postponed expected revenues.

The pieces highlight an important debate: Did Kansas City need to offer such massive subsidies at all? Economic development officials argue that data centers wouldn’t come without them, but others suggest that factors like cheap land, energy access, and infrastructure play a much bigger role​.

A broader trend is at play. At least 36 states now offer incentives for data centers, creating a nationwide bidding war​. Critics like Good Jobs First director Greg LeRoy argue that these subsidies often do little to sway a company’s decision, while shifting tax burdens onto residents​.

And while data centers bring major investments, they don’t create many full-time jobs—typically around 100 per facility, despite requiring billions in public support​.

As they have with entertainment districts, hotels, and sports stadia, Kansas City leaders are making a massive bet on data centers, banking on future economic gains. But as the Kansas City Business Journal’s reporting makes clear, the immediate costs are real, and the benefits remain uncertain. Will the promised revenues materialize? Will taxpayers ultimately bear the burden of subsidizing these projects?

The people of Kansas City should demand answers. If policymakers want to keep handing out billions in incentives, they owe the public clear, transparent explanations of when—and if—the promised returns will actually arrive.

The post Kansas City’s Data Center Boom: Another Costly Gamble appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

This is just the latest example over the years of City Hall favoring wealthy, connected corporations with taxpayer subsidies and special treatment.

Port KC CEO Jon Stephens framed the incentives as a “small, supportive element” aimed at ensuring Kansas City retains high-quality jobs. The project promises to add 150 jobs with an average salary of $126,000 while retaining 600 current employees. Yet no precise value for the tax exemptions was disclosed. Its not clear if PortKC attached performance requirements to the deal, but Friestad indicates there was no such discussion of it among the commissioners when the subsidies were approved.

Readers may recall Stephens backed subsidies for an independent baseball team in Kansas back when the team couldn’t pay its utilities. If nothing else, he is consistent in his apparent desire to redirect taxpayer money to private corporate interests

Such a deal is nothing new for JE Dunn. The company received a lucrative incentive package when building its headquarters in 2009. That project fell under the East Village tax-increment financing plan, redirecting $19 million in public funds for a parking garage, demolitions, and blight removal.

This latest deal follows a familiar script in which major corporations, including Cerner, H&R Block, Burns & McDonnell, and Commerce Bank have secured public funding for their private office projects. Research has indicated for years that such incentives do not significantly impact corporate decisions on location.

Port KC has repeatedly played a central role in funneling public dollars into private hands. Its recent involvement with JE Dunn reflects a long history of negotiating deals that often leave taxpayers holding the bag, such as the millions each year taxpayers must fork over to cover bond payments on the Power & Light District owned and operated by Cordish Company. (Stephens is a former manager of that project.)

As Kansas City grapples with persistent infrastructure needs, ballooning public debt, and limited funding for essential services, its continued reliance on subsidies for corporate renovations raises questions about priorities. For now, Kansas Citians can only watch as the city’s public funds are diverted to underwrite private gains.

The post KC’s Corporate Welfare: JE Dunn’s HQ Renovation Gets Public Support appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Since September 29, 2023, Kansas City has required new home builders to adhere to the most recent energy code standards, labeled 2021 IECC. In doing so, Kansas City leaped over a few previous iterations of the code, updated every three years. The result has been a drop in the number of new construction permits sought due to the dramatically higher cost of construction the new standards require.

As a recent article in the Kansas City Business Journal points out, “Through May — the most-recent data available — Kansas City approved 132 single-family permits across the three counties it covers. By that time last year, it had granted 480. The year before that, builders pulled 346 permits through May.”

Even that number is high, because it includes applications submitted before the new energy code standards were put in place. The actual number of single-family permits issued in Kansas City under the new energy code is 32.

Proponents of the new regulations argue they are necessary to increase energy efficiency and lower energy costs. Fair enough. But those savings come with their own costs of construction. It’s a trade-off. Public policy almost always presents us with such trade-offs. If policymakers want to increase energy efficiency without abruptly killing new home construction, they need to work on some sort of compromise. Ordinance 240434 is one such effort, but its consideration is being repeatedly put off. Regardless of the exact solution, Kansas City leaders need to show some urgency to fix this problem.

The post Kansas City Must Weigh Cost of Housing Regulations appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

If Cerner fails to live up to the promises that made it Missouri’s top recipient of taxpayer subsidies according to Good Jobs First, what are the consequences? Did the issuing agencies insist on clawbacks? Were subsidies issued on a performance basis? Or did taxpayers’ representatives just believe what they were told and not insist that Cerner actually deliver on its promises? If experience is any indication, it’s likely the latter.

Now we have an answer. According to a story in the Kansas City Business Journal, the Kansas City Council requested a report from the Tax Increment Financing Commission on the status of the Cerner development, now owned by Oracle. According to the author:

Cerner pledged 15,000 new jobs ahead of its TIF plan’s 2013 approval, and 16,000 with revisions through 2018. A Bloomberg report in April found Oracle Health had 40% of that count, or 6,400 employees, designated in Missouri, where the Innovations Campus is its lone metro location. However, the commission’s report did not discuss the campus’ job creation or retention, as its redevelopment terms do not have binding job thresholds.

The job creation promises were not binding. Our representatives, including members of the city council and the mayor, just took the company at its word. And what’s more, they didn’t even ask for any guaranty. We apparently just handed Cerner the money. Kansas City leaders should have set up measurable markers and demanded Cerner meet them lest it lose the subsidies and potentially face additional penalties.

As my colleagues here can attest, researching public policy will make you a skeptic. Often, one needs to resist becoming a cynic. But rarely—though maybe not as rare as we’d hope—you find out the truth is as bad or worse than you feared. This is one such occasion.

The post Apparently, Failing to Meet Promises Is Not a Violation of K.C. Subsidies Regime appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In 2014, Cerner received the largest economic development project subsidy in the state’s history. The company pledged to add 16,000 *new* jobs in Kansas City in exchange for substantial taxpayer subsidies to construct its new headquarters. However, by 2019, Cerner had only managed to expand its workforce to 14,000 total, and not all the jobs were in Kansas City proper. Cerner fell short of its promise. Now, under Oracle’s ownership, the local employee headcount has been nearly halved to a mere 6,400. This is far from the 26,000 jobs—the 16,000 new plus the 10,000 Cerner had at the time—that were supposed to be in place by this year.

The issue runs deeper than just the numbers; it’s more about the impact on the local economy and the trust that was placed in these corporations. The Kansas City region was promised significant economic growth and job creation. Taxpayers delivered, but Cerner, and now Oracle, have failed to keep their promises.

Just like the Power & Light District, and the proposed downtown stadium, the Cerner project reveals the misplaced faith in economic development incentives. Time and again, we see that these incentives often fail to deliver. Instead, they serve as generous gifts to corporations, paid for by taxpayers, with little to no accountability.

The Cerner deal has been an abject failure. All city and state leaders who cheered this project should be held to account.

Current and future Kansas City leaders must learn from these missteps. They must scrutinize these large-scale economic development projects more rigorously and demand transparency and accountability. Tax incentives and subsidies, if issued at all, should include meaningful and measurable outcomes, strict legal standards for what constitutes a new job, and oversight from a clearly defined agency that will monitor the subsidy recipient over time. Holding corporations accountable for their promises will not only protect taxpayers; it may reduce the demand for subsidies in the first place.

The April 2 stadium outcome showed that voters demand more details and accountability from those who seek public funds. Leaders must provide them.

The post Kansas City Must Learn Lessons from Cerner Failure appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

I believe in my gut that the timing is right for the Royals to become residents of the Crossroads and neighbors to Power & Light, 18th & Vine and Hospital Hill, helping to further connect the cultural center for our great city.

What’s important to note is that Sherman plans to include an entertainment district in the construction. Mike Hendricks of The Kansas City Star adds: “The imagined $1 billion-plus ballpark would be bordered on the east by office, retail and residential development, which would be a potential source of revenue for the team.”

No one should doubt that this publicly funded stadium with all the additional accouterments would be good for John Sherman. But will it be good for his neighbors?

Remember that all sorts of research and many economists make it clear that sports stadiums “are really poor public investments.” Part of the reason that the economic impact studies released by proponents of such efforts are flawed is that they count only the new spending at the new location—not the reduction of spending elsewhere. In a 2017 report, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis concluded: “economists generally oppose such subsidies. They often stress that estimations of the economic impact of sports stadiums are exaggerated because they fail to recognize opportunity costs.”

Consider the Power & Light District. According to the Regulated Industries Division of Kansas City, Missouri, the number of liquor licenses (a gauge of how many restaurants and bars are operating) and employee health cards (a proxy for the number of people employed at bars and in food service) remained flat citywide for a decade after subsidies were awarded.

The Power & Light District didn’t create new jobs or businesses. It merely moved them from elsewhere in the city to downtown. And it moved them from places where the city, county, and school districts were collecting property, sales, and income tax revenue to a place where those taxes are diverted back to the developer to offset the cost of construction.

Even if you consider the Power & Light District on its own merits, it has failed to be successful. Thomas Friestad reported last year in the Kansas City Business Journal that Kansas City has had to meet multimillion-dollar debt-service obligations because the district does not generate enough revenue to pay its own debts. Those payments have ranged from $6 million to $17 million, amounting to over $160 million since 2006.

Just as with the Power & Light District, John Sherman’s entertainment district will not create new economic activity. It will only move it from elsewhere in the city. On game day, fans who now stop at grocery and liquor stores on their way to tailgate may instead go to bars at the stadium. That is not new activity—just different activity. Fans who might have gone to Power & Light, or to other places in the Crossroads District, may now go to the bars that Sherman owns. That is not new spending—just different spending. This is exactly what happened when Ballpark Village opened in St. Louis; it cannibalized other existing businesses.

The economic impact studies that will inevitably be produced to tout this new entertainment district will likely only count the new spending in the new location—not the loss of spending elsewhere.

To the degree that the Royals’ new entertainment district leeches spending away from Power & Light—which seems like it may be the intent of Sherman’s gambit—Kansas City taxpayers will face even higher annual debt obligations than now.

A publicly funded downtown stadium and entertainment district will be good for John Sherman. It won’t be good for anyone else.

The post John Sherman’s Proposed Entertainment District Is Bad for Everyone Else appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

If approved by the Lee’s Summit City Council, this project could receive an additional $18.9 million in development incentives. According to an article in the Kansas City Business Journal, that would bring the total to $74.3 million in public support, which includes $32.3 million from transportation development district (TDD) bonds, $5 million from community improvement district (CID) reimbursements, $4 million in state funding, and $1 million in city funding. That’s a lot of taxpayer money!

This project is a mixed-use sports and entertainment project and it includes volleyball courts, children’s parks, restaurants, and retail establishments. Given the uncertainty regarding when we will return to “normal” use of these types of facilities, is this really where taxpayer dollars should be going?

The timing for this project is bad, but even in different times, it would still be a bad idea. Not only do government handouts give unfair advantages to some developers over others, but research shows that incentives such as these don’t result in measurable benefits for the communities that pay for them. They can end up being a huge waste of taxpayer dollars, which is something local governments really can’t afford right now. The developers for this project have already received more than enough public dollars. Do we really need to give them more?

The post Back for More Handouts appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

What is less surprising is that the governor of Kansas, who embarked on a highly publicized economic development truce with the governor of Missouri, is critical of the additional Waddell and Reed incentives. The Kansas governor is quoted in The Kansas City Star as saying:

My executive order limiting the use of state incentives was premised in part on Missouri local units of government bringing their property tax incentives to a level playing field with Kansas. Without that action, a true ceasefire cannot occur.

There always was less to the border war truce than people wanted to admit. The agreement was vague and full of loopholes, and I wrote as much in the Kansas City Business Journal in August. No piece of legislation or executive order is as important as a leader’s resolve, and without the ability to say no to incentives, the truce is meaningless.

The post Waddell & Reed and the Border War appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

City manager Troy Schulte said he wasn’t concerned about the increased price of the hotel since cost overruns are covered by the developer.

“We are actually getting a better project with lower public commitment,” Schulte said.

This seemed ominously familiar to me. A quick search confirmed my suspicions. Back in 2009, Vockrodt wrote in the Kansas City Business Journal about Cordish’s effort to reduce the property valuation for the Power & Light District. He included this:

Kansas City Councilman Ed Ford said he was told by city attorneys that the Power & Light District’s dispute would not put the city on the hook financially.

“It looks like the city is not going to have a dog in the hunt on that,” Ford said.

But of course it did affect the city because a low property tax assessment meant Cordish paid less in property taxes, which in turn meant there was less TIF money available to apply to bond payments. And because city leaders committed Kansas City taxpayers to paying any bond shortfall, we very much did have a dog in that hunt.

This doesn’t mean that hotel cost overruns will necessarily cost the city—unless the hotel so underperforms that taxpayers are told they need to add amenities to improve performance, exactly as has happened in the past. When it comes to publicly financed projects, being told by city leaders that there is no cause for concern seems itself to be a cause to be concerned.

The post When City Leaders Aren’t Concerned, Taxpayers Should Be appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

I read with interest a story in The Kansas City Business Journal that your company may be considering a move (back) to the City of Fountains. This is exciting, and the people of Kansas City would welcome you with open arms. According to the Journal,

A move could allow the company to consolidate its employees in a single location. A move to Missouri also could allow Waddell & Reed to receive sizable development incentives from the state and city agencies.

While this may be an opportunity for your company, it may affect not only your commuting time, but also your wallet. If you aren’t familiar with local economic development policies, let me bring you up to speed. In order to benefit from having more and bigger employers, cities often offer them incentives to relocate within their boundaries. They may include simple property tax abatements or more complicated programs like tax-increment financing (TIF). Cities may offer assistance in issuing bonds to pay for construction or forgo the sales taxes your company would otherwise pay on construction equipment. Heck, if you’re building a hotel, we might just give you a fat check!

Kansas City believes that these short-term costs are worth it over the long term. The economic research literature on the matter says otherwise, but certainly the company and its development partners see a great boon.

Given that Kansas City levies a flat tax on all earnings of people who either work or live within the city boundaries, you may experience a 1 percent reduction in income if Waddell & Reed does relocate. However, if your executives get the same incentive package that Burns & McDonnell did for its recent campus expansion at Bannister and Wornall Roads, you’ll be happy to know that half of your 1 percent earnings tax will be returned to your employer to offset the cost of development. Don’t think of it as a tax increase—think of it as a reduction in salary.

As the Twitter hashtag reads, that’s @howwedokc. City leaders tax workers so they can offer subsidies to their employers. (We also divert funds away from schools in which 90 percent of students are in the free and reduced-price lunch program to pay for successful companies’ headquarters buildings, but that probably won’t affect you.)

And if you find after a while the Kansas City just isn’t for you, remember that once these incentives expire, your company will likely start looking to move back to Kansas to take advantage of whatever incentives it may offer. If that turns out to be the case, as it was in 1990, we’ll certainly miss you. But just like Applebee’s before you, we know you’ll likely be back.

Regards,

Patrick Tuohey

The post An Open Letter to Waddell & Reed Employees appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Nine key organizations, including the St. Louis Economic Development Partnership, St. Louis Regional Chamber and St. Louis Development Corp., claim a role in economic development. They collect and spend some $78 million annually, mostly from businesses and taxpayers.

…Kansas City counts roughly 10 key entities focused on development, and spends $21 million, according to the review. Its organizations include the Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City Area Development Council. Kansas City’s rankings for job growth (91st), wage growth (83rd), and high-tech gross domestic product growth (96th) were better than those of St. Louis.

Note that the combined $99 million spent in Kansas City and St. Louis is just on the staff and overhead of the organizations that offer economic incentives—it does not include the additional hundreds of millions of dollars for the incentives themselves! While Kansas City’s growth barely places us in the top half of the 200 cities studied, St. Louis fares much worse. The Lou ranks 152nd in job growth, 142nd in wage growth, and 99th in high tech GDP growth.

Despite faring slightly better than St. Louis, it appears Kansas City proper isn’t getting much for its efforts. If you look at the news release webpage of the Kansas City Area Development Council—the same folks that put together the still-secret regional bid for Amazon’s second headquarters—you’ll find ten press releases for 2018. Several of them talk about positive developments in the Kansas City “region,” but only one, TrialCard, is actually about new jobs within the borders of Kansas City, Missouri. The announcement projected 225 new jobs.

Well, maybe. A Kansas City Business Journal story at the time suggested those numbers are temporary:

The Kansas City center will get up to the 200-225 employee mark beginning around November, including temporary workers, and drop to between 100 to 150 after about February, (TrialCard VP Scott) Dulitz said. Over time, he said, activity—and the employee count—could increase.

As if to underscore the St. Louis Business Journal’s point about the money spent, the release included:

KCADC was proud to work with a number of regional partners in attracting TrialCard to the region including the State of Missouri, Missouri Partnership, City of Kansas City, Missouri, Economic Development Corporation of Kansas City, Missouri, Clay County Economic Development Council, KCP&L, Spire Energy, Cushman & Wakefield and CBRE.

The problems with Kansas City and St. Louis won’t be solved by lavish economic development incentives. Instead, city leaders need to focus on the basics: infrastructure, public safety, education and the like. There is no shortcut to success—no matter how much you spend.

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Contrary to what proponents of economic development subsidies are claiming, the incentives aren’t really driving companies’ decision-making. The Upjohn Institute for Employment Research released a study in February which concludes in part that, “for at least 75 percent of incented firms, the firm would have made a similar location/expansion/retention decision without the incentive.” Amazon’s choice to move its new headquarters to New York City and a suburb outside Washington, DC, illustrates the point: companies do what is best for them, and tax incentives are rarely enough to outweigh other factors (like quality of workforce, for example) that influence decisions about where to set up operations.

Cities are starting to reevaluate their incentive programs. Nashville recently suspended the use of tax-increment financing (TIF) pending a study. St. Louis completed a broader study of economic development incentives in 2016 and is now considering reforms.

Kansas City undertook an effort to study its incentive regime, but the process seems intended to obfuscate. In a July 2016 story in The Kansas City Star, Mayor Sly James seemed to appreciate exactly how important a well-done study of incentives could be in improving policy. He said,

Such an analysis, if done correctly, will take some time to complete; however, we will be working to complete it as soon as possible. The report will provide the sort of data and facts that can lead to reasonable and responsible improvements to our economic development policy.

By October 2016, the mayor appeared to be backpedaling. In a speech to city employees he said, “City Hall doesn’t do a good enough job of promoting how economic development benefits the city.” That suggested a shift in purpose from a serious analysis of city policy to merely a public relations effort to promote existing policy.

Kansas City received eight bids—ranging from $174,000 to $287,000—on the proposed study, including from the PFM Group, an asset management company that had conducted the above-mentioned study in St. Louis. The highest bid came from the Council of Development Finance Agencies (CDFA), which according to its website is “a national association dedicated to the advancement of development finance concerns and interests.” It is not an accounting or economic evaluation firm, but a trade group seemingly placed in a conflict of interest.

Kansas City contracted with CDFA and paid the firm $350,000—more than what CDFA bid on the project, and approximately twice as much as St. Louis paid PFM for their 2016 study. There was now more reason to suspect this was not going to be a serious or rigorous analysis.

CDFA presented its report to the Kansas City Council on August 16, 2018—16 months past the original contract deadline. The report was a disappointment, but not a surprise. Rather than undertake the rigorous work of measuring the real impact of subsidies, CDFA simply assumed that subsidies had a positive economic effect. For example, it appears that the authors tallied up the value of a given economic development incentive and then divided it into the jobs or tax revenue that project generated. As a result, the CDFA report concluded, incredibly, that “each incentive dollar invested generated $3.83 in additional tax revenue.”

Importantly for policymakers, the report made no attempt to determine how or if a given incentive caused the subsequent development. It made no effort to determine if some projects generated more and better returns on incentives invested than others. During the presentation, council members continually questioned the consultants assembled about how the report could help them make better decisions in the future, or when incentives in a particular part of town met with diminishing returns. The consultants could not answer, because the study avoided such important questions.

Some organizations with an interest in promoting economic development incentives, such as the Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce and the Downtown Council, have uncritically parroted the $3.83-per-dollar-invested return rate on incentives. They should have known better. The editor of the Kansas City Business Journal called the report a “hot box of poo” and wondered, “did Kansas City blow a couple hundred thousand dollars on a completely useless study?”

While other cities are taking this issue more seriously, it appears that in Kansas City the answer is yes.

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The Kansas City Business Journal reported that the consultant who prepared the study couldn’t show “how much development might have occurred in the absence of all incentives.” This is no small oversight. Kansas City is spending or diverting hundreds of millions of dollars into various development schemes at significant cost to school districts, counties and other basic services. We ought to have some sense of whether this is working. No private sector CEO worth her salt would permit such a significant investment of resources without any idea of the return it was likely to generate.

Worse, the report’s inability to connect investment with return was not a bug; it was intentional. Plenty of organizations, academic and otherwise, have conducted research into this very relationship. In 2016, the St. Louis Development Corporation—the River City’s version of the Kansas City’s Economic Development Corporation—conducted exactly this sort of study and determined that the use of incentives could not be said to drive private investment or create jobs. Incidentally, the company that produced St. Louis’s study, The PFM Group, also submitted a lower bid on the Kansas City project than the vendor the city eventually chose.

A 2018 working paper published by the Upjohn Institute of Employment Research concluded in part, “For at least 75 percent of incented firms, the firm would have made a similar location/expansion/ retention decision without the incentive.” That is a devastating conclusion—and one that is largely supported by research elsewhere. Is Kansas City wasting three out of every four incentive dollars?

Unfortunately, city leaders don’t seem to want to know; the study they commissioned did not even attempt a but-for analysis. City Manager Troy Schulte heralded the study and encouraged developers to make more use of the program. Are we really to believe that every economic development incentive program in Kansas City is a wild success? Really?

The biggest disappointment of the study, as alluded to in the Business Journal’s editorial on the matter, is that the report cannot help policymakers sort good projects from bad. It cannot ensure that future decisions regarding incentives are data-driven. It simply took every bit of economic growth the city has seen and attributed it to the incentives that came before. That is not analysis that encourages better policy. It is political cheerleading, and it is unworthy of the people and policymakers of Kansas City.

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