This November, Clay County residents will vote on reducing an obscure tax that places the county at a competitive disadvantage compared to its neighboring communities.

In 1985 the State of Missouri changed the way local governments tax commercial and industrial property. It eliminated the tax on business merchandise and inventory and replaced it with a surtax on the value of commercial real estate. Every county that year calculated the new surtax at a revenue-neutral replacement level for the lost business inventory taxes. Among the reasons for the change was a desire to base the tax on the value of real estate, which is more consistent than the ever-changing values of inventories. The change, made by an amendment to the state’s constitution, was explicit that the replacement levy calculated by the counties could be lowered only by voters, not elected officials, and that the surtax would not adjust downward as assessed valuations increased. This puts the commercial surtax at odds with most other property taxes in Missouri, for which the tax rate is supposed to go down as assessed valuations go up.

When the rates were established in 1985, most of the collar counties around Kansas City and St. Louis were much smaller than they are today, with fewer businesses. Consequently, these collar counties set their commercial surtaxes at a low rate. But Clay County, likely because of inventory taxes generated by its massive Claycomo Ford Plant, bucked that trend. It set its surtax rate at $1.59 per $100 of assessed valuation. That is the third-highest rate in the state, and the highest in Western Missouri. By comparison, Jackson County has a commercial surtax of $1.44, while Cass’s rate is much lower at $0.54 and Platte’s surtax is a mere $0.36.

Assessed valuations have grown enormously since the tax was introduced. For example, the commercial assessments in Clay County have gone up 287 percent between 1985 and 2021, from $302 million to $1.17 billion, yet the surtax rate has never been reduced to offset that increase. The combination of a high tax rate and the difficulty of reducing it puts Clay County at a competitive disadvantage compared to other counties in its area, especially its Northland neighbor and competitor, Platte County.

This is a problem for Clay County. These differences may not have been a big deal in 1985, when the tax alteration was a neutral one for Missouri businesses and more of them were located in our central business districts. But it is a problem now. After much discussion and debate, the Clay County Commission decided in July to propose lowering Clay County’s surtax to $1.44, equal to Jackson County’s rate. If passed by voters, this modest reduction in the commercial surtax rate would both spur economic activity in Clay County and reduce the perceived need for tax incentives. As Clay County continues to grow and assessed valuations continue to increase, revenue reductions for local governments that receive the tax money will be miniscule or nonexistent. Even with the tax cut, revenues from the tax will almost certainly grow past current levels in the near future. That’s not voodoo economics; it simply reflects expected growth in population, business, and assessed valuation.

Clay County leaders deserve credit for placing this surtax reduction proposal on the ballot this November so voters can have a say in making their community more economically competitive. If approved, this reasonable and beneficial tax cut will help grow Clay County’s economy, and everyone benefits from that.

The post Clay County Should Reduce Its Commercial Property Tax Surcharge appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In November, voters in Clay County (and also Laclede County) will have the opportunity be the first counties in Missouri to reduce their commercial property surtax rate.

See a map of commercial surtax rates across Missouri here.

The commercial surtax is a property tax levied at the county level on commercial property only. Unlike other property taxes, it does not adjust downward as assessment value increases, and it cannot be lowered by elected officials. Per the Missouri Constitution, it cannot be raised, and only voters can lower it. To date, voters in Missouri have never lowered a surcharge tax rate, but in November, voters in Clay County will have the opportunity to be the first to do so. The modest reduction Clay County is proposing to equalize itself with Jackson County, in my opinion, is very good public policy, but more on that later.

The tax rate varies by county based on the amount of money the tax it replaced—a commercial inventory-based tax—raised in each county in 1985. If your county had many businesses that generated products subject to the inventory tax, such as Clay County with the Claycomo Ford Plant, you probably have a high replacement tax rate. If you are a county that had a lot of businesses that did not generate much taxable inventory, such as counties in the Lake of the Ozarks region with its tourism economy, you likely have a low commercial surtax rate. But the real issue is that because of the difficulty in adjusting the rate, counties still have the rate based on the economic conditions of 1985.

The post WATCH: Clay County Voters to Decide on Tax Reduction appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The tax rate varies by county based on the amount of money the tax it replaced—a commercial inventory-based tax—raised in each county in 1985. If your county had many businesses that generated products subject to the inventory tax, such as Clay County with the Claycomo Ford Plant, you probably have a high replacement tax rate. If you are a county that had a lot of businesses that did not generate much taxable inventory, such as counties in the Lake of the Ozarks region with its tourism economy, you likely have a low commercial surtax rate. But the real issue is that because of the difficulty in adjusting the rate, counties still have the rate based on the economic conditions of 1985.

That is why we built this map. The map below shows the commercial surtax rate for every county in Missouri. The redder the county, the higher the rate. The rate varies from $1.70 per $100 of assessed commercial valuation in St. Louis County to $0.01 in Reynolds County. The unweighted average rate is $0.53; the median rate is $0.41. Please check out the map (there is also a download link at the bottom of the post) and see where your county fits.

The post Map of Commercial Property Tax Surcharges in Missouri appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

City manager Troy Schulte said he wasn’t concerned about the increased price of the hotel since cost overruns are covered by the developer.

“We are actually getting a better project with lower public commitment,” Schulte said.

This seemed ominously familiar to me. A quick search confirmed my suspicions. Back in 2009, Vockrodt wrote in the Kansas City Business Journal about Cordish’s effort to reduce the property valuation for the Power & Light District. He included this:

Kansas City Councilman Ed Ford said he was told by city attorneys that the Power & Light District’s dispute would not put the city on the hook financially.

“It looks like the city is not going to have a dog in the hunt on that,” Ford said.

But of course it did affect the city because a low property tax assessment meant Cordish paid less in property taxes, which in turn meant there was less TIF money available to apply to bond payments. And because city leaders committed Kansas City taxpayers to paying any bond shortfall, we very much did have a dog in that hunt.

This doesn’t mean that hotel cost overruns will necessarily cost the city—unless the hotel so underperforms that taxpayers are told they need to add amenities to improve performance, exactly as has happened in the past. When it comes to publicly financed projects, being told by city leaders that there is no cause for concern seems itself to be a cause to be concerned.

The post When City Leaders Aren’t Concerned, Taxpayers Should Be appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

RideKC is the regional transit group responsible for the Kansas City streetcar. RideKC’s initiatives are largely funded by city taxpayers, and this latest venture is no exception. The cities of Kansas City, MO and North Kansas City, MO are both listed as public funders of the scooter project.

Eric Vaughan, bike share director for local advocacy group BikeWalkKC, commented on the scooter project:

RideKC is the only transit authority in the country that’s now integrating scooters as part of the regional transit network, which really goes to show how progressive our team here in Kansas City has been with their approach.

This raises an obvious question: If private companies are already putting electric scooters on the streets, why is taxpayer money being used so that the Kansas City transit authority can enter the market?

Bird is a company that consistently has scooters on the streets in Kansas City. Lime has had scooters in the area as well, and a company owned by Ford called SPIN will be placing scooters in Kansas City later this year. Scooters are widely available, and the companies’ use of private chargers and mechanics ensures that scooters are in good shape and located in well-trafficked areas. Lime’s 2018 year-end report claimed that 31,000 Kansas Citians used Lime scooters in a three month period.

The scooter market in Kansas City seems to be doing just fine without government help. If private companies are already providing services, why is our government spending taxpayer dollars on those services as well?

The post Why Is RideKC Entering The Electric Scooter Market? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

At the very least, it was poorly designed.

Many look at Missouri’s interdistrict transfer program, which has allowed more than 2,000 students from the Normandy and Riverview Gardens school districts to transfer to higher performing suburban districts, as if it were a Pinto. It has forced the two unaccredited districts to hemorrhage and rest on the verge of bankruptcy.

Is it ugly? Yes. Is it poorly designed? It depends.

In 2013, the year before students transferred, fewer than 20 percent of students in the two unaccredited school districts were proficient in reading or math. Dropout rates were abysmal, and the prospects were slim for graduates of either district.

Now, let’s imagine that the transfer law was not in place. What would be different today? Chances are, the school districts would not be performing significantly better. What’s more, few outside of the school districts would have taken any note of the quality of education being delivered in these two north Saint Louis County districts.

Since nearly a quarter of the students walked out of these flailing districts, much has changed. No, the districts have not gotten significantly better; nor have they gotten significantly worse. The transfer program, however, has allowed 2,000-plus students to have the opportunity for a better education. Moreover, it has launched a robust conversation around the state about how to turn around struggling school districts.

But to understand if the program was “poorly designed,” we have to determine what it was designed to do.

Was it designed to be a school reform model for unaccredited school districts? If so, it failed, since it has drained these districts of necessary financial resources and could bankrupt both of them.

Was it designed as a long-term fix, a permanent interdistrict program? Again, if this is the case, it failed, since the program lacks a feasible tuition system. Currently, tuition ranges from roughly $10,000 to $20,000, depending on where a student transferred.

Is it possible, however, that the transfer program was designed for another purpose, like to create controversy or to spark change?

As I note in my latest paper, “Interdistrict Choice for Students in Failing Schools: Burden or Boon?” the transfer students were largely absorbed into 24 receiving districts with little disruption. In this regard, the transfer program functioned relatively well.

The program has told families in low-performing schools that their children do not have to be doomed to perpetual underperformance. These families took the right to an education guaranteed by our state’s constitution. Angel Matthews, for instance, experienced the benefits that come from choosing your own school. Angel was one of 175 students who initially transferred from Normandy and Riverview Gardens to the Kirkwood School District, and she has embraced the rigors and opportunities of her new school by taking AP honors classes, cheerleading, and running track.

The transfer program has caught our attention, but it is not a permanent fix. We must now develop new policies that establish quality schools in every neighborhood. These policies must include some form of school choice, lest we fall back into our old pattern of assigning students to chronically failing schools.

The post Was the Transfer Program Poorly Designed? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

That [Cordish] valuation, which equates to an average of about $24 a square foot, is a far cry from Jackson County’s appraised value of $160 million, roughly $270 a square foot, which is what county officials say the district is worth for 2009, including Cosentino’s Downtown Gourmet Market.

“They said that $12 million was their number for 500,000 square feet when everything is completed,” said Jeph BurroughsScanlon, a Jackson County spokesman.

“We want to make sure we’re right on it,” said Curtis Koons, director of the county’s assessment department. “We just don’t feel $24 on a brand-new commercial venture is realistic.”

Vockrodt’s story went on to include a this statement on the City’s exposure to debt:

Kansas City Councilman Ed Ford said he was told by city attorneys that the Power & Light District’s dispute would not put the city on the hook financially.

“It looks like the city is not going to have a dog in the hunt on that,” Ford said.

Ford may have been talking about the lawsuit, but of course the city did have a dog in the hunt on the valuation. A low property tax assessment meant there would be less money required of Cordish (as taxes are not voluntary) to keep and apply toward their bond payments. And while, in a normal world, any bond shortfalls would be made up by the people making money off the project, Cordish is not a normal company and Kansas City is not a normal world.

In May 2015, Jackson County will again assess the value of the Power & Light District. Now that the facilities have been improved, will their value jump? After all, according to The Kansas City Star, things are booming:

[Cordish’s executive director of the Power & Light District Nick] Benjamin thinks district revenues are likely to continue growing, as the district has finally reached 94 percent occupancy. More than 50 tenants, including 22 locally owned tenants, have 450,000 square feet of retail space leased.

If Jackson County argued in 2009 that the Power & Light District should be valued at $160 million, the valuation should be much higher now, given the high occupancy rates. A higher assessment will mean more taxes paid by Cordish. And while Cordish will get to keep these taxes, they will in effect be paying more toward their own bond debt, meaning a lower taxpayer subsidy from City Hall. Even a large increase in the valuation for Power & Light won’t result in a big savings for Kansas City, but it would be something.

It’s too late for city planners, political leaders or their attorneys to be considered geniuses for the disastrous Power & Light deal. But an aggressive effort to make sure Cordish is paying it’s fair share of property taxes to Jackson County would at least suggest that Kansas City leaders truly have learned a lesson.

The post Righting the Wrongs of the Power & Light District appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

David Richard, a former fire captain and union member in Saint Louis County, told me that somewhere along the line the collective bargaining process became “infected.”

“The union became radical,” David told me. David believes a firefighters union can serve a good purpose, but the situation in many districts has become too adversarial. “The district needs a dialogue, a common ground.” And with the infected relationship between management and the union, ordinary procedures, such as employee review, are compromised.

“I was torn between my duties as a captain and my duties as a good union member,” David said of the employee review process. As a captain, he had the duty to review employees, but as a union member, he had a duty to protect his fellow union members. As the union became more militant, it became increasingly difficult for him to play both roles.

What’s the big deal? People complain about their union being too radical or too soft all the time.

The difference here is that we’re talking about our government.

If a traditional private-sector union is too radical and labor relations suffer, then it’s only a private company that suffers. It’s bad for employees and owners of that company, but society as a whole can always buy Toyotas instead of Fords. If government labor relations suffer, then citizens serviced by and paying for that government entity are stuck with the consequences.

More on this to follow…

The post Balance Through Transparency – Part 2 appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Though I never met the man, I feel a debt of gratitude to Ronald Coase, the Nobel Prize-winning economist who died on Labor Day at age 102. Reading his “Nature of the Firm” – one of the most cited essays in all of economic literature – encouraged me to start my own business.

Two decades ago, I persuaded John McDonnell, the CEO of McDonnell Douglas, then the nation’s 23nd largest industrial company, to outsource the biggest part of my job (writing his speeches) back to me as an independent writer. I left the company with an annual contract that paid me no less money than I was making before and that allowed me to pursue other clients. But as I told John McDonnell, I also knew that I had to perform at a high level – being painfully aware of the fact that the company could cancel my contract at any time if I did less well as an independent contractor than I had as a “salary-man” (to use the Japanese expression) or employee.

Anyone familiar with Ronald Coase’s work will recognize that I had struck a classic “Coasian” bargain – finding an efficient free-market solution to a particular problem (my unhappiness with the corporate environment and desire for independence) that worked for both parties: The CEO accepted the notion that I would be a hyper-motivated non-employee, and I became my own boss.

Coase was the first to ask – and provide a plausible answer to – the question of why companies exist . . . and why a critical part of their success comes from getting large numbers of people to submit to a form of voluntary servitude – punching a time clock and giving employers the right to direct their performance in exchange for predetermined wages or salaries and protection from sudden or arbitrary dismissal.

His answer was that companies exist for the purpose of reducing “transactions costs” – meaning all the costs of trying to order economic activity through voluntary exchange. That includes the costs of searching out and evaluating other parties; negotiating contracts; maintaining communication; and policing and enforcing the terms of those contracts.

Imagine the extraordinary difficulty that a Henry Ford or a William Boeing would have faced in trying to contract out for every part and every task going into the assembly of a car or airplane. Hence the need for the visible hand of management in coordinating the allocation of resources.

At the same time, Coase fully appreciated the disciplines and rewards of free enterprise, and he was acutely aware of the tendency of corporate (or government) bureaucracies to stifle individual initiative and kill any sense of real ownership that people have over the quality of their own work. Within a large, publicly owned corporation, no one, including the CEO, is spending his own money.

Citing the picturesque words of another economist (D. H. Robertson), the British-born Coase, who spent most of his working life in the United States, described companies as “islands of conscious power” – or central planning – in an “ocean of unconscious (i.e., spontaneous free-market) cooperation . . . like lumps of butter in a pail of coagulating buttermilk.”

The “lump of butter” of which I was a part in the early 1990s was a shrinking rather than a growing mass: In just three years, the company shed more than 50,000 jobs, or 42 percent of the workforce. In the midst of all the downsizing, people were angry and confused – not knowing where the axe would fall next and bitterly resenting a sudden loss of the personal security that they had gained (and felt entitled to) through years of fealty to the same company. What they didn’t see was that a whole way of life was disappearing.

And now it is gone. Today, no one – not even someone graduating from a top business school – expects to spend his or her entire adult life with a single company. Everyone accepts that big companies really aren’t built to last. More like lumps of butter than castles of perpetual growth and stability, they may dissolve at any moment and disappear into the liquid churn.

One may think of the quarter of a century from 1955 (the first year of the Fortune 500) to 1980 as a golden age for big business in America. During that time, Fortune 500 companies ruled the roost – growing at about twice the rate of GDP growth and enjoying robust profitability from one year to the next – even during recessions. In 1975, the last year of the virulent recession touched off by the Arab oil embargo, only 15 Fortune 500 companies, or 3 percent of the total, reported losses, and all of the top 50 companies were solidly in the black.

Compare that to 1993 – which happened to be my last year as an employee at McDonnell Douglas. This was a brutal year for many big companies. Even though the 1990-91 recession was officially over, no fewer than 151 Fortune 500 companies – or just more than 30 percent – lost money in 1993, and that included 4 out of the top 10 (GM, Ford, IBM, and DuPont) and 22 out of the top 50 ranked by revenues.

To add just one more statistic gleaned from sifting through old issues of the Fortune annual survey, it is worth noting that Fortune 500 companies shed close to 3 million jobs in the 10-year period ending in 1993.

So what happened to bring the era of big business dominance to a close and set the stage for a new era of entrepreneurship and greater dispersal as opposed to centralization of economic activity?

We may turn to Ronald Coase for what I believe is the key insight. In his essay on the nature of the firm – published in 1937, when he was a young professor at the London School of Economics – he addressed the different ways in which technological advancements could affect the size of companies:

It should be noted that most inventions will change both the costs of organizing and the costs of using the price mechanism. In such cases, whether the invention tends to make firms larger or smaller will depend upon the relative effect on these two sets of costs. For instance, if the telephone reduces the costs of using the price mechanism more than it reduces the costs of organizing, then it will have the effect of reducing the size of the firm.

But of course, I thought, when I read those words for the first time. This was a year before John McDonnell and I struck our Coasian bargain. With his encouragement, I had agreed to take part in a research project by the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis examining how U.S. firms (including McDonnell Douglas) were responding to the twin challenges of the information revolution and globalization . . . and to write sections of a book (The Dynamic American Firm) summarizing the findings.

Coase’s thinking loomed large in the book and in my own subsequent decision to go out on my own.

The mainframe computers that came into existence in the 1950s were so big and expensive that only the biggest companies could use them. With the help of these early computers in reducing the costs of organizing production and marketing, Fortune 500 companies became bigger and more prosperous throughout the sixties and seventies.

Then came the information revolution – which (even before the Internet) had the opposite effect of reducing the size of firms. It reduced the need for corporate bureaucracy. Still more, it caused many big companies to disassemble their carefully constructed vertical empires and to contract out for just about everything outside of their own core competencies. I knew that writing was not one McDonnell Douglas’s core competencies, and I reasoned that I should set a price for my work as an outside contractor that would be equal to the cost that the company would incur in having to hire a full-time speechwriter to replace me. Because the drafting of speeches and annual reports took maybe 50 percent of my time at McDonnell Douglas, I figured I would free up many hours that would go into serving other clients.

The Dynamic American Firm did not become a best-seller, but in re-reading some passages of the book, I can relive some of the excitement that I felt in pondering the next step in my own life:

Like “de-industrialization,” the rapid rise in business services and self-employment over the past several years has set alarm bells ringing in enlightened centers of thought. “In the future,” one displaced executive told Time magazine, “we are going to be moving from job to job in the same way that migrant workers move from crop to crop.”

Perhaps. But unlike the migrant worker, today’s corporate refugee, equipped with a personal computer, printer, copier and fax machine – all purchased for about $7,000 – can earn a good living toiling in the comfort of his, or her, home. That is so because the information revolution has greatly reduced transactions costs – for big firms and small contractors alike.

Coase may have done more to extend our understanding of business and commerce than any thinker since Adam Smith. But his influence did not stop there. He also had a profound influence in challenging the belief that government regulations, taxes, or subsidies were the best and, indeed, the only way of dealing with actions of business firms that have harmful effects on others, with a commonly cited example being the emission of sparks from a train that causes damage to a farmer’s crops along the railroad’s right-of-way.

In a “The Problem of Social Cost,” his second most famous essay, published in 1960, Coase argued that most disputes of this nature are best resolved by negotiation, rather than regulation or imposing strict penalties on the damaging party.

As Coase pointed out, both the railroad and the farmer would be better off if the latter agreed not to cultivate the vulnerable portion of his land in exchange for a payment that would equal or exceed the opportunity cost incurred in foregoing its cultivation. In other words, without regulation, the two sides could easily reach a mutually beneficial solution.

“The Problem of Social Cost” gave rise to a whole new body of literature in the field of “economics and the law.”

In awarding him the 1991 prize in economics, the Nobel committee observed that “Coase may be said to have identified a new set of ‘elementary particles’ in the economic systems.” Coase himself made no such claims, saying in a 2012 interview, “I’ve never done anything that wasn’t obvious and I didn’t know why other people didn’t do it.”

Andrew B. Wilson is a resident fellow and senior writer at the Show-Me Institute, which promotes market solutions for public policy in Missouri.

The post The Best Bargain I Ever Made appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

When the St. Louis Cardinals played the Detroit Tigers in the 1968 World Series, the whole nation was watching (it captured an astounding 57 percent of television viewers) and both cities — as well as both teams — were looking good. Detroit was still the unchallenged auto capital of the world, and St. Louis was home to a dozen of the nation’s biggest and best-known companies.

Since then, the two baseball teams have fared better than their cities. When they met again in the 2006 World Series, the rest of the nation yawned — 83 percent of viewers tuned out. Who cared about a baseball rivalry in two dying cities in flyover country?

From 1950 to 2010, Detroit’s population dropped from about 1.8 million to 714,000 — a 61.4 percent decline. Over the same period, St. Louis City dropped from 857,000 residents to 319,000 – a 62.7 percent decline.

Think of Detroit as a larger St. Louis — more than twice the size in area as well as population. Drive through north St. Louis and you see block after block of abandoned and boarded-up buildings; drive through Detroit and it is mile after mile of the same. It is the Empty Quarter of cityscapes — which partly explains why it takes an hour for Detroit’s police to respond to a 911 call.

Detroit leads the nation’s cities in violent crime, followed by Oakland and St. Louis. According to FBI statistics, your chances of being the victim of a violent crime (murder, rape, robbery, and assault) are not a whole lot less in St. Louis City than they are in Detroit. The incidence of such crimes is only 13 percent lower in St. Louis than Detroit. I worked in Detroit from 1976 to 1982 as a reporter and anchor at WXYZ-TV. Coleman Young was the city’s first black mayor, notorious for playing the race card (though most white politicians were no better). I once asked him about his girlfriend’s exorbitant salary as the administration’s PR person. That night, the station ran his response — an expletive-filled rant accusing me of racism for even raising the question. Later, many city employees — both black and white — thanked me for spotlighting the mayor’s favoritism.

Lee Iacocca took over a struggling Chrysler in 1978 and refused to meet union demands to match GM and Ford wage rates at $18 an hour. He told the union: “At $13 an hour, you can have 20,000 workers . . . at $18, you’ve got zero.” He understood the Big Three were on thin ice.

After 13 years anchoring and reporting at KSDK in St. Louis, I returned to Detroit for a year in 1999 at WDIV TV. I was astonished at how much worse the city looked. Gone were the well-kept, middle-class neighborhoods. The drugs and violence were so bad that city cops often would ride four to a squad car.

Therein, I think, is a principal difference between Detroit and St. Louis. Things in St. Louis never reached the same pitch of hopelessness.

St. Louis experienced its biggest out-migration of people in the 1980s, when the population fell 27.2 percent. From 2000 to 2010, the city’s population was down just 8 percent.

By contrast, Detroit’s population over the last decade fell a stunning 24.9 percent.

So, no, I do not think that St. Louis City is following Detroit down the road to ruin — or to bankruptcy, either. In a recent column in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dave Nicklaus pointed out that with slightly more than twice the population of St. Louis, Detroit has six times as much debt.

What’s more, St. Louis has not experienced a massive breakdown in vital services. Far from taking an hour to respond to a call , St. Louis police, on average, are at a crime scene in 10.32 minutes. And where Detroit police cleared only 11.3 percent of murders and 12.7 percent of reported rapes through arrests in 2011, St. Louis police cleared 66.4 percent and 71.8 percent of such crimes, respectively.

Though far from perfect, St. Louis City still works for most people. Many old neighborhoods are flourishing again. Let’s hope that we are on the cusp of a real turnaround in the city’s fortunes.

Rick Edlund is the communications director at the Show-Me Institute, which promotes market solutions for Missouri public policy.

The post Is St. Louis the next Detroit? (Not in my view) appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Perhaps because these handouts consume so much of our state budget, our government does pay some attention to where the money is going. As such, Missouri ranked high as one of the states that is “leading the way” in the Pew Center’s study.

While tax credit transparency is a laudable goal, it has accomplished little. Many of our state politicians call for tax credit reform, and then support tax credit programs soon thereafter. Consider Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon, who made news last year when he told journalists that it was time for tax credit reform. And yet later that year, he urged legislators to pass expansive tax credit legislation.

Our state may have a somewhat transparent tax credit system, but taxpayer dollars continue to be misused. Just last week, Missouri Journal reported that Brown Shoe received $2.4 million in jobs training tax credits this year — and is laying off 132 workers. Missouri Journal has also reported that Ford Motor Co. received $1.85 million in job training tax incentives, despite plans to lay off more than 1,000 Missouri workers temporarily. This would have been surprising, if it had not happened before: Despite issuing many of its employees pink slips, Liberty Mutual remained eligible for job creation tax credits.

And, regular Show-Me Daily readers certainly are familiar with the state-level reviews of tax credits with a 2010 audit report that found that the state Department of Economic Development had inflated some job creation numbers associated with tax credit awards, and another 2010 state audit report that found that tax credits are more expensive than advertised. The Governor’s Tax Credit Review Commission report had all kinds of strong recommendations for tax credit reform, but those have, perhaps predictably, not been implemented.

I wonder, if Missouri is considered to be “leading the way,” what is going on in states that Pew considers to be “trailing behind”? It seems we have all kinds of accountability problems with our tax credit programs.  Sadly, transparency seems to have given our politicians enough information to provide tough talk about reform, but not the gumption to implement it.

The post At Least We Are Transparent About Our Cronyism In Missouri! appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

There’s no doubt the governor grasps the notion that tax incentives can promote investment — but when will he realize that cutting taxes may have the same beneficial effects? Tax cuts may attract more investment to Missouri, promote job growth, and incentivize business expansions — three things for which Nixon already credits tax incentives. Tax cuts may even make business expansions easier; there won’t be all the red tape that goes along with obtaining government tax incentives.

It’s not as if tax incentives always work. Remember Mamtek? Hundreds of jobs were promised, but now all the state has to show for it are an SEC investigation and an unhappy legislature. Show-Me Institute Policy Analyst Audrey Spalding has already written on this and other tax incentive blunders. Because tax cuts won’t be tied to firm-specific investment and job creation, such government failures could become a thing of the past.

The governor needs to stop favoring focused tax incentives and start favoring broad tax cuts.

The post The Road To Prosperity Is Paved With . . . State Tax Incentives? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

It appears that the company figured out how to secure tax credits from the state government without increasing the level of employment. Ford is sending one line to Kentucky, but it is starting a new line in Kansas City. Although the number of jobs will remain constant, the company will continue to receive financial assistance from the state. Failing to deliver on promises, in terms of job creation and economic activity, is unfortunately a pervasive problem in Missouri. From an article in the Kansas City Business Journal:

The automobile side of the Kansas City Assembly Plant will cease production sometime during the fourth quarter of 2011, soon after the Louisville Assembly Plant in Kentucky begins production of the next-generation Ford Escape.

The effect on the 3,700 hourly employees in Kansas City remains unclear. However, Missouri state officials seem to expect some downtime at the Kansas City Assembly Plant in Claycomo, Mo., creating an opportunity for a big retooling in preparation for a new product.

Ford has a long history of pitting states against each other, so this news is not particularly surprising. The company has a pattern of securing millions in incentives from state governments, then shutting down operations and leaving the state unless it can secure additional incentives. Taxpayers, of course, are left to pick up the tab.

Don’t forget that the state of Michigan issued $909 million in incentives to Ford in October.

I find it disconcerting that the state government has a working relationship with the company in its operations. According to a statement from Gov. Jay Nixon’s office:

We have been working closely with senior Ford officials for months to make sure the vehicles of the future are manufactured at the Claycomo plant, and it’s clear that our hard work will pay real dividends for Kansas City and suppliers in communities across Missouri. We look forward to putting the finishing touches on this agreement in the coming weeks. Automotive manufacturing has a bright future in the Show-Me State.

Government officials can attempt to anticipate what the most efficient solution to a given problem will be — but, in all likelihood, they will get it wrong. This is because no individual has access to perfect information. As the Show-Me Institute’s editor Eric Dixon explained in the comment section of a recent post, the likelihood that an individual is wrong increases as he becomes further removed from the decentralized feedback loops that markets provide. Nixon and state policymakers are too far removed from the business of manufacturing vehicles to know the optimal state of the market. Missourians would be better off if the state government stayed out of this particular market, and instead allowed market forces to work.

This reminds me of the following concept that Henry Hazlitt describes in Economics in One Lesson. I cite this classic work frequently because it relates to many public policy issues in Missouri. I referenced this passage in a recent post in which I argued that government non-intervention is the optimal job creation strategy. Hazlitt wrote:

When providing employment becomes the end, need becomes a subordinate consideration. “Projects” have to be invented. Instead of thinking only where bridges must be built, the government spenders begin to ask themselves where bridges can be built.

Would the Claycomo plant stay open in the absence of the subsidy from the state of Missouri? If it would not, then the plant is, essentially, an invented project that is maintained because it can be, rather than because it satisfies a market demand. The fact that the new line has yet to be determined makes me wonder whether the project is in the process of being invented.

The post Encouraging Job Creation in Claycomo, Mo. Louisville, Ky. appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Not surprisingly, every person who has testified before the Missouri Tax Credit Commission during its regional meetings has spoken in favor of tax credit programs — primarily because those people, who work in industries subsidized by state tax credits, directly benefit from the programs.

Tax credit programs defeat the purposes that supporters usually cite in their favor: encouraging employment and helping Missouri compete. In short, tax credits are a form of wealth redistribution — we all bear the cost, but only special interests and favored industries benefit.

Tax credit programs are not as effective as advertised. The state auditor recently found that fiscal notes underestimated the total cost of the programs by $1.1 billion over a five-year period. Tax credit programs have failed to deliver on their promises in other states, too. The Mackinac Center for Public Policy in Michigan released a study in which it compared job estimates made by Michigan’s economic development agency accompanying tax credit awards to the actual outcomes of those programs. Mackinac found that only 7.9 percent of projects were completed on time and produced the number of jobs promised. Missouri cannot afford this failure rate.

A particular program may provide some social benefits, but the state has to weigh this against its cost. Dollar signs are missing too frequently from these discussions. Whenever the state of Missouri awards a tax credit, that credit comes at the expense of other activities. A dollar spent on tax credits is a dollar that the state must cut from another program. The state should consider whether the social benefits of, say, increased wine production, film production, or vacant land assemblage are worth cutting the budget of another state program.

In addition, another recent audit by the state auditor found that the Department of Economic Development (DED) had a 43-percent error rate just when recording estimated jobs and investment figures from businesses receiving enterprise zone tax credits. In one instance, the DED inflated a business’ investment estimate by 333 percent.
Given this amount of misinformation, how can the state possibly have a chance at encouraging the right businesses and industries? The government has no special ability to predict which businesses and industries will succeed, yet tax credits are an attempt to identify and subsidize future successes.

Tax credits often don’t create economic activity, but instead merely shift it to another location. When states compete over companies by offering increasingly generous incentive packages, taxpayers lose because they have to foot the bill. As a recent example, while Ford lobbied for $150 million in tax incentives from Missouri, Ford also courted Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Illinois for financial assistance, communicating the message that it would locate within the borders of the highest bidder. This is a very expensive game, and taxpayers everywhere would be better off if their state governments stopped playing.

Even if other nations, states, or localities offer tax incentives to lure businesses, Missouri would be better off if we don’t do the same — because we benefit from the lower prices that those subsidies create, without it costing Missouri’s taxpayers a dime. It would be better for everyone if all states stopped providing these subsidies, but Missouri will still experience better economic growth if it unilaterally removes itself from the tax incentive bidding wars.

Missourians would benefit if the state government took a hands-off approach to economic development instead of providing subsidies to private companies. Missouri’s tax credit programs have not fulfilled their stated purposes, and spending more on them will not likely result in better outcomes. Missouri’s tax dollars would be much better spent in the hands of individual Missourians than on enticements for companies like IBM and Ford.

If Missouri’s state government officials are serious about promoting economic development, they will stop attempting to pick and choose the economic activities that occur within its borders. Centrally planned economies have never worked, and that strategy won’t work for Missouri, either.

Christine Harbin is a research analyst for the Show-Me Institute, a Missouri-based think tank.

The post Tax Credits: A Poor Strategy for Economic Development in Missouri appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

[T]he heart of the case against the bailout is that it saps the life-blood of entrepreneurial capitalism. The bailout reinforces the debilitating precedent of protecting firms deemed ‘too big to fail.’ Capital and other resources are thus kept glued by politics to familiar lines of production, thus impeding entrepreneurial initiative that would have otherwise redeployed these resources into newer, more-dynamic, and more productive industries.

The ‘success’ of the bailout is all too easy to engineer and to see. The cost of the bailout – the industries, the jobs, and the outputs that are never created – is impossible to see, but nevertheless real.

This is particularly relevant to Missouri, because the $150,000 tax credit package that Missouri decided to give to Ford is Missouri’s version of the auto bailout, and is also associated with unseen costs. Although it is easy to see the benefits of the policy, it is impossible to see the economic activity that would have otherwise occurred (Merci, Frédéric Bastiat!). When the state government provides financial assistance to specific companies or industries, it crowds out private investment and entrepreneurial initiative. In addition to many other negative consequences, it incites the producers to invest their resources in an activity for which the state does not have a competitive advantage, at the expense of investing in activities that are “newer, more-dynamic, and more productive.”

The post Lost Entrepreneurial Initiative: An Unseen Cost of Auto Bailouts appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Here’s one of the editorial‘s major points:

It’s understandable that lawmakers would want to do something to protect the Claycomo jobs in the face of competing offers from other states that are equally shameless. Yet the whole process, despite the studied silence of Ford, had the feel of extortion. Ford never had to say a thing, but everyone knew the company was expecting something.

Ford expects handouts from other states too, despite the fact that it’s a profitable, private company. Ford is playing a game, and it is one that a state like Missouri can’t win. Unfortunately for taxpayers, Ford is not the only company playing — many other companies in other industries also pit states against each other in search of the biggest handout.

Additionally, from the editorial (emphasis mine):

“[Offering incentives] always has an unsavory feel,” said economist Chris Kuehl of Kansas City-based Armada Corporate Intelligence. “It’s not unlike the sports guy, dangling six different teams.” Kuehl said he actually heard someone compare the Ford deal to the bidding war over NBA star LeBron James.

Is Kuehl a Show-Me Daily reader? Perhaps the someone he refers to was Joseph Steelman, who made that exact comparison in a recent blog post. Or perhaps that person was myself, because I also previously discussed how the bidding war over James is an example of how taxes can incite people and businesses to change their behavior.

The post Missouri’s “Subsidies-for-Development Disease” appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

As the first part of my strategy, I would hire a team of lobbyists in order to enact rules and regulations that discriminate against products from other states that compete with mine. If I could keep firms from other states from entering Missouri, I would not have to work as hard to compete with them. I would try to get the state government to impose strict licensing requirements in order to keep others from entering the industry and trying to compete with me. In doing so, I could charge a higher price to consumers living within the state because this protectionist policy would reduce supply, thereby raising my profits.

Protectionist policies may have high cost to society, but as a self-interested CEO, the profitability of my firm is my only concern. Of all business activities, lobbying has one of the highest rates of return. The Washington Post reported in April 2009 on a study finding that a single tax break in 2004 earned companies $220 for every $1 that they spent on the issue. That is a 22,000-percent rate of return!

I could invest a lot of money in research and development in an attempt to improve my product, only to have my efficiency copied and replicated by my competitors. On the other hand, I could contract with a lobbying firm to convince the Missouri state government to give me financial incentives, and then enjoy an artificial competitive advantage for a long period of time. I wouldn’t have to worry about competing with smaller companies that do not have my lobbying power. As an added benefit, by keeping these firms out of the market, Missouri workers can ensure the security of their jobs. Consumers will have the satisfaction that they are consuming products that were made by a worker in Missouri, not in another state — even if they have to pay more for their products in order to subsidize those jobs.

If this strategy doesn’t work, I could use a different one: pitting states against each other to see which will give me the most money. I’ll tell each state government that other states are offering me huge incentives to invest there, and that they must meet or exceed these offers in order for me to stay. Ford is an expert at this, and I’d definitely follow its example.

All of the large companies in Missouri engage in lobbying activities, so my firm would be at a disadvantage if I didn’t. It doesn’t matter how big or profitable the company is — they’re all doing this! Just in my recent memory, Scottrade secured $2.6 million, Ford secured $150 million, IBM secured $31 million, Mamtek got $17 million, and other, large, private developers secured TIF and tax credits.

The post My Next Career Move: Professional Rent-Seeker appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Unsurprisingly, rent seekers tax credit supporters are critical of the new committee. According to an article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (emphasis added):

While the commission does include several prominent tax credit advocates, […] it lacks any representatives from small town Main Street groups, community development organizations or historic preservation groups, “all of whom have firsthand experience in how well the program works for the average citizen,” the [Coalition for Historic Preservation and Economic Development’s] press release reads.

Judging from the list of people on the committee, I don’t foresee many calls for scaling back these programs. Not only does the committee include bureaucrats and politicians, who have an incentive to grow the size of government, it includes businessmen whose companies have been issued tax credits. The committee includes a member from Hallmark, in Kansas City, which has received $8,657,730 in tax credits from the state government since 2000, according to the “Show-Me: Tax Credits” application. There is also a member from Commerce Bank in Saint Louis, which received $5,401,975 in historic tax credits in 2002. Legacy group investments received $183,586 in historic preservation credits in 2003. In addition, many other members come from the real estate industry, which would likely benefit from increased construction activity.

As I communicated to the Missouri Watchdog, I applaud the effort to review these programs, but I am skeptical that this commission will accomplish anything, given that the governor continues to dole out tax credits to his favored few (e.g., Ford, IBM, sugar substitute producers, data centers, filmmakers, etc.).

We live in a world of second-best options, and a review process is more desirable than nothing. The optimal solution would be to cut these incentive programs altogether, because they distort the playing field.

If the governor were serious about stimulating productive economic growth in Missouri, he would eliminate the programs entirely and return the money to taxpayers to spend on their own. People tend to spend their own money better than they do other people’s money, after all.

The post Regarding Missouri’s New Tax Credit Review Commission appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

So if Ford develops an all-new vehicle, it’s investing about $3 billion before it even builds the production line and hires and trains the workers to put the vehicle together.

Woe is Ford! It has a high cost of production! Boo hoo!

I have no sympathy for the company and its high cost of production, given that it made $2.6 billion in profit in the second quarter alone and forecasts even more growth in the immediate future. (By comparison, the $150 million in tax credits that the Missouri legislature decided to give Ford is just a drop in the bucket!) Cars and trucks may be costly to produce, but they are also associated with high marginal revenues that cover this cost.

The debate on subsidizing Ford could benefit from a refresher on the theory of the firm.

This $3 billion investment for a new vehicle is a one-time upfront cost, and because Ford produces vehicles in very large quantities, that cost is diffused. Ford is making billions of dollars in profit, so we know that the marginal cost of producing a car is lower than the marginal revenue. Ford is a firm that operates in (what is supposed to be) a competitive industry; the perfect competition ideal is illustrated in the following graph:

Ford in the Short Run

If, perhaps, Ford finds that the marginal cost of producing a vehicle is lower than the price it can charge, it will lose money and will eventually choose to leave the market. Other firms that are able to produce the good at a lower average cost will enter the market instead because they can realize profit. This is how the competitive environment is supposed to work.

It would be beneficial if, instead of providing subsidies to profitable companies like Ford, the Missouri state government took a laissez-faire approach. Consumers would benefit, because they would be able to purchase goods at a lower cost instead of subsidizing private firms with their tax dollars. Producers in other industries would also benefit, because they would not be forced to compete at an artificial competitive disadvantage.

The post Woe Is Ford! Boo Hoo! appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Pitting states against each other is one of the more significant negative consequences of offering generous incentive packages to single companies. It encourages states to offer incentive packages in ever-increasing amounts, in a desperate attempt to entice these companies to locate within the state. Then, the company tells each state government that other states are offering huge incentives for it to invest there, and that they must meet or exceed these offers in order for the company to stay.

In the case of Ford, it’s a confusing mess. After Ohio gave Ford $83 million in incentives during 2002 to expand in the state, Ford moved its production to Missouri. Because Illinois gave Ford an undisclosed amount of incentives in January 2010 to open an assembly plant in Chicago, the company moved its production of Explorers from Kentucky to Illinois. Just last month, the state government in Michigan awarded $10 million in Brownfield tax credits to Ford to redevelop a section of the Michigan Assembly Plant complex in Wayne. Meanwhile, Ford told the Missouri state government that it needs $150 million over 10 years to keep its Claycomo plant open, or else it would move production of its Ford Escape and Mercury Mariner to Louisville. At the same time, Ford seeks tax incentives from the Kentucky state government. They say that, in order to remain in Kentucky, they need financial assistance. Ford secured up to $180 million in incentives from Kentucky in 2008, and $66 million in 2007.

Now that Ford has secured $150 million from the Missouri state government, will the company ask for still more, or will it pack up and leave the state? How do we know that Ford won’t demonstrate the same behavior in Missouri?

When a large company like Ford pits states against each other, other groups are negatively affected. For example, it causes taxpayers to face a higher tax burden because the state has to pay for these incentive packages. It also forces small businesses that lack lobbying power to compete at a competitive disadvantage.

It’s a very expensive game, and taxpayers everywhere would be better off if their state governments stopped playing.

The post Pitting States Against Each Other: Ford’s Expensive Game appeared first on Show-Me Institute.