In St. Louis County, parts of the county are still recovering from the tornado, the county executive is under indictment (everyone is innocent until proven guilty), and county government’s 2026 budget forecast says there is an $80 million budget shortfall. The last part is the focus of this post.

Every government budget can be cut, and in every government budget there is enough waste and fat to be trimmed to make a difference. That said, cutting government spending is hard (I wish it weren’t). County governments in Missouri are not bloated bureaucracies wasting money hand over foot. They tend to operate fairly efficiently, at least by government standards. So, while making cuts should be the highest priority for the budget shortfall, I doubt that there is $80 million in waste and fraud to be trimmed. Some tough choices are going to have to be made. So, beyond cutting all the waste that it can, what should St. Louis County do?

First, if you are in a hole, stop digging. St. Louis County continues to inexplicably grant tax abatements and other subsidies that never live up to their promises. If these subsidies worked—and by “worked” I mean generated long-term revenues that outweighted the short-term costs—then St. Louis County wouldn’t be in this predicament in the first place. St. Louis County needs to stop giving away taxpayer money as part of a delusion that government planning grows the economy. And yes, this includes getting rid of the senior property tax freeze among other subsidies.

Privatization and outsourcing some services are always an important option for local governments. St. Louis County’s options here are limited, in that the county doesn’t operate any public utilities and it already provides many services via outsourcing. (This is, of course, all a good thing.) The biggest mistake county government has made in recent years is the debacle with the animal shelter. The county should never have taken the animal shelter back in-house. St. Louis County officials should admit their mistake and once again outsource management of the animal shelter.

One of the reasons St. Louis County is in this situation is that it has gone over a decade without a qualified county auditor catching mistakes and making suggestions for fiscal improvements. Hopefully, the recently hired county auditor can change that.

Now let’s talk about the revenue side. Nobody likes tax increases, but sometimes they are necessary. If the county were to consider raising taxes, what taxes should it either institute or increase?

St. Louis County voters have rejected a use tax several times, most recently in April, 2022. A use tax (which is a sales tax on online purchases) is probably the best tax option for the county from a revenue perspective. Two other options could be imposing a small county gas tax to help fund roads or a modest property tax increase. Both of these would be politically complicated.

Beyond all of this, cuts will have to be made. Those may be cuts to services people like, such as the police department or highway projects. But elected officials are there to make hard choices.

The post What Should St. Louis County Do about Its Budget Shortfall? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The new order affects new constructions, major remodels, parking lot reconstruction and overlay projects, and changes in use or occupancy classification. The changes apply to properties zoned for commercial, industrial, institutional, recreational, cultural, or municipal and park land uses. These properties must equip 2 percent of their parking spaces with electric vehicle (EV) chargers and have the electric wiring ready for another 10 percent of spaces on standby.

Not every property will be affected by this decision. But why should any?

The bill’s sponsor stated that its purpose is to incentivize more Missourians to drive EVs. However, EV ownership in Missouri, while small, is already increasing. Why not let property owners add EV charging spaces on their own and compete for EV drivers rather than force every renovating business to do so?

In addition to the bill’s warped incentives, it reeks of what economists call rent seeking, which is when companies use the political process to pad their bottom lines rather than providing a better service to customers. In this case, a prime beneficiary of the new requirements is local monopoly utility Ameren (which according to one councilmember lobbied heavily in the bill’s favor), which gets to make more money from captive customers simply by governmental order.

Another major problem is that installing EV charging stations is not cheap (they cost roughly $5,000 per unit). But the bill makes no mention of how property owners will pay for this. This is a government mandate that will squeeze business and property owners while only benefiting the existing electricity monopoly.

EV ownership is a personal preference. If more Missourians purchase EVs, businesses can make their own decisions about installing  EV charging stations and competing for customers’ business. Shouldn’t competitive markets decide these kinds of things instead of government bureaucrats?

The post St Louis County Council Mandates Businesses Install EV Charging Stations appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

While Kohler’s piece is worth reading, you might want to start with the ethics committee report. The report, which is available through a link at the bottom of this post, lists 14 findings in the executive summary on page 3. In short, the committee found that the County Executive’s personal staff negotiated a lease with Northwest Crossing that failed to properly represent the county and did so against the advice of the career professionals who usually conduct such negotiations. The staff is accused of misleading others about the costs and the process by which the contract was negotiated, and that additional costs for the lease were paid through budgetary sleight-of-hand. The committee also found that the Executive and his staff refused to provide documentation when asked.

The deal appears to have exposed county taxpayers to a lot of additional costs. The Post-Dispatch concludes that the lease “will cost taxpayers at least $69 million and could run as high as $77 million.” Skeptics might write this off as mere bureaucratic bungling, but the ethics committee report suggests darker motives.

Because the committee lacks the resources to further investigate, it recommended the full St. Louis County Council refer the matter to both the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Missouri Attorney General.

Irrespective of whether a crime has been committed, the report makes it clear that the County did not have in place the type of basic policies necessary to ensure transparency, accountability, and integrity. Taxpayers should be asking why not.

The post St. Louis County Council Ethics Committee Issues Stinging Rebuke of County Executive appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

To see why this is the case, remember first that building the proposed North–South MetroLink expansion may cost upwards of $2 billion, not including the increased costs of operating the system. That’s a huge price tag, one that the region would likely not consider if not for the possibility of getting federal grants, which can cover as much as 50% of transit infrastructure costs. However, getting these grants is a competitive process, and the County’s vocal opposition could harm (if not destroy) Saint Louis’s chances. No federal dollars would all but guarantee no new MetroLink.

However, let us imagine that the city moves forward over the county’s objections and, despite the disharmony, the federal government agrees to cover half the costs of MetroLink’s expansion. Even then, the city’s ability to go it alone is questionable. The city would still need to cover a billion dollars in capital costs and increased MetroLink operating expenses, requiring a new city-wide sales tax of more than 2 percent. Such an increase would put the city’s total average sales tax above 10 percent, with many areas in the city charging a tax of more than 12 percent on all goods and services. Even if the state legislature would allow a vote on it, Saint Louis’s residents and businesses would likely reject a tax hike of that size.

The other prime option for circumventing County opposition, the use of a transportation development district (TDD), is also unlikely to succeed. Creating a new taxing district near the proposed route could help fund the expansion, but creating a district large enough to raise a billion dollars would be difficult. TDDs, by state law, can charge a maximum of a 1% sales tax and a property tax of 10 cents on each $100 of assessed valuation (imposing the property tax would require a supermajority approval) in the district’s boundaries.  To fund a MetroLink expansion, the TDD would have to extend well beyond the city and reach economically productive areas in Saint Louis County, all of which would be far away from the North–South expansion’s route. These areas would be less likely to vote in favor of a high-tax TDD.

Unfortunately for the city, the only logical way to fund a multibillion-dollar MetroLink expansion is the same method used to fund past expansions: sales tax increases in both the city and the entire county, to tune of 0.5%. The city might find Stenger’s opposition embarrassing, but what’s more embarrassing here is that the MetroLink, with its massive expense and low ridership, requires financial support from those who will rarely, if ever, ride. In the end, if the city and transit activists want more rail, they are going to have to start begging the county, as they are now begging the federal government, to get on board. 

The post To Pay for North-South MetroLink, the City Will Need the County appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The post Saint Louis County: County Executive’s 2012 Recommended Budget appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Aerotropolis bill would give the mayor of St. Louis or the executive officers of nearby counties the power to designate “gateway zones.” While this power sounds innocuous, it has important ramifications.

First, those chief executives would become gatekeepers in the distribution of millions of taxpayer dollars. The Aerotropolis legislation would create $300 million in tax credits that would subsidize warehouse construction. That tax credit money could be awarded only to warehouses built in gateway zones.

Even if motives are pure, the ability to pick what areas could be eligible for hundreds of millions in tax credits would be an incredible power. The legislation does not say anything about monitoring such designations. Nothing in the legislation would prevent one of these chief executives from using such power as an indirect way to acquire campaign contributions or other untoward benefits.

A simple way to stop any such potential abuse of power would be to take the city and county chief executives out of the equation. If the state, despite a lack of substantive empirical evidence that these tax credits will do any economic good, really wants to subsidize warehouse construction, then all vacant land owners should be able to compete equally for the tax credits. There is no need to give special powers to city and county executives.

Second, this legislation would allow city and county executives appoint a three-person board to oversee millions in special tax revenues.

That board could impose a special tax on the warehouses receiving the Aerotropolis subsidies, and then oversee how those tax revenues are spent. Of those special tax revenues, 50 percent would go to the St. Louis airport. But the other 50 percent would be given to a “tax-exempt regional economic development association or associations….” The three-person board would select which associations would receive the money.

This, too, represents increased political power. The chief executives of St. Louis and nearby counties will be in a position to appoint people to determine what agency gets part of those special tax revenues. Nothing will prevent them from appointing individuals who have a vested interest in where those special tax revenues go.

Interestingly, it seems that the St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association (RCGA), the organization that pushed hard for the Aerotropolis tax credits, is a “tax-exempt regional economic development association.” There are others, such as the St. Louis County Economic Council. It appears that these organizations could qualify for the Aerotropolis special tax revenues. Awarding a steady stream of tax revenue to organizations that argued for the legislation that created that tax revenue is exceptionally poor public policy.

There’s a simple answer to all of these problems. Remove the possibility, however remote, of using the Aerotropolis subsidies and tax revenue as a political tool. There doesn’t seem to be a practical reason to include these mechanisms in the Aerotropolis legislation. They do, however, invite corruption into the process. The economic merits of the Aerotropolis tax credits are highly questionable, but if the legislature insists on enacting them, it should not allow that money to be controlled by political figures.

The post The Mayor, the County Executive, and the RCGA All Likely Have Vested Interests in the Aerotropolis Legislation: It Could Enhance Their Power appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Aerotropolis bill (as written during the 2011 legislative session — we’re still waiting on updated text for the special session) would give the authority to the mayor of St. Louis or the executive officers of nearby counties the power to designate “gateway zones.” While this power sounds innocuous, it has important ramifications.

First, those chief executives would become gatekeepers in the distribution of millions of taxpayer dollars. The Aerotropolis legislation would create $300 million in tax credits that would subsidize warehouse construction. That tax credit money could only be awarded only to warehouses built in gateway zones.

Even if motives are pure, the ability to determine which areas are eligible for hundreds of millions in tax credits would be an incredible power. The legislation does not say anything about monitoring such designations. Nothing in the legislation would prevent one of these chief executives from using such power as an indirect way to acquire campaign contributions or other untoward benefits.

A simple way to stop any such abuse of power would be to take the city and county chief executives out of the equation. If legislators — despite a lack of substantive empirical evidence that these tax credits will do any economic good — really want to subsidize warehouse construction, at least let all owners of vacant land compete equally for tax credits. There is no need to give special powers to city and county executives to achieve this (questionable) goal.

Second, this legislation would allow city and county executives appoint a three-person board to oversee millions in special tax revenues. That board could impose a special tax on the warehouses receiving the Aerotropolis subsidies, and then would oversee how those tax revenues are spent. Of those special tax revenues, 50 percent would go to the St. Louis airport. But the other 50 percent would be given to a “tax-exempt regional economic development association or associations…” The three-person board would select which association(s) would receive the money.

This, too, represents increased political power. The chief executives of Saint Louis and nearby counties will be in a position  to appoint the people who determine what agency gets part of those special tax revenues. Nothing in the Aerotropolis legislation would prevent them from appointing individuals who have a vested interest in where those special tax revenues go.

Interestingly, it seems that the St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association (RCGA), the organization that pushed hard for the Aerotropolis tax credits, is a “tax-exempt regional economic development association.” There are others, such as the St. Louis County Economic Council. It appears that these organizations could qualify for the Aerotropolis special tax revenues. Awarding a steady stream of tax revenue to organizations that argued for the legislation that created that tax revenue is exceptionally poor public policy.

There’s a simple answer to all of these problems. Remove the possibility, however remote, of using the Aerotropolis subsidies and tax revenue as a political tool. There doesn’t seem to be a practical reason to include these mechanisms in the Aerotropolis legislation. They do, however, invite corruption into the process. The economic merits of the Aerotropolis tax credits are questionable as it is, but if the legislature insists on enacting them, they should not allow that money to be controlled by political figures.

The post The Mayor, the County Executive, and the RCGA All Likely Have Vested Interests in the ‘Aerotropolis’ Legislation: It Could Enhance Their Power appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Aerotropolis bill would give to the mayor of Saint Louis or the executive officers of nearby counties the authority to designate “gateway zones.” While this power sounds innocuous, it has important ramifications.

First, those chief executives would become gatekeepers in the distribution of millions of taxpayer dollars. The Aerotropolis legislation would create $300 million in tax credits that would subsidize warehouse construction. That tax credit money could only be awarded to warehouses built in gateway zones.

Even if motives are pure, the ability to determine which areas are eligible for hundreds of millions in tax credits would be an incredible power. The legislation does not say anything about monitoring such designations. Nothing in the legislation would prevent one of these chief executives from using such power as an indirect way to acquire campaign contributions or other untoward benefits.

A simple way to stop any such abuse of power would be to take the city and county chief executives out of the equation. If the state — despite a lack of substantive empirical evidence that these tax credits will do any economic good — really wants to subsidize warehouse construction, at least let all vacant land owners compete equally for tax credits. There is no need to give special powers to city and county executives to achieve this (questionable) goal.

Second, this legislation would allow city and county executives to appoint a three-person board to oversee millions in special tax revenues.

That board could impose a special tax on the warehouses receiving the Aerotropolis subsidies, and then would oversee how those tax revenues are spent. Of those special tax revenues, 50 percent would go to the Saint Louis airport. But the other 50 percent would be given to a “tax exempt regional economic development association or associations …” The three-person board would select which associations would receive the money.

This, too, represents increased political power. The chief executives of Saint Louis and nearby counties will be in a position to appoint the people to determine what agency gets part of those special tax revenues. Nothing will prevent them from appointing individuals who have a vested interest in where those special tax revenues go.

Interestingly, it seems that the Saint Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association (RCGA) — the organization that pushed hard for the Aerotropolis tax credits — is a “tax exempt regional economic development association.” There are others, such as the Saint Louis County Economic Council. It appears that these organizations could qualify for the Aerotropolis special tax revenues. Awarding a steady stream of tax revenue to organizations that argued for the legislation that created that tax revenue is exceptionally poor public policy.

There’s a simple answer to all of these problems. Remove the possibility, however remote, of using the Aerotropolis subsidies and tax revenue as a political tool. There doesn’t seem to be a practical reason to include these mechanisms in the Aerotropolis legislation. They do, however, invite corruption into the process. The economic merits of the Aerotropolis tax credits are questionable as it is, but if the legislature insists on enacting them, they should not allow that money to be controlled by political figures.

The post The Mayor, the County Executive, and the RCGA All Likely Have Vested Interests in the ‘Aerotropolis’ Legislation: It Could Enhance Their Power appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

David Stokes, a Show-Me Institute policy analyst, makes recommendations for provisions that should be included in the proposed Franklin County charter.

• Restrict size of council
  1. The Law of 1/N states that the larger the size of the legislative body you have the greater the spending levels. While there are exceptions, this is a widely accepted rule of public choice economics.¹
  2. Five or seven councilmembers should be target for Franklin County. Five would likely work just fine. The salary should be set high enough to reasonably compensate for their time and effort.
  3. Workload and salary should be considered when setting council size. 56 % of Franklin County lives in an unincorporated area, while 44% lives in cities or towns. If you have too many councilmembers, there will be a large discrepancy in the workload for each member. People who represent all municipalities will have far less work than those who represent mostly unincorporated areas.
  4. Some at-large districts may be considered, such as Jackson County, Kansas City or St. Louis City. Independently elected county officials (see below) are probably preferable to that.
• Maintain at least some other countywide elected officials
  1. The U-Shaped spending theory of Gersen and Berry states that local governments can have both too few and too many elected officials.² This is a very interesting new theory that I believe has a great deal of validity. In short, the levels of spending increase with too few non-legislative elected officials, decrease as the number of non-legislative elected officials increases, and then increases again as you have too many non-legislative elected officials. The reasoning for this is voter difficulty in properly assigning credit, or blame, in cases where there are a very small or very large number of elected officials.
  2. Prosecuting Attorney, Sheriff, Assessor and Treasurer should be kept as elected positions. These officials either make policy decisions or serve as important checks on other offices.
  3. Public Administrator, Recorder of Deeds, Highway Engineer, Circuit Clerk and Collector of Revenue should be changed to appointed positions, with circuit judges having input on PA and CC. These offices generally perform duties as established and do not make policy decisions.
  4. County Clerk should follow the example of St. Charles and become the elected elections chief. It is imperative to have an elections official who does not answer to the other local officials and is independently responsible to the voters. (Or a board appointed by the governor, which is not recommended here.)
  5. Partisan elections should be kept (except for judges). In larger local governments, partisan elections allow voters a simple check on other officials.
• Restrict power of individual councilmembers
  1. No filibuster.
  2. Lack of authority to introduce spending bills is a dramatic but effective method to control spending. It is used in Saint Louis County, where all spending requests must come from the County Executive.
  3. Legislation should not be able to be killed in committee.
  4. Remember that when setting the requirement for the number of meetings each year, a council can always meet more often than needed, but not less than required. 48 meetings for Jackson and St. Louis Co., 24 for St. Charles. St. Louis City meets weekly, with exceptions. (Work sessions and committee meetings not included.) I recommend the St. Charles total.
  5. County Executive should have veto powers over bills, and council the authority to override veto with a supermajority vote.
  6. Council Chair should have enough power to effectively run council business, but not too much power to dominate, provided council size is kept small. Council Chair can also have a higher budget or salary because of the higher work load.
  7. Bills passed over the objection of county boards (such as approving a zoning change rejected by the Planning Commission) should require a supermajority for passage, like a veto override.
• Restrict power of County Executive
  1. No authority to make any expenditure without council approval.
  2. County auditor should report to, and be appointed by, the council, not the executive.
  3. All department heads and commission appointments require council approval.
  4. Council must have sufficient staff to perform independent research and analysis in case of disagreements with the executive office.
  5. Department of Administration should direct most day-to-day county business, and their employees should be civil service.
  6. Council should have subpoena power to conduct investigations in extraordinary circumstances.
• Judiciary
  1. Franklin County should consider going to non-partisan court plan system. This would not be done as part of a charter, so it can be left aside for now. Judges should also have at least a voice in selection of circuit clerk and public administrator.
• County employment
  1. A merit-based, civil service system shall be the basis of employment within Franklin County. This must be clearly laid out in the charter.
  2. The civil service system should not include department heads, nor a base level of staff for the council, county executive and other elected officials.
• Intergovernmental Cooperation and Partnerships
  1. Nothing in the charter should prohibit or limit the rights of current and future elected officials to enter into these types of arrangements, including partnering with other governmental entities, cross-boundary taxing districts, government outsourcing, the use of public-private partnerships, and more.
• Eminent Domain
  1. Most of the laws regarding issues eminent domain takings are governed by state law, and will be whether a charter is adopted or not. However, this commission should consider putting a strict interpretation of the uses of eminent domain into the charter in order to limit its uses within Franklin County as much as possible.
• Tax Incentives and Regulatory Controls
  1. Similar to eminent domain, the commission may wish to consider requiring supermajority votes on issues such as tax increment financing and other tax abatements.
  2. In a related issue, the commission may wish to consider putting strict limitations on future regulatory and planning actions that would affect the historic uses of property and Constitutional right of property owners. For example, planning ordinances that might conflict with agriculture uses could require a supermajority vote of the council.
  3. I realize these statements might conflict with the recommendations not to limit future officials in the previous section on government partnerships. However, eminent domain and land use laws strike at the heart of the freedom of the people of Franklin County. Intergovernmental cooperation and public-private partnerships are merely methods of providing services. That is an important distinction.
• Government Transparency
  1. Bills should take at least two meeting to be passed, except in emergencies. If the new council meets weekly, it should be three meetings.
  2. Public comment period should be before all votes, including veto override attempts.
  3. Roll call votes should be required on every bill at final passage.
  4. Substitute legislation should not be allowed to be both adopted and finally passed during the same meeting.
  5. Bills passed more quickly due to emergency status should require unanimous passage.
  6. The Charter should require council meetings to be held at a time and place convenient for the public to attend, i.e. night.
  7. Exceeding the mandates of the Sunshine laws should be the goal, not merely compliance.

¹ Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics,” Journal of Political Economy, 1981, vol. 89, no. 4.

² Berry and Gersen, “The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions,” University of Chicago, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper no. 344, June 2007.

Related Links

The post General Guidelines For Charter Governments: Testimony Before the Franklin County Charter Commission appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

David Stokes, a Show-Me Institute policy analyst, makes recommendations for provisions that should be included in the proposed Jefferson County charter.

• Restrict size of council
  1. The Law of 1/N states that the larger the size of the legislative body you have the greater the spending levels. While there are exceptions, this is a widely accepted rule of public choice economics.¹
  2. Five or seven councilmembers should be target for Jefferson County.
  3. Workload and salary should be considered when setting council size. Jefferson County has a much higher percentage of unincorporated population than other charter counties (74%).
  4. Some at-large districts may be considered, such as Jackson County, Kansas City or St. Louis City. Independently elected county officials (see below) are probably preferable to that.
• Maintain at least some other countywide elected officials
  1. The U-Shaped spending theory of Gersen and Berry states that local governments can have both too few and too many elected officials.² This is a very interesting new theory that I believe has a great deal of validity. In short, the levels of spending increase with too few non-legislative elected officials, decrease as the number of non-legislative elected officials increases, and then increases again as you have too many non-legislative elected officials. The reasoning for this is voter difficulty in properly assigning credit, or blame, in cases where there are a very small or very large number of elected officials.
  2. Prosecuting Attorney, Sheriff, Assessor, and Treasurer should be kept as elected positions. These officials either make policy decisions or serve as important checks on other offices.
  3. Public Administrator, Recorder of Deeds, Circuit Clerk and Collector of Revenue should be changed to appointed positions, with circuit judges having input on PA and CC. These offices generally perform duties as established and do not make policy decisions.
  4. County Clerk should follow the example of St. Charles and become the elected elections chief. It is imperative to have an elections official who does not answer to the other local officials and is independently responsible to the voters. (Or a board appointed by the governor, which is not recommended here.)
  5. Partisan elections should be kept (except for judges). In larger local governments, partisan elections allow voters a simple check on other officials.
• Restrict power of individual councilmembers
  1. No filibuster.
  2. Lack of authority to introduce spending bills is a dramatic but effective method to control spending. It is used in Saint Louis County, where all spending requests must come from the County Executive.
  3. Legislation should not be able to be killed in committee.
  4. Remember that when setting the requirement for the number of meetings each year, a council can always meet more often than needed, but not less than required. 48 meetings for Jackson and St. Louis Co., 24 for St. Charles. St. Louis City meets weekly, with exceptions. (Work sessions and committee meetings not included.) I recommend the St. Charles total.
  5. County Executive should have veto powers over bills, and council the authority to override veto.
  6. Council Chair should have enough power to effectively run council business, but not too much power to dominate, provided council size is kept small. Council Chair can also have a higher budget because of the higher work load.
  7. Bills passed over the objection of county boards (such as approving a zoning change rejected by the Planning Commission) should require a supermajority for passage, like a veto override.
• Restrict power of County Executive
  1. No authority to make any expenditure without council approval.
  2. County auditor should report to, and be appointed by, the council, not the executive.
  3. All department heads and commission appointments require council approval.
  4. Council must have sufficient staff to perform independent research and analysis in case of disagreements with the executive office.
  5. Department of Administration should direct most day-to-day county business, and their employees should be civil service.
  6. Council should have subpoena power to conduct investigations in extraordinary circumstances.
• Judiciary
  1. Jefferson County should consider going to non-partisan court plan system. This would not be done as part of a charter, so it can be left aside for now. Judges should also have at least a voice in selection of circuit clerk and public administrator.
• County employment
  1. A merit-based, civil service system shall be the basis of employment within Jefferson County. This must be clearly laid out in the charter.
  2. The civil service system should not include department heads, nor a base level of staff for the council, county executive and other elected officials.
• Intergovernmental Cooperation and Partnerships
  1. Nothing in the charter should prohibit or limit the rights of current and future elected officials to enter into these types of arrangements, including partnering with other governmental entities, cross-boundary taxing districts, government outsourcing, the use of public-private partnerships, and more.
• Eminent Domain
  1. Most of the laws regarding issues eminent domain takings are governed by state law, and will be whether a charter is adopted or not. However, this commission should consider putting a strict interpretation of the uses of eminent domain into the charter in order to limit its uses within Jefferson County as much as possible.
• Tax Incentives and Regulatory Controls
  1. Similar to eminent domain, the commission may wish to consider requiring supermajority votes on issues such as tax increment financing and other tax abatements.
  2. In a related issue, the commission may wish to consider putting strict limitations on future regulatory and planning actions that would affect the historic uses of property and Constitutional right of property owners. For example, planning ordinances that might conflict with agriculture uses could require a supermajority vote of the council.
  3. I realize these statements might conflict with the recommendations not to limit future officials in the previous section on government partnerships. However, eminent domain and land use laws strike at the heart of the freedom of the people of Jefferson County. Intergovernmental cooperation and public-private partnerships are merely methods of providing services. That is an important distinction.
• Government Transparency
  1. Bills should take at least two meeting to be passed, except in emergencies. If the new council meets weekly, it should be three meetings.
  2. Public comment period should be before all votes, including veto override attempts.
  3. Roll call votes should be required on every bill at final passage.
  4. Substitute legislation should not be allowed to be both adopted and finally passed during the same meeting.
  5. Bills passed more quickly due to emergency status should require unanimous passage.
  6. The Charter should require council meetings to be held at a time and place convenient for the public to attend, i.e. night.
  7. Exceeding the mandates of the Sunshine laws should be the goal, not merely compliance.

¹ Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics,” Journal of Political Economy, 1981, vol. 89, no. 4.

² Berry and Gersen, “The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions,” University of Chicago, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper no. 344, June 2007.

Related Links

The post General Guidelines for Charter Governments: Testimony Before the Jefferson County Charter Commission appeared first on Show-Me Institute.