Susan Pendergrass speaks with Aaron Renn, author and consultant, and David Stokes, Director of Municipal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, about the recurring debate over whether the city of St. Louis should rejoin St. Louis County. They explore what city county mergers have actually accomplished in places like Indianapolis, Louisville, Nashville, and Lexington, why a full merger in St. Louis would be extraordinarily difficult to pull off, and whether the benefits would even outweigh the costs. They also discuss St. Louis’s demographic challenges, what the Pittsburgh model might offer as a path forward, the cultural barriers that make it hard to attract and retain people from outside the region, and more.

You can find Aaron’s work here.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:05): Welcome back, Aaron Renn, to the podcast. So happy to have you and David Stokes, our own expert on cities and counties and all things municipal. I appreciate you coming on, Aaron. There have been murmurings around St. Louis again on a topic that we have revisited for probably a hundred years: should the city of St. Louis be a separate county from St. Louis County?

Before we get to that, I want to ask you something because I was reading the news this morning, and I know that you’ve written about city county mergers before, like cities that are kind of dying and then either pulling in parts of their closest suburbs to sort of make everything look better, broaden their tax base, make their crime numbers look better. I was reading something you wrote a year or two ago about that, and you said that Louisville is a failed example of that. Is that right, basically?

Aaron Renn (01:01): Yeah, I’m a little skeptical of how these things have worked out in practice.

Susan Pendergrass (01:05): Yeah, in terms of losing the flavor and the coolness of the city. Literally this morning I saw an article about how Louisville is having a renaissance and these young professionals are all moving there because they didn’t tear down all their beautiful old Victorian homes, so you can still get one for close to a million dollars. They’ve got a cool art scene and a bourbon scene. So it sounds like maybe Louisville did not lose its personal flavor in the merger. I would be curious to know what you think of that.

Aaron Renn (01:33): Well, I like to put St. Louis in context. I’m glad you mentioned Louisville because many of these river cities have similar characteristics. I like to look at St. Louis as well as three cities in the Ohio Valley: Louisville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. All of them heavily German Catholic in their demographics. All of them are very geopolitically fragmented with many small tiny suburbs throughout. They all have very fragmented neighborhood systems as well, where everybody has a strong sense of neighborhood identity. Where you go to high school is a big social marker. They all have phenomenal collections of urban assets and great historic buildings. They all still have their own unique character in a country where that has sort of bled away.

Aaron Renn (02:31): And they also have curiously underperformed demographically and economically in terms of growth. They’re slow growth places. So one thing I always encourage people is to pan back the lens and don’t just look at St. Louis in isolation. Look at it in comparison or dialogue with some of these other places and see what you can learn from them.

Louisville is actually a quite troubled city in important ways. From a white collar employment perspective it’s doing well, from a blue collar perspective less so. It’s one of the 10 least educated major metros in the country. I don’t want to spend too much time on Louisville, but I want to talk about the city county merger, which is distinct from recombining the city and the county. This has been considered urban planning best practice for 30 or 40 years. There was a book written by David Rusk called Cities Without Suburbs. The idea is that cities that were able to expand their boundaries through either annexation or city county mergers were prospering, whilst cities that did not, like the Clevelands, the Cincinnatis, and the St. Louises, were struggling. So the idea is we need big box government.

Indianapolis, where I live now, had a city county merger in 1970. Louisville did a city county merger, I grew up near Louisville. Jacksonville, Florida, Lexington, Kentucky, and Nashville, Tennessee did as well. What I would say is a few things. Merger is not necessarily bad. For Indianapolis, merger did prevent the city from essentially going down the tubes in important ways. So it really was a win in important ways.

But it did not prevent the historic city from going into the exact same demographic decline as St. Louis. The historic city of Indianapolis has lost almost exactly the same share of its population since 1970 as St. Louis has. Secondly, these are very politically difficult to pull off. They take enormous effort. They often fail multiple times. Louisville had multiple failures.

The most precious resource is always management time and attention. Is this where you want to put all your political chips? And in order to get it passed politically, what happens invariably is that most entities are actually not consolidated. In Louisville, none of the existing incorporated suburban governments were in fact merged. In Indianapolis, the school districts weren’t merged.

This means you don’t necessarily get all of the benefits you think from consolidation, because many things are excluded. And then unlike a corporate merger, where there’s typically a lot of downsizing and cost rationalization, in city county mergers nobody ever loses their job and salaries and benefits might even be harmonized upward to the high watermark. So don’t expect it to save any money. Personally, city county merger might have some benefits for St. Louis. I’m not saying it would have no benefits, but in my opinion it’s not going to be a needle mover and most likely it would be extraordinarily politically difficult and uncertain to pull off.

Susan Pendergrass (06:00): Yeah, no question. It’s been very politically difficult. People don’t want to do it. However, we do have these little tiny school districts and police districts. We have, I don’t know, 28 911 systems. We have a lot of what looks like bureaucratic waste and red tape. To the extent that doesn’t get resolved in a merger, then what’s the point? But I do think, you know, we’ve been talking about the demographics of St. Louis. There were over 800,000 people in the city once. Now there are maybe 280,000 and declining, and we’re in the death spiral of more people dying than being born. We’ve been in that for a while. And I guess it brings up the question of what is St. Louis to do if we are in this death spiral? We’re not having the babies. We’re having fewer babies than we did 15 years ago. So school enrollment is only declining. What is the prescription in that situation?

I’ve been to Cincinnati quite a bit. They’re trying to get people downtown with sports stadiums. It doesn’t really work. Louisville has sports stadiums downtown. I don’t know if people really want to move down there. I don’t see it working in St. Louis. So what is a city in that situation to do?

Aaron Renn (07:18): It’s going to be challenging in a sense because your problems are a little over determined. St. Louis was once a regional capital city, much like a Dallas or an Atlanta or a Denver or a Minneapolis. And it lost a lot of those functions. Many of its headquarters have left. It used to have a lot of professional services firms like ad agencies that did business all over the country, not just for the local market. Now St. Louis, although it’s still bigger than Indianapolis, looks a lot more like an Indianapolis or a Columbus, Ohio, where you have fewer corporate headquarters and most of the service firms are just there to serve the local market. St. Louis has essentially shrunk a little bit in relative importance, and it’s hard to get that back.

The demographics are also quite difficult and create a situation where it’s hard to attract business when you have a shrinking labor force, weak demographic growth, and a weak ability to bring people in from the outside. So it’s a very complicated situation and I don’t think there’s any silver bullet for St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (08:39): That’s what I’m asking you for. You have the answers. What’s the silver bullet?

Aaron Renn (08:43): So here are the things I would look at if I were in St. Louis. One of the clear issues that affects all of these river cities is that their wonderful, unique local cultures come with a downside, which is an extreme parochialism that has two negative effects. One, it makes it difficult for the communities to cohesively work together, which I’m not telling you anything you don’t already know. City-suburb divides tend to be bigger. In Indianapolis, regional leadership is mostly all on the same page about the big issues. Same with Columbus, Ohio. Secondly, it makes it very difficult to attract people from out of town because they come there and they can’t make friends, they can’t penetrate the social networks.

Susan Pendergrass (09:15): 100%, yes.

Aaron Renn (09:40): You hear it over and over again in places like St. Louis, Cleveland, even Minneapolis, Minnesota. There are some sayings there. If you want to make friends in Minnesota, go to kindergarten, because that’s when everybody makes their friends. Or Minnesotans will give you directions anywhere but their house. They’re never going to invite you over. St. Louis has that reputation. I don’t think it’s just a reputation. And I know you just had Ness Sandoval on.

Susan Pendergrass (09:53): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (10:08): He’s talking about you need to get better on migration. Migration isn’t going to improve if migrants are not going to be able to join the social networks here. And that’s not even just international migration, that’s domestic migrants. So I think that’s a huge issue for the city. Cultural issues are hard to solve, but maybe less intractable than infrastructure.

The other thing is looking at Pittsburgh as a sort of model. Pittsburgh hasn’t solved really most of its problems by any means, but it has been able to regenerate in the city a sort of high value economy around Carnegie Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. It’s done quite well. Many Silicon Valley firms have set up shop there. What’s happened in Pittsburgh, although it’s still a demographic decline story, is there’s been a demographic transition in the city. Pittsburgh went from one of the least educated cities in America to now one of the youngest and most educated. Part of it is old people moved and died off and young educated people replaced them. So the total number of people in the city was declining, but there was a churn happening underneath. And the same thing is already happening in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (11:13): How did they do that?

Aaron Renn (11:33): College degree attainment in the city is now well north of 40%. So the people who live in the city of St. Louis are very educated. That demographic churn has raised educational attainment and thus incomes in the city a lot. Now Pittsburgh was different because it was an almost entirely white city. There’s a racial divide in St. Louis and gentrification concerns become more salient. But St. Louis is now an educated city. This is not an old post-industrial blue collar city. The city of St. Louis itself is very educated. And also being very small, it doesn’t necessarily need a massive change to move the needle. In Indianapolis we have a population of over 900,000. Moving that behemoth takes a lot. St. Louis now being smaller has a situation where there could be a big impact from lower numbers of things. So I think a knowledge economy built around Washington University and your medical centers has some possibilities, somewhat similar to Pittsburgh.

Susan Pendergrass (12:45): So much medical.

Aaron Renn (12:58): Carnegie Mellon’s engineering and computer science areas will be a little different. I might also look at Vanderbilt, what’s going on there? What are some peer schools you could watch to see what’s going on? But I think there are actually some reasons to think that the city of St. Louis, believe it or not, could be sort of turning a corner. It has now demographically renewed itself to a higher educational attainment state. Being small, it probably doesn’t have that much further to fall, and you can start building from there. Obviously there are governance challenges, but looking at the Pittsburgh model, studying similar complexes around peer schools, and addressing the culture issues is where I’d look.

David Stokes (13:33): Hopeful.

Susan Pendergrass (13:47): So as a spokesperson for St. Louis, what do you see for the future?

David Stokes (13:52): Well, I would be curious to get Aaron’s thoughts on that size question, about how the city of St. Louis has in fact gotten so small. It’s about 10% of the metro area. How does that affect the pros or cons of any type of a merger? These would not be a merger of equals. St. Louis County would almost subsume St. Louis City into it. How do you think that would affect things for better or worse?

Aaron Renn (14:28): Well, that was the critique of the Louisville merger by two academics at the University of Louisville. I mentioned the book Cities Without Suburbs. They wrote an academic paper called Suburbs Without a City, which basically said if the merger passed in Louisville, it would essentially mean the suburbs take over the city, not the city taking over the suburbs, because the old city of Louisville only had about 260,000 people and the suburbs would numerically dominate. The same thing would certainly happen in St. Louis. If there were a merger, suburban St. Louis County would control the city in essence.

Another consideration, and this is a Cincinnati issue, I interviewed about 15 years ago the mayor of Cincinnati, John Cranley. Here’s what he said, and I think this is an important point. He said, 30 years ago, city county merger was the thing because cities were in decline and you wanted to tap that suburban tax base to fund the city. But now it’s reversed. Now the cities are coming back and it’s the inner suburbs that are actually going down the tubes. And so in Cincinnati today, we have all the corporate headquarters, we have the universities and the medical centers, and we don’t have to share our tax revenue with anybody. If we were merged with the county government, we’d have to prop up all these failing suburbs. And so I think you’re in a similar situation in St. Louis, where the high value activity, not all of it is in the city of St. Louis because of Clayton and so on, but the St. Louis County suburbs are mostly places that are themselves on negative trajectories. Merging the city, which may be on the cusp of being able to bottom out and turn around, with all of these still declining inner suburban areas, might actually be an albatross around the city’s neck.

Susan Pendergrass (15:16): What would that mean?

David Stokes (16:37): I just think one of the differences between St. Louis and Cincinnati, and I don’t know the property tax base of Cincinnati, is that so much of the city of St. Louis is tax exempt right now. Between Washington University, Saint Louis University, and all the government entities, there’s just so much of it. I say that as somebody who supports property tax changes to make them pay something towards it. But I just don’t think the Cincinnati argument applies to the city of St. Louis right now. That property tax exemption part is a huge factor because the most growing, thriving part of it is the entire giant Barnes-WashU-Cortex complex, and the amount of property taxes they pay is miniscule.

Susan Pendergrass (16:38): Hmm.

Aaron Renn (17:26): Well, some of that is a planning issue. And I think the reality is, when you have a complex like that, are all these people going to move to St. Charles? Maybe not. I’ll tell you, I live in the suburb of Indianapolis named Carmel, and a lot of the hospitals and things have been opening facilities here. When these nonprofit hospitals come up here, we will not approve zoning changes for those hospitals unless they agree to make payments in lieu of taxes. You want to come up here and you want a zoning change, you’re going to have to pay. We were actually quite prescient in that one of the local hospital chains opened a for-profit hospital. As part of the approval deal, we said, if you ever convert to nonprofit status, you will continue paying property taxes. And we did that.

So I think there probably is leverage from the city over some of these entities. You don’t have a lot of leverage over a corporation deciding where to put their office, but that’s not a tax exempt situation. The stuff at Cortex is probably not going to leave if you make them pay a little money the next time they come to you for a zoning approval. I think you need to start looking at how to get more money out of these entities that are nonprofits in name only. These universities and hospitals are effectively gigantic hedge funds. Their executives are extremely well compensated and billions of dollars are flowing through there. Undoubtedly the better solution there is to figure out how to tax them rather than figure out how to tax the soon-to-be-dead mall in the suburb over the border.

David Stokes (19:24): Well, yeah, and that’s sort of the trade off, unfortunately, is that they do pay earnings tax. The employees, many of them very highly compensated, pay the earnings tax. And that’s what makes the city more dependent on local income taxes, not less, because they’re either tax exempt or in the case of Cortex, have tax abatements that make them essentially tax exempt.

Susan Pendergrass (19:25): We do have earnings taxes, right? So the folks who work there have to pay an earnings tax.

Aaron Renn (19:53): Yeah. Again, I don’t know exactly the fiscal architecture there. But I would say you don’t want to do a merger simply to do a tax dollar grab. The lesson of Indianapolis is we did that. We grabbed suburban tax dollars and we used it to rebuild our downtown successfully. But here we are 50 years later, and now we have enormous tracts of decayed suburbia that are an enormous problem. Our entire core county is now in a sense the inner city. We have big challenges because we were not able to invest in ways that allow those suburban areas to retain their allure over the long term.

And I’m not saying that’s impossible, but any short term juice you get, cities always rise and fall. Core cities have proven more resilient and more able to regenerate themselves than suburbs. Part of it is because state governments cannot afford to let their state’s largest city or major urban center go down the tubes.

Susan Pendergrass (21:06): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (21:16): Missouri cannot let St. Louis and Kansas City implode. Michigan cannot just write off Detroit and say who cares. But these suburban areas have proven a lot tougher to save. We don’t have a good model. We’ve spent decades thinking about how to rebuild cities and build districts. There are certain things you can pull off in a city around conventions, civic events, gathering spaces, museums, and government that are very hard to translate to suburban settings. So there’s not a great playbook, especially in declining markets, for renewing suburbs. The playbook for suburban renewal, if you want to call it that, is places like Carmel, Indiana, which are growing and affluent, and therefore can build large mixed use centers, new urbanist developments, trails, and parks. The suburbs of St. Louis County are probably tremendously deficient in infrastructure as we would understand it today.

So again, there may actually be some benefits in having St. Louis City rejoin the county in a sense, because then the county functions are spread and amortized across a larger population.

Susan Pendergrass (22:45): It would immediately improve our murder rate because we would be mixing it in.

Aaron Renn (22:48): Yeah, there is some of that. The murder rate is an artifact of the size of the city more than anything. There are places in Chicago with higher murder rates. A former colleague of mine at the Manhattan Institute, Rafael Mangual, did an analysis of Chicago. He said there are areas on the South Side of Chicago that are larger and have more people than St. Louis with far higher murder rates than St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (22:56): We get called out because of the small denominator.

Aaron Renn (23:17): And so there is that. The other thing is Chicago is a good example. New York City was essentially a city county merger. In 1898, the five counties that are the five boroughs of New York were consolidated into one city. Philadelphia was also a city county consolidation from the 19th century. But what happens when you create a very large city of say a million people or more is you really have to scale up your government. You have to have a government that operates at that scale.

What happened with Indianapolis was we merged city and county government, but we didn’t really have a government that could effectively manage this new larger territory. It never built out the infrastructure in the suburbs. In New York, the Bronx has subways, great parks, everything built out with proper infrastructure, because it was part of New York and New York had to expand governance to become a city of eight million. Chicago got big in the 19th century and built a city government that could run a city of three million people. And some of the stuff that gets critiqued there, for example, is a lot of city services were organized by ward or city council district. There are 50 city council districts and every city councilor is sort of a little mini mayor of their district. The alderman essentially has veto power over any zoning changes. It’s called aldermanic privilege. So there are a lot of constraints there.

But if it’s just one mayor and one city council trying to think about a huge city of 77 neighborhoods and three million people, they can’t keep that much in their head. All they can think about is downtown. And that’s what happened in Indianapolis. The mayor and city council can really only think about downtown. We should have built out structures in townships throughout the city so that you had leadership focused on that area and money focused on that area. That’s what made the suburbs work really well. A suburb like Carmel is basically township sized. We have 100,000 people, big enough to do things, but not so big that our mayor and council can’t keep the whole city in their head and plan and manage the whole city.

So if you merge with the county government, you’re going to have to create an entirely new government structure that allows you to essentially manage every sub area of the whole thing and bring it all up to a standard of services. That’s the other thing they often did in Louisville and Nashville. They merge, but they have a two tier service system where there’s an urban services district for the old city which gets more services, and then the others get less. They didn’t do that in New York. There’s one standard of service in New York, one in Philadelphia, one in Chicago. So if you can’t commit to a single standard of service, you’re basically creating a bogus merger in my opinion. If you’re going to do a merger, you need to obliterate every government and entity in St. Louis County and city, merge them all into one with one standard. That’s not going to happen.

Susan Pendergrass (26:35): That’s not going to happen. What do you think, David?

David Stokes (26:37): Yeah, that’s not going to happen.

Aaron Renn (26:43): So you end up with a lot of problems. Louisville didn’t merge any fire departments. Imagine a city that doesn’t have a consolidated fire department. Imagine a city without a single police department. That was actually Indianapolis. When we merged, the Indianapolis Police Department still patrolled the old city, but the new parts of the city that were consolidated in from the county were still controlled by the sheriff.

Susan Pendergrass (27:13): That is 100% what would happen in St. Louis. Everyone would retain their school system and their police department and their fire department. I lived for a long time in Fairfax County, Virginia, which is a single county government. It’s massive, 150,000 students in their school system. It seems to function with a single police department and fire department. But I don’t think you can backwards engineer that into a place that for hundreds of years has been operating as it has been operating.

Aaron Renn (27:43): Lexington, Kentucky worked pretty well because one, the schools were already consolidated, as in the South it’s typically county school districts. Secondly, there were no other government entities, no township governments, no other incorporated municipalities. So it merged everything. And they were sort of able to solve the urban services district issue because the outer areas of Fayette County were horse farms. They actually put in a kind of green belt rule, you can’t develop out there, because they wanted to protect these scenic landscapes. So there was actually a good reason to treat that differently, because it was a very unique American landscape. Lexington, I think, was pretty successful.

Susan Pendergrass (28:15): They are. I appreciate it when I drive across Route 64.

Aaron Renn (28:39): Lexington was pretty successful and wasn’t especially controversial when they did it, in part because there weren’t all these entrenched interests like there are in other places. If you look at places that did the mergers, they weren’t the Cincinnatis and Pittsburghs. They’ve been talking about consolidation in Pittsburgh forever. It was very hard. And Louisville did it, but it was one of the least consolidated so-called consolidated governments. What the Louisville merger functionally did was dissolve the city of Louisville and reorganize county government. The county government now has a mayor and a council instead of the old fiscal court with the judge executive and all that.

Susan Pendergrass (29:21): That’s kind of what would happen in St. Louis, right?

Aaron Renn (29:36): That’s essentially what they did. They basically dissolved the city and the county government was reorganized, but nothing was merged.

Susan Pendergrass (29:43): Did you have a question?

David Stokes (29:45): I want to get back to the fire district point. We’re talking about why this would be so hard. There’s actually a law in St. Louis that only applies in St. Louis County that makes it impossible to consolidate fire districts. Even if a modest mid-sized suburb annexes an unincorporated part of town, they’re not allowed to provide fire services to that new annexed area, or they can, but they have to pay so much to the old unincorporated fire district that it makes it impossible to do so. That’s just one example of how even if you wanted a full scale merger, it would just be impossible to actually carry through.

Susan Pendergrass (30:34): Why do you think people float this idea, David? Why does it come back every couple of years?

David Stokes (30:38): You know, it’s the old line. I remember a study I read about Pittsburgh and St. Louis many years ago. The question was, are the St. Louis and Pittsburgh areas really inefficient with all the fragmented government? And the conclusion was, well, you would never design a metro area like this, but they’ve both made it work over the last century better than you would think. The conclusion was that St. Louis and Pittsburgh aren’t actually as inefficient as you might assume when you run the numbers.

I think people have trouble accepting that. People look at so many small municipalities, many of them dysfunctional, many of them until recent times funded themselves primarily with traffic tickets, which is a terrible way to fund local government, and that’s not even an exaggeration. And there’s just this fundamental belief that if you can just plan it better you’ll create a better place. I just think it fails.

One of the reasons it would fail, going back to what Aaron led this conversation off with, is that if St. Louis County and St. Louis City joined together, they’re not actually going to lay any government employees off to save any money. St. Louis City government is not going to fire city employees. It’s never going to happen. So you’re not going to save any money and it’s all just going to collapse.

Aaron Renn (32:12): Yeah, New York City and large governments are not more efficient.

I look at it and say, look, I think merger is a solution for failed states, if you want to call them that, in the St. Louis suburbs. Take some micro-suburb that’s a complete scam or is bankrupt and merge it in with its neighbor. Do some consolidation like that, that probably needs to be led by state government, almost like a receivership sort of thing. That’s just kind of good government as you work through it. But I just don’t think the benefits you would gain from trying to do a complete governmental merger of St. Louis City with St. Louis County would outweigh the opportunity cost of how much time and effort you spend on it, when you could be spending that on other things that I think will actually move the needle more.

The downsides are arguably as high as the upsides. There’s no guarantee it’s even net positive in this environment. The time to have merged was when Indianapolis did it in 1970, not in 2026. Nashville did it in the 60s. Jacksonville did it a long time ago.

And then I think it doesn’t fix the fundamental issues around the culture. You’ve got to take a hard look at that and say, it’s maybe very difficult to change. The idea that people who aren’t from here have to be able to move here and get connected and feel like they belong in the city. There’s a couple we know who lived in St. Louis. The wife taught in St. Louis public schools. They’re big urban people. The husband was from St. Louis, and they moved here to Carmel, Indiana.

Susan Pendergrass (33:47): Tell me more about that.

Aaron Renn (34:10): Basically they said, man, people are just so much friendlier here. They make better eye contact, they engage more. It’s just so much more welcoming than it was in St. Louis, even though they were actually in a sense connected because the husband was from there.

So when even people who lived in St. Louis and liked it notice a difference when they leave, that is a killer when you’re already struggling demographically. I had a guy who owned a business in Cleveland who said to me one time, I learned the hard way never to recruit anyone from out of town to work for my company unless that person or their spouse is from Cleveland, because otherwise they will never stay. When that’s where you are as a place, that is just rough. I think that is one of the killers for these river cities.

Susan Pendergrass (35:16): Yeah, what’s the fix for that? I don’t know what the fix is.

Aaron Renn (35:38): I think the optimistic case for St. Louis, and I actually tweeted this a year or two ago, is that St. Louis City educational attainment is really high now. In a sense, it’s a small, highly educated city that is probably going to continue growing more educated. So I think the Pittsburgh option looks viable in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (36:00): And certainly great medical care. I know that the average age is getting older in St. Louis. I think within 10 years, one in four people will be over the age of 65. But we also have an Alzheimer’s research center and access to medical care, which as you get older gets more important. I do think there’s an opportunity to lean in to the medical services that are available, as the country as a whole gets older. I think St. Louis looks more attractive for that reason. So I think you’re right that with universities and medical centers, there’s an opportunity.

Aaron Renn (36:35): Yeah, I think if America’s demographics keep on this trend, a lot of other places are going to get to where St. Louis is. And the thing to be careful of is that when you’re in a declining market, that often prompts centralization of activity and population. What happened with Japan is that once Japan’s population started falling, everybody started moving to Tokyo. It’s Tokyo and a handful of other cities where everything is concentrated, and they literally have ghost towns there.

I don’t think it’s any accident that Indianapolis’ growth really took off once the Rust Belt era and deindustrialization hit the state. Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio have grown in large measure through drawing people out of the rest of the state as those states declined. Huge numbers of people move from Cleveland to Columbus every year.

Missouri is a little different than that. One of your challenges is that St. Louis does not draw people from rural Missouri. When I looked at the data, it’s not like there’s a massive flow into St. Louis from the rest of the state. So you don’t have that siphon bringing people in.

Susan Pendergrass (37:55): There are public safety issues around that, but yes.

Aaron Renn (38:00): And the issue we have is that we’ve now eaten our seed corn. There’s not going to be next generations of children in the towns I grew up in in rural Indiana to move to Indianapolis anymore. The cohort sizes are going to be smaller. So that pump, even Tokyo is declining now in population. That siphon is draining the water table. We can only rely on that so long.

But I think this is the risk for St. Louis in that kind of environment. People with opportunity might avoid or flee St. Louis and go to Austin, Texas or Nashville. They go to the handful of places in America that are really still growing. That’s a threat even for Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio. In a declining market, it’s very hard to get people to want to come to a shrinking city because the opportunity space is shrinking. St. Louis’s opportunity space has been shrinking because you’re losing corporate headquarters and your working age population is declining. That dynamic is really going to be a challenge. But within that, the city of St. Louis might end up doing okay. Again, being small actually helps it here.

Susan Pendergrass (39:25): Any closing thoughts on that, David?

David Stokes (39:27): Just that the part of Missouri that is definitely still growing, and that probably is attracting those young rural people who are moving to a city, is going into southwest Missouri, the Springfield-Branson area. That’s absolutely the growing part of the state. And even Kansas City is growing certainly more than St. Louis is.

Aaron Renn (39:48): Yeah, it’s not a culturally cohesive state. Springfield and that area are definitely growing, and growing despite the fact that they have nowhere close to the urban assets of a St. Louis. It’s interesting to watch, and we’ll just have to see what happens.

Susan Pendergrass (40:05): It is. I think about it a lot. I’ve been talking about this in terms of school enrollment for years and years, where you could see the biggest kindergarten cohort was after the Great Recession of 2009. You know that that’s the biggest kindergarten cohort for the last 15, 16, 17 years. We do nothing but build schools and hire teachers. We are slow to catch on to these things happening. But I think your perspective is certainly very interesting. On the question of the merger, it’s not worth the cost for whatever benefits there might be. But it still gets talked about, so I appreciate you coming and giving us your thoughts on it. Maybe we’ll have to have you back to talk about it again.

David Stokes (41:02): And Aaron, I want you to come back. I want to find out how we get more roundabouts in Missouri. I love roundabouts. I go to Carmel it seems like once a year for these gigantic youth sports tournaments up at Westfield, just a little bit north of you. My kids’ sports take me there. And I love the roundabouts. You cannot get enough of them.

Aaron Renn (41:09): I’d love to talk about that. My favorite topic.

Aaron Renn (41:24): Yeah, it’s great. We hardly ever have to stop. There are barely any stoplights or stop signs left in our city. It’s amazing. We’re one of the few growing places in America where traffic is better today than it was 20 years ago.

Susan Pendergrass (41:32): They’re awesome.

David Stokes (41:45): People don’t realize how good that is for air quality and everything. You just keep moving along, not stop and start. We need 100 times more roundabouts in this area.

Susan Pendergrass (41:55): Are you pretending that people stop at stop signs in St. Louis? Because let’s be honest, people don’t stop at stop signs.

David Stokes (42:00): Well, they roll them, but it’s still wrong when they roll them. Maybe all the people blowing red lights on Kings Highway at 50 miles an hour are just being environmentally conscious. I need to give them more of the benefit of the doubt, I guess.

Susan Pendergrass (42:12): That’s exactly right. All right, thanks so much. I really appreciate it.

Aaron Renn (42:19): Thank you.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post The St. Louis City-County Merger with Aaron Renn and David Stokes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Susan Pendergrass speaks with J.S. Onésimo “Ness” Sandoval, demographer and professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Saint Louis University, about what the data says about the future of the St. Louis region. They discuss record low birth rates and what they mean for school enrollment, why St. Louis is among the top regions in the country for deaths outnumbering births, how the region compares to Pittsburgh and Cleveland, and why suburbs like Chesterfield and St. Charles are aging faster than most people realize. They also discuss the role of housing supply, school choice, crime, and domestic migration in whether St. Louis can attract and retain young families, and more.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:00): Well, certainly not the first time we’ve spoken, Dr. Sandoval. At St. Louis University, you are such a fascinating demographer of the region, and I’ve been following your work as new census data has been released. You’ve been writing about it and creating what I think are really cool mapping tools that folks can look at to see how the St. Louis region is impacted. Thanks for coming on to talk about that. But first I want to sort of expand our view, because pretty sure that I read within the last week that the number of babies born in the United States was at an all-time low. Is that right?

Ness Sandoval (00:35): Yeah, so every year the United States will probably be breaking records. The data coming out for 2025 is a record low, and the data coming out for 2026 is even lower. The first few months of 2026, the provisional data that’s out shows even fewer. And this is what we expected. We call this a demographic shock, because in 2026, whenever you create an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear, rational people do not have children until they understand that their job is safe, there’s not a recession coming, and we’re not at war. When you create this sense of fear, young people do the rational thing and don’t have children. We saw this in 2020 with COVID. We saw this in 2008 with the Great Recession. Anytime there is uncertainty, young people will postpone births. And that’s what we’re seeing. This started in November. We started to see the decline in births, and it’s continued from November, December, January, February. And so this is what we’re going to see.

Susan Pendergrass (01:51): So next year is going to be lower. And when you look at the state of Missouri, I’ve been saying this ad nauseum for years that our K-12 school enrollment is declining and will decline because of that sort of peak in 2008, just before the Great Recession. So our biggest kindergarten class was around 2012, and our kindergarten classes have by and large declined ever since. And so those kids are moving through the system. You can project that we will just have fewer and fewer kids enrolled in our K-12 system in the state of Missouri.

Ness Sandoval (02:06): No, we peaked in 2008.

Susan Pendergrass (02:11): By and large declined ever since 2012. And so those kids are moving through the system. So you can project that we will just have fewer and fewer kids enrolled in our K-12 system in the state of Missouri.

Ness Sandoval (02:24): Yeah, this is true, and we have a pretty good chart. We make these for every city. We’re replacing very large cohorts of children who were born. I have a son who was born in 2007, just before the recession. That cohort that graduated in St. Louis was 40,000 students. The baby birth cohort is now 27,000 students. So that’s just in that one year a 13,000 decline. And it’s going to decline every year for the next 15 to 18 years, because we don’t know what the bottom is yet. It has not reached the bottom.

Susan Pendergrass (03:01): Right. People say where are the kids going? I’m like, they’re not going anywhere. They weren’t born. The St. Louis region, like Clayton is declining, Ladue was, I mean, all of these school districts, I think almost everyone in the county has fewer kids today than they had 10 years ago.

Ness Sandoval (03:07): They weren’t born. Yes, and it’s not just St. Louis County. St. Charles County is experiencing this. There are some parts that are growing, in the Wentzville area, O’Fallon, but if you look at the old St. Charles areas, they’re experiencing decline. Families with children are declining in those areas. We had made an interactive map that I think shocked a lot of people, of seniors outnumbering youth. People could not comprehend this. Like, my gosh, this is not 2000 where youth were dominating these neighborhoods. I live out here in Chesterfield. The entire Route 64 corridor is senior citizens dominating the youth in Chesterfield. People are shocked. More seniors lived in Chesterfield than youth in 2010, and that’s only grown since. This is happening throughout West County.

Susan Pendergrass (04:14): Wow. And your maps actually go down to the zip code, right? You have very granular data.

Ness Sandoval (04:27): Across into Illinois, yes. The only way you can turn this around is young people from across the United States deciding that they want to make St. Louis their home, have a family there, create a business there. This is what I promote. We have to get younger. We really should have a preferential option for families with children. And that’s a hard message for a lot of people because they’re like, wait a minute, we grew from 1970 to 2020. And I’m like, but all of that growth was driven by babies born. Over 1.8 million babies were born. And I tell people, just do the math. 27,000 babies per year times 50. That’s the back of the envelope for what’s coming over the next 50 years. Unfortunately, that’s not what’s going to come. It’s going to be a lot lower than that. People are starting to get it. We’re not going to have 1.8 million babies born over the next 50 years.

Susan Pendergrass (05:33): Yeah, and I think about things like individual school systems building new elementary schools when there have got to be a lot of buildings that are empty. And also, won’t there be more competition for public resources between children and older people?

Ness Sandoval (05:49): Yeah. At my previous job at Northwestern, we did a project on this in one of the suburbs because we were studying seniors. There was a debate about how to spend public money. Was it for transit for seniors or transit for children? This was 2006, and this was the debate happening in Chicago. How do you provide paratransit for senior citizens when that number is increasing? We’re just having this discussion because St. Louis is leading. We’re in the top three of regions. Pittsburgh leads the country, Cleveland is second, and St. Louis is third, tied with Tampa. More people dying than babies born. We simply don’t have the number of babies born for the size of our population. And it’s because we’re a very old region. We’re the ninth oldest region in the country.

Susan Pendergrass (06:58): Yeah, I mean, we used to have 800,000 people in the city of St. Louis, right? And now we’re 280,000 or something.

Ness Sandoval (07:05): Yeah, and I was just looking at the numbers. It is very possible within two years that Kansas City will have more babies born in absolute numbers than the St. Louis metro region. That’s how few babies. I’m talking about the region. Indianapolis is about 700 babies behind St. Louis. Nashville is about 800 babies behind. All of these smaller regions are having lots of babies, and young people are moving there. Your future depends on the number of children born. And when you look at population projections, I kind of know what this looks like. When you fall below Kansas City in number of births, at some point Kansas City will be larger than St. Louis. We can project this out. We’re talking absolute births, not birth rates. We had lots of babies born 10 years ago. We were fine 10 years ago.

Susan Pendergrass (08:09): Yeah, wow.

Ness Sandoval (08:29): We can go back and talk about what happened since 2010.

Susan Pendergrass (08:35): Yeah, please. I’m curious what did happen. I know you call it the death spiral when there’s more deaths than births, but how did we get into this?

Ness Sandoval (08:41): So I moved here for the Great Recession. I moved in 2008 to start my job at SLU. And there was hope when I got here. There was some positive momentum happening. I think the region took it for granted that it didn’t have to do anything. We just have to be St. Louis. We don’t have to do anything. Unfortunately, Nashville came on the scene. Then you started to see regions change. Regions thinking we need to get young. And St. Louis absolutely did nothing. Since I’ve lived here, there’s been a lot of resistance to economic development in the region. Nashville, I think it was the popularity of being young, being pro-development. I went to Nashville to actually look at it, like why are young people there? And I went to Vanderbilt. And I saw this really interesting integration between the city and Vanderbilt University. That does not exist here in St. Louis. Making it a vibrant, cohesive, urban experience.

Susan Pendergrass (09:47): Yeah. Right. Now you step off campus at SLU and you’re in an area you don’t want to walk at night.

Ness Sandoval (10:00): Yeah, and even if it was WashU, right. And then you can talk about the Loop. It never recovered from COVID, traffic is down. I think the region has really struggled to attract young people to stay here and live here.

Susan Pendergrass (10:13): Well, we’ve been looking into the issue of crime in St. Louis quite a bit, and I know it’s down and everyone’s celebrating that fact, but I’m not sure when you survey people and ask how they feel walking alone at night, that it’s changed all that much. Even if the number of murders are down, I don’t know that people feel safer walking alone at night, and that’s got to have an impact on whether you want to stay in St. Louis after you have kids.

Ness Sandoval (10:47): Yeah. I think in the city you move out to the suburbs. The challenge is they work and you live for affordability. So many suburbs are against new development, even though they can develop. We see these debates in Chesterfield, that debate in Creve Coeur, several debates out in St. Charles. They don’t even talk about Jefferson County, because they’re celebrating voting down housing. My point is if you don’t want to build housing, Indianapolis is going to build it. Columbus is going to build it. Nashville is building it. We are no longer in the top 50 in new housing permits in the country. We’re 58th.

Susan Pendergrass (11:34): Why though? Is it because there’s not demand, or is supply being constrained?

Ness Sandoval (11:42): Supply is being constrained. Part of it is, when I speak to people, they say it’s going to hurt my home values. People want supply down. But you understand there’s a consequence to this. And home values are always good in St. Louis. But again, we always say there’s a city that we can look to that’s our future, and that’s Pittsburgh. If you really study Pittsburgh and look at it, you’re like, wow, there’s a lot of things we can learn as a city, and say this is not what we want to be. Pittsburgh leads the country in discounted rates on home sales. When people offer their price, most people do not get the price that they want. It’s a significant discount because the demand’s not there. We are about 20 years behind Pittsburgh.

Susan Pendergrass (12:25): Wow. I think a lot, in what I do, about the educational offerings in the region. Before we were recording we were talking about Texas. Texas, number one, doesn’t have an income tax, and also you can pick your child’s school from the get-go. They have hundreds, if not thousands of charter schools. And now they have a private school choice program that I think 250,000 families apply to. And Missouri has an extremely limited private school choice program, maybe 6,000 or 7,000 kids in the state, and not even the ability within St. Louis County to go outside of these tiny little districts. You can’t even go from Clayton to Brentwood. People really feel strongly about this and fight the idea of opening up the county and letting kids go within the county to any school district, and then the legislature fights it every year. And I’m like, we are just becoming less and less competitive.

Ness Sandoval (13:36): I don’t think people understand. I do a lot of work with schools now. We’re going to lose at a minimum 100,000 children under 15 by 2045. This loss is built into the system based on 27,000 births right now. The numbers are starting to show up in kindergarten. We have a smaller kindergarten class, a smaller first grade class coming in. And so a lot of schools are like, wait a minute, what’s going on? This is just starting. You have another 20 years, because we have these large cohorts that were still born after the Great Recession that are going to be replaced by smaller cohorts coming in. And there is no significant migration of children coming into the region.

Susan Pendergrass (14:28): So there are going to be difficult staffing decisions, and people don’t want to hear it. Like, we cannot continue to hire more teachers.

Ness Sandoval (14:32): You have to close schools. You have to close schools, have to merge schools. I’m doing some work in Parkway. People should not be surprised. Parkway is having meetings this month about what Parkway looks like going forward, and people are discussing consolidation. Rockwood is talking about a 15% decline in 10 years. Go out another 10 years, Rockwood will be talking about school consolidation. St. Charles will be talking about school consolidation in the old St. Charles area, the city of St. Charles. This is coming. Everybody focuses on the city and says the city needs to close schools. But you will see a discussion, I think, between Clayton and Brentwood.

Susan Pendergrass (15:06): For sure. Clayton had 2,500 kids. Now they’ve got closer to 2,000. I mean, that’s teachers, that’s buildings. And I know in Indianapolis, I’ve talked to a superintendent in that area. All parents can pick a public school. And he was like, I had some under-enrolled elementary schools and it was great for me because I put a language immersion program in one to bring parents in. I think the resistance to this idea is all about not wanting kids who aren’t paying property taxes, but I think it’s going to flip. Then you’ll be like, we’ve got to fill these seats. We’re paying the same teacher for 18 seats that we could pay for 22 kids. At some point they’re going to have to start laying off teachers. So I think there are some very difficult decisions ahead that you can see now, and there are things that could be done now, like at least not filling open positions.

Ness Sandoval (16:16): I think universities are seeing this, because many of them are relying on tuition and those dollars are not coming in. A smart university has to make cuts because it doesn’t get any better next year or the following year. There will be fewer students coming in. So universities that want to survive are making necessary cuts to survive.

Ness Sandoval (16:45): Again, we don’t know what the bottom of the birth decline looks like. We just happen to live in a state and a region that has seen a significant decline in children. I keep saying we’re modeling the future for people, either as a good or bad thing. They’re like, we want to be like St. Louis, or we don’t want to do what they did.

Ness Sandoval (17:13): I think a lot of people are starting to understand this. It’s like, we’re letting our children go, and we’re not doing a very good job of trying to keep them here. When you had 1.8 million births, you had enough to let children leave your region, leave the state. You don’t have that luxury anymore. Our models show the region should have anywhere between 1.3 million to a million births coming in over the next 50 years. We hope it’s not a million births, because that means you have an 800,000 decline in your population under 50. Or it’s 1.3 million births, which is only a 500,000 decline. But that’s coming.

Susan Pendergrass (17:43): How does immigration factor into it? Because I remember the last time we talked, you said that St. Louis is not very immigration friendly. And of course, the current national environment is not very immigration friendly.

Ness Sandoval (18:03): Missouri and St. Louis cannot rely on immigration to save it. It’s not a state that immigrants are going to come to in large numbers. They’re going to go to Florida. Miami leads the country. Even though domestic migration has people leaving, international migrants are going there as their top destination. They’re going to Philadelphia, they’re going to New York. We get immigrants who come here, but it’s a very small number, like 6,000 a year. We’re not even in the top tier as a top 25 metropolitan region. And Missouri is not either. So Missouri has to rely on domestic migration.

The data will show that probably for the decade, there will be more people dying than babies born in Missouri. Missouri will start to have from a natural perspective more people dying than babies born. And 91 counties across the whole state will have more people dying than babies born. So Missouri will become dependent for growth on domestic migration.

Susan Pendergrass (19:29): Or do we just accept that we’re not going to grow anymore? What’s the impact of that?

Ness Sandoval (19:33): Again, it’s going to be specific. I do think the Springfield area is going to grow, the Branson area, there’s growth. Part of this is retirement, I think. Kansas City is growing.

Susan Pendergrass (19:42): Why Kansas City more than St. Louis? What’s attracting younger people to Kansas City that is not happening here?

Ness Sandoval (19:49): Kansas City is a younger region. St. Louis is a fairly old region. Kansas City is a lot younger and it has a large Latino population, and that’s the largest growing population in the country, birth-rate wise. Latinos are now the second largest population in Kansas City. They surpassed the Black population, which I think even shocked me, because we thought we knew this was coming, but we thought this was going to be post-2030. The fact that it already happened shows just how many Latinos are moving there. And then you have an exodus of Black residents leaving Kansas City as well as St. Louis. I always tell people, when you have young Black families leave or young Black adults leave, those children ultimately leave too. And so that’s part of the story.

Ness Sandoval (20:48): When young people leave, the children that traditionally were born to those young people are now being born in Charlotte, Atlanta, Houston. The number one challenge for St. Louis and the state is the decline in births. If that doesn’t change, then you’re going to see that decline start to show up in five to ten years in our schools.

Ness Sandoval (21:17): And the private schools will simply go out of business because that’s dictated by the private market. Or they’ll do what many of the Catholic schools are doing. They think, we’re going to have middle school now, or we’re going to be K through 12. But then what about the parochial schools? There’s no growth. They’re just taking children out of other schools and putting them in their school system.

Ness Sandoval (21:45): And so again, I go back to Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh is about how do we manage population decline? The city is growing a little bit, but 100% of the growth in terms of the losses is in the suburbs. And that’s going to happen in St. Louis. When this loss starts to show up in the demographic accounting, most of the loss is going to be outside of the city of St. Louis. It’s going to be in the Chesterfield areas. It’s going to be in St. Charles.

Susan Pendergrass (22:18): So what could be done from a policy perspective? Chesterfield is trying to have this arts and entertainment district. They put in Topgolf and the concert venues. They’re trying to attract younger people there. Is it working?

Ness Sandoval (22:34): It’s not working. I mean, they have the same slight increase. I just posted this yesterday. People are shocked. The growth is in non-family households in Chesterfield. If you look at the new development, I call it downtown West Chesterfield. These are million-dollar homes, very expensive. Very few families with kids are there. These are empty nesters or dual-income, no-kids households. It’s very expensive for young families to get into Chesterfield today, when your entry-level home that was $170,000 in 1980 is $600,000 today. These are the challenges.

Susan Pendergrass (23:23): So build more starter homes?

Ness Sandoval (23:32): You need more entry-level homes. I’m not even going to use the word affordable. You need attainable homes for two incomes. And they can be built. But what I’ve heard is that a lot of cities do not want these homes. They want the $600,000 to $700,000 homes because of taxes. And so there is this tension there.

Ness Sandoval (23:56): Parkway and Rockwood are going to look very different in 30 years. They were very attractive amenities for young families with children. But I look at the data, and my kids are in Parkway. These schools are under-enrolled. You go and objectively look at the classrooms, you’re like, there should be 30 kids in these rooms and there’s 15. It’s great for me as a parent. I’m glad there’s only 15 kids for my fourth grader. One of the classes in Parkway Central, in the middle school, in his math class, there are eight students. I love it as a parent, but as someone who looks at the data, this is not sustainable.

Susan Pendergrass (24:45): Yeah, lots of one-on-one. Yeah. I’m just trying to figure out what would cause a renaissance in St. Louis. It doesn’t feel super safe. It has some great amenities and a great food scene and now MLS soccer. What would it take? Well, number one, you do have the school system problem where the St. Louis public school system is kind of a dumpster fire. So people want to move out if they have small children.

Ness Sandoval (25:32): Yeah, the decision to move out is made within the first three years once the baby’s born. We can see that in the data. When we moved from Chicago, because we lived in the city of Chicago, we wanted to live in the city of St. Louis. I think most people who move from Philadelphia or Boston are living in the city. We thought the city of St. Louis would be offering the same amenities. Because of the Great Recession, I came a year before my family, and we soon realized the city of St. Louis was not the city of Chicago in terms of amenities. And so we ended up in St. Charles. And I think most people make that same decision.

Susan Pendergrass (26:25): Yeah, my husband and I moved right into the city.

Ness Sandoval (26:27): We see it in the data. People are moving into the city from Philadelphia, from Boston, from Houston. But then, like me, if you have children and you’re not going to pay for private school, because that’s a tax in many ways, they’re going to exit out. And then with the Catholic schools closing in the city, there are going to be fewer options.

Susan Pendergrass (26:50): Yeah. But the public transportation is no good. I mean, there are things.

Ness Sandoval (26:57): And it’s interesting. We did see a kind of experiment during COVID. When COVID happened, the Catholic schools in the county opened up. A lot of families wanted their children in face-to-face instruction. So they left the city. They did not stay. So we had kind of a quasi-experimental design there. Education was very important.

Ness Sandoval (27:26): A lot of people left the city because of that and never came back. And that started before COVID. But I think this idea of school choice is something where parents want it. We have enough anecdotal evidence. When Normandy closed, the school system closed, families moved to Normandy to get their kids into Francis Howell. There’s enough evidence to show that families want to make these decisions. The question would be, would Parkway accept all of the students that would want to be in Parkway?

Susan Pendergrass (27:56): Yeah, the law would have to say that they would have to. You couldn’t let them pick and choose.

Ness Sandoval (28:15): Yeah. And so the question is, you have a lot of people who would love to be in Parkway. I gave a talk at Marquette and I was shocked because a good percentage of the students there were saying those public school students, but the parents had left to get out to West County for their children. So the question is, do you just let the private market dictate this? Those who can leave the city will ultimately leave the city and get out to West County.

Susan Pendergrass (28:50): There’s movement out. And I think in terms of domestic migration, to get parents to move in, you can go to our northern border, Iowa. The state pays for private school tuition. Oklahoma to the south, the state pays for private school tuition. Kansas, you can go to any public school in the state. It’s 100% open enrollment. Arkansas is one of the strongest for school choice, both public and private. I think we’re going to be surrounded by it and just have our arms folded across our chest. Because Parkway doesn’t want all those kids coming, or Rockwood doesn’t want all those kids coming. Parents are simply going to move across the border to a state where they can pick any public or private school. I’ve talked to some parents who have reached out to say, I’m thinking about moving to the region, is it true I can’t pick a school? And I’m like, it is true. You cannot pick a school. And I think they’re like, forget it. I’m not going to make this big decision on where to buy a house. I think if we don’t do things that are family friendly, and if we don’t get crime under control in some way, or have a 911 system where when you call somebody responds, I think it’s interesting that St. Louis will become this example for the nation of what a dying city looks like.

Ness Sandoval (30:08): We have three examples today: Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and St. Louis. Tampa is kind of unique because it is a destination for retirees. The Wall Street Journal has an article today on Cleveland, the renaissance of downtown Cleveland. And Detroit too, it’s a renaissance.

Susan Pendergrass (30:29): Wow. What about Detroit now? So St. Louis hasn’t figured out our renaissance yet.

Ness Sandoval (30:49): And to be honest with you, I think it will be hard. I’m not pro anything, but I find this whole debate about the city and county interesting. I’m not from here, so I don’t have this history of growing up here. But I think objectively, when I look at the budget of the city of St. Louis and compare it to Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh is a little bit bigger. It’s got 25,000 more people. But their budget is significantly smaller than St. Louis City’s budget. Part of me wonders, because the city is both a city and a county, it doesn’t have enough people or revenue to operate as both. And this is what’s helping Pittsburgh out. This is what’s helping Cleveland out, because that county revenue is spread among more taxpayers. In St. Louis City, the county functions are spread among a dwindling number of taxpayers. The city probably cannot be a county anymore. There’s just too few taxpayers to provide both city services and county services.

Ness Sandoval (32:08): I looked at these budgets and I’m like, my gosh, why is St. Louis’s budget so much more? I’m talking not a little bit more, a lot more than Pittsburgh’s budget. Pittsburgh is having trouble. And I don’t see the long-term fiscal situation turning around for the city because it’s got to provide all of these services. The tax base is going to decline. The next three years are probably going to see population loss in the city. The numbers just came out in March, but we’ll get the numbers in May. It’ll probably lead the country again in population decline for large cities.

Susan Pendergrass (32:58): Are we still a top 20 city? We’re number one in population decline, but what about in population size?

Ness Sandoval (33:01): We’re number one in decline. Last year, St. Louis City was number one. We’re declining. We’re not in the top 20 yet, but we’re very close. If we go back to 2020, we’re smaller than we were in 2020. The only reason we’re not number one in decline is because we had so many immigrants that offset our domestic migration loss. But this will be an interesting 2030 census, because it’ll be the first time the region will go into a census with more people dying than babies born. In the last census, we had about 75,000 natural growth. We’re looking at about 25,000 to 30,000 natural decline going into this census without any domestic migration. I tell people that this story is just starting. We have 74 years of the century left.

Ness Sandoval (34:18): I’m just trying to get people to move from the mindset that this is 2010 St. Louis. You don’t have 36,000 births anymore. You have 27,000 and it’s declining, one of the fastest declines in the country. Because of it, we’re aging very fast, and so we have to shift. The region has to make a choice that we start to organize our economy around senior citizens. There’s lots of money to be made from senior citizens, but we will never be viewed as Nashville or Austin as a place for young people.

Susan Pendergrass (34:52): Absolutely. That Route 64 corridor is just going to be all retirement homes.

Ness Sandoval (35:04): We won’t be talking about single family homes anymore. We’ll be talking about senior housing. We’ll be talking about a workforce that’s going to work with seniors instead of a workforce for children. And there is money to be made in that economy. I’m not saying that this is a bad thing. But again, we can look at other parts of the country where this transition has happened. Local government spending is being consumed by senior citizens, the healthcare of senior citizens, the paratransit of seniors. Seniors will lose their ability to drive. That cost typically gets covered by local governments. And so you will not be providing buses for children. You’ll be providing paratransit to get seniors to their doctors. Churches will have to think about being accessible to seniors. I go to Church of the Ascension and they are not prepared. At Easter, one of the Masses, one-third of this section was senior citizens in wheelchairs. The churches are simply not prepared for a parish that’s going to be 50% of the population at 70 years old and older. Restaurants have to think about this.

Susan Pendergrass (36:30): Wow, that’s crazy. Well, interesting stuff. I hope you’ll come back and talk about this more. And certainly I’m very interested in reading everything that you write about what St. Louis can do. We need to figure out a renaissance.

Ness Sandoval (36:51): We’ve got to get younger. The kids are giving us a try. They’re coming to school, they’re coming here because they have hopes. We just have not responded the way we need to. A lot of companies are starting to recognize this. I talked to the mayor and said, you need to be a more proactive voice on this. But the region, this is not a city of St. Louis issue. This is a St. Charles issue, a Jefferson County issue, a Chesterfield issue. Most of the people live outside of St. Louis city. The loss we’re projecting is going to come from the suburbs. And that’s what’s happening in Pittsburgh, that’s what’s happening in Cleveland. 100% of the demographic loss is in the suburbs.

Susan Pendergrass (37:21): Yeah. Wow, that’s crazy. Well, fascinating. Thank you so much for explaining it. I don’t want to be depressed about it, but it’s not super optimistic. We’ll find a silver lining. Thanks, Dr. Sandoval.

Ness Sandoval (37:59): All right, thank you very much.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post St. Louis Demographics and the Future of the Region with Ness Sandoval appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Cory Deangelis of Cato reviewed the eight existing studies on school choice and integration that were conducted using rigorous, empirical research methods. Seven showed that school choice programs were associated with statistically significant progress toward racial integration (the other yielded results that were statistically neutral). These studies looked at voucher programs in Cleveland, Louisiana, Milwaukee, and Washington, D.C.

Attempting to revive long-debunked claims doesn’t help kids get a better education. With clear research on school choice and segregation, discussions of school choice should focus on what will improve schools for all kids. 

The post The School Choice Segregation Myth appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

On Tuesday, April 5, Saint Louis voters will decide whether to extend the city’s 1 percent earnings tax for five more years.

Without a doubt, this is a hugely important decision.

In inviting me to talk to you, Ron Zager (co-chairman of the Missouri Progressive Action Group), asked that I begin by presenting both sides of the argument—for and against the earnings tax .

I am happy to do so. It makes for an interesting—and even a startling—contrast.

Supporters cite three principal reasons for extending the earnings tax:

1. It is simple, fair, and easy to collect. Businesses withhold $1 out of every $100 from the paychecks of all of their employees and pay it directly to the city. They also pay a 1 percent tax on their net profits.
2. It brings in a lot of revenue—almost as much as the combined receipts from the city’s property, sales, and utility taxes. It provides a third of the city’s General Revenue Fund, used to support fire, police, courts, streets, parks, recreation, and other day-to-day city services.
3. A large portion of this revenue is like manna from heaven. People who commute into Saint Louis from the surrounding suburbs account for more than half of the city’s annual earnings tax receipts of about $160 million. And why not? The high-earning commuters are significant consumers of city services, swelling the daytime population of the city by about 35 percent.

To sum up the case in favor of retention: The earnings tax is critical to the continued functioning of city and the continued provision of police and other services to a population that includes a high proportion of low-income residents. It is a real lifeline. The city would be in danger of going bankrupt without it.

Opponents have three main reasons of their own for eliminating or phasing out the earnings tax:

1. It encourages people and businesses to move out of the city.
2. It also encourages an ongoing merry-go-round of tax carve-outs and special favors for large and well-known firms. The city does not extend the same benefits to thousands of smaller businesses, which take care of most of the daily needs of people who live in the city, such as the neighborhood grocer, cleaners, pharmacist, or auto repair shop.
3. Though not a regressive tax (applying the same 1 percent to people at all income levels), it is a cruel one. Unlike federal and state income taxes, there is no exemption from the city earning tax for working people at or below the poverty line. The tax hits the first dollar of income even from the lowest-paying jobs. A still greater problem is the narrowing of job opportunities in parts of the city experiencing a rapid out-migration of people and the closure of many small businesses.

The minuses are really the flip side of the pluses I have just mentioned.

Yes, the earning tax is easy to collect, but it is also easy to avoid. As a business owner, you can avoid the tax on your net profits simply by moving your business to the suburbs—anywhere outside the city. There is no earnings tax in Clayton, here in Frontenac, or anywhere else in Saint Louis County and other surrounding counties and municipalities. If you did move your business, many or even most of your employees who already live in the county would, out of their own self-interest, applaud your decision. And others who live in the city would be given a reason to move to the county.

Yes, the earnings tax pays many big bills for the city. By the same token, it provides a strong incentive for individuals and businesses—who have bills of their own to pay—to relocate in order to avoid the tax.

By collecting more than half of earning tax revenue from commuters, the city is (inadvertently) making a powerful argument for downtown-based law firms and other businesses with a large number of highly paid employees to take flight—for both economic and personal reasons. At one stroke a firm can give many of its officers and employees an instant 1 percent raise while sparing them the bother of a long commute. So what can the city do to prevent such businesses from moving?

If you are the sitting mayor or other high-ranking city official, here’s the answer: Offer big potential flight risks all kinds of tax breaks and other incentives to stay downtown. Find ways to abate property taxes to keep prestigious firms from leaving downtown. Waive the half-percent payroll tax (separate from the earnings tax) for large employers such as Anthem and Wells Fargo. And lobby the state for more handouts.

But of course, given your obsession with preserving earning tax receipts, you do that only for the big guys and you forget all about the little guys who are so numerous (even in decline) that you know little or nothing about them.

A classic example of how this works can be taken from 2011, when Stifel Financial Corp., which has had its corporate headquarters in downtown Saint Louis since 1890, announced plans to buy its downtown office building and expand its workforce in the city by a couple hundred people. Mayor Francis Slay called it “tremendous news for the future of downtown.” He also helped Stifel get some $17 million in public financing for the purchase and renovation of the building.

Why would a large and successful financial firm need help in feathering its own nest? Ron Kruszewski, Stifel’s CEO, said it all: “There’s very little investment going on right now without some incentives.”

That prompted Bill McClellan of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch to comment in one of his columns: “When liberals like me argue for comprehensive health care, critics call us socialists. But when businesspeople demand public money to underwrite their projects, hardly anyone says anything.”

(I’ll take issue with McClellan on one point here: There is at least one institution that has fiercely and consistently opposed all forms of corporate welfare and crony capitalism, whether it is providing public funds for new corporate headquarters, public funds for professional sports stadiums, or any other kind of commercial development. That is the Show-Me Institute.)

To sum up the minuses: the earnings tax is a tax on work and enterprise, and when you tax something, you get less of it. In this case that means fewer jobs and less growth. The earnings tax has also encouraged unfair and unwise favoritism in tax practices—decisions made up on the fly to keep big-name businesses from bolting to the county. It’s time for a long look at Saint Louis city government—how it is financed and, more fundamentally, how it thinks.

Let us take a moment to consider decade-to-decade changes in the relative importance of Saint Louis among major cities in the United States over a long period of time—both before and after the introduction of the earnings tax in 1954.

According to census data, the last time Saint Louis moved upward in the ranks of U.S. cities was in the 1890s. The population grew from 452,000 people at the beginning of the decade to 575,000 in 1900, and Saint Louis moved from being the 5th largest city in the country to the 4th (behind New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia).

Of course, that was just prior to the Saint Louis World’s Fair. In that same amazing year of 1904, Saint Louis also hosted the world’s third modern Olympics—following the 1900 Olympics in Paris and the 1896 Olympics in Athens.

Saint Louis held onto 4th place until the 1920 census, when it was overtaken by Detroit and Cleveland, dropping to 6th. It was passed by Los Angeles in 1930 and Baltimore in 1940, falling to 8th. It remained in that spot in the 1950 census—when the city’s population hit an all-time peak of 857,000.

At that point the city’s population went into a steep decline that continues to this day. Since 1950, its population has dropped from close to 900,000 to a little more than 300,000—discarding almost two-thirds of its human body weight—and Saint Louis has gone from being the 8th-largest city in the country down to the 60th, behind such places as Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Wichita, Kansas.

It would be absurd to place all or even most the blame for this decline on the earnings tax. It would be equally absurd to deny that the earnings tax has made a significant contribution to the depopulation of the city and the growth of surrounding areas.

For one thing, we know that downtown Saint Louis no longer rules the roost as the unchallenged commercial center of the Saint Louis region. Clayton has become a strong second center, and other places around the county are also filled with offices and business enterprises. It is only in Saint Louis City that you find acres and acres of abandoned houses, deserted storefronts, and boarded-up factories.

Here’s a statistic that may surprise you: There are now more people who commute into Saint Louis County . . . both from the city and from Saint Charles and other counties . . . than there are people who commute into the city from the county or other jurisdictions. There are 236,000 people commuting into the county versus 172,000 commuting into the city, according to recent census data.

Somehow, Clayton and other municipalities receiving this great daily influx of commuters have been able to handle it . . . without instituting an earnings tax or having everything from the streets to public safety fall to pieces. Why is it any different for the city of Saint Louis? Why is the city unable to cope without taxing the earnings of people who come there to work?

Let’s turn then to the question of whether it is possible to phase out the earnings tax without throwing the city into bankruptcy and fulfilling the worst predictions.

Bear in mind that the proposal on Tuesday’s ballot in the city calls for phasing out the earnings tax over 10 years—whittling away at a $160 million funding gap that would occur in the year 2026 through spending cuts or revenue enhancements averaging $16 million a year between now and then.

Is $16 million a year too tall a mountain to climb? Somehow, in the city’s desperate efforts in recent months to persuade the Rams and the NFL to keep the team in Saint Louis, the city funneled $16 million through the Saint Louis Convention & Visitors Center Commission to pay legal fees and other expenses in what turned out to be a losing effort.

Before that, Mayor Slay and Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon were prepared to raise about $400 million to pay for a large portion of the cost of building a new downtown stadium for the Rams. That alone would have equaled the revenues from the earnings tax over a two-and-a-half-year period.

If almost any large business you can imagine were to lose customers year after year—eventually losing more than half of its business base—you would expect it to downsize drastically, if not go out of business.

Why is it—despite the steady, continuing loss in population—that the city’s budget continues to grow, if only slowly, from one year to the next, with few if any large reductions in its workforce?

Faced with such questions, city officials typically shift the focus to public safety, saying they need more rather than fewer police and firemen. Public safety accounts for a little over half of general funds expenditures. Why, then, is it so hard to trim the other expenditures that make up about 45 percent of the budget?

There are other ways that the city can either cut expenditures or raise revenues besides the shock of instituting sudden and drastic increases in property or sales taxes. It could raise hefty sums of money by privatizing assets such as the airport or the water system.

It could also make a serious effort to raise some revenue from its large nonprofit institutions. As Post-Dispatch business columnist David Nicklaus pointed out in a recent article:

These universities and hospitals depend on city service but don’t pay property taxes. Boston and other cities have negotiated payments from their big nonprofits; Saint Louis could try to do the same. Eliminating the 1 percent earnings tax should make it easier for these institutions to attract and retain employees; wouldn’t they pay something to make the tax go away?

But none of those things is going to happen without a fundamental change in thinking on the part of city officials who have come to look upon the earnings tax as the sine qua non of Saint Louis city governance.

Following the last election, when voters re-approved the earnings tax, city officials heaved a sigh of relief, agreed that the tax did indeed put the city at a competitive disadvantage, and promised to study alternatives. That was five years ago. And since then they have done nothing.

Maybe if the vote is closer this time, they will begin to think differently. But maybe not. Maybe they will just go on hoping for miracles while continuing to pursue policies that have contributed the city’s decline and fall from the heights it once occupied as a great American city.

The post The Saint Louis City Earnings Tax: Lifeline or Noose? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Far from it. Of the 77 U.S. cities that KPMG ranked (which was not exhaustive of all major metros), Saint Louis ranked 45th and Kansas City ranked 46th. Among the cities cheaper than Saint Louis (and Kansas City) are regional competitors like Nashville, Omaha, Cincinnati, Memphis, Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Oklahoma City, to name a few. Worse yet, Saint Louis was more expensive than all 18 Southeastern cities KPMG looked at, from Atlanta to New Orleans.

So where did the Post-Dispatch get a top ten ranking for Saint Louis? If we only consider regions with populations greater than two million (of which KPMG ranked 31), Saint Louis is the 9th cheapest. I will leave it to the readers of this blog to decide if Saint Louis should pat itself on back for being cheaper than New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, when it has higher costs for businesses than Nashville, Memphis, and just about every other regional competitor. But if we do decide to use population as criteria, it seems more justified to look at metros with populations similar to those of Saint Louis and Kansas City (between two and three million residents). When we do that, Saint Louis is 7th and Kansas City is 8th out of 14 such cities. That seems awfully middling.

That’s probably why, if one reads the study that the Post-Dispatch reports on, they’ll find that it does not claim that Saint Louis is among the most competitive cities in the country. KPMG didn’t even break down cities by population in the study, choosing instead to do so by region.  The Post-Dispatch story (while citing the study) is actually based on an ancillary KPMG press release, which lauds Cincinnati, and is careful to note context.

Titling an article “St. Louis among most cost-competitive cities for business, report says” when the report in question says no such thing is a questionable decision for a newspaper of record. But this is not just a problem with the headline. The article itself is equally misleading, and it was not a headline writer who placed this story front and center on the Post-Dispatch’s website less than a week before a vote on multiple tax issues (where the city’s business climate is an issue). 

The post Report: Saint Louis, Kansas City *Not* Among Most Cost-Friendly Cities for Business appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

                The recent downgrade saw Saint Louis’s general obligation debt rating fall one notch, from Aa3 to A1. That still leaves the city with a rating denoting an upper-medium investment grade, even if the rating is well below prime. And as some news sources have pointed out, that means Saint Louis’s rating is higher than Chicago’s or Detroit’s. Unfortunately, if we don’t compare Saint Louis to cities exiting or very likely entering bankruptcy, its rating is relatively low, as the chart below demonstrates:

                A lower bond rating can lead to higher borrowing costs. In the same way that an individual with a low credit score might have to pay higher interest rates on a car loan or a mortgage than someone with a great credit score, a lower rating for a city can mean it has to pay more to borrow. As cities regularly borrow money to make civic improvements, the higher cost of borrowing means residents pay more for large projects like, say, a football stadium. Speaking of stadiums, the rating for nonessential debt (read: convention center and stadium) issued by the Saint Louis Municipal Finance Corporation was also downgraded, to A3. That corporation would responsible for issuing bonds for a new stadium.

                The primary reason for Saint Louis’s weak credit rating is the city’s “weak socioeconomic profile,” which is admittedly difficult for city leaders to fix. However, there are ways city hall could work to increase the city’s bond rating. According to Moody’s, the city is too reliant on the earnings tax. In addition, the city could boost its rating by making an effort to reduce total debt. Unfortunately, with the city prepared to go even further into the red to build a billionaire a new football stadium, it may be a while before Saint Louis can brag about its credit rating to people who don’t live Chicago. 

The post Bad for Borrowing: Saint Louis Bond Ratings Slip appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Cleveland metro area – roughly defined by STR, a hospitality research firm, as Cuyahoga, Lorain, Lake, Geauga, Medina and Ashtabula counties – is home to nearly 22,000 hotel rooms, up about 4 percent from two years ago. In downtown Cleveland, the increase in room inventory is even more dramatic: up 16 percent since late 2012, to 3,945 rooms, according to STR.

Cleveland, which is considered a lower-tier market for conventions than Kansas City, has the same number of rooms in the downtown area. The Kansas City region has many more hotel rooms than Cleveland. Cleveland won the GOP convention likely due to other important political considerations that have nothing to do with the specifics of convention bids, including hotel room count. Keep this in mind next time you hear someone claim that Kansas City needs to spend tens of millions of dollars on a convention hotel.

The post We Didn’t Lose the GOP Convention Because of Hotel Rooms appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The debate over what millennials want continues to rage in Kansas City and elsewhere. City leaders are spending gobs of taxpayer money on entertainment districts, streetcars, and subsidized housing in hopes that the so-called creative class will flock there. But the evidence to support such efforts is weak and growing weaker with time.

The New York Times published a column recently about where young college-educated people are choosing to live. The author wrote:

[A]s young people continue to spurn the suburbs for urban living, more of them are moving to the very heart of cities — even in economically troubled places like Buffalo and Cleveland. The number of college-educated people age 25 to 34 living within three miles of city centers has surged, up 37 percent since 2000, even as the total population of these neighborhoods has slightly shrunk.

Yet a Wall Street Journal piece, published just last week, reports:

A survey released Wednesday by the National Association of Home Builders, a trade group, suggested otherwise. The survey, based on responses from 1,506 people born since 1977, found that most want to live in single-family homes outside of the urban center, even if they now reside in the city.

A recent article in Business Insider suggests that the era of young professionals living in urban areas has peaked:

But a decade from now, the landscape will look very different. Millennials will pair up and have kids and want space. Cities, particularly the megacities like New York and Chicago, aren’t likely to become more affordable.

Demographics are destiny. That big bulge of younger millennials visible in the population pyramid is going to be hitting the prime age range for marriage and having kids in the next few years, and it’s likely that many of those new families will move out to the ‘burbs (or further!).

The true cost of revitalizing downtown may be more than the city can bear. Kansas City cannot afford to operate its own fountains and is cutting funds to public safety services. It cannot cover bad investments without taking money from the airport, it neglects the real urban core, and it relies on charity to meet basic city services. Kansas City needs to have a debate on these economic development assumptions, especially because there is so little money left to give away.

The post The Myth of the Urban Millennial appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

“Good, smart transit—a mix of buses rails, and other people movers—is a vital component of any successful city.”

But does a city really need a streetcar, or for that matter any type of light rail, to be successful?

Certainly many cities in the United States, more than 50, have some form of fixed rail transit. The largest rail systems are the New York City Subway and the Chicago L, but many small cities like Kenosha, Wis., Little Rock, Ark., and Tucson, Ariz., also have light rail or streetcars. However, many cities, large and small, do not have rail transit. Cities like Honolulu, San Antonio, Orlando, Indianapolis, and Cincinnati have been popular cities to work and play in for many years without much or any fixed rail. These cities, and many others like Kansas City, rely on bus systems.

There’s no reason why Kansas City cannot continue to rely on buses. Whether it’s rapid transit or simply providing service to wide areas, buses are capable of meeting cities’ needs in most situations. For example, the Chicago Transit Authority’s bus system had more than 314 million boardings in 2012. KCATA only had around 16 million boardings that year. The limits of KCATA’s bus system is yet to be reached.

While rail systems may be necessary in cities with significant congestion and population densities, nowhere does Kansas City have population or traffic to make rail necessary. And while it is not necessary, rail has its drawbacks, paramount of which is cost. For instance, Kansas City’s proposed streetcar expansion (less than 10 miles of routes) costs were more than double the entire capital spending on KCATA’s 250-plus bus fleet from 1992 to 2002.

Rail supporters contend that rail transit creates development, drives density, and is necessary to make Kansas City an attractive city for people to live in. But much of that belief is based on anecdotal evidence from successful cities with rail, usually ignoring places where rail has failed to drive development. Cities like Cleveland, Detroit, Baltimore, Buffalo, and Saint Louis have seen little regeneration from their rail lines, some of which cost more than a billion dollars.

Kansas City needs efficient transit that serves the community. It does not need rail to be successful, and residents should not let city officials with status anxiety waste hundreds of millions just to say Kansas City has rail.

The post Does Kansas City Need Rail Transit? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

All that said, there actually is a lot to like in these vetoes. For example, the governor vetoed more than $7 million in funds for biodiesel incentives. The state should be eliminating these types of incentives and it is a good thing that Gov. Nixon is cutting back on them. The governor also is vetoing $2 million in funding for the Rolling Stock Tax Credit. The Show-Me Institute has published numerous writings about the desirability on cutting back on these types of tax credits. It is good to see Gov. Nixon trying to do so.

Gov. Nixon’s vetoes could go further. For example, he withheld $5 million from efforts trying to lure the Republican National Convention to Kansas City. There has been a lot said about using government money to try to lure big events, but in this case, the money isn’t necessary because the Republican National Committee has already narrowed its search down to Cleveland and Dallas. Gov. Nixon should have simply vetoed this specific appropriation.

There was a lot to like in the governor’s vetoes. If the legislature was more disciplined, many of the vetoes would not have been necessary. Hopefully, state spending can be controlled going forward.

The post Vetoes, Vetoes, And More Vetoes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Urbanists, journalists, and academics — not to mention big-city developers — were easily persuaded that shelling out to court “the hip and cool” would benefit everyone else, too. And [development consultant Richard] Florida himself has prospered through books, articles, lectures, and university positions that have helped promote his ideas and brand and grow his Creative Class Group’s impressive client list. …

Well, oops.

Another way I would describe this development strategy: “Warehouse lofts over warehouses.”

Indeed, the recasting — and really, inversion — of the American city by contemporary urban planners does not share a great deal in common with why American cities developed in the first place: because that is where the jobs were. As transportation and communication became more expansive and readily available, living in or near the city center for work became less of a necessity and more of an active choice. In a time where “creatives” can give a presentation over Skype and telecommute to work, location-location-location ain’t as necessary as it used to be when it comes to jobs. Moving downtown in the 21st Century oftentimes has less to do with labor needs as it does with identity preferences.

And that is, of course, the development quandary. My proximity to my place of work is going to affect where I live greatly if my job is in manufacturing. Indeed, many cities were purpose-built for the manufacturing industry: shoes, cars, etc. But manufacturing is not the industry cities seem to devote too much attention to these days, and unfortunately for cities, the “creatives” they are trying to attract do not exactly have development coattails.

Kotkin:

Indeed in many ways the Floridian focus on industries like entertainment, software, and social media creates a distorted set of economic priorities. The creatives, after all, generally don’t work in factories or warehouses. So why assist these industries? Instead the trend is to declare good-paying blue collar professions a product of the past. If you can’t find work in deindustrialized Michigan, suggests Salon’s Ray Fisman, one can collect “more than a few crumbs” by joining the service class and serving food, cutting hair or grass in creative capitals like San Francisco or Austin.

The story actually quotes Florida, one of the lead movers in the “hip” development scene, admitting to a serious flaw in the last decade’s worth of development fads: “On close inspection, talent clustering provides little in the way of trickle-down benefits.” In other words, if you build it, the “creatives” might come to your converted warehouses and niche dining establishments . . . but that is about it. (Emphasis mine.)

Yet this footprint of such “cool” districts that appeal to largely childless, young urbanistas in the core is far smaller in most cities than commonly reported. Between 2000 and 2010, notes demographer Wendell Cox [who has written for Show-Me], the urban core areas of the 51 largest metropolitan areas — within two miles of the city’s center — added a total of 206,000 residents. But the surrounding rings, between two and five miles from the core, actually lost 272,000. In contrast to those small gains and losses, the suburban areas — between 10 and 20 miles from the center — experienced a growth of roughly 15 million people.

The smallness of the potentially “hip” core is particularly pronounced in Rust Belt cities such as Cleveland and St. Louis, where these core districts are rarely home to more than 1 or 2 percent of the city’s shrinking population. Yet the subsidy money for developers is often justified in the name of “reviving” the entire city, most of which has continued to deteriorate.

More on this topic shortly.

The post Part One: The Smallness Of The Potentially ‘Hip’ Core appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The friendliness and charity of our countrymen can always be relied upon to relieve their fellow citizens in misfortune. . . . Federal aid in such cases encourages the expectation of paternal care on the part of the government and weakens the sturdiness of our national character, while it prevents the indulgence among our people of that kindly sentiment and conduct which strengthens the bonds of a common brotherhood.

Although Cleveland was talking about federal aid during a drought, the lesson is applicable to our current situation: Charity should be preferred over taxes. After all, taxes do not lend themselves to a “kindly sentiment.” And is charity such a radical option? Don’t universities already receive such donations? It seems that if the state believes citizens want to support universities, the government should let the people voluntarily display their support.

But suppose charity falls short – what then? Tuition increases should be considered. After all, let’s not forget that students are the ones choosing to attend college. When the price of education goes up, there is nothing wrong with charging a higher fee. And for those who cannot afford the higher fee, there are alternatives: scholarships and student loans. If both those options do not work, there is the alternative of a less costly education at a community college. Finally, if all else fails, college can be deferred. I have known several individuals who have put off college in order to accumulate savings for it. All options should be exhausted before reaching into the public purse.

The post Promote Kindness, Not Taxes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

National Public Radio ran a segment today on a Cleveland-area land bank. According to reporter Mhari Saito, the Cuyahoga Land Bank (CLB) is scheduled to demolish about 700 properties this year.

The situation in Cleveland looks like this: A family goes into mortgage foreclosure. The lender takes the home, but is unable to sell it, given the depressed economy. It costs money for the lender to maintain the home while it sits vacant. And, if lenders don’t maintain their properties, they can face large code violation fines.

Looking for a solution, the CLB has made an offer to lenders: Pay to demolish the house, and the land bank will take the property from you. Seems like a win-win solution, right? In fact, Saito characterizes it as such. From her report:

Lenders pay $3,500 to $7,500 per house. Wells Fargo’s Russ Cross says it’s a sensible and responsible business plan.

“We want to make loans on an ongoing basis, and to do so, we need stable to rising home values,” he says. “We’ve got to do whatever we can to protect home values in neighborhoods.”

Given the policy catastrophes we’ve seen at the Saint Louis land bank and  the burgeoning land bank growth across the U.S., the policy of running bulldozers over hundreds of properties each year needs to be considered seriously.

Let’s talk about the need to “protect home values.” While existing homeowners might want to keep their home values at artificially high prices, the fact of the matter is, home values have fallen. Attempting to boost home values by destroying existing home supply is no solution. In fact, consider who is hurt by this solution: Low income individuals, first-time home buyers, and people who want to take a risk on an old property at a low price.

An op-ed in the New York Times illustrates the value of super cheap home prices perfectly.

A couple (he an artist and her an architect) purchased a home in East Detroit for $1,900. The home was stripped of wiring and run down, but the couple saw that home as an opportunity to install green appliances and solar-powered utilities. They then purchased two other lots, installed a garden, sold a home to another artist couple at a $50 profit, and then called their friends (those who had bought the $100 home) to encourage them to move into the neighborhood.

Had Detroit bulldozed those properties, as the CLB is doing now, such innovation within existing structures would have been prevented.

I suppose the relevant question to ask is whether it is good public policy to prop up home prices by destroying the supply of very cheap homes and increasing the amount of land owned by government. Land banks throughout the United States (and NPR reporters) should take a closer look at the Saint Louis land bank. After all, the land bank here has existed for 40 years, and the situation has only gotten worse.

The post Is Bulldozing a Way to Prosperity? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

An economic impact study commissioned by the mayor of New York City concluded that the LeBron effect would likely inject $60 million per year into the local economy. Not surprising, given that ticket sales, advertising revenues, and team retail in Cleveland had increased dramatically since James’ rookie year.

Because of the way the free-agent landscape worked out, and overall team salary cap requirements, Miami was not able to offer James a competitive contract, while both New York and Cleveland were. But Miami did possess a wild card that the other suitors couldn’t match: tax-relief. No, not in the form of direct incentives, in the form of a healthier tax climate.

Interestingly, Florida does not impose a personal income tax, whereas both Ohio and New York levy personal income taxes of 6 percent and 12.6 percent, respectively, in their highest brackets. On a deal said to be worth around $100 million, that 12.6 percent tax on income wipes out the economic comparative advantage that New York may have had. However, the 6-percent income tax would level the playing field for Miami and Cleveland were it not for Cleveland’s pesky earnings tax. The 2 percent of James’ income that the city of Cleveland could claim was enough to give Miami the fiscal residual it needed to land its new money-making machine.

What can Missouri learn from all this?

Simply put, our current economic development plans may not be able to compete against states with lower taxes. New York may offer James lots of incentives to coax him to the state, but the simple ability to keep the money you’ve earned is a strong incentive in itself.

The post High Heat and Low Taxes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

With vacancy pervasive throughout our community, St. Louisans may often logically conclude that said emptiness is the direct consequence of the stark reality that persons simply do not want to live here in the same numbers that they once did. In fact, it would be difficult to argue that losing nearly two-thirds of the city’s peak population would have a negligible impact on the appearance of the city’s landscape.

But does so much property necessarily remain vacant from a lack of market demand for single-family homes, larger yards, and new business locations, or could vacancy be the product of market distortion by a governmental agency?

At the urging of a colleague, I attended my first ever hearing of the St. Louis Land Reutilization Authority (LRA) on Wednesday morning, looking for an answer.

Within moments of its commencement, the meeting shattered every expectation that I had for a body with the following statutory mandate (emphasis and link added):

The land reutilization authority is hereby created to foster the public purpose of returning land which is in a nonrevenue generating nontax producing status, to effective utilization in order to provide housing, new industry, and jobs for the citizens of any city operating under the provisions of sections 92.700 to 92.920 and new tax revenues for said city.

Instead of operating in a manner consistent with its above-enumerated legislative intent, the LRA appeared to operate according to a morass of opaque cultural practices that stand divorced from any legislative language. Indeed, the insistence by the assembled commissioners that prospective buyers of tax-foreclosed properties have the express written support of the alderman representing the ward that is home to the vacant property struck me as patently absurd. (After all, the word “alderman” does not appear in Chapter 92 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.) Five people attempted to purchase property from the LRA this month without a letter of support from their alderman. Of those five, four offers were rejected, because the LRA purportedly treats a lack of aldermanic support as a reason to reject a prospective buyer’s offer.

After witnessing Wednesday’s proceedings and perusing the many purchase offers on the LRA agenda, I can say with great certainty that much of the vacancy subject to the LRA’s jurisdiction in St. Louis city is not a consequence of a lack of private demand for property; rather, much of it derives from government legitimation and infringements on the free market.

The post Vacancy, Legitimated appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

It is not exactly groundbreaking research for me to state that teams and players pay substantial income taxes in various forms. Here are the most recent payrolls and league ranking for the five Missouri teams:

1. Rams, $62,384,821 (32)
2. Chiefs, $83,187,156 (31)
3. Cardinals, $93,540,751 (12)
4. Royals, $71,405,210 (21)
5. Blues, $46,485,000 (22)

As far as I know, the location in which a team plays its regular season home games is the primary determinate for which taxes must be paid. So, the city of St. Louis, which hosts the home games of all three St. Louis teams, gets $1,518,079 per year in earnings and payroll taxes just from the Cardinals, Rams, and Blues players. Kansas City gets $772,962 from Chiefs and Royals players. (This post originally mistakenly said that the KC stadiums were outside of Kansas City proper. Thanks to David Nicklaus of the Post-Dispatch for sending me a correction, and for reading our blog!) Of course, when you account for team employees and the profit tax levied on each organization, the earnings tax receipts grow even larger.

Missouri receives an estimated $10,710,088 each year from applying the 6-percent income tax rate to athletes from each of its five sports teams. (With deductions, etc., this figure would be a little lower.) Missouri, like many other states, enforces its income taxes on visiting athletes, too. However, just as players from visiting teams must pay the income and earnings taxes, all the players get credit for taxes paid to other cities and states. The result is that the total taxes paid are just moved around between jurisdictions, as our former editor Tim Lee first pointed out when writing about the “jock tax” in 2005:

But Missouri athletes who pay other states’ jock taxes are able to subtract those tax payments from their Missouri tax bills. When you subtract the revenue lost from other states’ jock taxes, the result is practically a wash. If all 20 states repealed their jock taxes simultaneously, states would get virtually the same revenue with a lot less administrative overhead.

Two lists help us determine whether players pay more or less taxes: states without an income tax, and cities with an earnings tax. The Cardinals players don’t appear to do so well here. They pay both a state income tax and city earnings tax at home, and regularly travel to Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, New York, and Philadelphia. Only when they travel to play the Astros — and, less frequently, the Marlins — do they really get a pay raise. The Royals also pay the local earnings tax when they travel to Detroit, Cleveland, or New York. Both the Cardinals and Royals pay the other city’s e-tax each year when they travel across I-70 for the annual “rivalry” series.

The Blues pay a local tax on their frequent visits to Detroit or Columbus, but get a nice tax vacation when they head to Nashville. Of course, Canadian taxation becomes a issue for any hockey player, and for the Royals to a lesser extent.

The NFL schedule rotates from year to year more than other leagues, but the Rams players have to like getting to play one guaranteed road game in Seattle each year, because Washington has no state income tax and Seattle has no earnings tax. The Chiefs and Rams play this year in the regular season, so both teams will be paying the host city’s e-tax then, as well. (The two football teams usually play in the pre-season for the much-coveted “Governor’s Cup” but I don’t think athlete’s salaries are based on pre-season games so no earnings tax would be collected in that case.) If you are looking to avoid taxes, the AFC south is where you want to play — aside from the smallish earnings tax in Indianapolis, of course. The Chiefs have to pay high California state taxes for at least two games per year. (Disclaimer: All team opponent and schedule info listed here has been pulled from my own memory, with a little help from ESPN.com.) Of course, other factors such as where an athlete keeps his primary residence, the agressiveness of his accountant, etc., will all play a factor here. A player who lives full time in Missouri is going to pay Missouri income tax on salary earned, but not taxed, playing in Texas, while someone who lives in another state might not. I am a policy analyst, not a CPA.

What does all of this prove? Nothing really, yet. This post is less debatable than future posts in the series might be, because in these cases the teams and players are treated just like other businesses, and the taxes paid are substantial. That does not mean I think they should be substantial, just pointing out that the applicable tax policies show no favoritism. Also, it is simultaneously difficult to say that the athletes and teams are not paying enough in taxes when around 100 individual players generate more than $1.5 million per year to the city of St. Louis alone, and it is almost as hard to seriously complain about the taxes paid by modern professional athletes, who earn enormous salaries to play a game for a living. (Am I jealous? Absolutely!)

Future posts in this series will deal with areas in which teams are not treated like other businesses, for better or worse.

The post Taxes and Sports: The Earnings Tax (Part One in a Series) appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Rail transit has become such an albatross around the necks of the American cities that have it that it is hard to imagine that anyone of good will would wish it upon Kansas City. Rail transit is expensive to build, operate, and maintain.

One of rail transit’s dirty secrets is that the entire system — rails, cars, electrical facilities, stations — must be replaced, rebuilt or rehabilitated roughly every 30 years. This costs almost as much as the original construction, which means for taxpayers that rails are a “pay now, pay more later” proposition.

The Chicago Transit Authority is on the verge of financial collapse. The agency estimates it needs $16 billion it doesn’t have to rehabilitate tracks and trains. To keep the trains running, the agency siphoned money away from the city’s bus system and lost a third of its bus riders between 1986 and 1996.

Newer systems face other financial challenges. San Jose’s light-rail system put the city’s transit agency so far in debt that when sales tax revenues fell short early in this decade, it was forced to cut bus and rail service by 20 percent.

Rail construction almost always costs more than the original estimates. Denver voters approved a 119-mile rail system in 2004 on the promise that it would cost $4.7 billion to build it by 2017. The current estimate is up to $7.9 billion, and the regional transit agency says the system might not be complete until 2034.

Once built, light-rail systems never live up to their promises, even in places like Portland. Before building light rail, Portland’s bus system carried 9.8 percent of the region’s transit riders to work. Today, thanks to cutbacks in the bus system forced by the high cost of rail, transit carries just 7.6 percent.

Nor is rail transit good for the environment. Most U.S. light-rail lines use more energy, per passenger mile, than an SUV. Considering that most of Missouri’s electricity comes from fossil fuels, a Kansas City light rail, like the ones in Dallas, Denver, and Cleveland, is also likely to produce more greenhouse gases per passenger mile than an SUV.

Buses can provide better, faster, safer transit service than light rail at a far lower cost. Light rail is a hoax perpetrated on taxpayers by companies that profit from designing and building rail lines.

Rail advocates tell Kansas Citians that they need to catch up with other cities that have rail transit. I suggest instead that Kansas City should be proud not to fall for the light-rail hoax.

Randal O’Toole is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, and author of the Show-Me Institute study, “Review of Kansas City Transit Plans.”

The post Light-Rail Systems Are a False Promise appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

He is pinning the district’s hopes for revival on niche offerings, like single-gender schools and two new high schools specializing in science, technology, engineering and mathematics.

Where have we heard about those niche offerings before? They sound a lot like specialized charter schools and private schools. Cleveland’s public schools could have given parents these options earlier, but they had no incentive to change until they began losing students to single-gender schools and science academies.

Maybe the expanding charters in St. Louis will trigger similar progress.

The post When Schools Compete, They Improve appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

East Hills, Pennsylvania, is a community just outside of Pittsburgh.

So Wal-Mart is locating just outside of Pittsburgh.  What does Pittsburgh have that East Hills almost certainly does not?  Besides the Steelers and Pirates…An Earnings Tax of 1%.  On the other hand, Wal-Mart is locating within the city limits of Indianapolis which has an earnings tax, although at 0.7% it is the lowest such tax in the country.  Wal-Mart appears to have located new stores in suburbs just outside of major cities, such as Atlanta, San Francisco and Washington, DC.  While those last three cities do not have earnings taxes, they very likely do have higher taxes in general than the chosen suburbs outside them.

Wal-Mart is also opening a store that appears to be within the city limits of Cleveland, which has a high earnings tax of 2%.  However, the new Cleveland store appears to be a part of a major revitalisation project, Steelyard Commons, which likely has substantial tax incentives that would offset the earnings tax.  Chicago, the other major site for a new Wal-Mart within municipal limits, does not have any earnings tax.

The final store count is two out of nine in cities with earnings taxes. One in a large city without an earnings tax.  Three in suburbs without earnings taxes located just outside major cities, and three in more distant suburban areas without earnings taxes.  I must conclude that earnings and other local taxes were a significant, but not the decisive, factor in where Wal-Mart has chosen to open these new stores.

The post Earnings Taxes and Wal-Mart appeared first on Show-Me Institute.