What is clear, though, is that the north–south MetroLink expansion isn’t the panacea advocates claim it is.

It isn’t a solution to automobile dependence. Saint Louis’s low population density and dispersed employment centers make the city a bad fit for light rail. Popular, cost-effective light rail systems require population densities upwards of 20,000 people per square mile, but Saint Louis City has fewer than 5,000 per square mile. And experience with existing MetroLink routes demonstrates our region’s preference for the car. Today, a lower percentage of Saint Louisans use transit than in 1990, before MetroLink even operated. Even more embarrassing, MetroLink has lower ridership today than it did in 2005, the year before the Shrewsbury line opened.

It isn’t a solution to poor transit service, either. Firstly, the proposed north-south line operates along a route already served by numerous bus routes. Secondly, the reason less than 4% of Saint Louisans commute on transit isn’t because they have trouble going from North City to downtown. It’s because the antiquated “hub and spoke” model Metro uses makes travelling from North City to employment centers in Central and West County a multi-transfer odyssey. If regional leaders truly want to improve mobility, they’d do better by advancing bus-rapid-transit (BRT) lines. BRT uses sleek, rail-like vehicles, well-appointed and generously-spaced stations, and exclusive rights-of-way to deliver service comparable to light rail. For just a fifth of the local cost of expanding MetroLink, the region could construct the five BRT lines in its long-range transportation plan.

Nor is MetroLink a cure for anemic urban development. Despite claims of rail advocates, the economic consensus is that light rail is not a catalyst for economic growth. Even putting aside the wildly inflated figures touted by rail advocates, we can see with our own two eyes that MetroLink has failed to spur development in Saint Louis. Far from rejuvenating depressed areas, MetroLink has even failed to prevent decline in areas that seemed to be on the rise in 1994 when the first lines opened, like Union Station and Laclede’s Landing. Nor did it ever bring the fantastically improbable golf course to East Saint Louis.

And MetroLink will not solve historic segregation or achieve the nebulous goal of “connectedness.” There simply is no evidence, save the endless, unfounded repetition of rail advocates, that light rail is a solution to economic, social, or racial segregation. (Just think: how might riding a train downtown, where so few jobs exist, make life better for an average North City resident?) And if “connectedness” means residents and visitors have the ability to travel from North or South County to downtown, then we’ve achieved it, as these areas are already connected by bus and bikes routes, streets, and sidewalks. No, these areas are not connected by rail—but if the argument is that we need rail because we don’t have rail, then advocates are running in circles.

Soon, the Mayor and rail proponents will stop begging the question and start begging for money. When they do, Saint Louisans should carefully consider what benefits could possibly justify a $2 billion MetroLink expansion, and whether or not it’s just an expensive “remedy” to treat problems for which we already have more sound solutions. 

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To see why this is the case, remember first that building the proposed North–South MetroLink expansion may cost upwards of $2 billion, not including the increased costs of operating the system. That’s a huge price tag, one that the region would likely not consider if not for the possibility of getting federal grants, which can cover as much as 50% of transit infrastructure costs. However, getting these grants is a competitive process, and the County’s vocal opposition could harm (if not destroy) Saint Louis’s chances. No federal dollars would all but guarantee no new MetroLink.

However, let us imagine that the city moves forward over the county’s objections and, despite the disharmony, the federal government agrees to cover half the costs of MetroLink’s expansion. Even then, the city’s ability to go it alone is questionable. The city would still need to cover a billion dollars in capital costs and increased MetroLink operating expenses, requiring a new city-wide sales tax of more than 2 percent. Such an increase would put the city’s total average sales tax above 10 percent, with many areas in the city charging a tax of more than 12 percent on all goods and services. Even if the state legislature would allow a vote on it, Saint Louis’s residents and businesses would likely reject a tax hike of that size.

The other prime option for circumventing County opposition, the use of a transportation development district (TDD), is also unlikely to succeed. Creating a new taxing district near the proposed route could help fund the expansion, but creating a district large enough to raise a billion dollars would be difficult. TDDs, by state law, can charge a maximum of a 1% sales tax and a property tax of 10 cents on each $100 of assessed valuation (imposing the property tax would require a supermajority approval) in the district’s boundaries.  To fund a MetroLink expansion, the TDD would have to extend well beyond the city and reach economically productive areas in Saint Louis County, all of which would be far away from the North–South expansion’s route. These areas would be less likely to vote in favor of a high-tax TDD.

Unfortunately for the city, the only logical way to fund a multibillion-dollar MetroLink expansion is the same method used to fund past expansions: sales tax increases in both the city and the entire county, to tune of 0.5%. The city might find Stenger’s opposition embarrassing, but what’s more embarrassing here is that the MetroLink, with its massive expense and low ridership, requires financial support from those who will rarely, if ever, ride. In the end, if the city and transit activists want more rail, they are going to have to start begging the county, as they are now begging the federal government, to get on board. 

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In making the case for expanding the streetcar, Kansas City officials have claimed that the streetcar (despite the fact that it only recently opened) has spurred development within the rail’s transportation development district (TDD). But the data on the market value of property within the TDD tell a different story. In fact, as the chart below shows, property values within the streetcar’s TDD follow largely the same trajectory as property values did in the county as a whole. According to data provided by Jackson County, market values grew in the early 2000s, fell during the recession, and began rising again in 2014. While the market value of property within the TDD has grown faster than values in Jackson County as a whole from 2000 to 2015, that growth occurred before the TDD’s creation, and is mainly due to the construction of the Power and Light District (which opened in 2007).

If we simply look at market values after the streetcar’s TDD was finalized in 2012, Jackson County as a whole performed better than the TDD. This directly contradicts the idea that the Kansas City Streetcar is boosting development downtown:

So why the disconnect between city hall’s streetcar rhetoric and the actual property data? Findings from the latest report from the Federal Transit Administration on streetcar development may shed some light on the situation:

Almost all [civic] representatives interviewed believed that streetcars positively affected the built environment, particularly in attracting new development or enhancing revitalization, although the degree of impact varies. Few systems, however, reported the types of ancillary changes in the built environment, such as reduced parking garage construction, increased pedestrian or bike lane investments, or explicit parking reductions that often are associated with light rail systems. Few, if any, streetcar system operators seek information on their impact on economic activity, although most interviewed consider economic-related questions to be vital and desire further research on this topic. [emphasis added]

Put another way, never let the truth get in the way of a good story.  

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First, let’s analyze MetroLink’s effect on public transportation usage. It is true that people (including myself) use the MetroLink; the system handles an average of about 44,000 trips per day. However, MetroLink’s effect on total transit ridership has been modest. Despite the immense expenditures (around $3 billion) and multiple expansions, total bus and rail ridership today is lower than bus ridership alone was in 1991, three years before the MetroLink opened. Even worse, not all MetroLink expansions have even resulted in sustained higher MetroLink ridership. Take the case of latest expansion, from Forest Park to Shrewsbury, which opened in 2006. While the addition initially pushed rail ridership to new heights, ten years later total MetroLink ridership is lower than it was the year before the expansion opened.

The increasing supply of light rail, along with flagging enthusiasm for its use, has meant that in terms of passengers, MetroLink now has the lowest rate of use it has ever had, with only 2.55 riders per vehicle revenue mile.

Next let’s evaluate the MetroLink’s impact on development in Saint Louis. Consider the expectations of MetroLink’s proponents when the initial line opened in 1994. They hoped rail would generate urban renewal, with specific hopes that it would save Saint Louis Centre and bring life (and even a golf course) to East Saint Louis. Far from rejuvenating areas that were down on their luck, the MetroLink failed to prevent decline in areas of its route that appeared on the ascendency in 1994, like Union Station and Laclede’s Landing. Some areas near MetroLink stations have done well, like the Central West End or the Loop, but in these places development seems to be happening near the MetroLink, not radiating from it. With few exceptions, MetroLink platforms remain areas of quiet repose, far from businesses, residences, and crowds. It’s ironic, given the claims of rail advocates, that the true success stories of urban renewal in Saint Louis City are places like Soulard, South Grand, the Grove, and now Cherokee Street, located far away from any MetroLink station.

With regard to increasing transit usage in Saint Louis and spurring urban revitalization, the MetroLink has, to this point, been an expensive disappointment. There is no reason to think any MetroLink expansion will create different results. It’s time for the region to start looking for better, more cost-effective ways to achieve progress toward public transportation and development goals. 

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Assuming other types of public transportation service (such as buses) are unaffected, the addition of a North–South MetroLink line could increase the speed and quantity of public transportation in the Saint Louis region.  Light rail is generally much faster than standard buses, so more rail can mean faster transit and more riders. However, light rail is not the only way to improve public transportation, and Saint Louis needs to consider light rail as just one option among many, perhaps not the most prudent one.

As we’ve discussed many times before, Saint Louis is a dispersed region, both in terms of where people work and where they live. Most residents live and work outside of Saint Louis City, and more people commute into Saint Louis County than Saint Louis City for work. The area in the region with the most employees and the highest payroll is not downtown, but West County. Nevertheless, the North–South MetroLink plan would route riders in and out of downtown Saint Louis, as if the year were 1904. In terms of population density, most of Saint Louis City (and nearly the entire planned route of North-South MetroLink) has less than 5,000 residents per square mile. Cost-effective light rail systems generally have population densities nearing 20,000 people per square mile around stops.

Saint Louis’s existing MetroLink lines already encounter ridership problems, despite serving areas with more employment and population than the proposed North-South line would. After spending more than $2 billion building the current system, a lower percentage of Saint Louisans use transit now than did in 1990. And, despite the hopes of transit activists, the situation is not getting any better. Both MetroLink and MetroBus ridership peaked in 2008, and even as better economic times have come to Saint Louis in the last few years, MetroLink ridership continues to stagnate. The result of this failure to draw more riders is that, accounting for all light rail costs since 1992, the MetroLink has cost Saint Louis nearly $10 for every passenger that has ever stepped on board, with a one-way fare of only $2.50. The bottom line is that the existing MetroLink has, despite the investment, failed to achieve meaningful progress toward promoting transit ridership or generating urban development. There is little reason to believe that an expansion will yield better results.

Fortunately for the region, adding more rail is not the only way to improve public transportation. Saint Louis could, for far less than a billion dollars, improve its poorly managed bus system or implement bus rapid transit, both options made much easier by the incredibly low traffic levels on Saint Louis’s highways and arterial roads.

However Saint Louis officials move forward, they would do best to consider public transportation plans that take the city as it is, and not how transit activists want it to be. If they don't the system will continue to operate as it does today: expansive yet inefficient, expensive yet resource-poor, overbuilt yet under-ridden. 

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The Scottrade Center, originally Kiel Auditorium, cost $135 million to build and first opened its doors in 1994. While private interests covered most of the price tag, the city of Saint Louis provided $15 million in construction subsidies (the city also built the stadium’s western parking lot at a cost of nearly $10 million). Aside from direct handouts, Saint Louis worked to reduce the stadium’s tax liabilities. Like Busch Stadium and the Dome formerly known as Edward Jones, the Scottrade Center sits on public land, shielding the Blues’ ownership from standard tax rates. In addition, the LCRA (a city body), and not the stadium’s owners, issued all the bonds for the stadium’s construction, making those bonds tax-exempt.

Now, a little over two decades after the Scottrade Center opened, the Blues no longer find their accommodations adequate. They want a larger scoreboard, better seating, and an expanded team store. Perhaps with a jealous eye toward Ballpark Village, the Blues hope to build a year-round beer garden at the stadium. They estimate that these upgrades will cost $160 million, which, adjusting for inflation, is slightly more than the original cost estimate of the Scottrade Center when financing got underway in 1990 (yet more evidence that cities should only expect about 20 years out of their stadiums before they have to pay for them all over again). But who will pay this time around?

All we know right now is that, like in the ‘90s, the Blues expect the city to issue the bonds for the stadium’s construction so they can avoid taxation. But for the city’s bottom line, who will pay those bonds back is the most important question. Last time around, the city covered about 10% of those costs and stadium owners paid 90%. There’s no guarantee that the Blues won’t ask for more support this time, especially after the city last year showed itself willing to spend well over $100 million to keep the Rams in town. Of course the Blues could pay the whole cost themselves, although the fact they are negotiating with the city to come up with a financing deal likely means that’s out of the question.

Still, it will be better for Saint Louis residents if the Blues pay for the costly upgrades themselves. The proposed improvements, from a larger team store to a “Blues-park Village,” are clear examples of nice-to-have amenities that would greatly add to the Blue’s assets. The impact of the improvements on city’s bottom line or its economy is difficult to determine, but given the evidence, it’s likely negligible.  It’s time the city focused on getting the basics of civic governance right instead of involving itself once more in how Saint Louisans spend their spare time.

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“The entire region should be outraged by this because what happens in the central business district, the economic engine and heart of the St. Louis region affects us all. It affects our national reputation. It affects what businesses consider St. Louis when exploring options for their headquarters. Most importantly, it affects each of our families. Downtown St. Louis is the region’s Downtown. We all own it. We all deserve to feel safe visiting the many assets that can only be found in the heart of our city.”

Of course, violent crime is nothing new to Saint Louis, and downtown is far from the most dangerous neighborhood in the city. However, safety problems in the CBD tend to generate much more response than similar crimes in other areas do. Saint Louis leaders are eager to defend the “heart” of Saint Louis, and to call on the whole region to support the downtown.

But what exactly is Saint Louis’s CBD the heart of? Certainly not the region’s population. As we’ve written before, Saint Louis’s downtown actually has a lower population density than areas farther away from the core, like the Central West End. Furthermore, the region’s population is extremely dispersed, with large sections of the population living more than 20 miles from city hall. The Saint Louis metropolitan area is region with more than 2.8 million residents, only a few thousand of whom live downtown:

What of the CBD’s status as the business heart, or the economic engine, of Saint Louis? Today, less than 1% of the region’s annual payroll comes from businesses in the CBD. If we look at the zip codes that contain Saint Louis’s CBD, we find that areas in Saint Louis County, specifically Chesterfield and Creve Coeur, contain more businesses, contain more employees, and generate higher payroll than downtown. Looking at the maps below, we don’t see an economically dominant CBD surrounded by bedroom communities; instead we find dispersed areas of high employment. These areas include a broad central corridor that contains the CBD (but also Clayton and the Central West End) and a highly productive corridor in West County along I-270 that has more businesses and higher payrolls. The Saint Louis economy is so geographically dispersed that it might be difficult for a person not familiar with the region to locate downtown from economic data alone:

What of culture? The Saint Louis CBD has the Arch grounds. It also has the Scottrade Center, museums, libraries, theatres, and a sculpture garden. And of course, it has Busch Stadium, home to the Saint Louis Cardinals. For decades, the Saint Louis region as whole has poured tax money into amenities downtown, from the Dome formerly known as Edward Jones to the Arch grounds. Even as population and business activity left downtown, very few publicly funded civic projects were considered for any area but downtown (Forest Park being a notable exception). If public monuments, sports stadiums, and astro-turfed urbanism are all there is to culture, certainly downtown is unrivaled.

Whether or not Saint Louis’s downtown is truly its cultural heart, the region is undeniably diverse and dispersed. People live all over and work all over the map. To look at the region realistically (and plan for it effectively), we have to understand that St. Louis’s CBD is just one neighborhood among many, and we need to stop pretending that it has the economic and demographic dominance it did at the turn of the 20th century. Whether the problem is crime or economic growth, we’re unlikely to find a way forward when we can’t admit where we are.

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In the past, when companies or individuals violated MTC policies, police in Saint Louis City and County enforced the commission’s rulings by ticketing drivers. That is, after all, how the region responded to Lyft in 2014. However, Saint Louis City has flatly refused to use its police to block Uber, and police in Saint Louis County haven’t done much either. While the MTC could have used its very limited law enforcement capacity to attack Uber in 2015, the commission found itself in the midst of a public relations nightmare, with the state legislature seemingly ready to step in and completely overhaul the MTC. As a result, Uber now operates in Saint Louis, the police do nothing, and the MTC (while reiterating that Uber is acting illegally) keeps its head down.

 Now that the state legislature has failed either to reform the MTC or implement statewide ridesharing regulations, and with the unprofessionalism of MTC commissioners fading into memory, the taxi commission is reportedly planning to remind everyone who runs this town. As the Riverfront Times reports, the commission will begin seeking out UberX drivers and citing them for operating without a commission license. If such an act does not prompt Uber to shut down its services in the region altogether, it may seriously diminish the number of people willing drive for the company.

Whether or not the MTC will follow through on its threats is an open question. But what Saint Louisans should recognize by this time is that Uber, operating outside the regulatory framework of the MTC, has provided an innovative new service for all Saint Louis residents for almost a year. Where is the evidence that Uber is dangerous? Where are the market failures that the MTC needs to correct? From what we’ve seen so far, it seems that the ridesharing market operates just fine without the MTC.       

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To explore this question, we first need to look at traffic on the bridge. Before MoDOT placed weight restrictions, about 4,000 vehicles used the Champ Clark Bridge every day. That’s about as much as a lightly used urban street, and it’s low for a Mississippi River crossing. For example, bridges at Hannibal and Quincy each carry between 15,000 and 17,000 vehicles per day. Also, according to the Census Bureau, only four Missourians living in Pike County, Missouri (where the bridge is located) commuted to work in Pike County, Illinois. Actually, that estimate was within the margin of error, meaning it is possible that no one who lives in the county on the Missouri side of the Champ Clark Bridge works in the county on the Illinois side. About 500 residents of Pike County, Illinois, work in Pike County, Missouri. This low traffic makes sense when one notes that on the Missouri side there is only the small city of Louisiana (population 3,300) and the Illinois side of river is primarily farmland. Additionally, commodity flows are generally routed to the north or south of the Champ Clark Bridge.

Given the low traffic level on the Champ Clark Bridge, and the very few commuters who live in Missouri and commute to Illinois, a new Mississippi River bridge is likely to have limited positive impact for Missouri. The bridge’s replacement, therefore, is a perfect opportunity for Missouri to explore the option of tolling. Assuming the $60 million cost estimate is correct, a toll of around $2.50 per vehicle would be able to pay for bridge in 30 years, assuming existing drivers were willing to pay for the convenience of a Mississippi River bridge in that area. And if they are not, it calls into question the need for a bridge, with or without a toll. By placing a toll on the bridge, those who benefit greatly from the new bridge can fund its replacement without much, if any, additional strain on MoDOT’s or IDOT’s finances. It would be a fair way of funding a new bridge, and was in fact the method used to fund the construction of the Champ Clark Bridge in the first place.

The bottom line is that paying a new bridge on US Route 54 may not be worth it for Missouri, but it may be worth it for those who would actually use the bridge. The best way to find out whether that is the case is to explore the tolling option.

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Unfortunately, nothing was accomplished. On the issue of MoDOT funding, many reforms were proposed, such as reducing the size of the state highway system, increasing the state fuel tax, and allowing for public-private partnerships for tolling I-70. None of these proposals became law, although a proposal to increase fuel taxes by 5.9 cents came very close to going to a vote of the people.

As for ridesharing regulation, bickering over the exact level of safety regulation in the Senate was enough to scupper a promising reform bill. Until lawmakers are convinced that Missourians can choose for themselves the level of security that they consider adequate, the chances are slim for further regulatory reform in the state.

The only major transportation bill that passed the Missouri legislature was SB 861, which started out as a port improvement measure but ended up as a grab bag of corporate welfare measures. For instance, the bill would authorize tax deductions to lure back jobs that have gone to other states, whether or not these jobs have anything to do with ports.

While the legislature may have left transportation in the lurch, the news is not all bad. The recent passage of more funding at the federal level (through the FAST Act) and increased revenue at the state level has placed MoDOT on firmer financial footing, at least for the near future. This has led MoDOT to add 855 projects to its 2017–2021 state transportation improvement program, providing more than $700 million in new construction awards every year through 2021. As the threat that MoDOT will be unable to maintain the state highway system recedes, so does pressure to do anything to increase MoDOT’s funding.

However, major projects, like the rebuilding of I-70, remain out of reach for Missouri. And access to ridesharing services in Missouri’s largest metropolitan area (St. Louis) is still in legal limbo. It would be a mistake for Missouri’s policymakers to think they can continue to put off making sound policy reforms and hope outside circumstances continue to break in our favor. 

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But not every airport in Missouri need fear the meltdown (or tantrum) of the TSA.  One lucky airport is Kansas City International (MCI), which contracts security out to the private sector and does not use the TSA. MCI is one of a handful of major airports across the United States (including San Francisco) that participate in the Screening Partnership Program (SPP). In this program, the TSA sets standards for airport security, but the airport itself is allowed to contract service out to qualified vendors. Using contractors for screening is mainly touted as a money-saving measure, but it also allows an airport to essentially fire its security team if it isn’t performing. Compare that with the normal operating procedure: no matter how bad things get at Saint Louis-Lambert International Airport (STL) or Chicago O’Hare (ORD), the TSA cannot and will not be fired.

The map below shows airports that are participating in the SPP program.

So why haven’t more airports in Missouri and nationwide opted out of the TSA? In fact, many of them have tried, including Springfield-Branson Airport (SGF) in Southwest Missouri. Unfortunately, for many airports the TSA has held up the application process to join the SPP. TSA officials have argued to Congress that actual TSA officers are better and more efficient than private screeners, justifying their foot-dragging on the SPP program. It seems unlikely that such a claim will survive the summer, and large airports across the country are already telling the TSA that enough is enough.

One of the greatest benefits any airport can provide to the flying public is reliably short security lines. But aside from MCI, commercial airports in Missouri don’t currently have any control over this amenity. TSA’s current failings might finally create an impetus to reform airport security and expand the SPP program, and airports like SGF and STL should take advantage.

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An important and rarely addressed point is that a city does not need to have a giant, publicly funded convention center with a dome in order to hold conventions. In fact, many (if not most) conventions are held at private hotels. For instance, the Chase Park Plaza Hotel (located in Saint Louis’s Central West End neighborhood) has rooms that can host conventions and conferences. Some of its spaces can handle up to 2,500 people. Other hotels in the area offer to host conferences and small conventions as well.

For very large groups (with tens of thousands of visitors), a space like the America’s Center is necessary. The only problem is that Saint Louis does not attract many of those events, despite abundant available space. For instance, in 2014 the Saint Louis Convention and Visitors Commission (CVC) hosted 393 events for a total of 425,411 room nights. However, only 14 of those events had more than 2,000 attendees, meaning that about 96% of all events held by the CVC in 2014 could have fit comfortably in hotel spaces. Those small events also account for most of the room nights and attendees that supposedly prop up the downtown economy. Of course, if the Saint Louis government wasn't able and willing to rent extensive convention space at unprofitable rates, groups of various sizes might well be discouraged from holding their events in the city. But on the other hand, without its convention center spending, St. Louis City could afford to cut its hotel taxes in half, remove part of its restaurant tax, and retire much of its civic debt.

The bottom line is that while it is easy to claim that conventions contribute to the local economy (although not as much as supporters might have us believe), that’s not the same thing as saying that publicly funding a massive convention center designed to handle tens of thousands of visitors (and a dome that can seat many more) is of significant benefit to the local economy. And that is even further from proving that the next big upgrade will finally draw the big conventions that are currently bypassing Saint Louis.

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We have made a conscious decision as a community to build the infrastructure to retain, attract and grow tech companies here and support entrepreneurship. It’s one of our strongest economic drivers.

Unfortunately, the data tell a different story.

Recently, the San Diego Economic Development Corporation released a comprehensive report on the national tech sector, where it also ranked cities based on the health of their tech scene. Of the country’s 50 largest metros, Saint Louis ranked an unimpressive 28th, placing it below regional competitors like Indianapolis, Columbus, and Oklahoma City.

One of the most jarring reasons for Saint Louis’s low ranking, given the rhetoric, is the fact that the region has comparatively few software developers. The region has only 8.8 software developers per 10,000 workers, low for a large city. For comparison, San Francisco, Raleigh, and Washington, D.C., each have more than 20 developers per 10,000 workers (San Jose has more than 60). Worse yet, tech jobs actually decreased in Saint Louis from 2010 to 2014 by almost 10%. Average tech employment increased by more than 13% in the country’s largest cities during that same period. It’s hard for the region to be a rising tech hub when it has fewer and fewer software developers.

In terms of the tech sector pipeline, Saint Louis also performed poorly. The region’s residents are much less likely to have math or computer science degrees than are residents in other cities. If it’s harder to find tech talent, it’s harder to attract tech companies. One of the few bright spots for Saint Louis is money. After adjusting for cost of living, tech workers in Saint Louis get paid more than they would in most other large cities. In addition, Saint Louis attracts a decent amount of venture capital given the size of its tech sector.

To sum up, Saint Louis has established tech companies. It has startups and a tech incubator. But that can be said of almost any large American city. Taking a national view, Saint Louis’s tech growth strategy seems downright banal. As Aaron M. Renn from the Manhattan Institute put it:

Civic policy at the local level is dominated by “school solutions” that promote the same characteristics everywhere, often as a way of signaling that a city belongs in the “club.” …most cities try to look exactly the same as other cities that are considered cool, including offering bike lanes, coffee shops, microbreweries, a creative class, a food scene, and a startup culture. Even most cluster analysis seems to produce primarily a collection of the same five basic focus areas in every region (high tech, life sciences, green industry, advanced manufacturing, and logistics).

Simply having a tech scene is a natural result of being a populous region in the 21st century; it shouldn’t be taken as a sign that Saint Louis is about to have an economic transformation. The fact is, despite public support, Saint Louis’s tech scene is not a large player nationally, nor is it a terribly significant driver of the Saint Louis economy. 

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There are good reasons to build new airport terminals, whether at MCI or any other airport. It may be that continuing to maintain and operate existing buildings is just too expensive compared to a modern replacement, especially given possible service upgrades. Many airports also build new terminals to accommodate increased flights or different carriers that existing terminals cannot.

However, the cost of any terminal plan needs to be taken into consideration. If an airport like MCI takes on too much debt, the results can be higher prices (for parking, car rentals, etc.) and fewer flight options for residents. Right now, MCI is in a good financial position, and has a relatively low debt load for an airport of its size. That allows MCI to offer low fees to airlines and moderate prices for terminal services, and to borrow cheaply. As a counterexample, consider the most indebted of MCI’s peers, San Jose International Airport (SJC).  After completing a $1.3 billion new terminal a couple years ago, SJC struggles to keep airline costs low so it does not lose service.  Doing so is causing SJC to burn through reserves at a rate of $30 million per year, which is not sustainable. If SJC cannot significantly increase revenue, San Jose may have to subsidize the airport’s debt through the city’s general fund.

If MCI had gone forward with the erstwhile “New Terminal Plan” (priced at $1.2 billion) its debt level (and debt payments) would have become the highest among its peers, including San Jose:

This would have been a risky move for MCI and Kansas City residents. Unfortunately, despite our objections and common sense, some in Kansas City’s leadership seem to think that costs do not matter at airports, and that MCI can simply pass extra costs onto airlines and travelers without consequence.

Kansas City International Airport may be better off with a new terminal. The city’s aviation department may put forward a plan that makes sense for travelers and the airport’s finances. Our main criticism over the late “New Terminal Plan” was that because of the $1.2 billion price tag and the fact that the plan would have resulted in less capacity, the proposal seemed more about civic ego than helping residents get good flights. We hope any new plan won’t have the same problem.

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The answer is that Missouri would still have a fuel tax well below the national average. Some news sources have put average state fuel tax at 20.88 cents per gallon, but this ignores the additional taxes many states (but not Missouri) place on fuel. For instance, Illinois’s fuel excise tax is only 19 cents per gallon, but its additional taxes add on 11 cents per gallon. Often, these additional taxes are sales taxes whose per-gallon amount fluctuates with gas prices. When these taxes are accounted for, the average state tax rate for a gallon of regular gas comes to 29.63 cents, with diesel at 29.33 cents.

If Missouri increases its fuel taxes by 5.9 cents (and the price of fuel holds steady), Missouri would have the 17th-lowest regular fuel tax in the nation and the 16th-lowest diesel fuel tax. Our regular fuel tax would still be cheaper than those of Kansas (24.03 cents), Iowa (32 cents), Illinois (30.18 cents), Nebraska (27.7 cents) and Kentucky (26 cents). We would become a more expensive state for gas than Arkansas (21.8 cents), Oklahoma (17 cents), and Tennessee (21.4 cents). 

Whether or not voters are willing to increase fuel taxes in Missouri at all is an open question. However, even under the proposed increase, Missouri would still be a relatively cheap place to fill up, both nationally and in our region. 

The post Even under Fuel Tax Increase, Missouri Taxes Would Still Be Below Average appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

We’ve written about ridesharing regulations in Missouri many times before, and we have submitted testimony on HB 2330 specifically. While state regulation of industries is not something the legislature should consider lightly, in the case of ridesharing, local government intransigence invites state-level intervention. For instance, in Saint Louis City and County, the Saint Louis Metropolitan Taxicab Commission has fought tooth and nail against the entry of Lyft and Uber. Far from embodying the ideal of local control, the commission, half of whose members are representatives of existing taxi companies, uses the state’s enabling legislation as an argument for why it cannot accommodate the entrance of ridesharing services.

The problem of local regulatory bodies trying to block ridesharing companies is not limited to Saint Louis; it's a nationwide phenomenon. In response, 30 states (including all of Missouri’s neighbors save Iowa) have approved statewide ridesharing regulations similar to those proposed in HB 2330.

Ridesharing can provide increased services and employment opportunities in Missouri’s urban areas, and efforts to allow these types of companies to operate safely and effectively could benefit the entire state. Whether or not HB 2330 becomes law, Missouri cities should reform their ridesharing regulations.

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