Susan Pendergrass speaks with Aaron Renn, author and consultant, and David Stokes, Director of Municipal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, about the recurring debate over whether the city of St. Louis should rejoin St. Louis County. They explore what city county mergers have actually accomplished in places like Indianapolis, Louisville, Nashville, and Lexington, why a full merger in St. Louis would be extraordinarily difficult to pull off, and whether the benefits would even outweigh the costs. They also discuss St. Louis’s demographic challenges, what the Pittsburgh model might offer as a path forward, the cultural barriers that make it hard to attract and retain people from outside the region, and more.

You can find Aaron’s work here.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:05): Welcome back, Aaron Renn, to the podcast. So happy to have you and David Stokes, our own expert on cities and counties and all things municipal. I appreciate you coming on, Aaron. There have been murmurings around St. Louis again on a topic that we have revisited for probably a hundred years: should the city of St. Louis be a separate county from St. Louis County?

Before we get to that, I want to ask you something because I was reading the news this morning, and I know that you’ve written about city county mergers before, like cities that are kind of dying and then either pulling in parts of their closest suburbs to sort of make everything look better, broaden their tax base, make their crime numbers look better. I was reading something you wrote a year or two ago about that, and you said that Louisville is a failed example of that. Is that right, basically?

Aaron Renn (01:01): Yeah, I’m a little skeptical of how these things have worked out in practice.

Susan Pendergrass (01:05): Yeah, in terms of losing the flavor and the coolness of the city. Literally this morning I saw an article about how Louisville is having a renaissance and these young professionals are all moving there because they didn’t tear down all their beautiful old Victorian homes, so you can still get one for close to a million dollars. They’ve got a cool art scene and a bourbon scene. So it sounds like maybe Louisville did not lose its personal flavor in the merger. I would be curious to know what you think of that.

Aaron Renn (01:33): Well, I like to put St. Louis in context. I’m glad you mentioned Louisville because many of these river cities have similar characteristics. I like to look at St. Louis as well as three cities in the Ohio Valley: Louisville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. All of them heavily German Catholic in their demographics. All of them are very geopolitically fragmented with many small tiny suburbs throughout. They all have very fragmented neighborhood systems as well, where everybody has a strong sense of neighborhood identity. Where you go to high school is a big social marker. They all have phenomenal collections of urban assets and great historic buildings. They all still have their own unique character in a country where that has sort of bled away.

Aaron Renn (02:31): And they also have curiously underperformed demographically and economically in terms of growth. They’re slow growth places. So one thing I always encourage people is to pan back the lens and don’t just look at St. Louis in isolation. Look at it in comparison or dialogue with some of these other places and see what you can learn from them.

Louisville is actually a quite troubled city in important ways. From a white collar employment perspective it’s doing well, from a blue collar perspective less so. It’s one of the 10 least educated major metros in the country. I don’t want to spend too much time on Louisville, but I want to talk about the city county merger, which is distinct from recombining the city and the county. This has been considered urban planning best practice for 30 or 40 years. There was a book written by David Rusk called Cities Without Suburbs. The idea is that cities that were able to expand their boundaries through either annexation or city county mergers were prospering, whilst cities that did not, like the Clevelands, the Cincinnatis, and the St. Louises, were struggling. So the idea is we need big box government.

Indianapolis, where I live now, had a city county merger in 1970. Louisville did a city county merger, I grew up near Louisville. Jacksonville, Florida, Lexington, Kentucky, and Nashville, Tennessee did as well. What I would say is a few things. Merger is not necessarily bad. For Indianapolis, merger did prevent the city from essentially going down the tubes in important ways. So it really was a win in important ways.

But it did not prevent the historic city from going into the exact same demographic decline as St. Louis. The historic city of Indianapolis has lost almost exactly the same share of its population since 1970 as St. Louis has. Secondly, these are very politically difficult to pull off. They take enormous effort. They often fail multiple times. Louisville had multiple failures.

The most precious resource is always management time and attention. Is this where you want to put all your political chips? And in order to get it passed politically, what happens invariably is that most entities are actually not consolidated. In Louisville, none of the existing incorporated suburban governments were in fact merged. In Indianapolis, the school districts weren’t merged.

This means you don’t necessarily get all of the benefits you think from consolidation, because many things are excluded. And then unlike a corporate merger, where there’s typically a lot of downsizing and cost rationalization, in city county mergers nobody ever loses their job and salaries and benefits might even be harmonized upward to the high watermark. So don’t expect it to save any money. Personally, city county merger might have some benefits for St. Louis. I’m not saying it would have no benefits, but in my opinion it’s not going to be a needle mover and most likely it would be extraordinarily politically difficult and uncertain to pull off.

Susan Pendergrass (06:00): Yeah, no question. It’s been very politically difficult. People don’t want to do it. However, we do have these little tiny school districts and police districts. We have, I don’t know, 28 911 systems. We have a lot of what looks like bureaucratic waste and red tape. To the extent that doesn’t get resolved in a merger, then what’s the point? But I do think, you know, we’ve been talking about the demographics of St. Louis. There were over 800,000 people in the city once. Now there are maybe 280,000 and declining, and we’re in the death spiral of more people dying than being born. We’ve been in that for a while. And I guess it brings up the question of what is St. Louis to do if we are in this death spiral? We’re not having the babies. We’re having fewer babies than we did 15 years ago. So school enrollment is only declining. What is the prescription in that situation?

I’ve been to Cincinnati quite a bit. They’re trying to get people downtown with sports stadiums. It doesn’t really work. Louisville has sports stadiums downtown. I don’t know if people really want to move down there. I don’t see it working in St. Louis. So what is a city in that situation to do?

Aaron Renn (07:18): It’s going to be challenging in a sense because your problems are a little over determined. St. Louis was once a regional capital city, much like a Dallas or an Atlanta or a Denver or a Minneapolis. And it lost a lot of those functions. Many of its headquarters have left. It used to have a lot of professional services firms like ad agencies that did business all over the country, not just for the local market. Now St. Louis, although it’s still bigger than Indianapolis, looks a lot more like an Indianapolis or a Columbus, Ohio, where you have fewer corporate headquarters and most of the service firms are just there to serve the local market. St. Louis has essentially shrunk a little bit in relative importance, and it’s hard to get that back.

The demographics are also quite difficult and create a situation where it’s hard to attract business when you have a shrinking labor force, weak demographic growth, and a weak ability to bring people in from the outside. So it’s a very complicated situation and I don’t think there’s any silver bullet for St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (08:39): That’s what I’m asking you for. You have the answers. What’s the silver bullet?

Aaron Renn (08:43): So here are the things I would look at if I were in St. Louis. One of the clear issues that affects all of these river cities is that their wonderful, unique local cultures come with a downside, which is an extreme parochialism that has two negative effects. One, it makes it difficult for the communities to cohesively work together, which I’m not telling you anything you don’t already know. City-suburb divides tend to be bigger. In Indianapolis, regional leadership is mostly all on the same page about the big issues. Same with Columbus, Ohio. Secondly, it makes it very difficult to attract people from out of town because they come there and they can’t make friends, they can’t penetrate the social networks.

Susan Pendergrass (09:15): 100%, yes.

Aaron Renn (09:40): You hear it over and over again in places like St. Louis, Cleveland, even Minneapolis, Minnesota. There are some sayings there. If you want to make friends in Minnesota, go to kindergarten, because that’s when everybody makes their friends. Or Minnesotans will give you directions anywhere but their house. They’re never going to invite you over. St. Louis has that reputation. I don’t think it’s just a reputation. And I know you just had Ness Sandoval on.

Susan Pendergrass (09:53): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (10:08): He’s talking about you need to get better on migration. Migration isn’t going to improve if migrants are not going to be able to join the social networks here. And that’s not even just international migration, that’s domestic migrants. So I think that’s a huge issue for the city. Cultural issues are hard to solve, but maybe less intractable than infrastructure.

The other thing is looking at Pittsburgh as a sort of model. Pittsburgh hasn’t solved really most of its problems by any means, but it has been able to regenerate in the city a sort of high value economy around Carnegie Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. It’s done quite well. Many Silicon Valley firms have set up shop there. What’s happened in Pittsburgh, although it’s still a demographic decline story, is there’s been a demographic transition in the city. Pittsburgh went from one of the least educated cities in America to now one of the youngest and most educated. Part of it is old people moved and died off and young educated people replaced them. So the total number of people in the city was declining, but there was a churn happening underneath. And the same thing is already happening in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (11:13): How did they do that?

Aaron Renn (11:33): College degree attainment in the city is now well north of 40%. So the people who live in the city of St. Louis are very educated. That demographic churn has raised educational attainment and thus incomes in the city a lot. Now Pittsburgh was different because it was an almost entirely white city. There’s a racial divide in St. Louis and gentrification concerns become more salient. But St. Louis is now an educated city. This is not an old post-industrial blue collar city. The city of St. Louis itself is very educated. And also being very small, it doesn’t necessarily need a massive change to move the needle. In Indianapolis we have a population of over 900,000. Moving that behemoth takes a lot. St. Louis now being smaller has a situation where there could be a big impact from lower numbers of things. So I think a knowledge economy built around Washington University and your medical centers has some possibilities, somewhat similar to Pittsburgh.

Susan Pendergrass (12:45): So much medical.

Aaron Renn (12:58): Carnegie Mellon’s engineering and computer science areas will be a little different. I might also look at Vanderbilt, what’s going on there? What are some peer schools you could watch to see what’s going on? But I think there are actually some reasons to think that the city of St. Louis, believe it or not, could be sort of turning a corner. It has now demographically renewed itself to a higher educational attainment state. Being small, it probably doesn’t have that much further to fall, and you can start building from there. Obviously there are governance challenges, but looking at the Pittsburgh model, studying similar complexes around peer schools, and addressing the culture issues is where I’d look.

David Stokes (13:33): Hopeful.

Susan Pendergrass (13:47): So as a spokesperson for St. Louis, what do you see for the future?

David Stokes (13:52): Well, I would be curious to get Aaron’s thoughts on that size question, about how the city of St. Louis has in fact gotten so small. It’s about 10% of the metro area. How does that affect the pros or cons of any type of a merger? These would not be a merger of equals. St. Louis County would almost subsume St. Louis City into it. How do you think that would affect things for better or worse?

Aaron Renn (14:28): Well, that was the critique of the Louisville merger by two academics at the University of Louisville. I mentioned the book Cities Without Suburbs. They wrote an academic paper called Suburbs Without a City, which basically said if the merger passed in Louisville, it would essentially mean the suburbs take over the city, not the city taking over the suburbs, because the old city of Louisville only had about 260,000 people and the suburbs would numerically dominate. The same thing would certainly happen in St. Louis. If there were a merger, suburban St. Louis County would control the city in essence.

Another consideration, and this is a Cincinnati issue, I interviewed about 15 years ago the mayor of Cincinnati, John Cranley. Here’s what he said, and I think this is an important point. He said, 30 years ago, city county merger was the thing because cities were in decline and you wanted to tap that suburban tax base to fund the city. But now it’s reversed. Now the cities are coming back and it’s the inner suburbs that are actually going down the tubes. And so in Cincinnati today, we have all the corporate headquarters, we have the universities and the medical centers, and we don’t have to share our tax revenue with anybody. If we were merged with the county government, we’d have to prop up all these failing suburbs. And so I think you’re in a similar situation in St. Louis, where the high value activity, not all of it is in the city of St. Louis because of Clayton and so on, but the St. Louis County suburbs are mostly places that are themselves on negative trajectories. Merging the city, which may be on the cusp of being able to bottom out and turn around, with all of these still declining inner suburban areas, might actually be an albatross around the city’s neck.

Susan Pendergrass (15:16): What would that mean?

David Stokes (16:37): I just think one of the differences between St. Louis and Cincinnati, and I don’t know the property tax base of Cincinnati, is that so much of the city of St. Louis is tax exempt right now. Between Washington University, Saint Louis University, and all the government entities, there’s just so much of it. I say that as somebody who supports property tax changes to make them pay something towards it. But I just don’t think the Cincinnati argument applies to the city of St. Louis right now. That property tax exemption part is a huge factor because the most growing, thriving part of it is the entire giant Barnes-WashU-Cortex complex, and the amount of property taxes they pay is miniscule.

Susan Pendergrass (16:38): Hmm.

Aaron Renn (17:26): Well, some of that is a planning issue. And I think the reality is, when you have a complex like that, are all these people going to move to St. Charles? Maybe not. I’ll tell you, I live in the suburb of Indianapolis named Carmel, and a lot of the hospitals and things have been opening facilities here. When these nonprofit hospitals come up here, we will not approve zoning changes for those hospitals unless they agree to make payments in lieu of taxes. You want to come up here and you want a zoning change, you’re going to have to pay. We were actually quite prescient in that one of the local hospital chains opened a for-profit hospital. As part of the approval deal, we said, if you ever convert to nonprofit status, you will continue paying property taxes. And we did that.

So I think there probably is leverage from the city over some of these entities. You don’t have a lot of leverage over a corporation deciding where to put their office, but that’s not a tax exempt situation. The stuff at Cortex is probably not going to leave if you make them pay a little money the next time they come to you for a zoning approval. I think you need to start looking at how to get more money out of these entities that are nonprofits in name only. These universities and hospitals are effectively gigantic hedge funds. Their executives are extremely well compensated and billions of dollars are flowing through there. Undoubtedly the better solution there is to figure out how to tax them rather than figure out how to tax the soon-to-be-dead mall in the suburb over the border.

David Stokes (19:24): Well, yeah, and that’s sort of the trade off, unfortunately, is that they do pay earnings tax. The employees, many of them very highly compensated, pay the earnings tax. And that’s what makes the city more dependent on local income taxes, not less, because they’re either tax exempt or in the case of Cortex, have tax abatements that make them essentially tax exempt.

Susan Pendergrass (19:25): We do have earnings taxes, right? So the folks who work there have to pay an earnings tax.

Aaron Renn (19:53): Yeah. Again, I don’t know exactly the fiscal architecture there. But I would say you don’t want to do a merger simply to do a tax dollar grab. The lesson of Indianapolis is we did that. We grabbed suburban tax dollars and we used it to rebuild our downtown successfully. But here we are 50 years later, and now we have enormous tracts of decayed suburbia that are an enormous problem. Our entire core county is now in a sense the inner city. We have big challenges because we were not able to invest in ways that allow those suburban areas to retain their allure over the long term.

And I’m not saying that’s impossible, but any short term juice you get, cities always rise and fall. Core cities have proven more resilient and more able to regenerate themselves than suburbs. Part of it is because state governments cannot afford to let their state’s largest city or major urban center go down the tubes.

Susan Pendergrass (21:06): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (21:16): Missouri cannot let St. Louis and Kansas City implode. Michigan cannot just write off Detroit and say who cares. But these suburban areas have proven a lot tougher to save. We don’t have a good model. We’ve spent decades thinking about how to rebuild cities and build districts. There are certain things you can pull off in a city around conventions, civic events, gathering spaces, museums, and government that are very hard to translate to suburban settings. So there’s not a great playbook, especially in declining markets, for renewing suburbs. The playbook for suburban renewal, if you want to call it that, is places like Carmel, Indiana, which are growing and affluent, and therefore can build large mixed use centers, new urbanist developments, trails, and parks. The suburbs of St. Louis County are probably tremendously deficient in infrastructure as we would understand it today.

So again, there may actually be some benefits in having St. Louis City rejoin the county in a sense, because then the county functions are spread and amortized across a larger population.

Susan Pendergrass (22:45): It would immediately improve our murder rate because we would be mixing it in.

Aaron Renn (22:48): Yeah, there is some of that. The murder rate is an artifact of the size of the city more than anything. There are places in Chicago with higher murder rates. A former colleague of mine at the Manhattan Institute, Rafael Mangual, did an analysis of Chicago. He said there are areas on the South Side of Chicago that are larger and have more people than St. Louis with far higher murder rates than St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (22:56): We get called out because of the small denominator.

Aaron Renn (23:17): And so there is that. The other thing is Chicago is a good example. New York City was essentially a city county merger. In 1898, the five counties that are the five boroughs of New York were consolidated into one city. Philadelphia was also a city county consolidation from the 19th century. But what happens when you create a very large city of say a million people or more is you really have to scale up your government. You have to have a government that operates at that scale.

What happened with Indianapolis was we merged city and county government, but we didn’t really have a government that could effectively manage this new larger territory. It never built out the infrastructure in the suburbs. In New York, the Bronx has subways, great parks, everything built out with proper infrastructure, because it was part of New York and New York had to expand governance to become a city of eight million. Chicago got big in the 19th century and built a city government that could run a city of three million people. And some of the stuff that gets critiqued there, for example, is a lot of city services were organized by ward or city council district. There are 50 city council districts and every city councilor is sort of a little mini mayor of their district. The alderman essentially has veto power over any zoning changes. It’s called aldermanic privilege. So there are a lot of constraints there.

But if it’s just one mayor and one city council trying to think about a huge city of 77 neighborhoods and three million people, they can’t keep that much in their head. All they can think about is downtown. And that’s what happened in Indianapolis. The mayor and city council can really only think about downtown. We should have built out structures in townships throughout the city so that you had leadership focused on that area and money focused on that area. That’s what made the suburbs work really well. A suburb like Carmel is basically township sized. We have 100,000 people, big enough to do things, but not so big that our mayor and council can’t keep the whole city in their head and plan and manage the whole city.

So if you merge with the county government, you’re going to have to create an entirely new government structure that allows you to essentially manage every sub area of the whole thing and bring it all up to a standard of services. That’s the other thing they often did in Louisville and Nashville. They merge, but they have a two tier service system where there’s an urban services district for the old city which gets more services, and then the others get less. They didn’t do that in New York. There’s one standard of service in New York, one in Philadelphia, one in Chicago. So if you can’t commit to a single standard of service, you’re basically creating a bogus merger in my opinion. If you’re going to do a merger, you need to obliterate every government and entity in St. Louis County and city, merge them all into one with one standard. That’s not going to happen.

Susan Pendergrass (26:35): That’s not going to happen. What do you think, David?

David Stokes (26:37): Yeah, that’s not going to happen.

Aaron Renn (26:43): So you end up with a lot of problems. Louisville didn’t merge any fire departments. Imagine a city that doesn’t have a consolidated fire department. Imagine a city without a single police department. That was actually Indianapolis. When we merged, the Indianapolis Police Department still patrolled the old city, but the new parts of the city that were consolidated in from the county were still controlled by the sheriff.

Susan Pendergrass (27:13): That is 100% what would happen in St. Louis. Everyone would retain their school system and their police department and their fire department. I lived for a long time in Fairfax County, Virginia, which is a single county government. It’s massive, 150,000 students in their school system. It seems to function with a single police department and fire department. But I don’t think you can backwards engineer that into a place that for hundreds of years has been operating as it has been operating.

Aaron Renn (27:43): Lexington, Kentucky worked pretty well because one, the schools were already consolidated, as in the South it’s typically county school districts. Secondly, there were no other government entities, no township governments, no other incorporated municipalities. So it merged everything. And they were sort of able to solve the urban services district issue because the outer areas of Fayette County were horse farms. They actually put in a kind of green belt rule, you can’t develop out there, because they wanted to protect these scenic landscapes. So there was actually a good reason to treat that differently, because it was a very unique American landscape. Lexington, I think, was pretty successful.

Susan Pendergrass (28:15): They are. I appreciate it when I drive across Route 64.

Aaron Renn (28:39): Lexington was pretty successful and wasn’t especially controversial when they did it, in part because there weren’t all these entrenched interests like there are in other places. If you look at places that did the mergers, they weren’t the Cincinnatis and Pittsburghs. They’ve been talking about consolidation in Pittsburgh forever. It was very hard. And Louisville did it, but it was one of the least consolidated so-called consolidated governments. What the Louisville merger functionally did was dissolve the city of Louisville and reorganize county government. The county government now has a mayor and a council instead of the old fiscal court with the judge executive and all that.

Susan Pendergrass (29:21): That’s kind of what would happen in St. Louis, right?

Aaron Renn (29:36): That’s essentially what they did. They basically dissolved the city and the county government was reorganized, but nothing was merged.

Susan Pendergrass (29:43): Did you have a question?

David Stokes (29:45): I want to get back to the fire district point. We’re talking about why this would be so hard. There’s actually a law in St. Louis that only applies in St. Louis County that makes it impossible to consolidate fire districts. Even if a modest mid-sized suburb annexes an unincorporated part of town, they’re not allowed to provide fire services to that new annexed area, or they can, but they have to pay so much to the old unincorporated fire district that it makes it impossible to do so. That’s just one example of how even if you wanted a full scale merger, it would just be impossible to actually carry through.

Susan Pendergrass (30:34): Why do you think people float this idea, David? Why does it come back every couple of years?

David Stokes (30:38): You know, it’s the old line. I remember a study I read about Pittsburgh and St. Louis many years ago. The question was, are the St. Louis and Pittsburgh areas really inefficient with all the fragmented government? And the conclusion was, well, you would never design a metro area like this, but they’ve both made it work over the last century better than you would think. The conclusion was that St. Louis and Pittsburgh aren’t actually as inefficient as you might assume when you run the numbers.

I think people have trouble accepting that. People look at so many small municipalities, many of them dysfunctional, many of them until recent times funded themselves primarily with traffic tickets, which is a terrible way to fund local government, and that’s not even an exaggeration. And there’s just this fundamental belief that if you can just plan it better you’ll create a better place. I just think it fails.

One of the reasons it would fail, going back to what Aaron led this conversation off with, is that if St. Louis County and St. Louis City joined together, they’re not actually going to lay any government employees off to save any money. St. Louis City government is not going to fire city employees. It’s never going to happen. So you’re not going to save any money and it’s all just going to collapse.

Aaron Renn (32:12): Yeah, New York City and large governments are not more efficient.

I look at it and say, look, I think merger is a solution for failed states, if you want to call them that, in the St. Louis suburbs. Take some micro-suburb that’s a complete scam or is bankrupt and merge it in with its neighbor. Do some consolidation like that, that probably needs to be led by state government, almost like a receivership sort of thing. That’s just kind of good government as you work through it. But I just don’t think the benefits you would gain from trying to do a complete governmental merger of St. Louis City with St. Louis County would outweigh the opportunity cost of how much time and effort you spend on it, when you could be spending that on other things that I think will actually move the needle more.

The downsides are arguably as high as the upsides. There’s no guarantee it’s even net positive in this environment. The time to have merged was when Indianapolis did it in 1970, not in 2026. Nashville did it in the 60s. Jacksonville did it a long time ago.

And then I think it doesn’t fix the fundamental issues around the culture. You’ve got to take a hard look at that and say, it’s maybe very difficult to change. The idea that people who aren’t from here have to be able to move here and get connected and feel like they belong in the city. There’s a couple we know who lived in St. Louis. The wife taught in St. Louis public schools. They’re big urban people. The husband was from St. Louis, and they moved here to Carmel, Indiana.

Susan Pendergrass (33:47): Tell me more about that.

Aaron Renn (34:10): Basically they said, man, people are just so much friendlier here. They make better eye contact, they engage more. It’s just so much more welcoming than it was in St. Louis, even though they were actually in a sense connected because the husband was from there.

So when even people who lived in St. Louis and liked it notice a difference when they leave, that is a killer when you’re already struggling demographically. I had a guy who owned a business in Cleveland who said to me one time, I learned the hard way never to recruit anyone from out of town to work for my company unless that person or their spouse is from Cleveland, because otherwise they will never stay. When that’s where you are as a place, that is just rough. I think that is one of the killers for these river cities.

Susan Pendergrass (35:16): Yeah, what’s the fix for that? I don’t know what the fix is.

Aaron Renn (35:38): I think the optimistic case for St. Louis, and I actually tweeted this a year or two ago, is that St. Louis City educational attainment is really high now. In a sense, it’s a small, highly educated city that is probably going to continue growing more educated. So I think the Pittsburgh option looks viable in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (36:00): And certainly great medical care. I know that the average age is getting older in St. Louis. I think within 10 years, one in four people will be over the age of 65. But we also have an Alzheimer’s research center and access to medical care, which as you get older gets more important. I do think there’s an opportunity to lean in to the medical services that are available, as the country as a whole gets older. I think St. Louis looks more attractive for that reason. So I think you’re right that with universities and medical centers, there’s an opportunity.

Aaron Renn (36:35): Yeah, I think if America’s demographics keep on this trend, a lot of other places are going to get to where St. Louis is. And the thing to be careful of is that when you’re in a declining market, that often prompts centralization of activity and population. What happened with Japan is that once Japan’s population started falling, everybody started moving to Tokyo. It’s Tokyo and a handful of other cities where everything is concentrated, and they literally have ghost towns there.

I don’t think it’s any accident that Indianapolis’ growth really took off once the Rust Belt era and deindustrialization hit the state. Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio have grown in large measure through drawing people out of the rest of the state as those states declined. Huge numbers of people move from Cleveland to Columbus every year.

Missouri is a little different than that. One of your challenges is that St. Louis does not draw people from rural Missouri. When I looked at the data, it’s not like there’s a massive flow into St. Louis from the rest of the state. So you don’t have that siphon bringing people in.

Susan Pendergrass (37:55): There are public safety issues around that, but yes.

Aaron Renn (38:00): And the issue we have is that we’ve now eaten our seed corn. There’s not going to be next generations of children in the towns I grew up in in rural Indiana to move to Indianapolis anymore. The cohort sizes are going to be smaller. So that pump, even Tokyo is declining now in population. That siphon is draining the water table. We can only rely on that so long.

But I think this is the risk for St. Louis in that kind of environment. People with opportunity might avoid or flee St. Louis and go to Austin, Texas or Nashville. They go to the handful of places in America that are really still growing. That’s a threat even for Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio. In a declining market, it’s very hard to get people to want to come to a shrinking city because the opportunity space is shrinking. St. Louis’s opportunity space has been shrinking because you’re losing corporate headquarters and your working age population is declining. That dynamic is really going to be a challenge. But within that, the city of St. Louis might end up doing okay. Again, being small actually helps it here.

Susan Pendergrass (39:25): Any closing thoughts on that, David?

David Stokes (39:27): Just that the part of Missouri that is definitely still growing, and that probably is attracting those young rural people who are moving to a city, is going into southwest Missouri, the Springfield-Branson area. That’s absolutely the growing part of the state. And even Kansas City is growing certainly more than St. Louis is.

Aaron Renn (39:48): Yeah, it’s not a culturally cohesive state. Springfield and that area are definitely growing, and growing despite the fact that they have nowhere close to the urban assets of a St. Louis. It’s interesting to watch, and we’ll just have to see what happens.

Susan Pendergrass (40:05): It is. I think about it a lot. I’ve been talking about this in terms of school enrollment for years and years, where you could see the biggest kindergarten cohort was after the Great Recession of 2009. You know that that’s the biggest kindergarten cohort for the last 15, 16, 17 years. We do nothing but build schools and hire teachers. We are slow to catch on to these things happening. But I think your perspective is certainly very interesting. On the question of the merger, it’s not worth the cost for whatever benefits there might be. But it still gets talked about, so I appreciate you coming and giving us your thoughts on it. Maybe we’ll have to have you back to talk about it again.

David Stokes (41:02): And Aaron, I want you to come back. I want to find out how we get more roundabouts in Missouri. I love roundabouts. I go to Carmel it seems like once a year for these gigantic youth sports tournaments up at Westfield, just a little bit north of you. My kids’ sports take me there. And I love the roundabouts. You cannot get enough of them.

Aaron Renn (41:09): I’d love to talk about that. My favorite topic.

Aaron Renn (41:24): Yeah, it’s great. We hardly ever have to stop. There are barely any stoplights or stop signs left in our city. It’s amazing. We’re one of the few growing places in America where traffic is better today than it was 20 years ago.

Susan Pendergrass (41:32): They’re awesome.

David Stokes (41:45): People don’t realize how good that is for air quality and everything. You just keep moving along, not stop and start. We need 100 times more roundabouts in this area.

Susan Pendergrass (41:55): Are you pretending that people stop at stop signs in St. Louis? Because let’s be honest, people don’t stop at stop signs.

David Stokes (42:00): Well, they roll them, but it’s still wrong when they roll them. Maybe all the people blowing red lights on Kings Highway at 50 miles an hour are just being environmentally conscious. I need to give them more of the benefit of the doubt, I guess.

Susan Pendergrass (42:12): That’s exactly right. All right, thanks so much. I really appreciate it.

Aaron Renn (42:19): Thank you.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post The St. Louis City-County Merger with Aaron Renn and David Stokes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Susan Pendergrass speaks with J.S. Onésimo “Ness” Sandoval, demographer and professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Saint Louis University, about what the data says about the future of the St. Louis region. They discuss record low birth rates and what they mean for school enrollment, why St. Louis is among the top regions in the country for deaths outnumbering births, how the region compares to Pittsburgh and Cleveland, and why suburbs like Chesterfield and St. Charles are aging faster than most people realize. They also discuss the role of housing supply, school choice, crime, and domestic migration in whether St. Louis can attract and retain young families, and more.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:00): Well, certainly not the first time we’ve spoken, Dr. Sandoval. At St. Louis University, you are such a fascinating demographer of the region, and I’ve been following your work as new census data has been released. You’ve been writing about it and creating what I think are really cool mapping tools that folks can look at to see how the St. Louis region is impacted. Thanks for coming on to talk about that. But first I want to sort of expand our view, because pretty sure that I read within the last week that the number of babies born in the United States was at an all-time low. Is that right?

Ness Sandoval (00:35): Yeah, so every year the United States will probably be breaking records. The data coming out for 2025 is a record low, and the data coming out for 2026 is even lower. The first few months of 2026, the provisional data that’s out shows even fewer. And this is what we expected. We call this a demographic shock, because in 2026, whenever you create an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear, rational people do not have children until they understand that their job is safe, there’s not a recession coming, and we’re not at war. When you create this sense of fear, young people do the rational thing and don’t have children. We saw this in 2020 with COVID. We saw this in 2008 with the Great Recession. Anytime there is uncertainty, young people will postpone births. And that’s what we’re seeing. This started in November. We started to see the decline in births, and it’s continued from November, December, January, February. And so this is what we’re going to see.

Susan Pendergrass (01:51): So next year is going to be lower. And when you look at the state of Missouri, I’ve been saying this ad nauseum for years that our K-12 school enrollment is declining and will decline because of that sort of peak in 2008, just before the Great Recession. So our biggest kindergarten class was around 2012, and our kindergarten classes have by and large declined ever since. And so those kids are moving through the system. You can project that we will just have fewer and fewer kids enrolled in our K-12 system in the state of Missouri.

Ness Sandoval (02:06): No, we peaked in 2008.

Susan Pendergrass (02:11): By and large declined ever since 2012. And so those kids are moving through the system. So you can project that we will just have fewer and fewer kids enrolled in our K-12 system in the state of Missouri.

Ness Sandoval (02:24): Yeah, this is true, and we have a pretty good chart. We make these for every city. We’re replacing very large cohorts of children who were born. I have a son who was born in 2007, just before the recession. That cohort that graduated in St. Louis was 40,000 students. The baby birth cohort is now 27,000 students. So that’s just in that one year a 13,000 decline. And it’s going to decline every year for the next 15 to 18 years, because we don’t know what the bottom is yet. It has not reached the bottom.

Susan Pendergrass (03:01): Right. People say where are the kids going? I’m like, they’re not going anywhere. They weren’t born. The St. Louis region, like Clayton is declining, Ladue was, I mean, all of these school districts, I think almost everyone in the county has fewer kids today than they had 10 years ago.

Ness Sandoval (03:07): They weren’t born. Yes, and it’s not just St. Louis County. St. Charles County is experiencing this. There are some parts that are growing, in the Wentzville area, O’Fallon, but if you look at the old St. Charles areas, they’re experiencing decline. Families with children are declining in those areas. We had made an interactive map that I think shocked a lot of people, of seniors outnumbering youth. People could not comprehend this. Like, my gosh, this is not 2000 where youth were dominating these neighborhoods. I live out here in Chesterfield. The entire Route 64 corridor is senior citizens dominating the youth in Chesterfield. People are shocked. More seniors lived in Chesterfield than youth in 2010, and that’s only grown since. This is happening throughout West County.

Susan Pendergrass (04:14): Wow. And your maps actually go down to the zip code, right? You have very granular data.

Ness Sandoval (04:27): Across into Illinois, yes. The only way you can turn this around is young people from across the United States deciding that they want to make St. Louis their home, have a family there, create a business there. This is what I promote. We have to get younger. We really should have a preferential option for families with children. And that’s a hard message for a lot of people because they’re like, wait a minute, we grew from 1970 to 2020. And I’m like, but all of that growth was driven by babies born. Over 1.8 million babies were born. And I tell people, just do the math. 27,000 babies per year times 50. That’s the back of the envelope for what’s coming over the next 50 years. Unfortunately, that’s not what’s going to come. It’s going to be a lot lower than that. People are starting to get it. We’re not going to have 1.8 million babies born over the next 50 years.

Susan Pendergrass (05:33): Yeah, and I think about things like individual school systems building new elementary schools when there have got to be a lot of buildings that are empty. And also, won’t there be more competition for public resources between children and older people?

Ness Sandoval (05:49): Yeah. At my previous job at Northwestern, we did a project on this in one of the suburbs because we were studying seniors. There was a debate about how to spend public money. Was it for transit for seniors or transit for children? This was 2006, and this was the debate happening in Chicago. How do you provide paratransit for senior citizens when that number is increasing? We’re just having this discussion because St. Louis is leading. We’re in the top three of regions. Pittsburgh leads the country, Cleveland is second, and St. Louis is third, tied with Tampa. More people dying than babies born. We simply don’t have the number of babies born for the size of our population. And it’s because we’re a very old region. We’re the ninth oldest region in the country.

Susan Pendergrass (06:58): Yeah, I mean, we used to have 800,000 people in the city of St. Louis, right? And now we’re 280,000 or something.

Ness Sandoval (07:05): Yeah, and I was just looking at the numbers. It is very possible within two years that Kansas City will have more babies born in absolute numbers than the St. Louis metro region. That’s how few babies. I’m talking about the region. Indianapolis is about 700 babies behind St. Louis. Nashville is about 800 babies behind. All of these smaller regions are having lots of babies, and young people are moving there. Your future depends on the number of children born. And when you look at population projections, I kind of know what this looks like. When you fall below Kansas City in number of births, at some point Kansas City will be larger than St. Louis. We can project this out. We’re talking absolute births, not birth rates. We had lots of babies born 10 years ago. We were fine 10 years ago.

Susan Pendergrass (08:09): Yeah, wow.

Ness Sandoval (08:29): We can go back and talk about what happened since 2010.

Susan Pendergrass (08:35): Yeah, please. I’m curious what did happen. I know you call it the death spiral when there’s more deaths than births, but how did we get into this?

Ness Sandoval (08:41): So I moved here for the Great Recession. I moved in 2008 to start my job at SLU. And there was hope when I got here. There was some positive momentum happening. I think the region took it for granted that it didn’t have to do anything. We just have to be St. Louis. We don’t have to do anything. Unfortunately, Nashville came on the scene. Then you started to see regions change. Regions thinking we need to get young. And St. Louis absolutely did nothing. Since I’ve lived here, there’s been a lot of resistance to economic development in the region. Nashville, I think it was the popularity of being young, being pro-development. I went to Nashville to actually look at it, like why are young people there? And I went to Vanderbilt. And I saw this really interesting integration between the city and Vanderbilt University. That does not exist here in St. Louis. Making it a vibrant, cohesive, urban experience.

Susan Pendergrass (09:47): Yeah. Right. Now you step off campus at SLU and you’re in an area you don’t want to walk at night.

Ness Sandoval (10:00): Yeah, and even if it was WashU, right. And then you can talk about the Loop. It never recovered from COVID, traffic is down. I think the region has really struggled to attract young people to stay here and live here.

Susan Pendergrass (10:13): Well, we’ve been looking into the issue of crime in St. Louis quite a bit, and I know it’s down and everyone’s celebrating that fact, but I’m not sure when you survey people and ask how they feel walking alone at night, that it’s changed all that much. Even if the number of murders are down, I don’t know that people feel safer walking alone at night, and that’s got to have an impact on whether you want to stay in St. Louis after you have kids.

Ness Sandoval (10:47): Yeah. I think in the city you move out to the suburbs. The challenge is they work and you live for affordability. So many suburbs are against new development, even though they can develop. We see these debates in Chesterfield, that debate in Creve Coeur, several debates out in St. Charles. They don’t even talk about Jefferson County, because they’re celebrating voting down housing. My point is if you don’t want to build housing, Indianapolis is going to build it. Columbus is going to build it. Nashville is building it. We are no longer in the top 50 in new housing permits in the country. We’re 58th.

Susan Pendergrass (11:34): Why though? Is it because there’s not demand, or is supply being constrained?

Ness Sandoval (11:42): Supply is being constrained. Part of it is, when I speak to people, they say it’s going to hurt my home values. People want supply down. But you understand there’s a consequence to this. And home values are always good in St. Louis. But again, we always say there’s a city that we can look to that’s our future, and that’s Pittsburgh. If you really study Pittsburgh and look at it, you’re like, wow, there’s a lot of things we can learn as a city, and say this is not what we want to be. Pittsburgh leads the country in discounted rates on home sales. When people offer their price, most people do not get the price that they want. It’s a significant discount because the demand’s not there. We are about 20 years behind Pittsburgh.

Susan Pendergrass (12:25): Wow. I think a lot, in what I do, about the educational offerings in the region. Before we were recording we were talking about Texas. Texas, number one, doesn’t have an income tax, and also you can pick your child’s school from the get-go. They have hundreds, if not thousands of charter schools. And now they have a private school choice program that I think 250,000 families apply to. And Missouri has an extremely limited private school choice program, maybe 6,000 or 7,000 kids in the state, and not even the ability within St. Louis County to go outside of these tiny little districts. You can’t even go from Clayton to Brentwood. People really feel strongly about this and fight the idea of opening up the county and letting kids go within the county to any school district, and then the legislature fights it every year. And I’m like, we are just becoming less and less competitive.

Ness Sandoval (13:36): I don’t think people understand. I do a lot of work with schools now. We’re going to lose at a minimum 100,000 children under 15 by 2045. This loss is built into the system based on 27,000 births right now. The numbers are starting to show up in kindergarten. We have a smaller kindergarten class, a smaller first grade class coming in. And so a lot of schools are like, wait a minute, what’s going on? This is just starting. You have another 20 years, because we have these large cohorts that were still born after the Great Recession that are going to be replaced by smaller cohorts coming in. And there is no significant migration of children coming into the region.

Susan Pendergrass (14:28): So there are going to be difficult staffing decisions, and people don’t want to hear it. Like, we cannot continue to hire more teachers.

Ness Sandoval (14:32): You have to close schools. You have to close schools, have to merge schools. I’m doing some work in Parkway. People should not be surprised. Parkway is having meetings this month about what Parkway looks like going forward, and people are discussing consolidation. Rockwood is talking about a 15% decline in 10 years. Go out another 10 years, Rockwood will be talking about school consolidation. St. Charles will be talking about school consolidation in the old St. Charles area, the city of St. Charles. This is coming. Everybody focuses on the city and says the city needs to close schools. But you will see a discussion, I think, between Clayton and Brentwood.

Susan Pendergrass (15:06): For sure. Clayton had 2,500 kids. Now they’ve got closer to 2,000. I mean, that’s teachers, that’s buildings. And I know in Indianapolis, I’ve talked to a superintendent in that area. All parents can pick a public school. And he was like, I had some under-enrolled elementary schools and it was great for me because I put a language immersion program in one to bring parents in. I think the resistance to this idea is all about not wanting kids who aren’t paying property taxes, but I think it’s going to flip. Then you’ll be like, we’ve got to fill these seats. We’re paying the same teacher for 18 seats that we could pay for 22 kids. At some point they’re going to have to start laying off teachers. So I think there are some very difficult decisions ahead that you can see now, and there are things that could be done now, like at least not filling open positions.

Ness Sandoval (16:16): I think universities are seeing this, because many of them are relying on tuition and those dollars are not coming in. A smart university has to make cuts because it doesn’t get any better next year or the following year. There will be fewer students coming in. So universities that want to survive are making necessary cuts to survive.

Ness Sandoval (16:45): Again, we don’t know what the bottom of the birth decline looks like. We just happen to live in a state and a region that has seen a significant decline in children. I keep saying we’re modeling the future for people, either as a good or bad thing. They’re like, we want to be like St. Louis, or we don’t want to do what they did.

Ness Sandoval (17:13): I think a lot of people are starting to understand this. It’s like, we’re letting our children go, and we’re not doing a very good job of trying to keep them here. When you had 1.8 million births, you had enough to let children leave your region, leave the state. You don’t have that luxury anymore. Our models show the region should have anywhere between 1.3 million to a million births coming in over the next 50 years. We hope it’s not a million births, because that means you have an 800,000 decline in your population under 50. Or it’s 1.3 million births, which is only a 500,000 decline. But that’s coming.

Susan Pendergrass (17:43): How does immigration factor into it? Because I remember the last time we talked, you said that St. Louis is not very immigration friendly. And of course, the current national environment is not very immigration friendly.

Ness Sandoval (18:03): Missouri and St. Louis cannot rely on immigration to save it. It’s not a state that immigrants are going to come to in large numbers. They’re going to go to Florida. Miami leads the country. Even though domestic migration has people leaving, international migrants are going there as their top destination. They’re going to Philadelphia, they’re going to New York. We get immigrants who come here, but it’s a very small number, like 6,000 a year. We’re not even in the top tier as a top 25 metropolitan region. And Missouri is not either. So Missouri has to rely on domestic migration.

The data will show that probably for the decade, there will be more people dying than babies born in Missouri. Missouri will start to have from a natural perspective more people dying than babies born. And 91 counties across the whole state will have more people dying than babies born. So Missouri will become dependent for growth on domestic migration.

Susan Pendergrass (19:29): Or do we just accept that we’re not going to grow anymore? What’s the impact of that?

Ness Sandoval (19:33): Again, it’s going to be specific. I do think the Springfield area is going to grow, the Branson area, there’s growth. Part of this is retirement, I think. Kansas City is growing.

Susan Pendergrass (19:42): Why Kansas City more than St. Louis? What’s attracting younger people to Kansas City that is not happening here?

Ness Sandoval (19:49): Kansas City is a younger region. St. Louis is a fairly old region. Kansas City is a lot younger and it has a large Latino population, and that’s the largest growing population in the country, birth-rate wise. Latinos are now the second largest population in Kansas City. They surpassed the Black population, which I think even shocked me, because we thought we knew this was coming, but we thought this was going to be post-2030. The fact that it already happened shows just how many Latinos are moving there. And then you have an exodus of Black residents leaving Kansas City as well as St. Louis. I always tell people, when you have young Black families leave or young Black adults leave, those children ultimately leave too. And so that’s part of the story.

Ness Sandoval (20:48): When young people leave, the children that traditionally were born to those young people are now being born in Charlotte, Atlanta, Houston. The number one challenge for St. Louis and the state is the decline in births. If that doesn’t change, then you’re going to see that decline start to show up in five to ten years in our schools.

Ness Sandoval (21:17): And the private schools will simply go out of business because that’s dictated by the private market. Or they’ll do what many of the Catholic schools are doing. They think, we’re going to have middle school now, or we’re going to be K through 12. But then what about the parochial schools? There’s no growth. They’re just taking children out of other schools and putting them in their school system.

Ness Sandoval (21:45): And so again, I go back to Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh is about how do we manage population decline? The city is growing a little bit, but 100% of the growth in terms of the losses is in the suburbs. And that’s going to happen in St. Louis. When this loss starts to show up in the demographic accounting, most of the loss is going to be outside of the city of St. Louis. It’s going to be in the Chesterfield areas. It’s going to be in St. Charles.

Susan Pendergrass (22:18): So what could be done from a policy perspective? Chesterfield is trying to have this arts and entertainment district. They put in Topgolf and the concert venues. They’re trying to attract younger people there. Is it working?

Ness Sandoval (22:34): It’s not working. I mean, they have the same slight increase. I just posted this yesterday. People are shocked. The growth is in non-family households in Chesterfield. If you look at the new development, I call it downtown West Chesterfield. These are million-dollar homes, very expensive. Very few families with kids are there. These are empty nesters or dual-income, no-kids households. It’s very expensive for young families to get into Chesterfield today, when your entry-level home that was $170,000 in 1980 is $600,000 today. These are the challenges.

Susan Pendergrass (23:23): So build more starter homes?

Ness Sandoval (23:32): You need more entry-level homes. I’m not even going to use the word affordable. You need attainable homes for two incomes. And they can be built. But what I’ve heard is that a lot of cities do not want these homes. They want the $600,000 to $700,000 homes because of taxes. And so there is this tension there.

Ness Sandoval (23:56): Parkway and Rockwood are going to look very different in 30 years. They were very attractive amenities for young families with children. But I look at the data, and my kids are in Parkway. These schools are under-enrolled. You go and objectively look at the classrooms, you’re like, there should be 30 kids in these rooms and there’s 15. It’s great for me as a parent. I’m glad there’s only 15 kids for my fourth grader. One of the classes in Parkway Central, in the middle school, in his math class, there are eight students. I love it as a parent, but as someone who looks at the data, this is not sustainable.

Susan Pendergrass (24:45): Yeah, lots of one-on-one. Yeah. I’m just trying to figure out what would cause a renaissance in St. Louis. It doesn’t feel super safe. It has some great amenities and a great food scene and now MLS soccer. What would it take? Well, number one, you do have the school system problem where the St. Louis public school system is kind of a dumpster fire. So people want to move out if they have small children.

Ness Sandoval (25:32): Yeah, the decision to move out is made within the first three years once the baby’s born. We can see that in the data. When we moved from Chicago, because we lived in the city of Chicago, we wanted to live in the city of St. Louis. I think most people who move from Philadelphia or Boston are living in the city. We thought the city of St. Louis would be offering the same amenities. Because of the Great Recession, I came a year before my family, and we soon realized the city of St. Louis was not the city of Chicago in terms of amenities. And so we ended up in St. Charles. And I think most people make that same decision.

Susan Pendergrass (26:25): Yeah, my husband and I moved right into the city.

Ness Sandoval (26:27): We see it in the data. People are moving into the city from Philadelphia, from Boston, from Houston. But then, like me, if you have children and you’re not going to pay for private school, because that’s a tax in many ways, they’re going to exit out. And then with the Catholic schools closing in the city, there are going to be fewer options.

Susan Pendergrass (26:50): Yeah. But the public transportation is no good. I mean, there are things.

Ness Sandoval (26:57): And it’s interesting. We did see a kind of experiment during COVID. When COVID happened, the Catholic schools in the county opened up. A lot of families wanted their children in face-to-face instruction. So they left the city. They did not stay. So we had kind of a quasi-experimental design there. Education was very important.

Ness Sandoval (27:26): A lot of people left the city because of that and never came back. And that started before COVID. But I think this idea of school choice is something where parents want it. We have enough anecdotal evidence. When Normandy closed, the school system closed, families moved to Normandy to get their kids into Francis Howell. There’s enough evidence to show that families want to make these decisions. The question would be, would Parkway accept all of the students that would want to be in Parkway?

Susan Pendergrass (27:56): Yeah, the law would have to say that they would have to. You couldn’t let them pick and choose.

Ness Sandoval (28:15): Yeah. And so the question is, you have a lot of people who would love to be in Parkway. I gave a talk at Marquette and I was shocked because a good percentage of the students there were saying those public school students, but the parents had left to get out to West County for their children. So the question is, do you just let the private market dictate this? Those who can leave the city will ultimately leave the city and get out to West County.

Susan Pendergrass (28:50): There’s movement out. And I think in terms of domestic migration, to get parents to move in, you can go to our northern border, Iowa. The state pays for private school tuition. Oklahoma to the south, the state pays for private school tuition. Kansas, you can go to any public school in the state. It’s 100% open enrollment. Arkansas is one of the strongest for school choice, both public and private. I think we’re going to be surrounded by it and just have our arms folded across our chest. Because Parkway doesn’t want all those kids coming, or Rockwood doesn’t want all those kids coming. Parents are simply going to move across the border to a state where they can pick any public or private school. I’ve talked to some parents who have reached out to say, I’m thinking about moving to the region, is it true I can’t pick a school? And I’m like, it is true. You cannot pick a school. And I think they’re like, forget it. I’m not going to make this big decision on where to buy a house. I think if we don’t do things that are family friendly, and if we don’t get crime under control in some way, or have a 911 system where when you call somebody responds, I think it’s interesting that St. Louis will become this example for the nation of what a dying city looks like.

Ness Sandoval (30:08): We have three examples today: Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and St. Louis. Tampa is kind of unique because it is a destination for retirees. The Wall Street Journal has an article today on Cleveland, the renaissance of downtown Cleveland. And Detroit too, it’s a renaissance.

Susan Pendergrass (30:29): Wow. What about Detroit now? So St. Louis hasn’t figured out our renaissance yet.

Ness Sandoval (30:49): And to be honest with you, I think it will be hard. I’m not pro anything, but I find this whole debate about the city and county interesting. I’m not from here, so I don’t have this history of growing up here. But I think objectively, when I look at the budget of the city of St. Louis and compare it to Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh is a little bit bigger. It’s got 25,000 more people. But their budget is significantly smaller than St. Louis City’s budget. Part of me wonders, because the city is both a city and a county, it doesn’t have enough people or revenue to operate as both. And this is what’s helping Pittsburgh out. This is what’s helping Cleveland out, because that county revenue is spread among more taxpayers. In St. Louis City, the county functions are spread among a dwindling number of taxpayers. The city probably cannot be a county anymore. There’s just too few taxpayers to provide both city services and county services.

Ness Sandoval (32:08): I looked at these budgets and I’m like, my gosh, why is St. Louis’s budget so much more? I’m talking not a little bit more, a lot more than Pittsburgh’s budget. Pittsburgh is having trouble. And I don’t see the long-term fiscal situation turning around for the city because it’s got to provide all of these services. The tax base is going to decline. The next three years are probably going to see population loss in the city. The numbers just came out in March, but we’ll get the numbers in May. It’ll probably lead the country again in population decline for large cities.

Susan Pendergrass (32:58): Are we still a top 20 city? We’re number one in population decline, but what about in population size?

Ness Sandoval (33:01): We’re number one in decline. Last year, St. Louis City was number one. We’re declining. We’re not in the top 20 yet, but we’re very close. If we go back to 2020, we’re smaller than we were in 2020. The only reason we’re not number one in decline is because we had so many immigrants that offset our domestic migration loss. But this will be an interesting 2030 census, because it’ll be the first time the region will go into a census with more people dying than babies born. In the last census, we had about 75,000 natural growth. We’re looking at about 25,000 to 30,000 natural decline going into this census without any domestic migration. I tell people that this story is just starting. We have 74 years of the century left.

Ness Sandoval (34:18): I’m just trying to get people to move from the mindset that this is 2010 St. Louis. You don’t have 36,000 births anymore. You have 27,000 and it’s declining, one of the fastest declines in the country. Because of it, we’re aging very fast, and so we have to shift. The region has to make a choice that we start to organize our economy around senior citizens. There’s lots of money to be made from senior citizens, but we will never be viewed as Nashville or Austin as a place for young people.

Susan Pendergrass (34:52): Absolutely. That Route 64 corridor is just going to be all retirement homes.

Ness Sandoval (35:04): We won’t be talking about single family homes anymore. We’ll be talking about senior housing. We’ll be talking about a workforce that’s going to work with seniors instead of a workforce for children. And there is money to be made in that economy. I’m not saying that this is a bad thing. But again, we can look at other parts of the country where this transition has happened. Local government spending is being consumed by senior citizens, the healthcare of senior citizens, the paratransit of seniors. Seniors will lose their ability to drive. That cost typically gets covered by local governments. And so you will not be providing buses for children. You’ll be providing paratransit to get seniors to their doctors. Churches will have to think about being accessible to seniors. I go to Church of the Ascension and they are not prepared. At Easter, one of the Masses, one-third of this section was senior citizens in wheelchairs. The churches are simply not prepared for a parish that’s going to be 50% of the population at 70 years old and older. Restaurants have to think about this.

Susan Pendergrass (36:30): Wow, that’s crazy. Well, interesting stuff. I hope you’ll come back and talk about this more. And certainly I’m very interested in reading everything that you write about what St. Louis can do. We need to figure out a renaissance.

Ness Sandoval (36:51): We’ve got to get younger. The kids are giving us a try. They’re coming to school, they’re coming here because they have hopes. We just have not responded the way we need to. A lot of companies are starting to recognize this. I talked to the mayor and said, you need to be a more proactive voice on this. But the region, this is not a city of St. Louis issue. This is a St. Charles issue, a Jefferson County issue, a Chesterfield issue. Most of the people live outside of St. Louis city. The loss we’re projecting is going to come from the suburbs. And that’s what’s happening in Pittsburgh, that’s what’s happening in Cleveland. 100% of the demographic loss is in the suburbs.

Susan Pendergrass (37:21): Yeah. Wow, that’s crazy. Well, fascinating. Thank you so much for explaining it. I don’t want to be depressed about it, but it’s not super optimistic. We’ll find a silver lining. Thanks, Dr. Sandoval.

Ness Sandoval (37:59): All right, thank you very much.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post St. Louis Demographics and the Future of the Region with Ness Sandoval appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In a series of sketches for Saturday Night Live, Billy Crystal played a fictionalized version of actor and director Fernando Lamas as host of the talk show “Fernando’s Hideaway.” Crystal’s character would often say that it is better to look good than to feel good.

This was on my mind as I reviewed recent evaluations of St. Louis’s guaranteed basic income pilot by Washington University’s Center for Social Development. The review’s claims will sound familiar to anyone who has followed these pilot programs around the country. Participants reported feeling more financially secure. They were better able to pay bills and cover everyday expenses like rent, utilities, and groceries.

In many ways, the findings are exactly what one would expect. St. Louis distributed $500 per month for 18 months to several hundred households using federal pandemic relief funds. If someone suddenly receives an additional $500 each month, it should not surprise anyone that paying bills becomes easier in the short run.

The St. Louis program is also not unique. Over the past several years, cities across the country have launched similar guaranteed income pilot programs. Their evaluations tend to report the same kinds of outcomes: reduced financial stress, improved food security, and higher levels of self-reported well-being.

But as economists Hilary Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein of the University of California, Berkeley note in a review of the universal basic income literature, the new wave of guaranteed-income pilots is “not well suited” to answer the most important questions about the policy. (My colleague David Stokes wrote about this same study in 2024.) The pilot program evaluations tend to measure short-run responses that economists have already examined for decades in earlier experiments.

These evaluations often measure something quite narrow—how recipients say they feel about their financial situation. But feeling good about one’s finances is not the same thing as actually being better off.

More comprehensive research on guaranteed income programs paints a more complicated picture. A recent randomized study published by the National Bureau of Economic Research examined the effects of unconditional cash transfers using a large experimental design. In that study, 1,000 individuals were randomly selected to receive $1,000 per month for three years, while a control group received only a nominal payment.

The researchers tracked employment, income, and time use using administrative data and detailed surveys. Their findings suggest that while the payments increased consumption and temporarily improved subjective well-being, participants also worked fewer hours and saw declines in income earned from work. The transfers reduced labor-force participation and led participants to shift some of their time away from paid work and toward leisure.

In other words, the transfers made recipients feel more financially secure—but they also changed work behavior in ways that reduced earned income.

This should not come as a surprise. Economists have been studying guaranteed income–style policies for decades. Earlier negative income tax experiments and other research on income transfers have consistently found that unconditional income tends to reduce work effort modestly. Those effects may be small, but they are real and have important implications for the long-term economic impact of such policies.

None of this is to say that guaranteed income programs provide no benefit to recipients, or that the research from Washington University is flawed. Reducing financial stress and helping families weather unexpected expenses is not nothing. But policymakers should be careful not to confuse the short-term financial relief detailed in the St. Louis pilot program evaluation with long-term economic improvement.

There are also broader societal concerns that pilot evaluations like this one cannot address. One of the Show-Me Institute’s objectives is to build a state where “all Missourians are free from dependence on government.” Large unconditional cash-transfer programs, such as the program tested in St. Louis, could expand long-term dependency on government support and weaken incentives for work and self-sufficiency. That risk remains a significant policy concern.

Feeling better about your finances is not the same thing as improving the underlying economics—regardless of what Billy Crystal might advise.

Local leaders must be careful not to confuse the two, lest we commit to an expensive program that does more harm than good.

The post Economically, Feeling Better Isn’t the Same as Being Better appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

On January 21, 2026, the Show-Me Institute hosted an in-depth discussion on crime and public safety trends in the City of St. Louis at the Knight Center at Washington University. Patrick Tuohey, Senior Fellow at the Show-Me Institute, was joined by local experts Gabe Gore, St. Louis Circuit Attorney; Janet Lauritsen, Curators’ Distinguished Professor Emerita in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missouri–St. Louis; and Pernell Witherspoon, Senior Professor of Criminal Justice at Lindenwood University.

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The post Watch: The Public Safety Climate in the City of St Louis appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Over the past five years, the number of crimes committed in St. Louis has decreased, however the city is still widely perceived as dangerous. What are the actual crime statistics, what are their real implications, and what shapes public perception? Our panel of experts will address these questions and more.

Don’t miss this opportunity to gain valuable insights, share your perspective, and participate in an informed community conversation on crime and public safety in St. Louis. Two Opportunities to Attend:

Event Details
Wednesday, January 21
The Knight Center at Washington University

Tuesday, February 10
MAC West

Reception at 4:30 p.m., including beverages and light appetizers
Program and Q&A from 5:00 to 6:00 p.m.

Registration
Please register for this complimentary event by emailing events@showmeinstitute.org. Include your name and specify which date you will attend. Walk-ins will not be admitted.

The post Crime and Public Safety in St. Louis: Upcoming Events appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

“We have gone from about 80 properties to about 480 properties,” Hulshof explained. “My cup runneth over.”

Like supporters of government-managed economic development programs everywhere, backers of the plan in Charleston think that if the government approves the right plan here, with the right subsidy there, with the right government agency approval soon, that government plans can magically turn a struggling city into a boomtown. As economist Dick Netzer once mocked these eco devo officials, “Who needs oil wells, when a state can be another Kuwait just by increasing the budget of a tiny agency?”

A Chapter 353 plan with mass property tax abatements would not help Charleston. It would, in fact, almost certainly hurt it more. If property taxes are too high for businesses in Charleston (which I doubt, to be honest), then the city, school district, county, etc. should lower the rate for everyone, not give some property owners in downtown Charleston a big tax abatement that will almost certainly force tax increases on everyone else to make up the difference.

There are a multitude of studies that demonstrate the fallacy of believing that government economic development agencies can successfully engineer economic growth through various subsidies. Here is one simple summary from two economists who have looked at the question thoroughly: “The best case is that incentives work about 10% of the time and are simply a waste of money the other 90%.”

There are other economists who wouldn’t even agree they work 10 percent of the time. As one economist said after he reviewed a similar tax-subsidy laden plan for north St. Louis:

Among the most vocal critics of the NorthSide plan was the chair of Washington University’s Department of Economics, Prof. Michele Boldrin, who testified at the trial that the benefits promised by McKee such as new jobs and increases in property value were “dreamy,” “out of thin air,” “unreasonable,” and “completely arbitrary” and further stated that “if an MBA student came up with it, I’d throw him out of my office.”

St. Louis and other cities in Missouri have been using tax incentives as a prop for politicians to claim they are “doing something” for decades. How has it worked out for St. Louis? As author Colin Gordon wrote in him study on that precise question in his book, “Mapping Decline”:

The overarching irony, in Saint Louis and elsewhere, is that efforts to save the city from such practices and patterns almost always made things worse. In setting after setting, both the diagnosis (blight) and its prescription (urban renewal) were shaped by — and compromised by — the same assumptions and expectations and prejudices that had created the condition in the first place.

If you think the results in Charleston are going to be any different, I have a bridge over the Mississippi to sell you. A Chapter 353 plan for Charleston will allow politicians and planners to claim they are doing something, it will benefit the politically connected and the lucky, and it will empower city government to get more involved in the local economy. All of these things are, by the way, bad things. What a 353 plan won’t do for Charleston is help revitalize the city or grow the economy.

The post A Chapter 353 Tax Abatement Plan is the Last Thing Charleston Needs appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Susan Pendergrass speaks with Show-Me Institute Director of Municipal Policy David Stokes about his new paper in the Free-Market Guide to Missouri Municipalities series on planning and zoning. They discuss how fragmentation among local governments can limit overly strict zoning, how zoning rules affect housing affordability, and why “last house syndrome” poses risks for Missouri’s future growth. From accessory dwelling units and minimum parking requirements to the debate over multifamily housing, Stokes explains how smart reforms can protect property rights and keep housing costs down.

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Timestamps

00:00 Introduction to Planning and Zoning in Missouri
02:35 The Impact of Fragmentation on Zoning
05:24 Housing Affordability and Zoning Regulations
08:22 The Role of Municipalities in Housing Development
11:18 Challenges of NIMBYism and YIMBYism
14:21 Accessory Dwelling Units and Short-Term Rentals
17:00 Planning and Infrastructure in Missouri
19:57 Future Papers and Conclusion

Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:00)
Thank you, David Stokes, so much for being on the podcast this morning. You have a new paper out with the Show Me Institute. Well, it’s actually part three of an existing series on your free market guide to Missouri municipalities. And this one is on planning and zoning. So thanks for joining us to answer some questions about it. Great. I do have one question that I was just saying before we started recording. I’ve seen this paper a few times.

David Stokes (00:19)
Delighted to be here.

Susan Pendergrass (00:26)
And one thing that I noticed up front is that I complain about the number of school districts in St. Louis County and how fragmented it is. And other folks have also said similar things, too many small municipalities. But it seems to be the case that when we’re talking about things like planning and zoning and permitting and regulations, that can be a good thing. Is that right?

David Stokes (00:46)
Absolutely. Because it’s harder to enact comprehensive planning, zoning, major things like urban growth boundaries—the extreme things like an urban growth boundary that we don’t have in Missouri. But it’s harder to enact that the more governments you have to get in line to agree to it in the first place. So it’s definitely—I don’t want to say it’s a causation. I don’t think the data is there to—

Susan Pendergrass (00:47)
What?

David Stokes (01:14)
But it’s definitely a—I would say it’s a truism—that there’s a strong connection between the metropolitan areas that have less strict zoning around the country. And over the past decade, we’ve really changed a lot in American local public policy to realize the harms of overly strict zoning. Until the past decade or so, it was just sort of assumed that strict zoning was a good thing. So now that we recognize the harms of it, we see that the places like St. Louis—and to a lesser extent, Kansas City—that have more fragmentation. St. Louis by any measure nationally has extreme fragmentation, meaning a whole lot of local governments, be they cities or school districts or fire districts or streetlight districts. I mean, we can really get into the obscure ones here in Missouri, but the more you have of that, the less strict zoning you’re going to have. And then that results in lower housing prices.

Susan Pendergrass (02:00)
You—

David Stokes (02:10)
What is the good that comes from that in the end? I think there’s lots of goods that come from it and some harms too. But the real good—the point of this paper, and the good for somebody who doesn’t care about public policy or libertarian thoughts or anything and just wants to be able to buy a nice house at an affordable price—is: the less strict zoning you have, the more fragmentation you have, the more you see that in lower housing costs.

Susan Pendergrass (02:35)
Yeah, and if you were starting a business too and one municipality, let’s say Clayton, has really high restrictions on what you can build, where you can build a health office and be—I don’t know if they do or don’t—but then you could just simply go next door to the next place and pick a different place that has fewer restrictions.

David Stokes (02:52)
You can, and that does happen. One of the ways they’ve solved that dilemma in St. Louis County especially is they do a lot more code enforcement and permitting at the county level than at the municipal level. Because nobody wants to have to get—if I’m going to be a plumber—nobody wants to have a plumbing license in 88 different cities. So they do that at the county level. You get your county license and it’s good throughout all of St. Louis County. Now, there are good aspects of that—mostly that you have to get one license instead of 88, which is an obvious good—but it’s also subject to abuse as well. It’s sort of the counterargument to the benefits of fragmentation in that it’s easier for special interest groups, like in this case, say the plumbers union, to capture licensing in St. Louis County if they only have to dominate one board as opposed to 88 boards. So there are two different ways to go—there’s the good and then the part of it that might not be quite as good.

Susan Pendergrass (03:59)
Yeah, so you make the point in this paper that while St. Louis does not necessarily have a housing affordability issue—or maybe even Missouri—it’s still worthwhile for folks who are working at the municipal level, like if you’re working as a newly elected Board of Aldermen or newly elected county board official, to educate yourself on what is and isn’t possible to make sure that you avoid what you just described as the pitfalls of over-regulating.

David Stokes (04:28)
Absolutely. A lot of this paper is about—in the not very scientific term—sort of low-hanging fruit. Just because zoning in Missouri may be less strict than in other states… there’s actually, I discovered in researching this paper—I’d always understood and known that zoning in Missouri and in St. Louis and Kansas City was less strict than in many other parts of the country—but then I discovered that there is actually an index out of the Wharton Business School at the University of Pennsylvania that ranks metropolitan areas by zoning strictness. And St. Louis is the least strict for zoning of any metropolitan area in the country in this ranking. And Kansas City is sort of in the middle. But then you see that Kansas City on the Missouri side is closer to St. Louis, and it’s the Kansas side that is more strict and puts them in the middle. So we really do have not-strict zoning.

Susan Pendergrass (05:05)
That’s hilarious.

David Stokes (05:24)
And that’s a wonderful thing, but it doesn’t mean that cities shouldn’t make some of these reforms that are coming nationwide that would still benefit Missouri, such as abolishing minimum parking requirements, allowing smaller lot sizes, allowing people to build accessory dwelling units on their own property. It’s a great reform focus—from the Show Me Institute’s perspective—because these are changes that can be made that enhance people’s own property rights and what they can do with their own property, while at the same time giving people more choice. And in the long run, if you do more of these, you’ll help keep housing prices down even more for people. And in a good way—you’re not doing this through mandates or rules; you’re just saying we’re going to allow people to build even more. And I’m not against every limit on every property thing ever. There are some that are reasonable—particularly in Missouri we have floodplain limits on where you build that are very reasonable in many cases—but there’s still a lot of good stuff we can do.

Susan Pendergrass (06:33)
Yeah, I saw recently last week that in the upcoming election cycle, housing affordability is a top issue for folks. This is really bubbling up the list of priorities because it’s gotten so expensive and, you know, I keep reading about why people can’t afford to move, and they can’t afford to sell their home, or they can’t afford to buy a home. And certainly some markets—like you mentioned in the paper, like Portland—and you mentioned this briefly: Portland’s got a brown zone and a green zone, and you can’t build in the green zone. You have to stay in the brown zone, and it makes it very prohibitively expensive to build new housing stock in Portland, and the prices have gone up dramatically. We do not yet have that problem in St. Louis, but I know that it’s on a lot of people’s minds and certainly, statewide, we still have some concerns about having enough affordable housing for everybody. I do think it’s important to make sure that we don’t let regulation creep happen so that we find ourselves raising our prices artificially.

David Stokes (07:36)
And you see this in disputes in our exurban areas now in, say, St. Charles and Jefferson County—surrounding counties of St. Louis—and on the Kansas City side as well. Last year, for example, in St. Charles County, a big new subdivision was rejected in a wooded part of the county—I think it was near Weldon Spring. They’re also allowing some, but—

Susan Pendergrass (07:56)
Was it Weldon Spring, or what was that?

David Stokes (08:02)
And that’s the dilemma that people face: as places like St. Charles and Jefferson County grow and get more full, there’s going to be inevitable pressure from the people there now to stop new building. It’s called last-house syndrome: “Great, my new home here is great. Now don’t build any more because I got the house and it’s perfect.” You see that everywhere, and you understand the concerns. I try not to completely ignore the concerns of the folks, because they’re not always wrong—of course, we’ll go back to the floodplain issue—but you’ll have people worry. It’s the people there now: concerns about traffic and overbuilding and destruction of wooded areas and too dense and all those things. But you want people to realize that other people probably said the same thing before they built your house, and it was a good thing that people in most instances really said no to that, and it allowed that construction to continue. And I really want people to realize that.

Susan Pendergrass (08:34)
Yeah. That’s right. ⁓

David Stokes (09:00)
If we go—it’s not about any one subdivision, because look, there probably are certain instances in certain places where the new zoning is too dense, whatever it may be—it’s not that every rejection is always completely wrong. But if you start in Missouri making a pattern of this in the outer areas of Kansas City and St. Louis, where you start turning down a lot of these new subdivisions to preserve whatever it is that people moved out there for 20 years ago, then housing prices are going to increase in Missouri. They will increase substantially, and it won’t take that long if you really do stop the building. So that’s one of the takeaways from this paper: to the largest extent possible, we need to keep allowing the building of these new homes or apartments. And obviously a big part of the paper is that apartments should be generally allowed in more places too. That’s how we’re going to continue to have low housing costs, and that’s the benefit of it. It’s not about one subdivision in one space, but if it becomes a trend, it’s really going to be a problem—the trend being protecting it.

Susan Pendergrass (10:15)
Yeah, and the multifamily for sure. What are your findings around that? People don’t seem to want to have to look at apartment buildings. Is that right?

David Stokes (10:25)
They don’t—there’s just some natural rejection against it. And it’s frustrating to see. In some spots—I remember in the City of St. Louis; this is one where, when you lived in St. Louis, you lived near there—at the corner of Skinker and Delmar there was a proposal for a large apartment building right there, and it got a lot of opposition, and it has not moved forward. It was stopped. I hope it comes back because it’s a perfect lot for an apartment building. It’s just an empty lot—it was a chicken restaurant for many, many years and a popular one—but it’s been vacant forever. And it’s right near public transit. So it’s the perfect idea where you should be able to build there, and you shouldn’t have generous or extensive—

Susan Pendergrass (10:59)
An abandoned empty lot, right?

David Stokes (11:18)
—parking requirements for those buildings, because one of the projects—

Susan Pendergrass (11:21)
That’s what people were kind of freaking out about though, was the parking. Like, where are all these cars going to go? And there was one across the street and they had only put in like one parking space for every two units or something, and they figured that people would use public transport. Anyway, I remember the pushback on that. And it’s this NIMBYism–YIMBYism thing, right? It’s so hard to push people to YIMBYism—yes in my backyard—because of things they don’t… I don’t… These same people often talk a lot about housing affordability, so I don’t mean to overgeneralize, but there are some of the very same people who are so concerned about it who don’t want to look at apartment buildings.

David Stokes (11:50)
Right, don’t want to—and you understand. That’s a very liberal area that we’re talking about. If you were to define the politics of that area, you’re right: many of the residents of those communities in both the city and in University City right there would, in theory, in the big picture, probably agree, but then, “Oh, we don’t want this development here.” And it was a perfect place for a new apartment. Again, of all the St. Louis area, it’s one of the best areas served by public transit—

Susan Pendergrass (12:06)
Yes.

David Stokes (12:31)
—with buses and MetroLink and the WashU shuttles, because so many people who would be in those apartments would be WashU students. They’ve got that extensive shuttle system. But it was rejected, and I hope it comes back. And that’s just one of many, many examples of it.

Susan Pendergrass (12:31)
Yeah, yeah. What about the—what part of zoning and planning is this push in the City of St. Louis, anyway, to try to get people to move downtown? Is that something that’s coded in? I feel like they’re trying to get people to go downtown.

David Stokes (13:03)
They are. And thankfully, I don’t think zoning is preventing that. Of all the reasons people may or may not be choosing to move downtown—fear of crime and businesses leaving downtown, the jobs—as somebody who lived downtown in the late 1990s and early 2000s, to move down there when many of the jobs have left—fear—it’s a harder thing to convince. But I don’t think there’s— I don’t think it’s difficult or has ever been difficult for the loft developers of the ’90s to get permission to take an empty commercial building and turn it into lofts. There might have been a lot of issues they had to deal with, but zoning—I don’t believe—was one of them. Thankfully that’s a very good thing. But it’s one of the fun parts about this paper, right? We’re talking in the other papers and in the ones to come about the best ways to do public safety and public works and a lot of things. In most of these instances we all agree somebody has to do this service, and it’s just a question of: does the city provide it themselves? Do they contract with a neighboring municipality to do it—such as a small city contracting with a neighboring city to do police service? Should you let the private sector do it in a regulated manner, like utilities? But we can all agree it has to be done. Whereas I started this paper saying: despite the fact that it may be incredibly common, cities don’t actually need planning or zoning—life can exist without it. And that’s where the current HOA options come into play. And the history of HOAs in St. Louis, in the private place model, is such an interesting part of that. So there’s a little bit of the historic discussion of all of this in the paper too.

Susan Pendergrass (14:53)
So where do Missouri municipalities for the most part right now stand on things like—two questions I’m going to ask you—accessory dwelling units and short-term rentals or Airbnbs? Where do they stand on ADUs?

David Stokes (15:06)
Well, slowly but surely, we’re starting to permit ADUs. We haven’t had any sort of statewide, to my knowledge, overarching legislation. And that’s where the fact that we have low housing costs in Missouri matters. I don’t think we’re going to see the California situation that had to go statewide because none of the municipalities would agree to it. I don’t think we’ll see that here because there’s not the tremendous high-cost-of-housing crisis to push that. But slowly but surely, cities are starting to allow more ADUs, and that’s a very good thing. When you get out into rural areas—and in some places that don’t even have zoning in the first place—you can do any ADU you want to, or the zoning is so loose that of course you can build an apartment above your garage if you’d like to. Why are you even asking? But the cities have the rules against it.

Susan Pendergrass (15:52)
That’s where I live.

David Stokes (16:03)
Slowly but surely moving in the right direction there. And then it’s going in the opposite way with short-term rentals. Slowly but surely most cities are instituting short-term rental limitations. I’m not automatically opposed to that in every case. I get it: if you have a neighborhood and all of a sudden there’s a house where big parties are being thrown every weekend because they’re renting it out to different groups of people to throw parties, you’re going to hate that, and that’s going to impact the quality of your life. So I’ve been saying for a few years now that the short-term rental regulations I support would generally be things that don’t go to a blanket prohibition. I think that’s too far—and most cities aren’t doing that—but rather really focus on punishment of the property owner for repeated rule-breaking. One party is maybe one party, but if there’s a trend where you own the property and the people you’re renting to are consistently out of control, then the fines should be increased. I wouldn’t be opposed to them getting fairly steep up to a point too—that if it happens too often, you would lose your business license to operate that short-term rental. Because I do think that if you’re doing it a lot—if you’re routinely renting it out—you should be treated a little more like a hotel. We don’t want to give short-term rentals an advantage over the hotel-motel industry. You want that playing field to be as level as possible, especially for people who are renting their houses or condos or whatever out a lot. So then pull that license if it’s an abuse that’s happening consistently. But let’s try to—

Susan Pendergrass (17:55)
Well, I had that on my street.

David Stokes (17:56)
—go to a method through crackdown on rule-breaking, not blanket prohibitions.

Susan Pendergrass (18:00)
Yeah, we had that on my street in St. Louis, and it was a street of, I don’t know, three- or four-bedroom houses, and they somehow had eight bedrooms and a pool, which was very rare in my neighborhood. So they mostly just rented it out to college students and got called all the time—the police got brought in all the time for noise complaints. And there wasn’t really a good mechanism in place at the time to prevent it from happening. So I agree that there should be some limitations around them, but not to make it so strict that people can’t use it as intended. I mean, I stay in Airbnbs all the time. I like having them, but—

David Stokes (18:36)
Now, that police dilemma—that’s something in St. Louis and probably Kansas City, a few big cities, where the cops just have better things to do than break up parties. I mean, they’ve got violent crimes to address. That’s an issue: how are they going to take it seriously enough? In the average Missouri suburb or mid-sized cities, the police are going to take that a little more seriously, I would think. And a good comparison I like is in Lake of the Ozarks, where some cities have instituted strict rules against short-term rentals, while others, like Osage Beach—at least as of our research—hadn’t instituted anything and took a much more free-market approach: “We’re a tourist area; we want tourists to come here.” So it’ll be a good natural experiment over time to see how it affects property values, how growth is affected, as different comparable cities in the Lake of the Ozarks region choose different paths to move forward. So I definitely look forward to following that.

Susan Pendergrass (19:37)
Well, then I’ll know—another component to this paper is on planning. I think you just said a city doesn’t have to do planning if they don’t choose to, but are Missouri cities or municipalities planners? I mean, is that a planned thing, or are we more like anything goes?

David Stokes (19:56)
Most Missouri cities have plans. Right?

Susan Pendergrass (19:57)
I’ve been to New Town, by the way. I just want to say I have visited New Town, so—before you start talking.

David Stokes (20:03)
Well, that’s the architectural planning—how do we want to design it? Then there’s the legal, defined planning. And luckily, again, I really don’t think Missouri cities need to do any planning outside of general infrastructure planning. So I shouldn’t say they don’t need to do any planning—there’s the general infrastructure planning that pretty much everybody supports, meaning you should have an idea of how growth is going to go in your city and where you’re going to put sewers and sidewalks and streets. You want a general long-term plan for that, even if that plan is—as it should be—thoroughly adjustable and can be changed as growth happens naturally. But then you get into planning like we mentioned with Portland earlier—urban growth boundaries—where the planners really start to say, “You can live here; you cannot live here; you can build here; you cannot build here,” and it gets to be really extreme. We don’t really have that in Missouri. Thankfully, the plans that cities do adopt can be easily amended by any city council. They can be changed. When I worked at St. Louis County, we dealt with the county planning commission for the parts of the council district I worked in that were unincorporated, where the planning commission had a lot to say on that. So elected officials can and should be able to change that plan as they go. And then the biggest—let’s say you permitted a development that’s against your plan, but the elected officials want to do it anyway—I usually don’t have a problem with that. The fact that it’s inconsistent with your plan would generally be something that, if locals want to sue to stop the development, they would cite in the lawsuit—that it was inconsistent with your process and your plan—and then it would be determined by judges and the whole legal process. But planning in Missouri is something that, outside of basic infrastructure planning, cities shouldn’t really do. And to the extent that they do it, it’s easily amended and changed. And that’s a good thing.

Susan Pendergrass (21:55)
Mm-hmm. So the first two papers in your series were taxation, right?

David Stokes (22:20)
Taxation was number two, and the first one was just sort of the structure of municipal government in Missouri. It had a lot to do with city managers. And then the fragmentation issue was addressed as well in the first one that we discussed here, because that’s a part of that, obviously.

Susan Pendergrass (22:23)
Introductory. Okay. And taxation. And this is zoning and planning. Right. And then what’s on deck? What’s the next one?

David Stokes (22:41)
We don’t actually know yet what number four will be—germinating. Most of them are ready to go pretty quickly, so I think the next one will be released within the next two months—certainly this year. And I think it’s going to be on public works. But we have papers coming on public works, public safety, parks and recreation—which is one I’m really going to enjoy. You go to Forest Park and there’s all the great things in St. Louis’s Forest Park, and then you realize that many of the wonderful things there are actually done under contract with the private sector, either for-profit businesses like the Boathouse and the ice rink that pay the city to operate, or nonprofit businesses like the Muni that have been in the park for a long time. So it’s a great option to talk about all the different ways to provide parks and recreation services.

Susan Pendergrass (23:18)
Yeah.

David Stokes (23:35)
But those are at least three of the upcoming ones. And then there’ll be a concluding, summarize-it-all-up section as well.

Susan Pendergrass (23:41)
I look forward to hearing more about those, and thanks for coming on to talk about planning and zoning. It’s going to be a great series when it all gets put together. Thanks.

David Stokes (23:48)
Thank you very much, Susan.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

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The biggest problem with the Loop Trolley is that nobody wants to ride it. During its 13 months of operation, ridership was under 10 percent of expectations, which led to equally depressing revenue shortfalls. Time and again, trolley management turned to taxpayers to fill its budget gaps, ultimately pouring $51 million of other people’s money into the project. One of those funders, the Federal Transit Administration, issued an ultimatum to the Loop Trolley Transportation Development District (LTTDD): either restart the trolley or pay back $37 million in federal grants.

Show-Me Institute analysts have been issuing warnings about a taxpayer-funded trolley with minimal demand for more than a decade, so this is not your average “I told you so.” But now that Bi-State has decided to clean up the Loop Trolley’s mess, let’s hope it has a good plan.

Bi-State should do what it can to reduce the overall taxpayer burden. As of now, trolley funding will come solely from the LTTDD’s sales tax on loop shoppers, which will not be enough to run the trolley for long. One way to potentially reduce taxpayers’ burden is to sell advertisement spots on the trolley. (Yes, even park bench personal injury lawyers—somebody needs to represent the owners of the cars the trolley kept managing to hit last time).

Bi-State can also lessen taxpayer burden by charging passengers to ride the trolley. Currently, Bi-State is considering letting passengers ride for free. If the thinking is that this revenue would be too small to make a difference, Bi-State should remember that people voluntarily paying to ride the trolley is better than reaching into the pockets of people who don’t ride the trolley. Charging fares from the start would be better, but if Bi-State decides not to do that, it should at least try to boost ridership to the point of charging fares. Whether that’s seasonally themed rides, reaching out to business and marketing students at Wash U for consulting, or any other novel idea, boosting ridership to the point of charging for fares should be the goal.

The trolley is coming back whether we like it or not. Let’s hope Bi-State finds a way to get taxpayers off the hook.

The post What I Would Like to See from the Resurrected Trolley appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A student at Washington University recently opined in his school newspaper that the university should be paying payments-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILOTs) to the cities around the school where it owns property: University City, Clayton, and the City of St. Louis. A complicated question is what to do when Wash U buys homes or apartment buildings within those cities to house students or visiting faculty, and then those properties are removed from the tax rolls because Wash U is a non-profit. From an article in the Post-Dispatch:

To house some of those people, it has purchased many off-campus single-family homes, duplexes and apartment buildings – 11 in Clayton, 53 in the city and 121 in University City.

It also owns several commercial properties – with one of the largest being its 1991 purchase of the old Clayton Famous-Barr for $17.5 million. All those purchases have an impact: The university’s not-for-profit status removes them from the property tax rolls.

The residents in these buildings need police and fire protection, roads, and other public services. When a property is purchased by a university and comes off the tax rolls but still has residents, the cities continue providing services but no longer receive the property taxes. That puts cities in a bind, especially University City and Clayton, which depend more heavily on property taxes than the City of St. Louis. The Wash U writer documents how many other universities pay PILOTS for local services to their cities, including the second-best university in Southwest Connecticut: Yale.

You know who else has written about this issue? Me. I think larger non-profit organizations, such as Wash U, SLU, many senior citizen homes owned by non-profits, and others could be asked to make partial payments of property taxes to cities. As for the City of St. Louis, I definitely think that should be part of a trade-off for eliminating the earnings tax.

Without ending the earnings tax, I don’t think non-profits should be asked to pay PILOTs to the city. (Non-profits are also exempt from the half-percent payroll tax that for-profit companies pay to the city.) Wash U and SLU doctors, administrators, nurses, etc. pay plenty to the City of St. Louis via the earnings tax. University City and Clayton have no such alternative (nor should they). I think partial PILOTs by larger non-profits are a reasonable way to help fund local services so that the tax burden is not unfairly falling on local residents for services used by the non-profits as well.

The post What Should Washington University Do with All of That Money? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Read Chris’s full report: A Plan to Make Medicaid Fair, Focused, and Accountable

Chris Pope is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. Previously, he was director of policy research at West Health, a nonprofit medical research organization; health-policy fellow at the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce; and research manager at the American Enterprise Institute. Pope’s research focuses on healthcare payment policy, and he has recently published reports on hospital-market regulation, entitlement design, and insurance-market reform. His work has appeared in, among others, the Wall Street Journal, Health Affairs, US News and World Report, and Politico.

Pope holds a B.Sc. in government and economics from the London School of Economics and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Washington University in St. Louis.​

The post SMI Podcast: Chris Pope – A New Plan for Medicaid appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Nearly five months ago, I wrote about my concerns with the widely cited Washington University expansion model. Last week during testimony before the committee, the Missouri Department of Social Services (DSS) confirmed that my concerns were valid. DSS officials explained in no uncertain terms that it would be illegal to enroll disabled Missourians into the Medicaid expansion population. This means that currently disabled Missourians would only be eligible for the current lower matching rate for federal funds, instead of the much more generous matching federal rate for the expansion population. And as I outlined in February, without that assumption, there’s a billion-dollar hole in the Washington University model’s cost estimates.

DSS also released its own estimates for the budgetary impact of Medicaid expansion. The projections are based on Missouri’s current Medicaid costs, its economic conditions, and what is known about the state’s low-income population, and they show that expansion will cost more than $2.7 billion in total each year. The federal government will pay the majority of that $2.7 billion, but state taxpayers still pay federal taxes. In state general revenue spending, DSS estimates it will cost more than $167 million per year, which will amount to more than $870 million in state income and sales tax dollars between 2022 and 2026.

These estimates are a far cry from “savings,” which is especially important because these costs will come on top of the current Medicaid program’s growth. It is also important to understand why the Washington University expansion model varied so significantly from our own state Medicaid agency’s predictions. In the end, it comes down to a series of faulty assumptions.

Not only were the authors of the model wrong about what could be done with Missouri’s disabled population, but they also vastly underestimated the number of Missourians that would enroll in expansion and the associated cost of their care. Instead of roughly 230,000 newly eligible adults enrolling, DSS suggests the total will be closer to 286,000. And the monthly cost of each new enrollee will be more than $730 per month, as opposed to the Washington University assumption of $425.

With updated DSS numbers and corrected assumptions about disabled enrollment, the WashU model’s conclusion of a financial boon for Missouri is unattainable. Based on this new information, and given the severity of our state’s current economic downturn, it’s time to stop pretending Medicaid expansion will not break Missouri’s budget.

The post Missouri Medicaid Division Confirms Expansion Will Break Budget appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

People with disabilities often deal with a variety of complex medical issues, which makes them the costliest group to cover under today’s Medicaid program. It follows that reducing this group’s enrollment would lower costs. But the models don’t actually project lower total enrollment for disabled Missourians. Instead, the models employ what they call “PTD shifting,” which is an attempt to get the federal government to pay more for a significant portion of Missouri’s currently disabled enrollees.

In practice, PTD shifting refers to reclassifying currently enrolled disabled Missourians into the newly eligible Medicaid expansion population. Once reclassified, Missouri would be able to receive nine federal dollars for each state tax dollar it spends to cover the “newly eligible” recipients. This is a stark improvement over the state’s current federal match, which is roughly two federal dollars for each dollar Missouri spends. The problem—and it’s a big one—is that purposely classifying those who meet pre-expansion Medicaid eligibility requirements as newly eligible in order to receive additional federal funds is not allowed, and if money is collected under such a scheme it would need to be returned.

Don’t just take my word for it. New York tried PTD shifting, and its Medicaid program was then audited by the federal Office of Inspector General (OIG). Here’s what the OIG concluded:

Beneficiaries Were Disabled – Individuals may not be enrolled in the new adult category if they are otherwise eligible for Medicaid through a mandatory category. For 3 of the 130 sampled beneficiaries, the State agency incorrectly enrolled the individuals in the new adult group despite their case files demonstrating that they were certified as disabled and receiving Social Security disability benefits—a mandatory coverage group for which the standard FMAP rate applied.

There is an argument to be made that individuals who first apply for Medicaid may not know whether they are eligible to qualify for the program using their disability, but the OIG report concludes that it is the state’s responsibility to determine whether they are categorically eligible for Medicaid based on disability (someone who would be currently eligible, and thus only receiving the 2 to 1 federal match) before enrolling someone in Medicaid based on income (which would be someone newly eligible, thus receiving the 9 to 1 match).

Missouri’s Medicaid enrollment for people with disabilities has totaled over 150,000 annually for well over a decade. Models that project savings based on disregarding federal law should be met with extreme skepticism, to say the least.  And once you remove the PTD shifting assumption, the projected savings disappear entirely. Instead of continuing to look for a free lunch, we need to face the harsh truths about the cost of covering thousands more Missourians under Medicaid.

The post Uh Oh: Are Medicaid Expansion Savings Built on False Promises? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Well, you could try the hidden ball trick. Indiana’s Trine University softball team played this old ruse to perfection in advancing to the 2019 Women’s College World Series.

In a surprise pick-off move, Trine pitcher Kate Saupe turned and fired a bullet to second base. But the ball got away from the infielder and rolled into the outfield. So it seemed. Actually, the ball never left the pitcher’s glove. When the runner tried to advance, Saupe tagged her for the game-winning out.

In promoting the idea of a cost-free expansion of Missouri’s Medicaid program, the Missouri Budget Project, the Missouri Hospital Association, and others are using a similar (and equally spectacular) misdirection play to gain public support for a policy initiative that would be neither cheap nor free.

At $10.9 billion, Medicaid already accounts for 39.6 percent of Missouri’s 2019 budget. That’s more than education, prisons, public safety, or roads. It’s the most for any service funded in part or total by Missouri taxpayers.

So how can Missouri boost the number of Medicaid participants from 850,000 to more than a million people—and save money? It can’t. If we increase Medicaid enrollment more than quarter, there has to be a similar increase in costs—something on the order of $2 billion a year.

The hidden ball here is to treat the federal contribution in this joint state-federal program as “free money” —a manna-from-the-heavens gift from Uncle Sam to the Show-Me State. But the money is not free. Like the residents of other states, Missourians are on the hook for federal Medicaid obligations, no less than state Medicaid obligations. They pay the final bill either way—through state and federal taxes.

Under the Affordable Care Act, the federal government set out to expand Medicaid to include people earning up to 138 percent of federally defined poverty level.

As originally written, this legislation would have required states to comply with the planned expansion of Medicaid or face the loss of all federal matching funds, split roughly on a $3-to-$2 basis between the federal government and the states. The Supreme Court struck down that part of the law in 2012. The Obama administration then agreed to a $9-to-$1 split in favor of the states if they opted to participate in the expansion. What had been a “gun to the head” (as Chief Justice John Roberts wrote) suddenly became a mouth-watering carrot.

Kansas recently became the 37th state to opt into Medicaid expansion. If Missouri were to follow suit, it would still need to put up 10 percent of the cost. Citing a Washington University study, Medicaid expansionists think they have found a way to make even that cost disappear. But this is just one more example of cost-shifting as opposed to cost reduction.

According to the study, Missouri could re-enroll existing recipients currently classified as permanently and total disabled (PTD) based on income, rather than disability. That would trigger the new $9-to-$1 federal match—meaning more federal funds for the same people.

But there is a problem: This maneuver appears to be against the law. So the federal Office of Inspector General said in a recent audit of New York State when it tried to do same thing.

Over the last two decades, Medicaid has been a rapidly rising cost at both the state and national levels. But it remains a deeply troubled program that is not succeeding in its basic mission of providing ready access to high-quality healthcare for low-income families and individuals.

When it comes to promoting needed change in healthcare, using feel-good, sleight-of-hand accounting to promote a false idea of something-for-nothing benefits is a step backward, not forward.

The post The Myth of “Free” Medicaid Expansion appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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Dr. Patrick Rishe of Washington University in Saint Louis argues the current MLS stadium deal is one of the best he’s ever seen, as it includes numerous safeguards for the city and taxpayers and doesn’t use sales taxes to fund construction. Moreover, only 39% of stadium costs will be paid for by the public, compared to the usual 65% to 70%. Therefore, it’s a good public investment—and it certainly isn’t “corporate welfare.”

While his premises are true, the conclusions Dr. Rishe draws are not.

• Rishe states that this deal protects taxpayers in ways previous stadium deals did not. For instance, the ownership group must pay for cost overruns from construction, and the team has to stay in Saint Louis for 30 years (if the MLS doesn’t fold before then). These are reasonable provisions, but they don’t have anything to do with whether a stadium will grow the economy or redevelop downtown. The contractual safeguards simply manage the city’s risk; they don’t guarantee any of the glitz and glam proponents are promising. The stipulation that taxpayers won’t cover cost overruns doesn’t mean the benefits used on to justify the public expense, like economic growth, will be realized.
• Rishe points out that use taxes, which are paid by businesses, will go toward funding the stadium—not sales taxes paid by all city residents. Supposedly, it follows that residents won’t pay for the stadium unless they own a business or buy tickets. But while sales taxes won’t go directly to the stadium, city residents must increase their sales tax rate to get the stadium. That’s because use tax revenue can only be diverted to the stadium if voters first approve a sales tax hike for the MetroLink expansion. So while your sales taxes won’t pay for the stadium, you have to pay extra sales taxes for the stadium.
• If 39% is a breathtakingly low public contribution for a private venture, I’m in the wrong business. Cities across the country have been scammed by sports teams for decades, and the fact that other cities have agreed to worse deals than this one is hardly reason to celebrate. If $60 million is such a negligible contribution, why doesn’t the ownership team simply pay it themselves? Only cash-addicted millionaires would look at an offer to pay 61% of the cost for their own pleasure-dome as a selling point. (As for the $150 million expansion fee the ownership group is coughing up, recall that when the MLS announced the fee would be $50 million less than originally announced, stadium boosters didn’t reduce their ask for public assistance.)
• Rishe contends that giving away $60 million in handouts isn’t corporate welfare because MLS teams don’t turn a good profit. First, the profitability of an enterprise doesn’t bear on whether or not its receipt of subsidies counts as welfare. And second, if the teams currently in the league aren’t turning a profit, what does that say about the long-term prospects of a franchise in Saint Louis? We already have one stadium without a team downtown—do we want to risk adding another?

Joe Reagan, head of the Saint Louis Chamber of Commerce, notes (along with others) that the ownership group will invest $5 million over 20 years in youth sports programs. Moreover, an economic analysis shows the stadium will generate $77.9 million in taxes for the city over the next 30 years. Mr. Reagan presents these factors as evidence that the stadium deal is worthwhile. But here too some perspective is in order:

• The ownership group’s commitment to youth sports is commendable, but this is still a $5 million commitment in the context of a $60 million subsidy.
• The analysis stadium boosters rely on makes rosy assumptions and must (at the very least) be taken with a grain of salt. For instance, it assumes every man, woman, and child will spend roughly $50 on tickets, concessions, and food each time they attend a game, and that spending will increase faster than inflation for 30 years.
• More importantly, most of the economic activity at the hypothetical stadium won’t be “new,” but simply redirected from elsewhere in the city and region. This isn’t money that people were planning to keep hidden under the mattress—much if not most of it would be spent on other entertainment options if there were no soccer games to attend. And let’s not forget the $60 million that businesses are losing because of the use tax. But even assuming proponents’ analysis is correct, the stadium would only bring the city an average of $2.4 million annually—less than a quarter of a percent of the city’s $1 billion annual budget!

The history of stadium deals in Saint Louis and across the country shows these projects fail to make good on the promises made by their promoters. If sports stadiums were such lucrative investments, private investors would be flocking to Saint Louis to get their cut. Despite its supposed virtues, the facts and history indicate that the MLS deal is a bad one for taxpayers. 

The post Cheerleading Won’t Make the MLS Stadium a Good Deal for Taxpayers appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

• Over $440 million in road, bridge, and parking garage investments. That’s right, asphalt to drive and park your car on. (Most curious are improvements to Interstates 64 and 70.)
• $3.4 billion in renovations and expansions of established institutions like Barnes Jewish Hospital, Washington University, Saint Louis University, and the University of Missouri–St. Louis—investments that likely would have occurred with MetroLink or without.
• Another $785 million from government agencies and publicly funded sources—not the privately funded, mixed-use development rail advocates promise.
• CMT even associates another transit project—the $51 million Loop Trolley—with MetroLink.

Who, besides those ideologically wedded to rail, would think MetroLink is primarily responsible for these projects?

The chart below shows other developments that CMT associates with MetroLink. Even charitably assuming a causal link between rail investments and development, much of the economic activity CMT cites is tangentially related—at best—to MetroLink. So, be wary of claims about the economic payoff from rail investments. If MetroLink was so good at driving development, its advocates wouldn’t have to cast such a wide net for evidence of its success.

The post Has MetroLink Spurred Development? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

One might ask, if the city’s payroll tax is illegal, why hasn’t it been challenged before? After all, the tax has been in place since the late 1980s, ever since the city reformed its business license fees. The explanation here may come in the answer to another question: Who pays the payroll tax? The city of Saint Louis’s private-sector payroll was more than $11 billion in 2014. If all businesses paid the payroll tax evenly, the city should have received more than $56 million. In fact, the city earned only about $37 million. Most of that gap comes from the fact that nonprofits (along with government) do not pay the payroll tax. While that sounds charitable, it’s important to remember that Saint Louis City’s top employers are large, wealthy nonprofits like St. Louis University and BJC Healthcare. Small nonprofits like the Show-Me Institute have an impact as well.

But it doesn’t end there. Companies are regularly given payroll tax exemptions as part of incentive packages to keep them in the city. Anthem and Polsinelli are two such companies and are listed in the previously mentioned lawsuit. Do companies with legal departments large and savvy enough to know that the payroll tax has constitutional issues receive exemptions? Or is it simply clout that allows large companies to avoid the tax? Whatever the case, of the top ten employers in Saint Louis City in 2013, only one might have been paying the full payroll tax:

With the payroll tax, we have a policy that not only raises legal questions, but is also implemented unevenly. Does the full rate only apply to for-profit, private businesses without the clout to get a tax break or the wherewithal to make a fuss? If so, the city might want to reevaluate its tax policy, whether it is legal or not.

The post Does Saint Louis Have an Illegal Tax? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

At the time, SEIU was trying to organize Minnesota’s child care providers. When Jennifer got around to reading the petition, she realized that that it wasn’t about a health plan, as the man had told her, but part of a union organizing drive. Jennifer had been lied to.

Jennifer refused to play ball. Sometimes organizers tried to intimidate her. She recounts organizers following her to her car in an effort to show her that she was being watched. However, after she spoke out, most of the intimidation stopped. Eventually the Supreme Court affirmed the right of private care providers not to be forced into SEIU with the Harris v. Quinn decision.

In Missouri, we’re seeing similar stories coming out of SEIU organizing campaigns.

Take Mark Manteuffel, a biology adjunct at Washington University. St. Louis Public Radio reports this story about an SEIU organizer showing up at Mark’s doorstep and approaching his wife:

“They were just very pushy and rude,” Manteuffel said of the union representatives, “demanding my cell phone number. And they didn't introduce themselves first off, they just approached her and asked for me. So she stood back and asked them who they were and why they were looking for me. And she said that I would contact them if I was interested after they introduced themselves.

“The second time, the person said that they would show back up again, and she said no, he will contact you if he's interested. And they kind of huffed and puffed and said again that they would show up, and she said no, you're not listening to me, if you show up again, I will call the police and have you removed. Then the gentlemen seemed to get it.”

The campaign to organize Missouri’s in-home health care attendants is another front where SEIU has been active in our state. In 2010, the SEIU-backed Missouri Home Care Union won the right to represent all home care attendants despite receiving votes from less than 16% of attendants. Since then, the union has sought support from attendants who aren’t already members.

I’m hoping that the tactics used in Missouri don’t get as bad as they’ve been in other places. However, SEIU is not a member of the AFL-CIO and doesn’t always play by the same rules as an AFL-CIO union. For people who feel they’ve been targeted or persecuted for resisting SEIU’s organization drives, speaking out might be the best defense.

(Ms. Parrish is pictured above telling her story at an event sponsored by the National Right to Work Foundation. You can watch her presentation here.) 

The post Standing Up to Hardball Tactics appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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There are numerous criticisms one could make of their study. The authors assume that Saint Louis will get an MLS team and numerous other non-NFL events (that aren’t simply being drawn away from other Saint Louis venues). They only count the cost and benefits to a narrow section of Saint Louis City, and leave out the costs borne by state residents, which is around $300 million. There is also a lack of accounting for substitution effects, which will greatly reduce the NFL’s impact of city sales tax revenue and employment.

However, this post focuses on the key section of their analysis, namely their assumption that growing property tax receipts will exceed the costs of the new stadium for the city of Saint Louis. The authors claim that there is evidence that property values increase around stadiums, with effects diminishing the further away one is. They assumed that the central city’s property value would increase by 6% (excluding the stadium area and the street grid), which the city would tax at the full rate. This assumption accounts for the vast majority of the positive return the authors claim the stadium will create.

Unfortunately, as readers of this blog know, the city’s real property tax base has been hollowed out, especially downtown. Government bodies and tax exempt organizations own a sizable chunk of the city’s core, and much of what’s left receives tax abatements or lies in TIF districts. For these properties, an increase in real property value will have little or no effect on the city’s tax receipts. And we’re not talking about some negligible number of parcels. If we look at the area within a mile of the proposed stadium site, about 60% of real property (by assessed value) either is not subject to real property taxes, receive tax breaks, or is in a TIF district:

Even worse, the article the authors’ cite as a primary basis for their claim that stadiums increase property tax values only looks at residential property. While that article’s claim is in fact disputed, it expressly does not analyze commercial property value. As the map above shows, among what little is left of the unadulterated real property tax base near the proposed stadium, very little is residential.

In light of these facts, the students’ assumption of how much new property taxes the stadium will generate requires a massive downward correction, probably at least 60%. This is not a small problem for their study’s conclusions; property taxes make up about three-quarters of their tangible stadium-created benefits.

To be fair, this was simply a side project done by former business school students, not trained economists. This is only news because the Post-Dispatch ran an entire article on it. Can we now expect similar write-ups on each of the dozens and dozens of economic studies showing no positive impact from stadiums? Will they write an article on how prominent Washington University faculty members acknowledge that a riverfront stadium is not a good investment for taxpayers?

We’re waiting.

The post Property Taxes Will Not Save the Saint Louis Stadium Plan appeared first on Show-Me Institute.