Susan Pendergrass speaks with Aaron Renn, author and consultant, and David Stokes, Director of Municipal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, about the recurring debate over whether the city of St. Louis should rejoin St. Louis County. They explore what city county mergers have actually accomplished in places like Indianapolis, Louisville, Nashville, and Lexington, why a full merger in St. Louis would be extraordinarily difficult to pull off, and whether the benefits would even outweigh the costs. They also discuss St. Louis’s demographic challenges, what the Pittsburgh model might offer as a path forward, the cultural barriers that make it hard to attract and retain people from outside the region, and more.

You can find Aaron’s work here.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:05): Welcome back, Aaron Renn, to the podcast. So happy to have you and David Stokes, our own expert on cities and counties and all things municipal. I appreciate you coming on, Aaron. There have been murmurings around St. Louis again on a topic that we have revisited for probably a hundred years: should the city of St. Louis be a separate county from St. Louis County?

Before we get to that, I want to ask you something because I was reading the news this morning, and I know that you’ve written about city county mergers before, like cities that are kind of dying and then either pulling in parts of their closest suburbs to sort of make everything look better, broaden their tax base, make their crime numbers look better. I was reading something you wrote a year or two ago about that, and you said that Louisville is a failed example of that. Is that right, basically?

Aaron Renn (01:01): Yeah, I’m a little skeptical of how these things have worked out in practice.

Susan Pendergrass (01:05): Yeah, in terms of losing the flavor and the coolness of the city. Literally this morning I saw an article about how Louisville is having a renaissance and these young professionals are all moving there because they didn’t tear down all their beautiful old Victorian homes, so you can still get one for close to a million dollars. They’ve got a cool art scene and a bourbon scene. So it sounds like maybe Louisville did not lose its personal flavor in the merger. I would be curious to know what you think of that.

Aaron Renn (01:33): Well, I like to put St. Louis in context. I’m glad you mentioned Louisville because many of these river cities have similar characteristics. I like to look at St. Louis as well as three cities in the Ohio Valley: Louisville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. All of them heavily German Catholic in their demographics. All of them are very geopolitically fragmented with many small tiny suburbs throughout. They all have very fragmented neighborhood systems as well, where everybody has a strong sense of neighborhood identity. Where you go to high school is a big social marker. They all have phenomenal collections of urban assets and great historic buildings. They all still have their own unique character in a country where that has sort of bled away.

Aaron Renn (02:31): And they also have curiously underperformed demographically and economically in terms of growth. They’re slow growth places. So one thing I always encourage people is to pan back the lens and don’t just look at St. Louis in isolation. Look at it in comparison or dialogue with some of these other places and see what you can learn from them.

Louisville is actually a quite troubled city in important ways. From a white collar employment perspective it’s doing well, from a blue collar perspective less so. It’s one of the 10 least educated major metros in the country. I don’t want to spend too much time on Louisville, but I want to talk about the city county merger, which is distinct from recombining the city and the county. This has been considered urban planning best practice for 30 or 40 years. There was a book written by David Rusk called Cities Without Suburbs. The idea is that cities that were able to expand their boundaries through either annexation or city county mergers were prospering, whilst cities that did not, like the Clevelands, the Cincinnatis, and the St. Louises, were struggling. So the idea is we need big box government.

Indianapolis, where I live now, had a city county merger in 1970. Louisville did a city county merger, I grew up near Louisville. Jacksonville, Florida, Lexington, Kentucky, and Nashville, Tennessee did as well. What I would say is a few things. Merger is not necessarily bad. For Indianapolis, merger did prevent the city from essentially going down the tubes in important ways. So it really was a win in important ways.

But it did not prevent the historic city from going into the exact same demographic decline as St. Louis. The historic city of Indianapolis has lost almost exactly the same share of its population since 1970 as St. Louis has. Secondly, these are very politically difficult to pull off. They take enormous effort. They often fail multiple times. Louisville had multiple failures.

The most precious resource is always management time and attention. Is this where you want to put all your political chips? And in order to get it passed politically, what happens invariably is that most entities are actually not consolidated. In Louisville, none of the existing incorporated suburban governments were in fact merged. In Indianapolis, the school districts weren’t merged.

This means you don’t necessarily get all of the benefits you think from consolidation, because many things are excluded. And then unlike a corporate merger, where there’s typically a lot of downsizing and cost rationalization, in city county mergers nobody ever loses their job and salaries and benefits might even be harmonized upward to the high watermark. So don’t expect it to save any money. Personally, city county merger might have some benefits for St. Louis. I’m not saying it would have no benefits, but in my opinion it’s not going to be a needle mover and most likely it would be extraordinarily politically difficult and uncertain to pull off.

Susan Pendergrass (06:00): Yeah, no question. It’s been very politically difficult. People don’t want to do it. However, we do have these little tiny school districts and police districts. We have, I don’t know, 28 911 systems. We have a lot of what looks like bureaucratic waste and red tape. To the extent that doesn’t get resolved in a merger, then what’s the point? But I do think, you know, we’ve been talking about the demographics of St. Louis. There were over 800,000 people in the city once. Now there are maybe 280,000 and declining, and we’re in the death spiral of more people dying than being born. We’ve been in that for a while. And I guess it brings up the question of what is St. Louis to do if we are in this death spiral? We’re not having the babies. We’re having fewer babies than we did 15 years ago. So school enrollment is only declining. What is the prescription in that situation?

I’ve been to Cincinnati quite a bit. They’re trying to get people downtown with sports stadiums. It doesn’t really work. Louisville has sports stadiums downtown. I don’t know if people really want to move down there. I don’t see it working in St. Louis. So what is a city in that situation to do?

Aaron Renn (07:18): It’s going to be challenging in a sense because your problems are a little over determined. St. Louis was once a regional capital city, much like a Dallas or an Atlanta or a Denver or a Minneapolis. And it lost a lot of those functions. Many of its headquarters have left. It used to have a lot of professional services firms like ad agencies that did business all over the country, not just for the local market. Now St. Louis, although it’s still bigger than Indianapolis, looks a lot more like an Indianapolis or a Columbus, Ohio, where you have fewer corporate headquarters and most of the service firms are just there to serve the local market. St. Louis has essentially shrunk a little bit in relative importance, and it’s hard to get that back.

The demographics are also quite difficult and create a situation where it’s hard to attract business when you have a shrinking labor force, weak demographic growth, and a weak ability to bring people in from the outside. So it’s a very complicated situation and I don’t think there’s any silver bullet for St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (08:39): That’s what I’m asking you for. You have the answers. What’s the silver bullet?

Aaron Renn (08:43): So here are the things I would look at if I were in St. Louis. One of the clear issues that affects all of these river cities is that their wonderful, unique local cultures come with a downside, which is an extreme parochialism that has two negative effects. One, it makes it difficult for the communities to cohesively work together, which I’m not telling you anything you don’t already know. City-suburb divides tend to be bigger. In Indianapolis, regional leadership is mostly all on the same page about the big issues. Same with Columbus, Ohio. Secondly, it makes it very difficult to attract people from out of town because they come there and they can’t make friends, they can’t penetrate the social networks.

Susan Pendergrass (09:15): 100%, yes.

Aaron Renn (09:40): You hear it over and over again in places like St. Louis, Cleveland, even Minneapolis, Minnesota. There are some sayings there. If you want to make friends in Minnesota, go to kindergarten, because that’s when everybody makes their friends. Or Minnesotans will give you directions anywhere but their house. They’re never going to invite you over. St. Louis has that reputation. I don’t think it’s just a reputation. And I know you just had Ness Sandoval on.

Susan Pendergrass (09:53): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (10:08): He’s talking about you need to get better on migration. Migration isn’t going to improve if migrants are not going to be able to join the social networks here. And that’s not even just international migration, that’s domestic migrants. So I think that’s a huge issue for the city. Cultural issues are hard to solve, but maybe less intractable than infrastructure.

The other thing is looking at Pittsburgh as a sort of model. Pittsburgh hasn’t solved really most of its problems by any means, but it has been able to regenerate in the city a sort of high value economy around Carnegie Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. It’s done quite well. Many Silicon Valley firms have set up shop there. What’s happened in Pittsburgh, although it’s still a demographic decline story, is there’s been a demographic transition in the city. Pittsburgh went from one of the least educated cities in America to now one of the youngest and most educated. Part of it is old people moved and died off and young educated people replaced them. So the total number of people in the city was declining, but there was a churn happening underneath. And the same thing is already happening in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (11:13): How did they do that?

Aaron Renn (11:33): College degree attainment in the city is now well north of 40%. So the people who live in the city of St. Louis are very educated. That demographic churn has raised educational attainment and thus incomes in the city a lot. Now Pittsburgh was different because it was an almost entirely white city. There’s a racial divide in St. Louis and gentrification concerns become more salient. But St. Louis is now an educated city. This is not an old post-industrial blue collar city. The city of St. Louis itself is very educated. And also being very small, it doesn’t necessarily need a massive change to move the needle. In Indianapolis we have a population of over 900,000. Moving that behemoth takes a lot. St. Louis now being smaller has a situation where there could be a big impact from lower numbers of things. So I think a knowledge economy built around Washington University and your medical centers has some possibilities, somewhat similar to Pittsburgh.

Susan Pendergrass (12:45): So much medical.

Aaron Renn (12:58): Carnegie Mellon’s engineering and computer science areas will be a little different. I might also look at Vanderbilt, what’s going on there? What are some peer schools you could watch to see what’s going on? But I think there are actually some reasons to think that the city of St. Louis, believe it or not, could be sort of turning a corner. It has now demographically renewed itself to a higher educational attainment state. Being small, it probably doesn’t have that much further to fall, and you can start building from there. Obviously there are governance challenges, but looking at the Pittsburgh model, studying similar complexes around peer schools, and addressing the culture issues is where I’d look.

David Stokes (13:33): Hopeful.

Susan Pendergrass (13:47): So as a spokesperson for St. Louis, what do you see for the future?

David Stokes (13:52): Well, I would be curious to get Aaron’s thoughts on that size question, about how the city of St. Louis has in fact gotten so small. It’s about 10% of the metro area. How does that affect the pros or cons of any type of a merger? These would not be a merger of equals. St. Louis County would almost subsume St. Louis City into it. How do you think that would affect things for better or worse?

Aaron Renn (14:28): Well, that was the critique of the Louisville merger by two academics at the University of Louisville. I mentioned the book Cities Without Suburbs. They wrote an academic paper called Suburbs Without a City, which basically said if the merger passed in Louisville, it would essentially mean the suburbs take over the city, not the city taking over the suburbs, because the old city of Louisville only had about 260,000 people and the suburbs would numerically dominate. The same thing would certainly happen in St. Louis. If there were a merger, suburban St. Louis County would control the city in essence.

Another consideration, and this is a Cincinnati issue, I interviewed about 15 years ago the mayor of Cincinnati, John Cranley. Here’s what he said, and I think this is an important point. He said, 30 years ago, city county merger was the thing because cities were in decline and you wanted to tap that suburban tax base to fund the city. But now it’s reversed. Now the cities are coming back and it’s the inner suburbs that are actually going down the tubes. And so in Cincinnati today, we have all the corporate headquarters, we have the universities and the medical centers, and we don’t have to share our tax revenue with anybody. If we were merged with the county government, we’d have to prop up all these failing suburbs. And so I think you’re in a similar situation in St. Louis, where the high value activity, not all of it is in the city of St. Louis because of Clayton and so on, but the St. Louis County suburbs are mostly places that are themselves on negative trajectories. Merging the city, which may be on the cusp of being able to bottom out and turn around, with all of these still declining inner suburban areas, might actually be an albatross around the city’s neck.

Susan Pendergrass (15:16): What would that mean?

David Stokes (16:37): I just think one of the differences between St. Louis and Cincinnati, and I don’t know the property tax base of Cincinnati, is that so much of the city of St. Louis is tax exempt right now. Between Washington University, Saint Louis University, and all the government entities, there’s just so much of it. I say that as somebody who supports property tax changes to make them pay something towards it. But I just don’t think the Cincinnati argument applies to the city of St. Louis right now. That property tax exemption part is a huge factor because the most growing, thriving part of it is the entire giant Barnes-WashU-Cortex complex, and the amount of property taxes they pay is miniscule.

Susan Pendergrass (16:38): Hmm.

Aaron Renn (17:26): Well, some of that is a planning issue. And I think the reality is, when you have a complex like that, are all these people going to move to St. Charles? Maybe not. I’ll tell you, I live in the suburb of Indianapolis named Carmel, and a lot of the hospitals and things have been opening facilities here. When these nonprofit hospitals come up here, we will not approve zoning changes for those hospitals unless they agree to make payments in lieu of taxes. You want to come up here and you want a zoning change, you’re going to have to pay. We were actually quite prescient in that one of the local hospital chains opened a for-profit hospital. As part of the approval deal, we said, if you ever convert to nonprofit status, you will continue paying property taxes. And we did that.

So I think there probably is leverage from the city over some of these entities. You don’t have a lot of leverage over a corporation deciding where to put their office, but that’s not a tax exempt situation. The stuff at Cortex is probably not going to leave if you make them pay a little money the next time they come to you for a zoning approval. I think you need to start looking at how to get more money out of these entities that are nonprofits in name only. These universities and hospitals are effectively gigantic hedge funds. Their executives are extremely well compensated and billions of dollars are flowing through there. Undoubtedly the better solution there is to figure out how to tax them rather than figure out how to tax the soon-to-be-dead mall in the suburb over the border.

David Stokes (19:24): Well, yeah, and that’s sort of the trade off, unfortunately, is that they do pay earnings tax. The employees, many of them very highly compensated, pay the earnings tax. And that’s what makes the city more dependent on local income taxes, not less, because they’re either tax exempt or in the case of Cortex, have tax abatements that make them essentially tax exempt.

Susan Pendergrass (19:25): We do have earnings taxes, right? So the folks who work there have to pay an earnings tax.

Aaron Renn (19:53): Yeah. Again, I don’t know exactly the fiscal architecture there. But I would say you don’t want to do a merger simply to do a tax dollar grab. The lesson of Indianapolis is we did that. We grabbed suburban tax dollars and we used it to rebuild our downtown successfully. But here we are 50 years later, and now we have enormous tracts of decayed suburbia that are an enormous problem. Our entire core county is now in a sense the inner city. We have big challenges because we were not able to invest in ways that allow those suburban areas to retain their allure over the long term.

And I’m not saying that’s impossible, but any short term juice you get, cities always rise and fall. Core cities have proven more resilient and more able to regenerate themselves than suburbs. Part of it is because state governments cannot afford to let their state’s largest city or major urban center go down the tubes.

Susan Pendergrass (21:06): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (21:16): Missouri cannot let St. Louis and Kansas City implode. Michigan cannot just write off Detroit and say who cares. But these suburban areas have proven a lot tougher to save. We don’t have a good model. We’ve spent decades thinking about how to rebuild cities and build districts. There are certain things you can pull off in a city around conventions, civic events, gathering spaces, museums, and government that are very hard to translate to suburban settings. So there’s not a great playbook, especially in declining markets, for renewing suburbs. The playbook for suburban renewal, if you want to call it that, is places like Carmel, Indiana, which are growing and affluent, and therefore can build large mixed use centers, new urbanist developments, trails, and parks. The suburbs of St. Louis County are probably tremendously deficient in infrastructure as we would understand it today.

So again, there may actually be some benefits in having St. Louis City rejoin the county in a sense, because then the county functions are spread and amortized across a larger population.

Susan Pendergrass (22:45): It would immediately improve our murder rate because we would be mixing it in.

Aaron Renn (22:48): Yeah, there is some of that. The murder rate is an artifact of the size of the city more than anything. There are places in Chicago with higher murder rates. A former colleague of mine at the Manhattan Institute, Rafael Mangual, did an analysis of Chicago. He said there are areas on the South Side of Chicago that are larger and have more people than St. Louis with far higher murder rates than St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (22:56): We get called out because of the small denominator.

Aaron Renn (23:17): And so there is that. The other thing is Chicago is a good example. New York City was essentially a city county merger. In 1898, the five counties that are the five boroughs of New York were consolidated into one city. Philadelphia was also a city county consolidation from the 19th century. But what happens when you create a very large city of say a million people or more is you really have to scale up your government. You have to have a government that operates at that scale.

What happened with Indianapolis was we merged city and county government, but we didn’t really have a government that could effectively manage this new larger territory. It never built out the infrastructure in the suburbs. In New York, the Bronx has subways, great parks, everything built out with proper infrastructure, because it was part of New York and New York had to expand governance to become a city of eight million. Chicago got big in the 19th century and built a city government that could run a city of three million people. And some of the stuff that gets critiqued there, for example, is a lot of city services were organized by ward or city council district. There are 50 city council districts and every city councilor is sort of a little mini mayor of their district. The alderman essentially has veto power over any zoning changes. It’s called aldermanic privilege. So there are a lot of constraints there.

But if it’s just one mayor and one city council trying to think about a huge city of 77 neighborhoods and three million people, they can’t keep that much in their head. All they can think about is downtown. And that’s what happened in Indianapolis. The mayor and city council can really only think about downtown. We should have built out structures in townships throughout the city so that you had leadership focused on that area and money focused on that area. That’s what made the suburbs work really well. A suburb like Carmel is basically township sized. We have 100,000 people, big enough to do things, but not so big that our mayor and council can’t keep the whole city in their head and plan and manage the whole city.

So if you merge with the county government, you’re going to have to create an entirely new government structure that allows you to essentially manage every sub area of the whole thing and bring it all up to a standard of services. That’s the other thing they often did in Louisville and Nashville. They merge, but they have a two tier service system where there’s an urban services district for the old city which gets more services, and then the others get less. They didn’t do that in New York. There’s one standard of service in New York, one in Philadelphia, one in Chicago. So if you can’t commit to a single standard of service, you’re basically creating a bogus merger in my opinion. If you’re going to do a merger, you need to obliterate every government and entity in St. Louis County and city, merge them all into one with one standard. That’s not going to happen.

Susan Pendergrass (26:35): That’s not going to happen. What do you think, David?

David Stokes (26:37): Yeah, that’s not going to happen.

Aaron Renn (26:43): So you end up with a lot of problems. Louisville didn’t merge any fire departments. Imagine a city that doesn’t have a consolidated fire department. Imagine a city without a single police department. That was actually Indianapolis. When we merged, the Indianapolis Police Department still patrolled the old city, but the new parts of the city that were consolidated in from the county were still controlled by the sheriff.

Susan Pendergrass (27:13): That is 100% what would happen in St. Louis. Everyone would retain their school system and their police department and their fire department. I lived for a long time in Fairfax County, Virginia, which is a single county government. It’s massive, 150,000 students in their school system. It seems to function with a single police department and fire department. But I don’t think you can backwards engineer that into a place that for hundreds of years has been operating as it has been operating.

Aaron Renn (27:43): Lexington, Kentucky worked pretty well because one, the schools were already consolidated, as in the South it’s typically county school districts. Secondly, there were no other government entities, no township governments, no other incorporated municipalities. So it merged everything. And they were sort of able to solve the urban services district issue because the outer areas of Fayette County were horse farms. They actually put in a kind of green belt rule, you can’t develop out there, because they wanted to protect these scenic landscapes. So there was actually a good reason to treat that differently, because it was a very unique American landscape. Lexington, I think, was pretty successful.

Susan Pendergrass (28:15): They are. I appreciate it when I drive across Route 64.

Aaron Renn (28:39): Lexington was pretty successful and wasn’t especially controversial when they did it, in part because there weren’t all these entrenched interests like there are in other places. If you look at places that did the mergers, they weren’t the Cincinnatis and Pittsburghs. They’ve been talking about consolidation in Pittsburgh forever. It was very hard. And Louisville did it, but it was one of the least consolidated so-called consolidated governments. What the Louisville merger functionally did was dissolve the city of Louisville and reorganize county government. The county government now has a mayor and a council instead of the old fiscal court with the judge executive and all that.

Susan Pendergrass (29:21): That’s kind of what would happen in St. Louis, right?

Aaron Renn (29:36): That’s essentially what they did. They basically dissolved the city and the county government was reorganized, but nothing was merged.

Susan Pendergrass (29:43): Did you have a question?

David Stokes (29:45): I want to get back to the fire district point. We’re talking about why this would be so hard. There’s actually a law in St. Louis that only applies in St. Louis County that makes it impossible to consolidate fire districts. Even if a modest mid-sized suburb annexes an unincorporated part of town, they’re not allowed to provide fire services to that new annexed area, or they can, but they have to pay so much to the old unincorporated fire district that it makes it impossible to do so. That’s just one example of how even if you wanted a full scale merger, it would just be impossible to actually carry through.

Susan Pendergrass (30:34): Why do you think people float this idea, David? Why does it come back every couple of years?

David Stokes (30:38): You know, it’s the old line. I remember a study I read about Pittsburgh and St. Louis many years ago. The question was, are the St. Louis and Pittsburgh areas really inefficient with all the fragmented government? And the conclusion was, well, you would never design a metro area like this, but they’ve both made it work over the last century better than you would think. The conclusion was that St. Louis and Pittsburgh aren’t actually as inefficient as you might assume when you run the numbers.

I think people have trouble accepting that. People look at so many small municipalities, many of them dysfunctional, many of them until recent times funded themselves primarily with traffic tickets, which is a terrible way to fund local government, and that’s not even an exaggeration. And there’s just this fundamental belief that if you can just plan it better you’ll create a better place. I just think it fails.

One of the reasons it would fail, going back to what Aaron led this conversation off with, is that if St. Louis County and St. Louis City joined together, they’re not actually going to lay any government employees off to save any money. St. Louis City government is not going to fire city employees. It’s never going to happen. So you’re not going to save any money and it’s all just going to collapse.

Aaron Renn (32:12): Yeah, New York City and large governments are not more efficient.

I look at it and say, look, I think merger is a solution for failed states, if you want to call them that, in the St. Louis suburbs. Take some micro-suburb that’s a complete scam or is bankrupt and merge it in with its neighbor. Do some consolidation like that, that probably needs to be led by state government, almost like a receivership sort of thing. That’s just kind of good government as you work through it. But I just don’t think the benefits you would gain from trying to do a complete governmental merger of St. Louis City with St. Louis County would outweigh the opportunity cost of how much time and effort you spend on it, when you could be spending that on other things that I think will actually move the needle more.

The downsides are arguably as high as the upsides. There’s no guarantee it’s even net positive in this environment. The time to have merged was when Indianapolis did it in 1970, not in 2026. Nashville did it in the 60s. Jacksonville did it a long time ago.

And then I think it doesn’t fix the fundamental issues around the culture. You’ve got to take a hard look at that and say, it’s maybe very difficult to change. The idea that people who aren’t from here have to be able to move here and get connected and feel like they belong in the city. There’s a couple we know who lived in St. Louis. The wife taught in St. Louis public schools. They’re big urban people. The husband was from St. Louis, and they moved here to Carmel, Indiana.

Susan Pendergrass (33:47): Tell me more about that.

Aaron Renn (34:10): Basically they said, man, people are just so much friendlier here. They make better eye contact, they engage more. It’s just so much more welcoming than it was in St. Louis, even though they were actually in a sense connected because the husband was from there.

So when even people who lived in St. Louis and liked it notice a difference when they leave, that is a killer when you’re already struggling demographically. I had a guy who owned a business in Cleveland who said to me one time, I learned the hard way never to recruit anyone from out of town to work for my company unless that person or their spouse is from Cleveland, because otherwise they will never stay. When that’s where you are as a place, that is just rough. I think that is one of the killers for these river cities.

Susan Pendergrass (35:16): Yeah, what’s the fix for that? I don’t know what the fix is.

Aaron Renn (35:38): I think the optimistic case for St. Louis, and I actually tweeted this a year or two ago, is that St. Louis City educational attainment is really high now. In a sense, it’s a small, highly educated city that is probably going to continue growing more educated. So I think the Pittsburgh option looks viable in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (36:00): And certainly great medical care. I know that the average age is getting older in St. Louis. I think within 10 years, one in four people will be over the age of 65. But we also have an Alzheimer’s research center and access to medical care, which as you get older gets more important. I do think there’s an opportunity to lean in to the medical services that are available, as the country as a whole gets older. I think St. Louis looks more attractive for that reason. So I think you’re right that with universities and medical centers, there’s an opportunity.

Aaron Renn (36:35): Yeah, I think if America’s demographics keep on this trend, a lot of other places are going to get to where St. Louis is. And the thing to be careful of is that when you’re in a declining market, that often prompts centralization of activity and population. What happened with Japan is that once Japan’s population started falling, everybody started moving to Tokyo. It’s Tokyo and a handful of other cities where everything is concentrated, and they literally have ghost towns there.

I don’t think it’s any accident that Indianapolis’ growth really took off once the Rust Belt era and deindustrialization hit the state. Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio have grown in large measure through drawing people out of the rest of the state as those states declined. Huge numbers of people move from Cleveland to Columbus every year.

Missouri is a little different than that. One of your challenges is that St. Louis does not draw people from rural Missouri. When I looked at the data, it’s not like there’s a massive flow into St. Louis from the rest of the state. So you don’t have that siphon bringing people in.

Susan Pendergrass (37:55): There are public safety issues around that, but yes.

Aaron Renn (38:00): And the issue we have is that we’ve now eaten our seed corn. There’s not going to be next generations of children in the towns I grew up in in rural Indiana to move to Indianapolis anymore. The cohort sizes are going to be smaller. So that pump, even Tokyo is declining now in population. That siphon is draining the water table. We can only rely on that so long.

But I think this is the risk for St. Louis in that kind of environment. People with opportunity might avoid or flee St. Louis and go to Austin, Texas or Nashville. They go to the handful of places in America that are really still growing. That’s a threat even for Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio. In a declining market, it’s very hard to get people to want to come to a shrinking city because the opportunity space is shrinking. St. Louis’s opportunity space has been shrinking because you’re losing corporate headquarters and your working age population is declining. That dynamic is really going to be a challenge. But within that, the city of St. Louis might end up doing okay. Again, being small actually helps it here.

Susan Pendergrass (39:25): Any closing thoughts on that, David?

David Stokes (39:27): Just that the part of Missouri that is definitely still growing, and that probably is attracting those young rural people who are moving to a city, is going into southwest Missouri, the Springfield-Branson area. That’s absolutely the growing part of the state. And even Kansas City is growing certainly more than St. Louis is.

Aaron Renn (39:48): Yeah, it’s not a culturally cohesive state. Springfield and that area are definitely growing, and growing despite the fact that they have nowhere close to the urban assets of a St. Louis. It’s interesting to watch, and we’ll just have to see what happens.

Susan Pendergrass (40:05): It is. I think about it a lot. I’ve been talking about this in terms of school enrollment for years and years, where you could see the biggest kindergarten cohort was after the Great Recession of 2009. You know that that’s the biggest kindergarten cohort for the last 15, 16, 17 years. We do nothing but build schools and hire teachers. We are slow to catch on to these things happening. But I think your perspective is certainly very interesting. On the question of the merger, it’s not worth the cost for whatever benefits there might be. But it still gets talked about, so I appreciate you coming and giving us your thoughts on it. Maybe we’ll have to have you back to talk about it again.

David Stokes (41:02): And Aaron, I want you to come back. I want to find out how we get more roundabouts in Missouri. I love roundabouts. I go to Carmel it seems like once a year for these gigantic youth sports tournaments up at Westfield, just a little bit north of you. My kids’ sports take me there. And I love the roundabouts. You cannot get enough of them.

Aaron Renn (41:09): I’d love to talk about that. My favorite topic.

Aaron Renn (41:24): Yeah, it’s great. We hardly ever have to stop. There are barely any stoplights or stop signs left in our city. It’s amazing. We’re one of the few growing places in America where traffic is better today than it was 20 years ago.

Susan Pendergrass (41:32): They’re awesome.

David Stokes (41:45): People don’t realize how good that is for air quality and everything. You just keep moving along, not stop and start. We need 100 times more roundabouts in this area.

Susan Pendergrass (41:55): Are you pretending that people stop at stop signs in St. Louis? Because let’s be honest, people don’t stop at stop signs.

David Stokes (42:00): Well, they roll them, but it’s still wrong when they roll them. Maybe all the people blowing red lights on Kings Highway at 50 miles an hour are just being environmentally conscious. I need to give them more of the benefit of the doubt, I guess.

Susan Pendergrass (42:12): That’s exactly right. All right, thanks so much. I really appreciate it.

Aaron Renn (42:19): Thank you.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post The St. Louis City-County Merger with Aaron Renn and David Stokes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The newest demography newsletter from Saint Louis University delivers a jarring wake-up call that regional leaders can no longer afford to ignore. For years, the conversation around St. Louis has been one of stagnation, but the 2025 population estimates from the Census Bureau reveal we have shifted onto a much more dangerous track toward structural decline. While the national birth rate is falling, St. Louis has emerged as an epicenter of this trend, ranking first among the fifty largest metropolitan areas in the percentage decline of births since 2021 (9 percent). We are now in a state of demographic winter where deaths outnumber births, and unlike our neighbors, we do not have a steady stream of new residents moving in to offset the loss.

When we look at our peers in Indianapolis and Nashville, the contrast is stark. Indianapolis has seen a domestic migration gain of nearly 20,000 people since 2020, while Nashville has increased by 89,000. Meanwhile, St. Louis saw over 31,000 people leave for other parts of the country during that same period. St. Louis is heading into a period in which it will carry a much heavier demographic burden of older residents compared to these peer cities, which are successfully maintaining a younger and more sustainable age structure.

Both of these other regions have more childbirths annually than they did just five years ago. But this isn’t just by chance. Indianapolis has aggressively aligned its economic incentives with family needs, requiring companies that receive tax breaks to reinvest in childcare and neighborhood infrastructure. Indianapolis families can also choose between universally available private school vouchers, charter schools, or any traditional public school in the district. Nashville has used Tennessee’s lack of a state income tax to attract high-earning families and has focused on building the kind of walkable, tech-ready neighborhoods that remote-working parents prioritize. Both cities have created an environment where it is easier and more affordable to raise a family, which in turn fuels both natural growth and domestic migration numbers.

St. Louis is currently operating under the outdated assumption that we will always have 35,000 births a year to sustain our schools and workforce. The reality is that we have declined by over 7,000 births annually since 2011, and that number is still searching for a bottom. If we want to avoid a future of shrinking school districts and a hollowed-out economy, we have to stop treating these numbers as theoretical. We must move toward a strategy that makes St. Louis a destination for families again, rather than a place they leave behind.

The post A Wake-up Call for St. Louis appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

St. Louis has a reputation for being a violent city. Crime issues have helped push people out in droves and deterred newcomers from settling in the area. St. Louis City’s population has decreased by over 30% since the 1980s, and the number of vacant downtown buildings has increased substantially. The Wall Street Journal went as far as to call downtown a “real estate nightmare.”

Although St. Louis continues to rank among the most dangerous cities in the country, efforts have been made to solve the ongoing crime problem, beginning with the replacement of former St. Louis Circuit Attorney Kim Gardner in 2023. Gardner exacerbated the crime issue in several ways, including having an exclusion list of police officers who were not allowed to bring cases to her office and creating a massive backlog of more than 6,700 cases that awaited charging decisions. The current St. Louis Circuit Attorney, Gabe Gore, has since cleared all cases in the backlog.

More recent efforts include House Bill (HB) 495, signed by Governor Mike Kehoe into law in March. This legislation transfers control of the St. Louis Police Department to a state-appointed board. The governor has already made five interim appointments to the six-person board (the mayor is the sixth member of the board). In addition, a $45 million 911 dispatch center broke ground last year in St. Louis with the goal of improving response times. In St. Louis, only half of the 911 calls in 2022 were answered within the national standard of 10 seconds.

It is unclear whether these efforts will have positive impacts on public safety in St. Louis, but what is clear is that violent crime in the city is down. It was down 7.8% in 2024 compared to 2023. The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) reported homicides were down 6.3 % in 2024. It is worth noting that crime is down across the country, so this may be part of a larger trend.

The fact that St. Louis has lower violent crime and homicide rates is a positive sign, but time will tell if the city can sustain this success and lose the moniker of being one of the nation’s most dangerous cities.

The post St. Louis’s Improving Crime Data appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Now there is one more “doom loop” article about the challenges facing St. Louis. Governing magazine wrote recently about how declining downtown activity leads to economic decline. Its observations are similar to those in the Journal. Cities like St. Louis, where vacant office spaces drive down property values, are experiencing a vicious cycle where diminished tax revenues lead to reduced public services, further pushing businesses and residents away. According to Jason Bram, an economist interviewed in the article, “It’s a very slow-moving, long-term trend that’s only gotten worse.”

This pattern of urban decline is related to the broader challenges facing cities that fail to address fundamental issues like public safety, infrastructure, and housing. St. Louis, already burdened by economic stagnation, could face further setbacks unless city leaders refocus on foundational public services.

Flashy developments like downtown stadia won’t cut it; St. Louis needs to avoid repeating those expensive mistakes. Instead, cities should prioritize core services. For St. Louis, that means investing in improving public safety, maintaining infrastructure, and focusing on policies that encourage growth.

Without addressing these fundamental issues, St. Louis risks being caught in a permanent cycle of decline. Other cities should also heed this warning and ensure that they focus on sustaining a healthy urban core before chasing grandiose development projects.

The post The Many Doom Loops of St. Louis appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

But regardless of what is being celebrated, events like these point to a vibrant city.

Sadly, this may not be the case on the other side of the state in St. Louis.

On July 25, St. Louis Mayor Tishaura Jones was on hand to help hype the “Q in the Lou” barbecue festival, scheduled to be held on the grounds of the Gateway Arch in early September. Jason Hall, CEO of Greater St. Louis, a non-profit dedicated to revitalizing the city, was triumphal in saying that bringing this “signature national festival back to downtown St Louis is showing how this community is answering that call taking action and making us stronger.”

Apparently not.

Q in the Lou has been canceled. According the St. Louis Post-Dispatch:

Sean Hadley, one of the organizers of the event, confirmed the cancellation Monday afternoon, citing trouble garnering corporate sponsorship and VIP ticket sales — and public safety concerns disputed by the mayor’s office.

“We’re seeing a lack of support,” Hadley said. “It’s not there.”

This truly is a shame. St. Louis has a real problem with public safety and the public perception. Subsidized events and buildings won’t change that. It can only be solved by the slow and difficult work of public policy, including increasing public safety, keeping the city clean and orderly, maintaining infrastructure, and doing all of this in a cost-efficient manner.

There is no shortcut, no matter how good the ribs are.

The post STL Q Down the Loo appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A recent report from business resource AdvisorSmith analyzes population data of cities with more than 250,000 residents. With a compound annual growth rate of −1.1 percent, St. Louis tops the list as the fastest-shrinking city. This means that St. Louis City’s population fell by an average of 1.1 percent each year from 2014 to 2019. That’s a huge difference from the fastest-growing cities; Henderson, Nevada, and Irvine, California, both grew by an average of 3.1 percent each year over the same period.

So why is St. Louis shrinking?

It’s probably a combination of many things. High crime   and poor school performance certainly play a part, but there are other problems. Policies that place onerous burdens on businesses and residents can prevent both economic and population growth. The city’s earnings tax means that city residents and workers lose an additional 1 percent of their income to taxes. Numerous special-taxing districts make sales taxes as high as 11.679 percent in some areas of the city. Stringent business regulations make it harder for businesses to operate and hire workers. Does this sound like an attractive place to live, work, or start your business?

Our city continues to make headlines for losing population. If we want to stop this trend and attract residents and businesses to St. Louis, action is needed. Addressing the crime rate and poor schools will be challenging, but other cities such as Indianapolis (with a strong school choice environment, some crime rates trending down, and a growing population) have done so. With respect to taxes and regulatory policy, repeal the earnings tax, cut red tape, and rein in special-taxing districts. With a focused effort on doing the basics well and getting government out of the way of business, St. Louis City might start to grow again.

The post St. Louis Is Shrinking. Let’s Reverse the Trend appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

One of those effects—severe real estate blight—is immediately obvious to any tourist. Abandoned warehouses line the riverfront and entire neighborhoods in north St. Louis are decaying.   

But two unlikely allies are trying to solve the problem by philanthropic means.

The St. Louis Post Dispatch reports on an effort by a new organization, the St. Louis Blight Authority, to address the blight crisis by demolishing vacant and abandoned homes:

Tech billionaire Jack Dorsey, a St. Louis native and co-founder and CEO of both Square Inc. and Twitter, along with Detroit native Bill Pulte, whose grandfather founded national homebuilder Pulte Homes, were paying for the demolitions — $500,000 for a pilot program to completely clear more than 130 lots in a four-block area of the northwest St. Louis neighborhood hard hit by abandonment and vacancy.

However, the Post-Dispatch article explains the initial pilot phase will only knock down 30 structures. It’s a good first step, but it will make trivial progress toward solving the problem. St. Louis has 7,000 vacant buildings and more than 12,000 vacant lots.

The blight crisis will not solve itself, and Missouri’s major cities already use economic development programs that haven’t been shown to improve the situation. Could private resources, invested in an ambitious project, successfully remove blight in St. Louis? And is the St. Louis Blight Authority the entity to usher in success?

From the Post-Dispatch: “Dorsey and Pulte hope to inspire other philanthropists to contribute to the effort and perhaps expand it to other city neighborhoods.”

With the price tag for total blight removal estimated at $70 million, inspiration won’t cover the bill. But it’s a place to start.   

The post St. Louis Blight Authority: Philanthropy Might Provide What Markets Cannot appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

One reason is the City’s deserved reputation as a crime center. As recently as 2016, the city was ranked the most violent city in America by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and property crime remains a major issue for residents and visitors alike. What drives the crime is subject to interpretation and analysis; poverty and the region’s long-simmering racial tensions are factors. But whatever its source, crime affects whether people stay in the city—or for that matter, whether they come to the city in the first place.

Taxes are also an enormously important piece of the puzzle. The negative impact of income and earnings taxes on economic growth appears in the academic literature again and again, and yet St. Louis policymakers and others have refused to change course. In a paper written for the Show-Me Institute in 2014, economist Howard Wall found that half of the population loss that took place in the city between 2000 and 2010 could be attributed to the earnings tax. Even if the effect were only half as big, it would still be a massive problem.

Additional research, including a host of Show-Me Institute papers, have demonstrated similar growth issues related to the City’s earnings tax. Still, establishment political interests continue to rally around it. Whether that’s out of stubbornness or fear, the negative impact the tax has on the City and its future remains the same.

Capital and labor are mobile, and because they are, leaving the city is very easy. Factor in that the city gives away millions in tax dollars to a cavalcade of long-entrenched special interests, and it becomes clear that an economic system that robs Peter Taxpayer to pay Paul only works if Peter sticks around. And Peter hasn’t.

The city hasn’t just beggared taxpayers through the earnings tax and its tax subsidies; it has also beggared some of the very public services that lure young families to a city. I will leave the heavy lifting on education policy to my colleagues at the Show-Me Institute, but I will observe that a city steering $30 million per year from basic city services like education does so at its own peril. Yet, that’s exactly what the St. Louis does.

There is a charm to the urban environment that attracts many. That charm can be enough to compensate for the negative effect of somewhat higher taxes, or somewhat greater risk, or somewhat poorer services.

But there is a limit. If you were 30, married, and had children or were planning to, would you put down roots in a place bedeviled by St. Louis’s problems? Or would you go someplace where safety, educational opportunity, and tax stewardship were high priorities? When fundamental public needs are left unmet, it isn’t fleeing residents who are at fault; it’s the city that is.

Regional power is moving to the north and west of the city, through St. Louis County and toward St. Charles County. Lest we forget, St. Charles County is now larger than St. Louis City—and it’s positioned to widen that population gap for the foreseeable future.

The City’s greatest issue isn’t whether it will be the economic center of the region. Its greatest issue, the one that will determine its long-term viability, is whether it will be a competent steward of public money and the public’s trust—whether the City will address the policy questions that ultimately underpin and promote long-term development and population growth. Doing so will require a meticulous commitment to getting the fundamentals of governance right and eschewing the rest.

It’s said that the best time to plant a tree was twenty years ago, and the next best time is to plant a tree is today. For the sake of its future, now is the right time for St. Louis to address its fundamental and widely recognized issues of governance in a serious and research-driven manner. Until the city gets serious about regaining public trust by getting back to the basics of governance—above all, a full commitment to security, education, and the stewardship of the public checkbook—no one should be surprised when more St. Louisans follow their predecessors out the door.

The post St. Louis Is Failing, and It Has Only Its Government to Blame appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Indianapolis has been a standout in creating a vibrant network of schools from which parents can choose. In addition to dozens of charter schools and the Indiana Choice Scholarship voucher program, Indianapolis Public Schools (IPS) has been sponsoring Innovation Network Schools. These schools have been achieving large yearly gains in standardized test scores, for which IPS gets the credit. And parents get the benefit of a collaborative, choice-rich environment that prioritizes student needs over turf battles. Not surprisingly, Indy’s metro population has been growing by over five percent per year since 2010.

The news out of St. Louis is much less positive. Fodor’s added it to their “do not travel” list this year and the NAACP has issued a travel advisory to warn people against driving through the city. And, just last week, new census numbers revealed that St. Louis’ population—both in the city and the county—continues to decline, with the region having now dropped out of the top 20 largest metropolitan areas.

It’s hard to imagine that St. Louis is going to be able to turn this around and start growing again unless it focuses on getting the basics right: keeping people safe, providing quality schools, and not taxing people to exhaustion. It’s time to stop defending a failing status quo.

In 2017, just 31 percent of St. Louis Public Schools (SLPS) 8th graders were Proficient in English/Language Arts and just 9 percent were Proficient in Math. The Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) considers St. Louis Public Schools to be “fully accredited”; however, when only one out of ten students starts high school knowing how to do math at grade level, it’s going to be tough to turn out students who are college- or career-ready. And sure enough, the average ACT score in 2017 was 17.0, with 87 percent of those who took the exam scoring below the national average.

Fortunately, some St. Louis parents have access to public charter schools, many of which dramatically outperform the school district. But the district and the charter schools are often at odds. In fact, the district, along with the NAACP, is suing the charter schools over a desegregation sales tax the SLPS claims should not have been shared with the charter schools. If SLPS wins, most of the charter schools are likely to be bankrupted. Rather than trying to expand options for parents, the SLPS lawsuit could end up limiting them.

Too often in Missouri, it seems that giving parents options like charter schools is seen as a threat rather than a useful tool. Maybe that’s one reason the city is losing residents, as some parents vote with their feet and move elsewhere.

The post School Options and the Rise and Fall of Cities appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Blight, which is a legitimate and pervasive problem on the east side of Kansas City, is tragic. It scars communities, reduces property value and chases away private investment. The documentary “Our Divided City” demonstrates clearly the link between urban neglect, poverty, blight, and crime in Kansas City alone.

But Kansas City’s use of blight, particularly in the case of the InterContinental Hotel, doesn’t address those things. The Kansas City Star wrote that the hotel in question is seeking the blight designation so that it can create a community improvement district (CID) and collect a 1% tax. The hotel would keep the tax and use it to address “deteriorated bathroom finishes and ceilings, torn and badly stained carpets in heavily trafficked areas and guest rooms, and torn wall paper.” In short, the CID allows them to create and collect a tax that they don’t have to report as part of their basic rate. But it will still be charged to every customer—tacked on at the end of every bill like any other tax, even though the money will stay with the hotel. One Marriott general manager has said that if the InterContinental’s request is granted, other hotels will seek to follow suit. And why not? It’s an opportunity to charge customers an extra 1% more than the rates they advertise.

It's difficult enough to look at a hotel as opulent as the InterContinental and think blight. Now the hotel wants to charge customers an extra 1% that the city will never see, and call that a tax. Kansas Citians, along with those who visit the city and stay at the InterContinental, deserve better. The hand-wringing and nose-holding of the past is not sufficient. Kansas City needs a more open and fair tax policy.

The post The Luxurious Intercontinental Hotel is Blighted? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Sen. Eric Schmitt, a St. Louis County Republican, is sponsoring the legislation capping municipal court fines.

“We’re trying to prevent cities from using this as a revenue-generating opportunity and we’re trying to protect individuals who are primarily poor,” Schmitt told The Star. “People ought to obey the law, but we shouldn’t treat our citizens like ATMs.”

In a more recent story, the Star features various Jackson County and Kansas City leaders bristling at the idea of having court fines and fees reduced. Specifically they point to the impact this might have on addressing blight:

Deb Hermann, chief executive officer of Northland Neighborhoods Inc., said Kansas City is already planning to spend $10 million to tear down 800 dangerous buildings over the next two years, illustrating the level of blight in the city.

She said that for too many irresponsible property owners, $450 is just the cost of doing business.

“The city does not need to lose any tools it has to encourage people to take care of their properties,” she said.

Here is the problem: the City of Kansas City is the largest owner of blighted properties in the city. About 200 of the 800 dangerous vacant buildings that Kansas City is finally tearing down are its own. As several residents pointed out in the KCPT documentary, “Our Divided City,” the City can be quick to levy fines on private owners while letting their own properties languish.

This all reminds me of my father’s favorite example of chutzpah: a defendant convicted of killing his parents asking the court for leniency because he is an orphan.

No one should be surprised that local governments do not want the legislature restricting their ability to levy fines and fees. Claiming that they are motivated by addressing blight is just not supported by the facts. 

The post Kansas City’s Crocodile Tears over Blight appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

But while the metropolitan area did see a net increase in population, the news in context isn't all that great. (Emphasis mine)

St. Louis, which held steady at about 2.81 million people, is now the 20th-largest region in the U.S., having been leapfrogged by the surging Denver metro area, which gained an estimated 58,000 residents just last year.

The St. Louis region has added an estimated 24,000 people since 2010. Among the 25 largest metro areas, only Detroit has added fewer people. More people have left the region than moved in during the past five years, but the population was pushed upward because of births.

We have written at length about the importance of strong cities to our local economies. When a region's economic anchor begins to sink, the rest of the region suffers as well, and that's where things stand in St. Louis. From taxes to incentives to education and everything in between, the ship of state that is St. Louis City is running ashore. Rather than stay the course, it's time for a course correction. It's time, finally, for reforms.

The post Census Report: St. Louis City Continues to Shrink appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

I spend a lot of time talking to developers and I spend a lot of time talking to developers trying to get them to build east of Troost [Avenue]. If they don't want to do it, you can incentivize them all day long. What they look at is, "How do I get a return on investment?"

Developers can't be faulted for wanting to earn a buck, and investment on the east side of town can carry additional risks. That is exactly why governments adopted tax increment financing, or TIF, to alleviate some fo the risk that investors face. But that policy is made meaningless if everyone gets TIF, and if they get it in the nice parts of town. Of course a developer would not take on a large risk developing east of Troost when the city will subsidize a low-risk development west of Troost. The solution is to stop incentivizing the wealthy western part of the city, and save incentives for where they were actually intended.

Later in the film, Mayor James gets defensive when asked if it isn't time to take action. He says, [53:17]

Everybody says action. Nobody has an answer. If anybody had an answer to that question you don't think it would already be being used? You know, people seem to think that this is somehow a political issue. This is a citywide societal problem and the city and society has to address it; not just people in public office. That's crazy. If that were the case it would have been done by now. Certainly I would have done it by now if I had that power and authority but I don't even have the authority to keep guns out of the hands of 19 year olds.

Certainly the Mayor is correct that the problems faced in Kansas City are not unique to us. These problems plague urban areas all over the country, and they indeed stem from significant systemic issues of poverty, education, and racism. But that is not to say that the Mayor has no "power or authority," or that expecting political solutions from our political leaders is "crazy." It is not. 

The Mayor does have the "power and authority," for example, to tear down the 875 vacant and "dangerous" homes that litter the east side as featured in the documentary. He has the "power and authority" to beef up spending on code enforcement. Instead, he and the City Council have chosen policies that spend money on downtown streetcars and luxury apartments and hotels.

Frankly, if anyone lacks "power and authority," it is the people on the east side of town who can't afford to hire the high-priced development attorneys needed to get the ear of policymakers.

The post Policy Choices and “Our Divided City” appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In 1950 Saint Louis was the eighth largest city in the United States with a population of 856,796. According to the 2014 Census estimate, Saint Louis has two-thirds fewer people than in 1950.

Such a dramatic decrease in population has major effects on local government. As the population declines, taxable income and sales leave the area and revenue declines with it. Lower population levels exacerbate other issues such as abandoned buildings, lower property values, and, as a result, fewer funds for public schools.

Saint Louis is a city that has much to offer. So why are people continuing to leave? What should the city do to halt the deflating population?

The post The Incredible Shrinking City appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The City of Saint Louis has an agency, the Land Reutilization Authority (LRA), which manages more than 10,000 of these vacant and abandoned properties. The LRA has an enormous responsibility. Its actions, past and present, can play a major role in determining the future of this city. In a 2011 Show-Me Institute Policy Study called “Standstill: How City Agencies Have Hindered Development In Saint Louis While Waiting For Large-Scale Miracles,” then-policy analyst Audrey Spalding examined the actions and decisions the LRA makes that heavily affect the city of Saint Louis. The study found that the LRA was not fulfilling the responsibilities of the organization as created and defined in Missouri statute.

The LRA has the ability to increase private investment in Saint Louis neighborhoods, which can help create a better Saint Louis. But it cannot do that if it does not sell properties.

By building on the work presented in “Standstill,” this case study will provide insight into how the LRA has changed over the last couple of years and whether it has started to achieve the original goals tasked to it more than 40 years ago.

Read the case study:

See also the Show-Me Institute’s previous research on land banks:

• Standstill: Is Saint Louis Hindering Development by Waiting for Large-Scale Miracles? — April 19, 2011
• Land Banking: An Old Idea With A Poor Track Record — March 26, 2012
• Kansas City Land Bank Proposal: Learning From Failures Of The Saint Louis Land Bank— March 05, 2012
• Land Banking Is No Miracle — February 29, 2012
• Land Bank Recommendations — February 28, 2012
• Legislators Should Seriously Consider the Failings of the Saint Louis Land Bank before Creating a Kansas City Land Bank — February 08, 2012
• What a Difference a Year Makes: Saint Louis City’s Land Bank, the LRA — October 03, 2011
• Why Is There So Much Vacant Land in Saint Louis? — February 22, 2011
• Paper Questions City Landholding Policy — February 21, 2011

The post Promoting Private Land Ownership In Saint Louis: A Data Update On The Land Reutilization Authority appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

When the St. Louis Cardinals played the Detroit Tigers in the 1968 World Series, the whole nation was watching (it captured an astounding 57 percent of television viewers) and both cities — as well as both teams — were looking good. Detroit was still the unchallenged auto capital of the world, and St. Louis was home to a dozen of the nation’s biggest and best-known companies.

Since then, the two baseball teams have fared better than their cities. When they met again in the 2006 World Series, the rest of the nation yawned — 83 percent of viewers tuned out. Who cared about a baseball rivalry in two dying cities in flyover country?

From 1950 to 2010, Detroit’s population dropped from about 1.8 million to 714,000 — a 61.4 percent decline. Over the same period, St. Louis City dropped from 857,000 residents to 319,000 – a 62.7 percent decline.

Think of Detroit as a larger St. Louis — more than twice the size in area as well as population. Drive through north St. Louis and you see block after block of abandoned and boarded-up buildings; drive through Detroit and it is mile after mile of the same. It is the Empty Quarter of cityscapes — which partly explains why it takes an hour for Detroit’s police to respond to a 911 call.

Detroit leads the nation’s cities in violent crime, followed by Oakland and St. Louis. According to FBI statistics, your chances of being the victim of a violent crime (murder, rape, robbery, and assault) are not a whole lot less in St. Louis City than they are in Detroit. The incidence of such crimes is only 13 percent lower in St. Louis than Detroit. I worked in Detroit from 1976 to 1982 as a reporter and anchor at WXYZ-TV. Coleman Young was the city’s first black mayor, notorious for playing the race card (though most white politicians were no better). I once asked him about his girlfriend’s exorbitant salary as the administration’s PR person. That night, the station ran his response — an expletive-filled rant accusing me of racism for even raising the question. Later, many city employees — both black and white — thanked me for spotlighting the mayor’s favoritism.

Lee Iacocca took over a struggling Chrysler in 1978 and refused to meet union demands to match GM and Ford wage rates at $18 an hour. He told the union: “At $13 an hour, you can have 20,000 workers . . . at $18, you’ve got zero.” He understood the Big Three were on thin ice.

After 13 years anchoring and reporting at KSDK in St. Louis, I returned to Detroit for a year in 1999 at WDIV TV. I was astonished at how much worse the city looked. Gone were the well-kept, middle-class neighborhoods. The drugs and violence were so bad that city cops often would ride four to a squad car.

Therein, I think, is a principal difference between Detroit and St. Louis. Things in St. Louis never reached the same pitch of hopelessness.

St. Louis experienced its biggest out-migration of people in the 1980s, when the population fell 27.2 percent. From 2000 to 2010, the city’s population was down just 8 percent.

By contrast, Detroit’s population over the last decade fell a stunning 24.9 percent.

So, no, I do not think that St. Louis City is following Detroit down the road to ruin — or to bankruptcy, either. In a recent column in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dave Nicklaus pointed out that with slightly more than twice the population of St. Louis, Detroit has six times as much debt.

What’s more, St. Louis has not experienced a massive breakdown in vital services. Far from taking an hour to respond to a call , St. Louis police, on average, are at a crime scene in 10.32 minutes. And where Detroit police cleared only 11.3 percent of murders and 12.7 percent of reported rapes through arrests in 2011, St. Louis police cleared 66.4 percent and 71.8 percent of such crimes, respectively.

Though far from perfect, St. Louis City still works for most people. Many old neighborhoods are flourishing again. Let’s hope that we are on the cusp of a real turnaround in the city’s fortunes.

Rick Edlund is the communications director at the Show-Me Institute, which promotes market solutions for Missouri public policy.

The post Is St. Louis the next Detroit? (Not in my view) appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

You might be thinking, “Well, duh. I would sell them. Cha-ching!” Seems really simple, but the St. Louis Land Reutilization Authority (LRA) does not appear to have that same mindset.

When I met with Michael Allen, founder of the Preservation Research Office (a private historic preservation and architectural research organization) he remarked at how little advertising the LRA does for its properties. Compared to real estate agencies, LRA advertisement is practically non-existent.

Shouldn’t the LRA function in the same way as real estate agents if its goal is to sell property?

According to Janet McAfee Real Estate’s Marketing Director Chuck Roper, the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) is the primary source of real estate listing information for approved brokers in Saint Louis. LRA-owned properties, however, are very rarely listed in the MLS.

Besides the MLS, there are a variety of other ways to make information available about properties. Newspaper and magazine ads, online ads, listings on real estate websites, social media, direct mail…you get the picture. The LRA does none of these things. You could drive by an LRA property that is for sale and have absolutely no idea. Two LRA staff members gave me different replies about whether they post “For Sale” signs. One said they are put up on “selected properties.” But the other simply said, “Nope, we don’t do that.”

With the LRA, the onus is all on you, the potential buyer, to figure out the entire process to purchase a home. You have to know that the LRA exists, what it does, find its list of properties, set up your own inspection of the house, and then begin the application process.

Every year that goes by, the city pays more and more to maintain these properties. They sit vacant, collecting no property tax. With 8,000 vacant properties, the LRA cannot afford to have the attitude that these properties can sell themselves. Any real estate agent will tell you that couldn’t be further from the truth.

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More than 40 years ago, Saint Louis City set up a land bank in response to the exodus of its residents, and the vacant property they left behind. When the land bank was created, the hope was that it could return vacant property back to private, productive use.

Instead, the land bank has adopted policies which have compounded the vacancy crises. Most troubling is the land bank’s policy of giving area aldermen an inordinate amount of influence over whether someone can purchase property. Offers from residents are rejected simply because their local alderman does not express his approval of the sale.

Offers to buy vacant land bank property are often from neighborhood residents. The properties are generally in a state of disrepair, and the bidder is planning to repair the property in an attempt to make his or her neighborhood a better place to live. If the resident does not have the blessing of his local alderman, the offer is typically rejected.

Consider the case of 2925 Union, a rundown, 1-story brick building in Saint Louis that received offers from four different buyers. The Saint Louis land bank said no to all four offers. When the area alderman showed up at a land bank meeting and told the land bank to sell the property to another buyer, it did.

Tragically, this policy of deferring to area officials will be written into law if Philadelphia’s land bank ordinance is adopted. In its current form, Philadelphia’s ordinance forbids the land bank from entering into a transaction if the district council person expresses disapproval. This policy will almost certainly thwart development byresidents who do not have their councilman’s approval, even if the resident plans to put the property to productive use.

Our fear is not unfounded. This happens frequently in Saint Louis. The former deputy mayor for development told us that “the sort of working arrangement we have with the aldermen is that if they don’t want to do something, we don’t want to do it.”

In order to quickly get land back into private, productive use, a land bank should accept reasonable purchase offers, even if politicians oppose them.

Philadelphia should also heed Saint Louis’s failed attempts to hold property for future development. Show-Me Institute research revealed that between 2003 and 2010, the Saint Louis land bank rejected nearly half of all purchase offers. The most common reason for rejection was that the property was being held for future development. Unfortunately, the hoped-for future developments rarely materialize.

In Philadelphia, the land bank proposal establishes goals that may undermine efforts to return the land to productive use. The goals include otherwise laudable priorities, such as encouraging “affordable or mixed-income housing that is accessible or visitable” and “community facilities that provide needed services and enrichment opportunities; side- and rear-yards; urban agriculture; and community open space.” These goals may have the unintended consequence of providing a reason for the land bank to reject purchase offers that do not fit the land bank’s vision. Again, our fears are grounded in experience – this public policy failure has occurred repeatedly in Saint Louis.

To be clear, Saint Louis’s adverse policies are not written into law, and can be suspended at any time. Indeed, it appears that in response to the Show-Me Institute’s research the land bank bank’s rejection rate was cut nearly in half. But in Philadelphia, these poor policies will be written into law.

Bruce Stahl is a research assistant and Audrey Spalding is a policy analyst at the Show-Me Institute, which promotes market solutions for Missouri public policy.

The post Don’t Bank on It: When it Comes to Vacant Property, Learn from Saint Louis’ Failures appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

City leaders are touting the transfer of these vacant properties as a “gift.”  The Kansas City Star‘s headline today reads: “Bank of America gift of vacant houses will aid KC’s urban core.”

But this gift comes with many risks. Kansas City will have to pay to maintain the properties until they are sold. Presumably, Bank of America was paying property taxes on the properties that it owned — taxes that will not be paid if the city takes ownership. The transfer could be a gift, but if Kansas City fails to sell the properties quickly, that gift will soon turn into a liability.

Though I may disagree with their proposed solution, city leaders and area legislators have openly stated that it is difficult to sell vacant property in the city. It is a real possibility that some of the so-called donations will remain vacant, and in city ownership for a very long period of time. That is the risk of owning vacant property, regardless of whether you are a city, or a private investor: There is the chance that no one else will want to buy your property.

For the sake of Kansas City residents and taxpayers, I hope the city finds private buyers who can put the property to productive use as quickly as possible. But I think, given the foreclosure crisis and associated risks, a better headline would have been: “Kansas City’s acceptance of low value properties will aid Bank of America’s bottom line.”

The post A Gift? Or A Liability? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Some might say that the agreement is a validation of the city’s strategy to hold property for development. But even though political points may be gained by trumpeting development before it occurs, development of these parcels has not actually happened.  As one writer put it, “…until development occurs on a large portion of the land, the strategy will only have proven that after three decades, the city has found someone else to mow the yard.”

Indeed, while the prospect of selling 1,200 city-owned properties is great news for the city and its residents, this single development will not remake Saint Louis, even if successful. The city has dug itself into an incredible vacancy hole that would require almost another nine developments like the NorthSide one — just to take care of the vacant property that the Saint Louis land bank, also known as the Land Reutilization Authority (LRA), owns. And this proposed development took years to come about.

According to St. Louis Magazine, the NorthSide development was in the works since at least 2003, and no comparable large-scale development has taken place in Saint Louis. If we are pinning our hopes on more developments like NorthSide, we have to wait another 40 years. How much land will the city have amassed by then?

As part of the Show-Me Institute’s review of the operations of the LRA, we collected a great deal of data to see how frequently the agency was accepting and rejecting offers to buy its vacant property. We found that the LRA rejected formal offers to purchase more than 2,200 different parcels between the years 2003 and 2010. That is certainly a larger number than the 1,200 parcels being discussed as part of the NorthSide deal.

Some may be curious as to whether offers in recent years to purchase LRA property were rejected in the NorthSide footprint.

The map below shows all offers to purchase LRA property, with larger marks indicating higher-value offers. Between 2003 and 2010, offers to purchase more than 300 different properties within the NorthSide boundary were rejected.

However, to make the situation complicated, offers to purchase more than 280 properties in the area were accepted. While some offers were rejected because the agency was holding the property for “planned unified development,” others were accepted.

What I find more troubling is the city’s bad (but recently abandoned) habit of holding property off of its public for-sale list. Up until the publication of Show-Me Institute research, almost half of LRA property was not advertised for sale. This was due in part to agency staff members and area aldermen designating property as “Class C,” meaning that it was not “suitable for public or private use.” In practice, that designation made it more difficult, if not impossible in some cases, for people to purchase vacant property. Below is a map showing parcels not advertised for sale in red, with LRA parcels advertised for sale in green. The NorthSide boundary is included for reference.

We only have records for formal, written offers to purchase LRA property. It is impossible to know how many would-be buyers were discouraged from buying property in the NorthSide footprint as a result of the LRA’s practices.

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