Of course, the answer is obvious if you know anything about how educator pensions work in Missouri.

Missouri’s teacher pension system creates strong incentives for educators to retire as soon as they hit their pension’s peak benefit. This doesn’t mean they’re ready to stop working; it just means that staying on the job in Missouri would financially penalize them compared to retiring and working elsewhere. This system is problematic because it pushes experienced teachers, principals, and superintendents out of Missouri’s schools when they still have a great deal to offer.

When Missouri educators retire early, they take with them years of expertise and leadership. Instead of keeping our best and most experienced educators in Missouri classrooms, our pension system encourages them to leave for neighboring states. This harms our schools and weakens the overall quality of education available to Missouri students.

To fix this, we need pension reform. We should develop a retirement system that rewards long-term service without forcing educators into an artificial retirement timeline. Instead of a system that penalizes continued work, we should create one that allows educators to gradually phase into retirement, perhaps by working part-time or taking on mentorship roles while still accruing meaningful benefits.

Other states, such as Washington, have reformed their pension systems to better retain educators. Missouri should do the same. We cannot afford to keep losing our best teachers and leaders simply because our pension system makes it financially advantageous for them to retire and work elsewhere.

It’s time to change the incentives. Let’s keep our educators in Missouri, where they belong.

The post Missouri Pension System Pushes Out Another Great Educator appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

If I offered you $100,000 a year for the rest of your life to retire from your current job, would you take me up on the offer? What if I said you could have the money and also get a different job if you wanted? If you would answer yes to these questions, you have gone a long way toward understanding why turnover is high among public school superintendents. We financially incentivize them to “retire.”

Take a look at the recent article from Springfield News-Leader’s Claudette Riley, in which she discussed the problem of superintendent turnover. Nearly every person cited in the report was a superintendent who has retired and is working another job. Doug Hayter retired as superintendent of Branson Public Schools; he now draws his retirement benefit and serves as the executive director of the Missouri Association of School Administrators (MASA). Kelly Hinshaw and John Jungman, also quoted in the report, are retired administrators who now work for MASA.

Given the rules of our current state pension system, it makes financial sense to do just as these folks have done. Consider some of the other retiring superintendents listed in Riley’s report. Shawn Randles is retiring from the Logan-Rogersville School District. After a 31-year career, he’s eligible to draw 75 percent of his final average salary of $152,002 for the rest of his life. Depending on the payout he chooses, this could be as much as $114,000 a year. According to Riley, Randles “plans to start a second career in an education-related field.”

Chris Ford, Fordland’s “retiring” superintendent is in a similar position. He’s eligible to draw $108,000 a year for the rest of his life while continuing to work. He has taken a position at Evangel University.

We are told turnover among superintendents is high because the job is stressful. It is curious then that many retire and take up similar positions in other states. Take Crane’s retiring superintendent, Chris Johnson, who has accepted the superintendent post in Prairie View, Kansas.

Stress may be a factor, but the truth is that superintendent turnover is high because our state’s pension system makes it financially beneficial for our veteran administrators to leave. They can earn more by retiring than they could if they kept working.

As Riley’s piece explained, superintendents are eligible to retire after 30 years of service in the profession or after their years of service plus their age equal 80. This means that someone who starts teaching right out of college could be eligible for retirement by their mid-50s. These individuals can then draw their pension and take on new roles, as long as those roles are not covered by Missouri’s Public School Retirement System.

We should applaud efforts to mentor and train superintendents, but if we truly want to reduce turnover the solution is clear—we must change our retirement system. This does not have to mean abandoning the current defined-benefit pension system, though offering a defined-contribution option is something that should be considered. The solution could be as simple as allowing superintendents to draw early disbursements from their pension fund while retaining their current jobs. This would diminish the financial pull to retire and take up a new job in another state or outside of PSRS.

As long as we continue to make it financially lucrative to retire, we will continue to see our best educational administrators retire shortly after they hit year 30.

The post To Reduce Superintendent Turnover, Change the Pension System appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Advocates for Missouri’s current defined-benefit pension system argue that this type of system, where teachers are promised a generous and guaranteed pension once they retire, is needed because it increases teacher retention. Yet, there is little evidence that this type of system is a cost-effective method for increasing teacher retention. Rather, the example of these superintendents demonstrates how the system pushes out high-quality individuals. It does the same for teachers (teachers and superintendents are in the same pension system). When teachers hit 30 or 31 years, regardless of their quality or their desire to continue teaching, the financial incentive of the pension pushes them out.

Recently, Gov. Parson asked school superintendents to come up with a plan to increase teacher pay. One solution, which I have little hope will ever be recommended by the superintendents, is to change how we compensate teachers. A pension is basically a form of delayed compensation. We require teachers and their districts to contribute 14.5% of their salary to the pension system (the numbers are different in St. Louis City and Kanas City). That’s 29% of a teacher’s salary that is going into a pool that they may have access to if they make it to retirement.

We could give teachers in Missouri a 10% raise next year, with minimal cost to the state, if we just change this system.

Currently, teachers in the Public School Retirement System (PSRS) do not contribute to Social Security. The pension system is their only required retirement savings. In this proposed scenario, the teacher would receive a 10 percent raise on his or her salary. The teacher would begin contributing to Social Security (6.2 percent from the individual and the employer) and would be eligible for Social Security benefits. Additionally, the teacher and his or her employer could contribute a combined 5 percent of salary to a defined-contribution retirement account, such as a 401k or a cash balance plan. Of course, with a smaller raise the teacher could contribute more to retirement. 

There are numerous benefits to this proposal. First, teachers would own their retirement accounts. They would not lose any money if for some reason they do not vest at five years. They could also continue to work past 31 years and their accounts would not lose value. Teachers could also choose to invest more in their account, as many do now in 403b accounts.

The biggest benefit is that teachers would have higher salaries today. If we want to keep our best teachers and superintendents, higher salaries are a much more effective tool than outdated pension systems.

The post We Could Give Teachers a Ten Percent Raise Next Year appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Dear Missouri teachers and all Missouri citizens:

As a Missouri public-school employee, I don’t pay into Social Security; I pay into the Public School Retirement System (PSRS) pension—to the tune of 13-15% of my salary.

The Missouri pension system for public employees REPLACES Social Security (i.e., I will never get Social Security or my spouse’s SS); that’s why the word “pension” misleads a lot of people.

We don’t get both.

Last month, a Missouri state representative from Nixa, MO, introduced a bill to change the current funding structure for teacher pensions to a defined contribution rather than a defined benefit plan, claiming that taxpayers might need to pay for any shortfalls in future years should the funds not be adequate. THIS IS NOT CORRECT.

Missouri’s PSRS has long been admired nation-wide as one of the MOST SOLVENT pension plans IN THE NATION.

We (teachers) are not the enemy; we are not the problem. Missouri’s financial problems should not be balanced on the backs of teachers who have paid into the system for their entire careers. The Missouri government set the rules. We have followed them. They have not. Now, they want to blame teachers for the State’s money woes, and steal from teachers’ retirement again!

Please call your state reps to support teacher-retirement funding and not changing it!

PLEASE.

Claim 1: “I pay into Public School Retirement System (PSRS) pension— to the tune of 13-15% of my salary.”

MOSTLY TRUE

Since 2012, Missouri teachers have paid 14.5 percent of their salary into the public school retirement system. This is matched by another 14.5 percent from the employer. It rose steeply from around 10 percent in the early 2000s in an effort to address unfunded liabilities (See Figure 3 here).

Claim 2: “The Missouri pension system for public employees REPLACES Social Security (i.e., I will never get Social Security or my spouse’s SS); that’s why the word “pension” misleads a lot of people.”

MIX OF TRUE AND FALSE

Missouri teachers do not pay into Social Security, but they may still be eligible for a benefit. According to the PSRS website, teachers “may qualify for Social Security benefits if you have 40 units (10 years) of Social Security-covered employment. You may also be eligible for benefits from Social Security through your spouse or ex-spouse (living or deceased).”

Claim 3: “Last month, a Missouri state representative from Nixa, MO, introduced a bill to change the current funding structure for teacher pensions to a defined contribution rather than a defined benefit plan…”

FALSE

House Bill 864 does not change the structure of current defined-benefit pension system for anyone in the system. In fact, it sets the current PSRS system as the default option for all incoming teachers. It would simply allow teachers the option of choosing a defined-contribution (DC) plan if they want to. Teachers who opt into the DC plan could chose to contribute between 3 and 50 percent of their salary into their own individual retirement account. The school district would be required to contribute 5 percent. If teachers wanted to stay with their traditional plan, they could. HB 864 would just give them more options.

This is a very important point that is worth repeating. The current bill, which has not even been referred to a committee and has virtually no chance of passing, would not change anything for anyone unless the individual teacher chose to opt into the DC plan. (To find out why some teachers might choose a DC plan, click here.) Florida has a DC option and roughly a quarter of teachers choose this plan.

Claim 4: “Missouri’s PSRS has long been admired nation-wide as one of the MOST SOLVENT pension plans IN THE NATION.”

MIX OF TRUE AND FALSE

Yes, it is true that PSRS is rated as one of the best funded pension systems in the nation. According to PSRS, PSRS was 84 percent funded as of June 30, 2018. This amounts to over $7.4 billion in unfunded liabilities. According to an analysis by Rebecca Sielman, an actuary at Milliman, this puts PSRS in the top quarter in terms of funded ratios among the 100 largest U.S. pension plans. This fact, however, says more about the sad state of other systems.

It should be noted that these comparisons are slightly suspect as they are based on plan reporting, and plans use very different assumptions. In determining that PSRS is 84 percent funded, the plan uses a high assumed discount rate of 7.75 percent to calculate liabilities. The median discount rate was 7.5 percent. That difference may not sound like much, but when you are talking about compound interest on billions of dollars, it adds up quickly. As Sielman writes, “A relatively small change in the discount rate can have a significant impact on the Total Pension Liability.”    

In an analysis for the Show-Me Institute, economist Andrew Biggs shows that if PSRS used a Corporate Bond Yield rate of 4.26 percent, the plan would be 52 percent funded and would have over $27.7 billion in unfunded liabilities.

It’s important to understand that not all of the money that is contributed to a teacher’s pension actually ends up funding the pension. Teachers contribute 14.5 percent of their pay into the pension, and their employer adds an equivalent amount, so the amount that goes into the pension is equal to 29 percent of the teacher’s salary. Only 17.44 percent is required, according to plan actuaries, to pay for the teacher’s retirement benefits. This means nearly two-fifths of the contributions are used to pay for unfunded liabilities (see p. 106 here).

Claim 5: “Missouri’s financial problems should not be balanced on the backs of teachers who have paid into the system for their entire careers. The Missouri government set the rules. We have followed them. They have not. Now, they want to blame teachers for the State’s money woes, and steal from teachers’ retirement again!”

COMPLETE NONSENSE

Ok there isn’t really a claim here, but there is a completely nonsensical assertion that this bill would somehow take money away. A version of this myth has been repeated numerous times—they want to take our pension money to pay for roads is a popular one. This bill (and every other pension reform bill that I have ever seen in Missouri) would not touch teacher contributions to the system. There is absolutely no mechanism for the state to take that money.

CONCLUSION

Teachers who spread viral posts with completely inaccurate information do not reflect well on their profession. Why are you trying to scare your colleagues? And have you thought of the unintended consequences?

My advice, teacher to teacher, is the next time you see a viral post like the one above and feel compelled to do something, consider this: read the actual bill, think critically, and do not blindly share hyperbolic posts filled with factual errors.

The post Viral Facebook Post about Missouri Teacher Pension Bill Is Filled with Falsehoods appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Missouri’s largest teacher pension fund, the Public School Retirement System (PSRS), has already begun to recognize the improved mortality rates of teachers. A PSRS report on contribution rates for 2017-2018 notes that the system has already begun updating the plan’s mortality assumptions:

People are living longer. Mortality is improving, not just in Missouri, but also across the nation. As a result, actuaries are utilizing updated mortality tables, which reflect this trend. PSRS/PEERS conducted Actuarial Experience Studies to compare our actuarial assumptions to the actual experience of the Systems. In other words, are members living as long as we assumed they would, or are they actually living longer?

According to the internal PSRS analysis, people are living longer than the plan had assumed. Adjusting for greater longevity led to a tremendous increase in the plan’s liabilities. According to PSRS board chairman Aaron Zalis, “the revised mortality assumptions better reflect PSRS/PEERS’ actual experience, which results in an increase of over $2.1 billion in liabilities to the Systems.”

Teachers in PSRS are eligible to retire with full benefits after 30 years of service, and there are also early retirement options. This means a teacher may retire by 55 with 30 years of service. Given the new mortality tables from the SOA, a large subset of teachers might be expected to live beyond 90 years old, drawing a pension for 35 years or more.

It is unclear if the SOA’s updated mortality tables for teachers will encourage PSRS or Missouri’s other two pension plans to once again change their assumptions. If they do, we can assume the financial health of the plans will decline.

Let’s process what that means for a second. Some teachers in the past did not put enough into the retirement system to cover their own benefits. As a result, the pension plan will become increasingly underfunded. To make up for this, the plan will have to increase contributions for new members, hold down retirement benefits for retirees, or seek higher returns on investments (Read: “risky investments”). None of this is good for teachers of today or tomorrow.

So teachers, keep this in mind when you sign that contract. You are agreeing to fund the benefits of those who went before you. You may be striking a bargain that you end up regretting.

The post Teachers Live Forever appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Consider the costs to taxpayers. As of 2018, the plan has assets equal to less than 70 percent of their liabilities and—just to maintain that level of funding—the Missouri state government will have to contribute nearly 20 percent of its total employee payroll to the plan this year. In addition, employees hired after 2011 contribute 4 percent of their paychecks to the system. Imagine a private-sector benefit that cost nearly one-quarter of employee salaries but was considered so sacrosanct as so be untouchable. The hard truth is that we’re going to have to start talking about policy changes aimed at averting a funding crisis. Biggs’s essay explores various options, including grandfathering current plan participants and designing a new system for future employees.

Of course, MOSERS is just one of many public pension plans in the state. The pension systems for teachers aren’t any better.  Teachers argue that they work for low salaries and, in exchange for their sacrifice, they are “taken care of” with generous retirement benefits. But that is only true for those teachers who start their teaching career right out of college and work in the same state for at least twenty-five years. In fact, an analysis of the Missouri Public Schools Retirement System (PSRS)—the plan that covers all Missouri teachers other than those in Kansas City or St. Louis—found that a teacher in the Springfield district would have to work for 26 years in order to hit the “crossover” point at which their total retirement benefit is worth more than what they contributed.

Imagine that! Working for 26 years before your retirement plan is worth more than you put in.

While the PSRS is in better financial health than MOSERS, total annual contributions to the plan are 29 percent of payroll (with 14.5 percent coming from the teacher and 14.5 percent from the school district). This is only likely to get higher because there are now 78,000 teachers (active members) supporting 60,000 retired teachers. In 2000, roughly the same number of active teachers supported just 25,000 retirees. In addition, while the plan is currently nearly 84 percent funded, it has an unfunded liability of more than $7 billion and its administrators continue to assume that the plan will earn a 7.6 percent return on its investments every year, indefinitely. You don’t have to be a math teacher to know those numbers just don’t add up.

The post Public Employee Pensions: Time to Get Our Heads Out of the Sand appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

What, that’s not the norm? Well, it is exactly what the “retiring” Pattonville superintendent will be doing soon.

The Kansas City Business Journal is reporting that the longtime superintendent will be retiring from Pattonville this year and taking up the superintendent position in the Shawnee Mission School District in Kansas. This move will allow him to retire from the pension system in Missouri and begin drawing his guaranteed benefit while also earning a salary in his new district, because the two school districts are in different pension systems.

According to the St. Louis Business Journal, the Pattonville superintendent earned $267,232 in 2016–17. In Missouri’s Public School Retirement System, members can earn 75% of their final average salary (defined as their three highest consecutive years). This would easily put his annual retirement benefit over $200,000, because the listed salary does not include other benefits, such as medical, which are also included in the final average salary.

There are three important things to take away from this.

First, we have to ask if it is wise to have a system that pushes effective leaders out at a relatively early age. This superintendent, who might likely work for another decade or more in Kansas, will begin drawing his retirement immediately and will draw it for the rest of his life. Indeed, there is a tremendous incentive for individuals to retire at this point in their career.

This leads us to our second point, pushing out effective educators  may not be an effective strategy if we want to improve the quality of education. This superintendent will take his services elsewhere, but many terrific teachers, principals, and superintendents are pushed out of education all together.

Finally, when people ask why the pension system is underfunded, this should be one of the prime examples you give them. The problem is that individuals like this superintendent often do not contribute enough to the system to cover their pension benefits. He is a big time pension winner, who will be receiving much more in benefits than he contributed to the system.

Don’t get me wrong: I applaud the superintendent’s decision. It’s a smart one, and we should all be so lucky. The problem is that we can’t all be so lucky. Lavish benefits like this must be paid for by someone. As I have shown before, they are paid by teachers who leave money in the system, by low-paid teachers in other districts, and ultimately by taxpayers.

Superintendents and others like Pattonville’s are not simply getting what they put into the system; they are getting much more. Let me ask you which system seems fair: this one, or a system in which retirees receive benefits that are in line with their contributions? If you ask me, the answer seems obvious. 

The post A $200,000 Retirement Benefit and a $250,000 Salary? Deal! appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Given that teachers will be a constituency that would be significantly affected by any changes to pensions in the state, we thought it wise to ask them what they think, both about their current pensions as well as possible alternative arrangements. We worked with both district and charter school leaders to cast a wide net and include as broad a range of viewpoints as we could.

Unfortunately, not long after we put our survey in the field, one of the state’s teachers’ unions instructed its members not to participate in our data collection. It’s unfortunate, but at this stage, not unexpected.

While it significantly curtailed our sample, 53 teachers did choose to respond, and we thought their voices deserved to be heard—even when they disagreed with some of the stances that Show-Me Institute writers have taken in the past. Accordingly, in addition to the complete survey results we have included an appendix with every open response that teachers gave—the good, the bad, and the ugly.

We encourage you to give the paper a read. Teachers have complicated and often conflicting views on their pensions as well as alternatives. Understanding those views will improve public pension policy.

The post Teachers’ Opinions on Missouri’s Public School Retirement System appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Given that teachers will be a constituency that would be significantly affected by any changes to pensions in the state, we thought it wise to ask them what they think, both about their current pensions as well as possible alternative arrangements. We worked with both district and charter school leaders to cast a wide net and include as broad a range of viewpoints as we could.

Unfortunately, not long after we put our survey in the field, one of the state’s teachers’ unions instructed its members not to participate in our data collection. It’s unfortunate, but at this stage, not unexpected.

While it significantly curtailed our sample, 53 teachers did choose to respond, and we thought their voices deserved to be heard—even when they disagreed with some of the stances that Show-Me Institute writers have taken in the past. Accordingly, in addition to the complete survey results we have included an appendix with every open response that teachers gave—the good, the bad, and the ugly.

We encourage you to give the paper a read. Teachers have complicated and often conflicting views on their pensions as well as alternatives. Understanding those views will improve public pension policy.

The post Teachers’ Opinions of Missouri’s Public School Retirement System appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Other questions addressed in James Shuls’ new essay are related to the formula that the PSRS uses to determine retirement benefits, using the average salary earned over the last 3 years of service in the calculation. What affect does this approach have on teachers whose salary is relatively flat over time compared to those who get big pay increases at the end of their careers? Does the retirement system widen the compensation gap between teachers working in wealthy districts and those working in poorer areas?

The common denominator in all of these questions is fairness: How many (and which) teachers are receiving benefits that are proportional to the amount they contribute to the system over the years? To learn some possible answers, click on the link below to read the essay.

The post Is Missouri’s Teacher Pension System Unfair? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Other questions addressed in James Shuls’ new essay are related to the formula that the PSRS uses to determine retirement benefits, using the average salary earned over the last 3 years of service in the calculation. What affect does this approach have on teachers whose salary is relatively flat over time compared to those who get big pay increases at the end of their careers? Does the retirement system widen the compensation gap between teachers working in wealthy districts and those working in poorer areas?

The common denominator in all of these questions is fairness: How many (and which) teachers are receiving benefits that are proportional to the amount they contribute to the system over the years? To learn some possible answers, click on the link below to read the essay.

The post Essay: Is Missouri’s Teacher Pension System Unfair appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Logic tells us that when people receive benefits that far exceed the value of their contributions and interest, the funds must come from somewhere . . . and they do. They come from teachers who work for fewer years, from teachers with relatively low pay, and from future generations of teachers. The same characteristics of Missouri’s teacher pension system that enable some teachers to enjoy a comfortable retirement also create several forms of inequity that could undermine these plans.

Currently, teachers in Missouri (except in Kansas City and Saint Louis City) contribute 14.5 percent of their salary to the pension system. The district matches that amount, for a total equal to 29 percent of the teacher’s salary. A teacher who leaves before the five-year vesting period ends forfeits the district’s match. But even vesting doesn’t guarantee a teacher will receive full value for their contributions, let alone the district’s match. Because the benefits accrue slowly at the start of a teacher’s career and then rapidly as they approach retirement, a teacher must work more than 20 years just to recoup their own contributions. The teacher who works 15 years and moves because of a spouse’s job in another state, for example, will be leaving money behind that helps fund the generous benefits of others. This is known as intra-generational inequity—within a cohort of teachers, some benefit and others lose.

Another form of intra-generational inequity is the cross-subsidization that occurs between workers with different earnings trajectories. Some teachers (generally in wealthier districts) get very large raises over the course of their careers, but others do not. Teachers who become administrators make even more money. Since pension payouts are based on salary earned in just the final three years of employment, these individuals receive retirement benefits that exceed the amount of their own contributions to the system over the course of their careers.

Others have to make up the difference. These “others” come, in part, from poorer districts and districts with relatively flatter salary schedules. Teachers in these districts pay more into the system than they will get out. Their “excess” contributions go to fund the pensions of the former superintendent making $150,000 a year in retirement.

Even though the pension system shortchanges many teachers, it still does not have enough funds to cover all its expected obligations. Therefore, the system must rely on new teachers to fund the benefits of retired teachers. This is the third type of inequity—inter-generational inequity. As generations of teachers contribute less than they receive in benefits, unfunded liabilities grow. In turn, future generations are asked to contribute more to the system. We have already seen individual contributions to PSRS grow from 10 percent in 1995 to 14.5 percent today.

Defenders of Missouri’s teacher retirement system will be quick to tell us that the system is well-funded, over 80%. (We can quibble about this calculation another time.) They will reiterate that the system is well-liked by teachers and claim that retirees are doing well in this system. To make that argument is to miss the point of this entire article: unless we tie benefits to contributions, the pension system will continue to favor some at the expense of others.

The post Pension System’s Generous Benefits Come from the Pockets of Others appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Whether it is the Missouri Retired Teachers Association, MNEA-retired, or the director of The Public School Retirement System, breathless commentary argues over and over that we have some desire to destroy teachers’ pensions. 

I don’t take this personally. As Jay-Z says in classic song December 4th, “This is the life I chose, not the life that chose me.” But teachers in Missouri probably should. The stability of their retirement depends on it.

And that brings us to a recent article written by Chad Aldeman and Kelly Robson of Bellwether Education Partners. The refrain is one that should be familiar to readers of this blog. Many, many teachers are net losers in current pension systems.

The Missouri-specific numbers show that only 58% of Missouri teachers will “vest” in the pension system.  Only 38% will “break even” in the system, meaning that 62% will pay more into the system than they will get out of it.

These are not my numbers. These are not Show-Me Institute numbers. These are numbers collected and analyzed by a third-party organization and published in a reputable journal house at arguably the most prestigious university in our nation.

Combine this with the fact that poorer districts subsidize pensions in wealthier districts, pension funds are taking on riskier and riskier investments to chase higher returns, pension plans have huge unfunded liabilities, and that reformed pension systems can be beneficial to teachers (more evidence here) and then ask yourself: Who are the villains again?

At some point cheap theatrics and ad hominem arguments aren’t going to cut the mustard anymore, and someone will have to answer to the facts: More than 40 percent of teachers fail to vest in the system (losing everything that the state has contributed), and more than two-thirds are net losers in the system. 

The post Who Are the Villains in the Teacher Pension Story? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Mike gives you the context and outlines the underlying problems. Dale illustrates these problems by simply reporting on the current state of the Public School System of Missouri (PSRS).

Like most pension systems, PSRS assumes a relatively high rate of return—until recently, 8%—on its investments. Realizing they were probably being too optimistic (or maybe they read a few Show-Me Institute reports), they lowered their assumption to 7.5%. That simple change means the system needs more money to meet it current obligations to retirees.  On top of that, retirees are living longer—which increases the pension plans obligations—and actual investment returns are not hitting their targets.

As Mike said, “pension plans have a math problem.” To combat the problem, they either need more money or they need to reduce obligations.  To do this, they only have two mechanisms under their control. They can increase the contribution rates for teachers—who already pay 14.5% into the system, as do their school districts—or they can hold down payments to retirees by not providing a cost of living adjustment (COLA). Neither of these are long-term solutions for addressing the mounting unfunded liabilities.

 Give these two pieces a read. I think they make it pretty clear that it is time for a change. 

The post Two Must-Read Missouri Pension Pieces appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

For those unfamiliar with how public pensions work, these meetings may not seem particularly noteworthy, but the decisions made by MOSERS and PSRS will ultimately have a significant impact on taxpayers across the state. Overestimating the rate of return will result in lower initial payments into funds, higher total unfunded liabilities, and higher tax burdens down the road. A lower assumed return requires higher initial payments, but it helps ensure pensioners and taxpayers alike that the pensions can be funded solely out of those payments in the future.

Missouri Treasurer Clint Zweifel hopes to lower the current 8% assumption MOSERS uses to 7.4% this year and drop it to 7% over the next four years.  He predicts that the lower rate would cost Missouri taxpayers tens of millions of dollars, but states “This is the fiscally responsible thing to do, not only for the fund and for its beneficiaries but also for taxpayers in the state.” In the past the Show-Me Institute has written about how pension discount rates should be evaluated in a more realistic manner in order to reduce unwanted future risks.

And we are by no means on the ideological fringe on this question.  In 2014, the University of Chicago’s Business School surveyed professional economists and found that 96% agreed that assuming higher rates of return understates pension liabilities and the costs of providing pensions to public sector workers. That finding underscores the importance of these pension meetings.

Of course, one way to avoid burdening taxpayers with future pension liabilities, which we've also talked about, is to explore defined-contribution plans that consist of employer/employee contributions and investment gains as the final payout. In a defined-contribution plan, taxpayers won’t be held accountable when a retirement plan is underfunded because, by definition, the plan cannot incur liabilities.

But to be clear, pension liabilities are legally binding, so if the state is going to have defined-benefit pensions, it only makes sense that those pensions should be managed in a way that guarantees that employee pensions can be paid. 

A truly fully funded pension plan would ensure that unfunded liabilities do not rise and that pensions are sufficiently funded today rather than shifting the burden to future generations. Let's hope MOSERS and PSRS seize the opportunity to protect pensioners and taxpayers.

The post Back to the Future (Taxpayers) appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Based on Steinhoff and Yoakum’s comments, I’d like to make three points:

Point #1: Pensions Take From Some to Reward Others

The generous teacher retirement benefits for those who stay in the system for their full career are made possible by the contributions of those who leave the system early. According to Yoakum, “The retirement system is designed to provide a career employee in Missouri schools with roughly the same standard of living they had.” The key phrase there is “career employee.” Workers who leave early face a severe financial penalty.

As McShane pointed out in the article (and as I’ve noted before on the Show-Me Institute blog), benefits from the teacher pension system do not exceed a teacher’s contributions until they have worked for 28 years. 28 years! As a report from the Urban Institute noted, 62% of Missouri teachers do not stay for that long. The majority of teachers are not benefiting from the pension system, but are instead subsidizing the benefits of others.

Point #2: Retirement Benefits are an Ineffective Way to Recruit Teachers

Yoakum contends that the pension system is helping recruit teachers to Missouri. This is a poplar refrain among pension supporters. At first glance, the argument makes sense—better benefits attract more people. The problem is that people, especially young people, typically don’t pay much attention to their retirement benefits. This is illustrated by the quote from Steinhoff, “It is the best kept secret even within the profession because, for most teachers, it doesn’t come on their radar until they’re teaching for about 25 years.” I fail to see how a well-kept secret helps recruit teachers.

As a National Bureau of Economic Research report notes, employees value current pay much more than they value deferred compensation into a pension system.  Thus, a better way to recruit and retain teachers might be to pay them more now, rather than promise them more later.

Point #3: Pensions Pull Some to Stay, Push Others Out

OK, maybe pensions aren’t the best way to recruit new workers, but they do help keep teachers in the system, right? As Yoakum said, “From the employer standpoint, it does provide golden handcuffs to a certain extent. When a teacher has accumulated a certain years of service, it’s very hard for them to leave. This helps our school districts retain those very good teachers.”

This “Golden Handcuffs” phenomenon is discussed by economists Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky in an Education Next article with the same name (see their excellent illustration above). The yellow line is the value of Missouri’s teacher pension system, while the black line represents a smooth-accruing cash balance plan. This shows how teachers who leave early are worse off under the current system. As a result, Costrell and Podgursky agree with Yoakum that the back-loaded nature of PSRS pulls teachers to stay until full retirement—but at a cost. First, there is no indication that the “pull” is felt only by the “very good teachers” to whom Yoakum alluded. Indeed, there may be some teachers who are burnt out and want to retire, but feel compelled to stick it out until they reach full retirement. How is that good for kids? And after a teacher reaches their peak pension value, the system punishes them and pushes them out. Thus, beyond a point, the system acts as a disincentive for veteran teachers to stay.

We cannot accept the merits of defined-benefit pension systems simply because they provide a terrific benefit to a fraction of our teachers. Rather, we should consider whether the system is designed to provide fair retirement support for every teacher in Missouri. Clearly it is not. 

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Most recently, Michael Rathbone and I pointed out that Missouri’s teacher pension systems have shifted to riskier assets. From this study, we concluded that lawmakers “should be aware that these pension plan returns are based on increasingly risky assets and acknowledge that fact when planning for the future.” In particular, we suggested that the plans should forecast assets based on various expected rates of return.

On August 7, PSRS Executive Director M. Steve Yoakum issued a three-page response to the paper. Mr. Yoakum claims that our study “provides a limited and somewhat biased view of PSRS/PEERS and the Systems investment strategy,” but in the rest of his response he acknowledges several of the points we made.

Mr. Yoakum acknowledges the shift away from fixed-income investments and toward higher-risk investments, and goes on to justify this shift by citing lower returns on the former and greater opportunities “in other areas of the investment universe.” This is essentially the point we were making: equities and alternative investments have historically delivered higher returns than fixed-income investments, but they also carry greater risk.

Our paper states that current teacher and school district contributions do not cover the existing obligations, meaning that pension plans must rely on investment returns in order to meet their obligations to members. Mr. Yoakum’s response: “Only if we exclude income from investments is this true.” It is difficult to describe this as anything but a restatement of our point.

We stated, and Mr. Yoakum’s response acknowledges, that public employee pension systems have moved toward riskier assets than they held in the past. Much of Mr. Yoakum’s response is devoted to explaining this change—which is important— but the point of our paper was not to question the reasons behind the shift. Our goals were instead to document this trend and to endorse the recommendations of the Pew report that we cited repeatedly in our own study, namely that “Government sponsors can demand better reporting of future expected costs and the associated downside risks, and then use this information to make decisions about ways to deal with poor outcomes, should they occur.”

We remain committed to these recommendations, and we stand behind every word in our study. 

The post SMI Responds to PSRS on Teacher Pension Fund Risk appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

If the lovable bear Winnie the Pooh has a downside, it is his insatiable desire for the sweet taste of honey. Time and again, his uncontrollable urge has ended with him getting his head stuck in the honey pot and needing to be bailed out by his friends. In many ways, Missouri lawmakers have encouraged the same kind of foolishness, continually sweetening the pension pot for public school teachers. If they do not change course — and soon — they will put future lawmakers into an impossible situation where they are forced to call on their friends — the taxpayers — for a major bailout.

Sweetening the pension honey pot for public employees is a very tempting proposition. Indeed, for lawmakers, there is almost no down side because pension promises often are not realized for many years. By improving pension benefits, politicians can please many voters with promises that they do not have to keep. These pension enhancements, however, are not free.

In a new Show-Me Institute case study, Robert Costrell, professor of education reform and economics at the University of Arkansas, detailed the impact of pension enhancements to Missouri’s largest pension system, the Public School Retirement System (PSRS). “Missouri repeatedly and considerably enhanced its pension benefit formula from 1975 to 2001, resulting in large increases in pension wealth, particularly for those retiring in their 50s with 25-30 years of service,” Costrell wrote.

Three essential numbers are used to calculate a teacher’s pension payment from PSRS: years of service, final average salary and a multiplier that allows PSRS to calculate reduced early retirement benefits. Lawmakers can sweeten the pension pot by inflating final average salary calculations, increasing the multiplier or allowing individuals to retire earlier without penalty. Over the past few decades, Missouri lawmakers have employed each of these tactics.

Costrell noted that in 1977, a teacher could retire with his or her full benefits at 55 with 30 years of service. In 1986, the benefit multiplier was increased from 2 percent to 2.1 percent; in 1991, full benefits were granted with 25 years of service; in 1994, the multiplier increased to 2.3 percent; in 1996, lawmakers added insurance benefits into the final average salary calculations; in 1998, they increased the multiplier to the current 2.5 percent; in 1999, they instituted a “Rule of 80,” which allows a teacher to retire with full benefits when his or her age plus experience equals 80. That same year, lawmakers reduced the years used for the final average salary calculation from five to three, a move that increased the final average salary of all retirees.

With all of these enhancements, a teacher in Jefferson City can now retire in his or her early 50s after 30 years in the classroom with a pension that is approximately the equivalent of a lump sum payment of $950,000. That is, the “cash value” of the pension at the time of retirement is close to $1 million.

To keep pace with the pension enhancements, the contribution rate for teachers and their public school employers has increased dramatically from a combined 16 percent in 1975 to 29 percent today. Even with these increases, PSRS has not been able to keep pace with the promised benefits. If we assume a 4 percent return on investment, PSRS has more than $31 billion in unfunded liabilities.

If they are as simple-minded as ol’ Pooh, policymakers might think they are helping create a secure retirement system for teachers when they enact these pension enhancements. But they are really making promises that they (or future lawmakers) cannot keep. If they want to create a secure retirement system for current and future public school teachers, they do not need further enhancements; rather, they should enact fundamental pension reform.

James V. Shuls, Ph.D., is the director of education policy at the Show-Me Institute, which promotes market solutions for Missouri public policy.

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This paper examines the history of benefit enhancements in Missouri’s main teacher pension plan from 1975 to the present. The key organizing principle of this analysis is pension wealth, a standard measure, well established in the economics literature, which reflects both the size of an individual’s annual pension as well as the number of years over which it is collected. Missouri repeatedly and considerably enhanced its pension benefit formula from 1975 to 2001, resulting in large increases in pension wealth, particularly for those retiring in their 50s with 25-30 years of service. Although many states have reduced benefits in recent years, especially for new teachers, this has not been the case in Missouri. Indeed, two enhancements that were scheduled to expire in 2013 were extended or made permanent.

Read the full case study:

The post Teacher Pension Enhancement In Missouri: 1975 To The Present appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Last November, the Cooperating School Districts of Greater St. Louis pitched the idea of providing high-quality teachers as instructional coaches in struggling schools. A similar idea was raised by CEE-Trust, the consulting firm that the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education hired to address problems in the Kansas City School District. The CEE-Trust proposal called on accredited school districts “to play a significant role in helping [unaccredited] systems improve.” The St. Louis Post-Dispatch heaped praise on this idea, calling it among the “more promising ideas.”

However, there is one easily overlooked obstacle standing in the way of turning this localized version of a teacher peace corps into a reality in our two biggest cities: the incompatibility of different pension systems.

The suburban districts are a part of the Public School Retirement System (PSRS), as are all other school districts throughout Missouri – with the exception of Saint Louis and Kansas City, which have autonomous pension systems. If a teacher moves from PSRS to one of the city plans, he or she will incur a significant loss in pension wealth.

This is not a new problem, but a longstanding one. Saint Louis and Kansas City have been struggling with this for years. Research by University of Missouri economists has demonstrated that the separate pension systems create a barrier to recruiting school leaders into the two urban school districts. The separate pension systems also limit the pool of teachers who are willing to work in the cities. Jeffrey Kuntze, chief operating officer of the Confluence Charter Schools in Saint Louis, says “the separate pension systems make it extremely difficult for us to recruit veteran teachers from the county. We can get them when they retire, but not mid-career.”

These pension boundaries are not a problem for Normandy and Riverview Gardens, which are in PSRS, but they would make it practically impossible for high-performing school districts to operate a program, run a school, or loan teachers within the Saint Louis or Kansas City boundaries. They simply could not move teachers or school leaders across pension boundaries without making them suffer great financial penalties.

There is no easy way to solve this problem. Some have suggested we move Saint Louis and Kansas City into PSRS. This sounds like a good idea but is practically impossible because of Social Security. City teachers pay into it while PSRS teachers do not. Schools in Saint Louis and Kansas City cannot withdraw from Social Security. In effect, we have a Hotel California problem — urban schools can check out any time they like, but they can never leave Social Security.

The only real solution is to close the current systems to new entrants and place them in a new, statewide system that participates in Social Security. Before this idea causes mass hysteria, let me stress that this would not affect current employees’ or retirees’ pensions. They would remain secure in their current system. It would, however, remove the artificial pension boundaries and allow us to create a better pension system for teachers and students.

Opponents of this idea claim that closing the current defined benefit systems would be financially unsound, as it would lead to considerable “transition costs” that would far outstrip any benefits that we may receive. This is the very issue tackled in a recent Show-Me Institute policy study by Andrew Biggs, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Biggs examines the evidence for “transition costs” and concludes that the concerns are “largely mistaken and should not stand in the way of public employee pension reforms.”

Whether you believe busing teachers into failing schools is a viable solution or just another feel-good proposition, fixing this pension problem should be a top priority. Missouri should not have a system that puts our neediest communities at a disadvantage when it comes to recruiting talented teachers.

James V. Shuls, Ph.D., is the director of education policy at the Show-Me Institute, which promotes market solutions for Missouri public policy.

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