The “Green Line” is dependent on approximately $600 million in federal funds; funds I hope it doesn’t get. I suggest that cutting the national debt can start right here. As national politics affects local policy, I am hopeful that upcoming changes to federal policy will be the death of this plan. Indeed, some key voices, including Les Sterman, the past director of the East-West Gateway Council of Government, have recently called for the project to stop.

In 2004, MetroLink planners predicted there would be 80,000 boardings per day on MetroLink trains by 2025 in St. Louis, Missouri (that number excludes Illinois users). In the first quarter of 2024, there were about 18,800 actual boardings per weekday for the entire system, including Illinois (page 23 in link). (Ridership goes up slightly in the summer with baseball games, but not that much this summer, for obvious reasons.) We can just admit that MetroLink usage has been substantially less than projected. St. Louis should focus on serving the existing system as best it can instead of doubling down on failure with this latest expansion fantasy.

The “Green Line” plan only projects 5,000 boardings per day, at best. Even if that turned out to be accurate—and history suggests it won’t be—that is a very low number. Serving about 2,500 people per day (one person equals two boardings, on average) for over $1 billion is a terrible use of tax dollars. This project should not move forward.

The post Absurd Light Rail Project Marches Onward appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Let’s recap the proposal. The Green Line would be a five-mile route up and down Jefferson Avenue in St. Louis that then turns west for a few blocks on Natural Bridge near Fairground Park (which is where the JVL group bases its concerns). The entire plan will cost an estimated $1.1 billion, but the line is only predicted to have 5,000 boardings a day. That’s 5,000 boardings, not 5,000 people—most riders would use it both ways —and even that estimate is overly optimistic.

The demand for public transit along this route up and down Jefferson doesn’t currently justify its own bus route, but supposedly large numbers of people will magically ride MetroLink when the Green Line appears.

Why is Metro trying to build this route? Well, to quote Metro’s CEO, Taulby Roach:

A billion dollars sounds like a lot of money, but . . . 60 percent of that investment comes from the federal government, so why wouldn’t we want to get that money?

So, basically, let’s get the federal funds and spend them. Who cares that there is no demand for this route or that Metro’s own underwhelming projections admit that few people will actually use it? Let’s get some of other people’s money to spend! No wonder we are $35 trillion in debt.

I commend JVL’s neighborhood group for publicly asking tough questions about this project, which it calls the “Metro-Leg To Nowhere.” The pressure to support this boondoggle is strong. It’s great to see people stand up to it.

The post One Neighborhood Group Stands Up to Metro appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Download a copy of the Fact Sheet 

The proposed St. Louis MetroLink extension, with its staggering $1.1 billion price tag, would be useless and expensive.

Demand for public transit along this proposed new light rail route, spanning 5 miles primarily along Jefferson Avenue, is such that there is currently NO bus route that serves this same route, yet we are to believe a light rail system is sorely needed and will be heavily used.

The projected ridership of 5,000 boardings per day is underwhelming, especially when compared to past forecasts for MetroLink ridership. In 2004, Metro predicted 80,000 daily boardings by 2025 for the Missouri side alone; yet, in 2023, the entire system averaged just 16,700 boardings.

We can look to the Loop Trolley debacle as a cautionary tale. Despite abysmal ridership numbers, St. Louis is stuck funding the trolley due to federal funding stipulations. The exact same thing will happen with this latest MetroLink extension proposal. It will cost over a BILLION dollars, have VERY FEW riders, and we will be forced to operate and fund it for decades. This project isn’t merely wasteful. It is an actively harmful expenditure of federal and local tax dollars.

The post Useless and Expensive: The Proposed St. Louis MetroLink Extension appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Click here to read the full report.

The post Is St. Louis Transit Built for the 2020s or the 1910s? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Is this plan going to be a positive step forward for the St. Louis area? No, not at all. It will be a wasteful doubling down on a failed strategy to force feed light rail into a metropolitan area that would be far better served by an improved bus system from a transportation, financial, and social perspective.

In a forthcoming paper for the Show-Me Institute, Randal O’Toole will discuss how addressing transit issues in St. Louis by expanding MetroLink is a fool’s errand, and an extremely expensive one at that. Metro’s total transit ridership in 2019 was less than it was in 1993, before MetroLink even opened. The pandemic only exacerbated this problem, with fewer jobs and workers in downtown than before. Jobs are spread out throughout the metropolitan area, and buses are well equipped to connect workers to changing jobs, students to new schools, and sports fans to games. (We can admit MetroLink does a good job with the sports teams for some—but that is hardly a justification for expanding the entire wasteful system.)

Metro would better serve our region by spending its tax money on an effective bus system, including bus rapid transit for high-volume areas, instead of expanding a costly, inefficient, and unwieldy fixed-route light-rail system that fails in its primary purpose—serving St. Louis transit users.

The post Costly AND Outdated. Where Do We Sign Up? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Between 2014 and 2019, ridership on St. Louis Metro buses and light-rail trains dropped by nearly 25 percent. Thanks to the pandemic, ridership in recent months has only been half what it was in 2019, and thanks to increased numbers of people working at home it may not ever return to 2019 levels.

This suggests that St. Louis doesn’t need to spend hundreds of millions—or billions—of dollars building new light-rail lines. Yet that is exactly what St. Louis Mayor Tishaura Jones wants to do, not because St. Louis needs it, but because federal funding might become available for it. That federal funding would depend on local matching funds, meaning St. Louis taxpayers would have to pay higher taxes for train rides few of them will take.

St. Louis’s light-rail record is unimpressive. In 2001, Metro opened the 17-mile MetroLink College extension, doubling the total number of miles in the system. Metro carried fewer bus and light-rail riders the year after opening this line than it had carried the year before. The same thing happened when it opened the 3.5-mile Shiloh-Scott extension in 2003. The 8-mile Shrewsbury-Lansdowne MetroLink extension gained some new riders, but all of those riders were lost after the 2008 financial crisis, and most never came back.

Overall, light rail has failed to boost the region’s transit ridership. In 1993, before the region’s first light-rail line opened, buses carried 40.3 million riders. Since then, Metro has spent around $2.5 billion building 45 miles of light-rail lines. In 2019, buses and light rail together carried 36.1 million riders, 11 percent fewer than before light rail.

Part of the problem is that light rail is functionally obsolete: just about anything light rail can do, buses can do better for far less money. Counting capital costs, Metro spent $12.80 per light-rail rider but only $8.30 per bus rider in 2019.

The current proposal to expand MetroLink with a new north–south corridor line through downtown fails on two key fronts. First, while transit advocates say spending more money on transit helps low-income people, the fact is that most low-income people do not take transit to work. Census Bureau survey data show that only 4.4 percent of St. Louis–area workers who earned less than $25,000 a year took transit to work in 2019. Meanwhile, the sales taxes used to support Metro buses and light rail are highly regressive, meaning the 95.6 percent of low-income people who aren’t dependent on transit are disproportionately paying taxes to support rides they aren’t taking.

Second, cities that have successful rail transit have a high concentration of jobs in a central business district, and St. Louis is not one of those cities. The percentage of regional jobs in downtown St. Louis has been declining for years. It is currently down to about 60,000 employees downtown, very few of whom take light rail to work. Expanding MetroLink on the proposed north–south route will be a very expensive attempt to take people who don’t use light rail for work to jobs in an area where they don’t work.

The places in downtown St. Louis that benefit from MetroLink (the stadiums, convention center, etc.) already have it. The money Metro wisely spent adding and improving stations at Cortex and Barnes Hospital cost a fraction of the amount of a new line and served an area where people of all incomes actually use MetroLink to go to work. (The Barnes/Central West End stop is the busiest stop in the system.)

Meanwhile, while we debate MetroLink’s further expansion, Metro’s bus system is “disintegrating,” says engineer Richard Bose at the pro-transit NextSTL website, because the agency can’t find enough drivers to keep it operating. Jones and other city and regional officials should devote their efforts toward helping Metro run the system it already has rather than trying to expand it. Federal and local funds spent on an effective bus system offer a better solution to address the needs of the people who live in North St. Louis County. Otherwise, people might get the idea that the real purpose of light-rail transit is not to move people, but to move dollars from taxpayers’ pockets into the hands of light-rail contractors.

The post MetroLink Light Rail is MetroWaste appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

But who knows what city taxpayers will end up getting for their “investment?”

Taxpayers likely won’t get the 17-mile route they were presented last year. After more than a year of study, it was recently announced that the first phase of expansion will run some 9 miles, roughly from Chippewa St. to the NGA site north of downtown, and will cost $700 million. The project is also totally dependent on federal funding, which is a big if at this point, and will begin operations, best case scenario, in a decade.

It’s also unclear whether the expansion will get St. Louisans out of their cars. While consultants project the line will carry some 9,200 riders a day, my colleague Joe Miller has pointed out that it runs through neighborhoods with relatively low population density—density about a quarter of what’s needed for light-rail to be successful. Also, overall MetroLink ridership is trending downward; not only has it lost 3.9 million annual rides since 2014, but the rail system carries fewer passengers than it did prior to the 2006 Shrewsbury expansion. And crime on and around MetroLink trains has, according to Metro, contributed to an 11% decline in ridership since last year. While I don’t doubt that an expanded system will (at least initially) carry more passengers, experience—and more than 15 years’ worth of data—suggest we shouldn’t get our hopes up.

Source: National Transit Database, Federal Transit Administration

But perhaps the biggest if is the economic renaissance promised by MetroLink officials and proponents. Transit advocates claim that rail spurs economic development, that, once you put the rails in, the traffic generated by riders will induce all sorts of business growth. Unfortunately, this claim just doesn’t hold up. Many MetroLink stations are surrounded by land that’s either (a) already developed (and likely heavily subsidized), or (b) relatively empty. In fact, transit-oriented and adjacent development is so scarce in St. Louis that rail advocates have to cast an incredibly wide net for any evidence of it. For instance, Citizens for Modern Transit, the region’s major transit advocacy group, includes investments on Interstates 64 and 70 and parking garages as development “spurred” by MetroLink. And Metro, which operates MetroLink, seems to think any investment within a half-mile of a rail station is causally linked to the presence of their trains. (Or, all they present is data on development within a half-mile of their stations.) Perhaps this is why consultants are now saying that MetroLink could “spur possibly millions of dollars in economic development….” (my emphasis).

At this point, it’s unclear what, if anything, taxpayers will get in return for hiking up their sales taxes. Although rail proponents may have inexhaustible faith, history and facts suggest taxpayers won’t get much for their investment.

The post What Will the City’s New MetroLink Tax Get Us? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

But is MetroLink underdeveloped? One way to answer that question is to ask whether the existing supply of light rail meets demand. Based on ridership trends, the existing supply of light rail may actually exceed demand. Ridership plummeted during and shortly after the recession in 2008 and has failed to pick back up even while economic conditions have improved in Saint Louis.

Another way of determining if MetroLink is underdeveloped is to compare it to other light rail systems. The table below lists light rail systems from across the country, and looks specifically at the length of each system, as well as the population and geographic size of the urbanized area (UZA) where the system is located.

Note: Track miles are compared to UZA and not ‘Service Area’ (SA) because SA includes modes besides light rail (e.g., buses) and is a direct correlate of track miles. Thus, SA is simply a function of track miles, and not a measure of the metropolitan area a system serves.  See National Transit Database Glossary for more.  
Source: Track miles from agency websites, and UZA data from National Transit Database.

Given this perspective, we can see that in terms of track miles, Saint Louis has a rather robust light rail system compared to other cities. While there is variation across systems, Saint Louis has more miles of track than the average and the median system. In fact, of these 18 systems, Saint Louis is the 7th-largest (and if we excluded systems with heavy rail, the 5th-largest). MetroLink is even larger than some heavy rail systems, such as Metrorail in Miami-Dade County (24.4 miles), and is just about as large as Atlanta’s system (47.6 miles).

However, what matters is not just the length of a system but also the length of a system relative to the size of the area it serves. To measure this, we divide the size of an area by the miles of track its system has—the figures in the fourth column. (For a more complete picture, I’ve also included population as the last column.) In short, the lower the number in the fourth column, the more miles of track per square mile of land, and so, the more developed a system is. By this measure, Saint Louis has one of the more developed systems in the country and compares well to many cities, with a system that is far more developed than the average. Saint Louis even compares favorably to Los Angeles!

Based on this analysis, Saint Louis’s light rail system does not appear underdeveloped. It may even be overdeveloped (or, perhaps, it developed too quickly or along poorly chosen routes). Before pushing for another expensive MetroLink extension, shouldn’t officials ask if we already have more than we need (and can afford)?

The post MetroLink Underperforms, but It Is Not Underdeveloped appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Let everyone else sing the praises of a new book or movie. If he couldn’t make heads or tails of it, he told you so in his own inimitable way. He said it was weirt. Not weird, but weirt.

As a one-word critique, his mispronunciation spoke volumes. Weirt was more than passing strange and more than a little peculiar. If something was weirt, only someone with his head in the clouds, or buried in the sand, would think it worthy of serious consideration.

What else is weirt?

How about plans to spend $2.2 billion in taxpayer money to build a 17-mile extension of the Saint Louis MetroLink light-rail system? That works out to more than $100 million per mile, or about $2,000 per foot.

Despite the colossal expense, it’s a must-do, says Mayor Francis Slay. He calls it “a moral and economic imperative.”

If you believe that, you must also believe that more light rail will help to solve a multitude of urban problems – everything from inner city decay and high unemployment to traffic congestion and air pollution.

In fact, in a sprawling metropolis like Saint Louis, there is little light rail can do to ease, let alone solve, any of those problems.

Since the 1990s, MetroLink has soaked up $3 billion in taxpayer money through capital outlays and operating subsidies. What do we have to show for it?

Very little. MetroLink carries less than one-half of one percent of the area’s commuters. Adding 17 miles to the existing 46 miles of track won’t make much of a difference there.

So here’s a better idea, which people who actually ride on MetroLink – as opposed to the downtown political class – would surely appreciate.

Instead of adding a line, give new cars to all MetroLink riders – to include today’s 44,000 daily riders, plus an estimated 15,000 future riders from the planned expansion.

The local/regional share of the construction cost is $1.1 billion, plenty of money ($18,600 per rider) to buy everyone a new compact. Add the matching federal dollars, and you could give new SUVs to all MetroLink riders.

What else could the St. Louis region do with $1.1 billion. It could:

• pay tuition for more than 27,000 Missouri residents at the University of Missouri at Saint Louis (for their entire degrees)
• triple Bi-State Transit’s fleet of buses and make other major improvements
• send out $500 checks to every man, woman, and child in the metropolitan area.

That is not to say that we should do any of those things; it is just to put the magnitude of the proposed expenditure on MetroLink into a broader perspective.

For Slay and others to advocate spending that much money on an underutilized and largely irrelevant light-rail system is beyond weird; it is truly weirt.

The post Two Thumbs Down for MetroLink Expansion appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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It looks like the city’s “frugality” will be overshadowed by the massive costs of a proposed expansion that would extend the current line 3.75 miles south from Union Station to the Plaza and UMKC.

The projected construction costs for the extension are estimated at $227M (in 2019 dollars), and the downtown line cost $102M (in 2014 dollars) to build. After adjusting for inflation, on a per-mile basis, that makes Kansas City’s proposed expansion one of the most expensive streetcar projects in the nation.

All figures in 2014 dollars

As the chart above shows, the cost per mile of the proposed expansion is over 20% greater than that of the downtown starter line. Even if the city got a good deal—if we can call it that—on the downtown line, it surely won’t if expansion occurs.

The only streetcar more expensive than Kansas City’s proposed expansion is Washington D.C.’s 2.4 mile H-St. line, which cost over $200M to build. But besting D.C.’s line isn’t much to brag about—it’s been described as one of the most poorly handled streetcar projects in the nation. 

So as efforts mount to expand the streetcar beyond downtown, Kansas Citians should ask themselves: Are we willing to pay higher sales and property taxes to fund one of the most expensive streetcar projects in the country?

Although the rail boosters hope to garner a $100M grant from the feds, the city itself will be on the hook for $130M. More on the financial breakdown of the proposed expansion in my next blog!

Note: Figures adjusted to 2014 dollars with CPI deflator, assuming 2% annual inflation 2017-19. 

The post The Ballooning Cost of Streetcars appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

What is clear, though, is that the north–south MetroLink expansion isn’t the panacea advocates claim it is.

It isn’t a solution to automobile dependence. Saint Louis’s low population density and dispersed employment centers make the city a bad fit for light rail. Popular, cost-effective light rail systems require population densities upwards of 20,000 people per square mile, but Saint Louis City has fewer than 5,000 per square mile. And experience with existing MetroLink routes demonstrates our region’s preference for the car. Today, a lower percentage of Saint Louisans use transit than in 1990, before MetroLink even operated. Even more embarrassing, MetroLink has lower ridership today than it did in 2005, the year before the Shrewsbury line opened.

It isn’t a solution to poor transit service, either. Firstly, the proposed north-south line operates along a route already served by numerous bus routes. Secondly, the reason less than 4% of Saint Louisans commute on transit isn’t because they have trouble going from North City to downtown. It’s because the antiquated “hub and spoke” model Metro uses makes travelling from North City to employment centers in Central and West County a multi-transfer odyssey. If regional leaders truly want to improve mobility, they’d do better by advancing bus-rapid-transit (BRT) lines. BRT uses sleek, rail-like vehicles, well-appointed and generously-spaced stations, and exclusive rights-of-way to deliver service comparable to light rail. For just a fifth of the local cost of expanding MetroLink, the region could construct the five BRT lines in its long-range transportation plan.

Nor is MetroLink a cure for anemic urban development. Despite claims of rail advocates, the economic consensus is that light rail is not a catalyst for economic growth. Even putting aside the wildly inflated figures touted by rail advocates, we can see with our own two eyes that MetroLink has failed to spur development in Saint Louis. Far from rejuvenating depressed areas, MetroLink has even failed to prevent decline in areas that seemed to be on the rise in 1994 when the first lines opened, like Union Station and Laclede’s Landing. Nor did it ever bring the fantastically improbable golf course to East Saint Louis.

And MetroLink will not solve historic segregation or achieve the nebulous goal of “connectedness.” There simply is no evidence, save the endless, unfounded repetition of rail advocates, that light rail is a solution to economic, social, or racial segregation. (Just think: how might riding a train downtown, where so few jobs exist, make life better for an average North City resident?) And if “connectedness” means residents and visitors have the ability to travel from North or South County to downtown, then we’ve achieved it, as these areas are already connected by bus and bikes routes, streets, and sidewalks. No, these areas are not connected by rail—but if the argument is that we need rail because we don’t have rail, then advocates are running in circles.

Soon, the Mayor and rail proponents will stop begging the question and start begging for money. When they do, Saint Louisans should carefully consider what benefits could possibly justify a $2 billion MetroLink expansion, and whether or not it’s just an expensive “remedy” to treat problems for which we already have more sound solutions. 

The post North-South MetroLink Expansion: Snake Oil for Saint Louis appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The post MetroLink Expansion: Not on the Right Track? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

First, let’s analyze MetroLink’s effect on public transportation usage. It is true that people (including myself) use the MetroLink; the system handles an average of about 44,000 trips per day. However, MetroLink’s effect on total transit ridership has been modest. Despite the immense expenditures (around $3 billion) and multiple expansions, total bus and rail ridership today is lower than bus ridership alone was in 1991, three years before the MetroLink opened. Even worse, not all MetroLink expansions have even resulted in sustained higher MetroLink ridership. Take the case of latest expansion, from Forest Park to Shrewsbury, which opened in 2006. While the addition initially pushed rail ridership to new heights, ten years later total MetroLink ridership is lower than it was the year before the expansion opened.

The increasing supply of light rail, along with flagging enthusiasm for its use, has meant that in terms of passengers, MetroLink now has the lowest rate of use it has ever had, with only 2.55 riders per vehicle revenue mile.

Next let’s evaluate the MetroLink’s impact on development in Saint Louis. Consider the expectations of MetroLink’s proponents when the initial line opened in 1994. They hoped rail would generate urban renewal, with specific hopes that it would save Saint Louis Centre and bring life (and even a golf course) to East Saint Louis. Far from rejuvenating areas that were down on their luck, the MetroLink failed to prevent decline in areas of its route that appeared on the ascendency in 1994, like Union Station and Laclede’s Landing. Some areas near MetroLink stations have done well, like the Central West End or the Loop, but in these places development seems to be happening near the MetroLink, not radiating from it. With few exceptions, MetroLink platforms remain areas of quiet repose, far from businesses, residences, and crowds. It’s ironic, given the claims of rail advocates, that the true success stories of urban renewal in Saint Louis City are places like Soulard, South Grand, the Grove, and now Cherokee Street, located far away from any MetroLink station.

With regard to increasing transit usage in Saint Louis and spurring urban revitalization, the MetroLink has, to this point, been an expensive disappointment. There is no reason to think any MetroLink expansion will create different results. It’s time for the region to start looking for better, more cost-effective ways to achieve progress toward public transportation and development goals. 

The post Saint Louis Should Learn from MetroLink’s Disappointing Past appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Assuming other types of public transportation service (such as buses) are unaffected, the addition of a North–South MetroLink line could increase the speed and quantity of public transportation in the Saint Louis region.  Light rail is generally much faster than standard buses, so more rail can mean faster transit and more riders. However, light rail is not the only way to improve public transportation, and Saint Louis needs to consider light rail as just one option among many, perhaps not the most prudent one.

As we’ve discussed many times before, Saint Louis is a dispersed region, both in terms of where people work and where they live. Most residents live and work outside of Saint Louis City, and more people commute into Saint Louis County than Saint Louis City for work. The area in the region with the most employees and the highest payroll is not downtown, but West County. Nevertheless, the North–South MetroLink plan would route riders in and out of downtown Saint Louis, as if the year were 1904. In terms of population density, most of Saint Louis City (and nearly the entire planned route of North-South MetroLink) has less than 5,000 residents per square mile. Cost-effective light rail systems generally have population densities nearing 20,000 people per square mile around stops.

Saint Louis’s existing MetroLink lines already encounter ridership problems, despite serving areas with more employment and population than the proposed North-South line would. After spending more than $2 billion building the current system, a lower percentage of Saint Louisans use transit now than did in 1990. And, despite the hopes of transit activists, the situation is not getting any better. Both MetroLink and MetroBus ridership peaked in 2008, and even as better economic times have come to Saint Louis in the last few years, MetroLink ridership continues to stagnate. The result of this failure to draw more riders is that, accounting for all light rail costs since 1992, the MetroLink has cost Saint Louis nearly $10 for every passenger that has ever stepped on board, with a one-way fare of only $2.50. The bottom line is that the existing MetroLink has, despite the investment, failed to achieve meaningful progress toward promoting transit ridership or generating urban development. There is little reason to believe that an expansion will yield better results.

Fortunately for the region, adding more rail is not the only way to improve public transportation. Saint Louis could, for far less than a billion dollars, improve its poorly managed bus system or implement bus rapid transit, both options made much easier by the incredibly low traffic levels on Saint Louis’s highways and arterial roads.

However Saint Louis officials move forward, they would do best to consider public transportation plans that take the city as it is, and not how transit activists want it to be. If they don't the system will continue to operate as it does today: expansive yet inefficient, expensive yet resource-poor, overbuilt yet under-ridden. 

The post Light Rail a Losing Proposition for Saint Louis appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The city is correct to put the blame on the car owner for this accident. However, that doesn’t make it a good idea for a city to build a transportation system that relies on everyone studiously observing parking regulations. We put “all stops” in traffic signals, install high railings on bridges, and force McDonalds to serve cooler coffee, all because we correctly expect that some small percentage of people are just going to screw up.

Kansas City is not the only city dealing with these issues. Other metros, like Washington D.C., have had continuous problems with collisions on their recently opened streetcar line. Anecdotes aside, the federal government collects public transportation safety data, and from 2011 (when they started reporting streetcar data) to 2015, streetcars and their close cousins, cable cars, were by far the most collision-prone forms of public transportation. Streetcar revenue miles per collision were almost an order of magnitude lower than those for buses or other types of rail:

Cities should expect collisions because of the streetcar’s very design. They share the road with other vehicles and, due to fixed rails, cannot maneuver around obstacles like buses can (or avoid obstacles completely, as separated rail lines do). An object in the path of the rails means either a collision or a delayed streetcar. This safety problem is one of the factors that pushed cities away from streetcars in the first place, and is something policymakers should consider as they plan to bring a small part of that system back. 

The post Kansas City Streetcar Has First Crash appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The first thing to note about Saint Louis’s transportation system is that it is highly dependent on the highway and street system. In Saint Louis City, Saint Louis County, and Saint Charles County, about 89 percent of commuters either drove or carpooled in 2014. Only 3.4 percent used public transportation. More than half of those who did used buses, which also depend on streets and highways. In terms of the flow of goods, almost 70 percent of freight traffic moves by truck (and hence by road) in the Saint Louis area.

Regional transportation investments for the near future do not reflect these realities. Of the $1.2 billion in federally aided transportation projects slated to move forward in Saint Louis City, Saint Louis County, and Saint Charles County (including multi-state and multicounty projects, the vast majority of which tend to benefit Saint Louis City and County) from 2016 to 2019, 47 percent will be spent on public transportation improvements (see the graph above).

Breaking down the numbers further, investments by Metro (the regional transit agency) will outstrip road & bridge projects made by the Missouri Department of Transportation (which maintains state highways) by more than 30 percent:

Metro will spend about $230 million (45 percent of investments) on the MetroLink, the region’s light rail. This does not include large-scale MetroLink extension plans (aside from a new $13 million station near Grand Ave.), but instead is mostly intended for maintenance and rehabilitation. In all, somewhere between 15 and 20 percent of federally aided transportation investments benefiting Saint Louis City, Saint Louis County, and Saint Charles County will be spent maintaining light rail.

Perhaps increased spending on public transportation will cause residents to get out of their cars and onto the bus or rail. However, anything more than a modest increase in public transportation’s total travel share is unlikely, given the experiences of other cities. That being the case, systematically favoring transportation systems that few residents and no freight companies use over the one that quite literally moves the metropolitan area is asking for trouble.

The post Saint Louis Transportation Planning Prioritizes Public Transportation, MetroLink appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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On Oct. 4, 2015, six routes will be affected, including 24-Independence and 30-Northeast. Stops being removed will have Rider Alerts posted at each location. In a press release from the KCATA, the biggest factor in removing a stop is low ridership at a specific location, which will provide a smoother ride and help keep buses on time.

This is good news: a sign that the KCATA is reviewing their ridership information and making changes where necessary. But they can do more than just make changes to where buses stop, as this latest plan does. In the past, KCATA has issued bulletins about changes in service. Some are temporary responses to construction or large events, and some are more permanent changes in routes. As populations shift, KCATA is able to assess need and make changes to routes, route frequencies, and the number and location of stops. This is a good thing, and underscores the exact reason why modern bus transit is superior to light rail and streetcars. Not only can fixed rail not be rerouted to account for changing population needs, the train cars themselves cannot even change lanes to avoid broken down vehicles or other train cars.

As has been said before, trains don't take you were you want to go, they take you where developers and urban planners want you to go. KCATA's recent actions demonstrate exactly why buses are a better transit choice.

The post KCATA Makes Changes to Improve Bus Service appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

[Executive Director of Citizens for Modern Transit Kimberly] Cella cites studies that name MetroLink percentage-wise among the most utilized light rail corridors in the U.S.

Calling MetroLink one of the most utilized light rail lines could be considered damning with faint praise. However, the compliment itself does not appear to be correct. A quick look at data from the National Transit Database contradicts the idea that MetroLink is a particularly successful light rail line.

Of 21 reporting light rail systems, MetroLink ranked ninth in terms of passenger trips in 2013. Of course, those systems vary in their total mileage and level of service, so a better measure of utilization is passenger miles or passenger trips divided by total vehicle revenue miles (VRM), a proxy for total service provided. By those measures, MetroLink ranks eighth for passenger mile per VRM (24.6) and 19th for passenger trips per VRM (2.7).

From this data, we can see that large, dense cities tend to have the highest rate of ridership given the level of service provided. The best term to describe MetroLink utilization is middling.

Interestingly, utilization was much higher before MetroLink expanded in the early and mid-2000s.

When MetroLink only had the initial line from the airport to just across the river, it may have been true that the system had among the highest utilization rates of any light rail system. But after MetroLink expanded further into Illinois and again to Shrewsbury, utilization rates fell substantially. The reason for this is obvious: The route with the highest ridership potential was built first, with secondary options being built secondarily. Later routes, with fewer riders at a given level of service, drag down the entire system’s average.

In reality, MetroLink does not stand out among light rail systems in terms of ridership. Furthermore, adding new lines in Saint Louis County are likely to have even less ridership potential than existing routes, due to lower population density and higher car ownership. And since fewer people per train means higher subsidies per train, new lines will likely require higher subsidies and carry fewer riders. Residents should think carefully about whether Metro should, or even can, take on the extra burden.

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