“We have gone from about 80 properties to about 480 properties,” Hulshof explained. “My cup runneth over.”

Like supporters of government-managed economic development programs everywhere, backers of the plan in Charleston think that if the government approves the right plan here, with the right subsidy there, with the right government agency approval soon, that government plans can magically turn a struggling city into a boomtown. As economist Dick Netzer once mocked these eco devo officials, “Who needs oil wells, when a state can be another Kuwait just by increasing the budget of a tiny agency?”

A Chapter 353 plan with mass property tax abatements would not help Charleston. It would, in fact, almost certainly hurt it more. If property taxes are too high for businesses in Charleston (which I doubt, to be honest), then the city, school district, county, etc. should lower the rate for everyone, not give some property owners in downtown Charleston a big tax abatement that will almost certainly force tax increases on everyone else to make up the difference.

There are a multitude of studies that demonstrate the fallacy of believing that government economic development agencies can successfully engineer economic growth through various subsidies. Here is one simple summary from two economists who have looked at the question thoroughly: “The best case is that incentives work about 10% of the time and are simply a waste of money the other 90%.”

There are other economists who wouldn’t even agree they work 10 percent of the time. As one economist said after he reviewed a similar tax-subsidy laden plan for north St. Louis:

Among the most vocal critics of the NorthSide plan was the chair of Washington University’s Department of Economics, Prof. Michele Boldrin, who testified at the trial that the benefits promised by McKee such as new jobs and increases in property value were “dreamy,” “out of thin air,” “unreasonable,” and “completely arbitrary” and further stated that “if an MBA student came up with it, I’d throw him out of my office.”

St. Louis and other cities in Missouri have been using tax incentives as a prop for politicians to claim they are “doing something” for decades. How has it worked out for St. Louis? As author Colin Gordon wrote in him study on that precise question in his book, “Mapping Decline”:

The overarching irony, in Saint Louis and elsewhere, is that efforts to save the city from such practices and patterns almost always made things worse. In setting after setting, both the diagnosis (blight) and its prescription (urban renewal) were shaped by — and compromised by — the same assumptions and expectations and prejudices that had created the condition in the first place.

If you think the results in Charleston are going to be any different, I have a bridge over the Mississippi to sell you. A Chapter 353 plan for Charleston will allow politicians and planners to claim they are doing something, it will benefit the politically connected and the lucky, and it will empower city government to get more involved in the local economy. All of these things are, by the way, bad things. What a 353 plan won’t do for Charleston is help revitalize the city or grow the economy.

The post A Chapter 353 Tax Abatement Plan is the Last Thing Charleston Needs appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

First Ward Councilman Tom Oldham commented that he feels that Chapter 353 is a great tool, as evidenced by his visits to Elm Springs, a community that also took advantage of the Chapter 353 program. Elm Springs went from blight to beauty as a result, Oldham said.

(Note: I assume he meant Excelsior Springs, which has a 353 plan, and not Elm Springs—I can find no municipality in Missouri with that name.)

Did a 353 urban redevelopment plan really turn Excelsior Springs (or Elm Springs?) from blight to beauty? Of course not. Granting some properties in a designated area a tax abatement if they undergo the required legal process isn’t going to grow the economy. If you want to cut taxes, great—cut taxes for everyone, not just a designated few. The idea that politicians are qualified to pick the right companies or properties is absurd.

Economist Dick Netzer once mocked the exaggerated claims of success by economic development officials and politicians by writing, “Who needs oil wells, when a state can be another Kuwait just by increasing the budget of a tiny agency?” Those claims of subsidy success often border on the absurd. I once heard a Clay County economic development official claim that “all of the growth” in the town of Liberty—a fast growing, exurban community north of Kansas City the likes of which have been growing across the nation for decades—was due to a tax increment financing (TIF) package. All of it, he stated with certainty, as if suburbanization didn’t exist until Missouri’s TIF law was passed in the late 1980s.

Economists Alan Peters and Peter Fisher studied tax incentives closely and concluded that they work about ten percent of the time (as measured by job creation), and the other 90 percent are simply a waste of money. They added that, like the Clay County official mentioned above, economic development officials often credit all new employment and growth to tax subsidies.

The City of Saint Louis has been using tax incentives like 353 urban redevelopment plans, Enterprise Zones (EZs), TIF, and other subsidies as redevelopment tools for over half a century. How has it worked out? Colin Gordon, in his 2008 book Mapping Decline, documents the decline of the City of Saint Louis. The book’s research is exhaustive. The dominant theme of the book is the use of urban renewal tools and tax subsidies—and their absolute, total failure. From his conclusion:

The overarching irony, in Saint Louis and elsewhere, is that efforts to save the city from such practices and patterns almost always made things worse. In setting after setting, both the diagnosis (blight) and its prescription (urban renewal) were shaped by—and compromised by—the same assumptions and expectations and prejudices that had created the condition in the first place.

The dirty little secret that nobody seems to want to recognize is that 353 Plans, EZs, TIF projects, , tax abatements, and other subsidies do not work. They don’t succeed in growing the local economy, be it urban, suburban, or rural. The panoply of subsidies that come into play when a large area is declared blighted can have a number of adverse side effects. They shrink the local tax base, introduce more cronyism and favoritism into the economy, encourage more government planning of the economy, and increase the chances of eminent domain abuse. As a famous Swedish economist once said:

It is not by planting trees or subsidizing tree planting in a desert created by politicians that the government can promote . . . industry, but by refraining from measures that create a desert environment.

The Chapter 353 urban redevelopment plan didn’t help grow Excelsior Springs. It didn’t help grow St. Louis, nor any of the other cities that have such a plan. It won’t help grow Sedalia, either, but it will be great for the politically connected parties who get the tax subsidies they are after.

The post Sedalia Doesn’t Need a 353 Redevelopment Plan appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The proposal rests on shaky assumptions about the effectiveness of economic development subsidies. Tax credits and similar incentives have a long history of overpromising and underdelivering—even according to analyses from people supporting the projects!

These programs often enrich developers without producing significant long-term benefits for the communities footing the bill. Take, for example, the myriad subsidies for corporate headquarters and downtown stadiums in Kansas City. Despite their hefty price tags, these deals leave taxpayers shouldering higher costs with little to show for it in terms of jobs or economic growth. St. Louis risks again following the same path—throwing public money at developers while failing to address the underlying issues.

A major problem with subsidies like this is that they create a false sense of market demand. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch quotes one of the bill’s sponsors, Missouri Senator Steve Roberts, as saying, “The demand for more downtown residential is clear.” If that were true, private investors should already be stepping up. Developers should not need government support to pursue profitable opportunities.

Subsidy programs also suffer from a lack of transparency and accountability. Often, there are no robust safeguards to measure their success or clawback provisions when promises go unfulfilled. Without clear benchmarks and regular public reporting, these programs devolve into blank checks for developers.

St. Louis should focus on making the downtown area a desirable place to live by prioritizing public safety and basic city services. Addressing crime, for instance, would do far more to draw new residents and businesses than funneling public money into speculative real estate projects.

A smarter approach to revitalizing downtown St. Louis would let market forces lead the way. City leaders can play a supportive role by streamlining permitting processes and reducing regulatory barriers, making it easier for developers to pursue worthwhile projects. (There are some small, hopeful signs St. Louis is heeding this call.) At the same time, investments in public safety, infrastructure, and essential services would lay the groundwork for organic growth that benefits everyone—not just developers.

Yes, St. Louis needs more residents. Yes, increasing the downtown population would have all sorts of positive economic effects. But right now, too few people want to live there, and nothing will work until that changes first.

The post Downtown St. Louis Doesn’t Need Subsidies appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In 2022, Maryville University planned to redevelop the Woods Mill Center into a complex featuring an e-sports arena, among other amenities. While the plan faced substantial public backlash, it was recommended to the board of alderman by the Town and Country Planning and Zoning Commission. However, Maryville ultimately withdrew the proposal in 2023. The school was hesitant to spend any more money on a plan that it felt was likely to be denied by the board.

Earlier this year, McBride Homes submitted applications for rezoning and preliminary site development plan approval to redevelop Woods Mill Center into an 80-home development. Unlike the Maryville proposal, McBride’s “Woods Mill Crossing” received significant public support, especially after the plan was revised to have slightly fewer homes in response to public concerns. Nonetheless, Town and Country’s Planning and Zoning Commission failed to recommend approval of the rezoning and preliminary site development plan.

After discussion during multiple board of aldermen meetings, McBride withdrew its plan. According to reports, McBride wants to revise its plan to address some officials’ concerns and resubmit on July 19.

McBride’s biggest hurdle? Density. The St. Louis Post Dispatch reports that “the new neighborhood would have been the highest density residential development in the affluent west St. Louis County suburb.” Members of the Planning and Zoning Commission think increased density would hurt the character of the city. But should increasing density in Town and Country really be met with such consternation?

Increases in housing density are shown to have various positive impacts. Higher-density housing can make providing services more efficient and improve housing affordability. For example, while the median home price in Town and Country is around $1 million, the homes in the proposed development would be priced between $600,000 and $700,000. In addition, there are environmental benefits to higher-density housing including decreased automobile usage and, of course, less land usage. On top of that, the Woods Mill Crossing proposal is to redevelop already developed land, meaning there won’t necessarily be a loss of green space, as is often the concern with new developments (see another of McBride’s developments in St. Charles).

McBride’s proposal has the potential to make smart use of underutilized land, something that many residents want for the city of Town and Country. We will see if officials accept a revised proposal and the benefits of higher-density housing are realized in this community.

The post If at First You Don’t Succeed, Try, Try Again appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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But now it wants to both subsidize and fund a major redevelopment of and around the Chesterfield Mall, and it wants to use property taxes to do so. How do you do that when you don’t have a property tax? Solution: you just take the property taxes from other governments. While that type of stealing would be illegal in many other situations, it is, unfortunately, perfectly legal under the tax-increment financing (TIF) laws of Missouri.

How much tax money is Chesterfield planning to take from other taxing districts should the development be approved and built (no guarantees on either of those)? $300 million. That’s right, $300 million.

The development proposal includes over 3,000 new residential units. Those residential units are going to have families with children. That is obviously wonderful, but what is not wonderful is that the school property taxes from those 3,000 units for the life of the TIF (around 30 years due to the phased in nature of it in this instance) will not go to the school districts (mostly Parkway, some in Rockwood). That tax money will go to Chesterfield and to the developer. The plan includes giving millions of dollars voluntarily to Parkway in an effort to buy the school district’s support, but the school districts have added up the money and concluded it will be short. How far short?

$220 million short. That’s right, $220 million. The school districts have calculated the probable number of extra children who will join the district because of the development, the need for an entirely new school building to educate them, the cost to educate those children on top of the new building, the length of the TIF project, and more, and concluded that they are short $220 million tax dollars in this deal. How are Parkway and Rockwood going to make up that estimated $220 million? They have only a few choices: cut school services in various ways or—more likely, in my opinion—request a tax increase on taxpayers outside of the TIF district.

So let’s be clear: in order for taxpayers to fund the demolition of Chesterfield Mall (instead of having the group that actually owns the mall take care of it) and hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of other amenities—including $23 million to pay the cost of lawyers, planners, and financiers—the residents of Parkway school district can almost certainly look forward to a tax increase on everyone who is not inside the TIF district. (To be clear, residents inside the TIF district will also pay the higher tax, it just won’t go to Parkway schools.)

Something is deeply wrong with how we fund local government in Missouri.

The post Chesterfield and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Large TIF appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Late note: It is our understanding that the June 27 Board of Aldermen meeting has been cancelled.

The post Osage Beach Outlet Mall TIF Proposal appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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David Stokes joined The McGraw Show on The Big 550 KTRS to discuss the project.

The post Crestwood TIF Commission Considers Redevelopment Plan with $17 Million in Giveaways appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Kingsway Commercial Tax Increment Redevelopment Plan involves developing multiple projects where the Central West End meets Delmar Boulevard. But perhaps more importantly, a big chunk of funding for these projects would come via a tax-increment financing (TIF) district that would raise $6.2 million. This project will also be financed by a mixture of state and federal tax credits. There are additional plans to create a community improvement district (adding to Missouri’s growing special taxing district problem).

These economic development tools would help to finance this project at the expense of taxpayers; they give developers cash, reduce their tax burdens, and could increase sales taxes in the area. North of the “Delmar Divide” is generally a low-income area, so should we really be redistributing tax dollars from low-income residents to developers instead of using these dollars for public services? Especially when other publicly funded ventures like the Cerner headquarters in Kansas City or the Loop Trolley right down the street from this project haven’t delivered on their promises?

While I’m sure most can appreciate the “bridging the gap” intention of this project, TIF is a flawed economic development tool that often gives no benefit to taxpayers. TIF requires that an area be blighted (for which Missouri has a very broad definition), and that the development would not happen without the public funding. With the thriving Central West End neighborhood just steps from this development, it’s hard to believe that development in this area would not occur without millions of public dollars. Moreover, even if this area were blighted, does it really need these perks for the next 23 years? Is diverting tax dollars to a private development project really the best way to develop this area of St. Louis?

The post Fixing the “Delmar Divide” with a TIF? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Almost three years after voters approved the levy, conditions in the targeted district — 9th Street to Gregory Boulevard, The Paseo to Indiana Avenue — remain largely unchanged, and unacceptable. The initial promise of revitalization and renewal in those neighborhoods remains just that, a promise.

They point out that much of the funds collected from the sales tax remain unspent and urge the new oversight board to get to work improving the lives of citizens. Unsurprisingly, the editorial board endorsed the tax increase at the time of its creation. Writing skeptically of this and other ballot questions at the time, I suggested in a Star guest column:

While supporters of Question 4 are to be congratulated for wanting to address economic injustice, one more tax-funded subsidy will not solve the problem. In fact, one more increase to an already-high sales tax likely will do more harm.

. . . Without substantive long-term solutions to the problems that got us here, voters risk spending more to get the same outcome we have in the past.

Policymakers and observers are united in wanting the best for Kansas City, but that does not mean every proposal is a good one. This sales tax is not alone in failing to deliver on promises—nor does the proposal even articulate a policy for making people’s lives better. We are just now learning that the convention hotel was costlier than we thought—likely because city leaders didn’t do the work of vetting the proposal and questioning its assumptions.

The Kansas City Council is considering enacting free bus fare in the city, something else the Star’s editorial board has endorsed. But none of the important legwork work has been done to assess the viability of such a program, including even a survey of Kansas City’s transit riders. (If you assume that transit riders think fares are a priority, read this.)

City leaders need to do their homework so we can avoid this cycle of adopting new policies, including raising taxes, before we define success.

The post Tax First, Provide Detail Later appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Skeptics of a massive taxpayer-subsidized redevelopment project in University City were right to trust their guts. While the City’s website says that “The City will not use eminent domain under the tax-increment financing (TIF) law to condemn owner-occupied residential property,” now it sounds as if that might be an option. In a recent interview, City Manager Gregory Rose said “there may be an option that the developer says ‘we understand what council’s position has been regarding the use of eminent domain but we’d like you to take a look at this’ . . . and so the council will end up making that decision at that time.”

Why might eminent domain be on the table now? Well, my gut is telling me this: City officials have a lot to gain (in terms of sales tax revenue) from the development going through, and now, given that some homeowners don’t want to sell for the price being offered to them by the developer, city officials might be starting to worry. And if they have convinced themselves that this development must happen, no matter the cost to taxpayers, then kicking property owners out of their homes might be a price they are willing to pay.

This is worrisome for several reasons. First, the economic renaissance promised by development proponents, which is the main justification for the project, is unlikely to occur. Unfortunately, TIF—the subsidy mechanism the development most heavily relies on—just hasn’t been shown to increase surrounding property values. Trust me, a part of me wishes TIF did this, as I live just a few minutes from the redevelopment area. Unfortunately as the economic research suggests, TIF projects don’t make the neighborhoods surrounding them more valuable. If the ends justifying a blunt tool like eminent domain aren’t likely to materialize, we might not want to incur the costs of using that tool.

Second and most important is the fact that property owners—especially owner-occupied residential property owners—simply shouldn’t be forced out of their homes for the benefit of a private developer. Perhaps certain public projects, such as interstates and railroads, can justify the coercive removal of property owners from their property, but it is far from clear that homeowners should be ousted from their homes so that a politically-favored big-box store can make a nice profit. We’ve seen how these things can go.

But if you wonder why you, perhaps someone living far away from University City, should care about this, just keep in mind that your local government body is populated by the same sorts of people that populate University City government. If we are to learn anything from public choice theory, it’s that institutions—such as local governments—have values and goals of their own, and that the people behind local institutions are as fallible and greedy as everyone else. This isn’t to cast a blanket of doubt on all institutions, but rather to make clear that the violation of property rights in some areas of Missouri is a threat to the property rights everyone in the state.

In the end, University City officials should get over their infatuation with the I-170 & Olive redevelopment and abandon their apparent “any means necessary” strategy for ensuring its materialization. The threat of use of eminent domain is politically and morally disturbing, and would signal to University City residents and others that their homes and lives are for sale, so long as city hall thinks that the price is right. 

The post Is U City Considering Eminent Domain After All? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Philadelphia LandCare (PLC) program was started when residents of a particularly bad-off neighborhood team up with the state horticultural society to clean up vacant and trashy lots. The article reveals:

PLC is simple and was designed to be applied across the neighborhood. Trash and debris are removed from a vacant lot. The land is then graded, and grass and a few trees are planted. A low wooden post-and-rail fence is installed with openings to permit residents access to the newly greened spaces. The fence prevents illegal dumping of garbage and construction debris; it is also a visual sign that someone is maintaining the property. The result is a small “pocket park.” The rehabilitation of such lots takes less than a week to clean and green. The lots are maintained through twice-monthly cleaning, weeding, and mowing during the growing season (April through October). The cost to clean and green a typical lot is roughly $1,000–$1,300, along with $150 per year to stabilize the lot through biweekly cleaning and mowing.

The maintenance costs are higher in Missouri. St. Louis City’s Forestry Division (yes, St. Louis has a Forestry Division!) bills $108 per property per time they mow, and try to visit each property (there are 11,000) only 3 or 4 times each year instead of biweekly. As for Kansas City, a few weeks of calls and emails to various city departments and individuals have yielded no results on the costs of maintenance.

Kansas City is slowly making good on its promise to demolish dangerous structures, an important part of blight remediation. Addressing blight requires more. Churches, community groups, and charities of all kinds need to work together to address blight just like the people of Philadelphia. We clearly cannot expect government to do it for us.

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According to The Kansas City Star back in February 2016:

City Manager Troy Schulte recently estimated it would cost $10 million to knock down all the most dangerous houses and other buildings in the city. That backlog of 870 buildings has built up because in the past, the city has only been able to spend about $800,000 annually to demolish about 100 houses, and more properties keep getting added to the list every year.

The city sold bonds to raise the $10 million to pay for the demolition. Work started in June 2016 and it was to take two years to tear down about 800 buildings. In April 2018, Channel 41 reported that the city surpassed it goal and “taken care of” 895 buildings in two years. That is because many were sold and rehabilitated, not demolished.

According to city data, only 609 buildings actually have been torn down by the city in the three years since. While this is slower than initially planned, it represents good progress toward addressing blight.

As of October 7, 2019, there are 343 dangerous buildings remaining on the city’s list.

The post What Happened to Those 800 Dangerous Buildings? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Typically, a gift doesn’t require a contribution from the person on the receiving end. But St. Louis taxpayers are ponying up for nearly half the cost of the aquarium, as described in a St. Louis Post Dispatch article:

[Twenty] million of the St. Louis Aquarium’s construction costs will come from an existing tax-increment financing agreement and two special tax districts that carry a 1 percent tax on sales at Union Station. Included is LHM’s intent to use $5 million in historic preservation tax credits to help restore the 11-acre shed.

Show-Me Institute analysts have spent years documenting the failures and abuses of tax-increment financing (TIF), special taxing districts, and historic preservation tax credits. These programs take public dollars and shift investment risk to taxpayers, while allowing private investors to reap the benefits.

If the aquarium is a good idea, why aren’t there private investors lining up to fund the project?

Maybe it’s because aquariums are a pretty risky bet financially. A recent article in The Atlantic outlined the financial struggles of aquariums in big cities across the United States:

The stress of acquisition and maintenance often leads to financial struggle . . . In this century, the Denver aquarium, which opened to much fanfare in 1999, declared bankruptcy in 2002 because of defaults on building loans. (It was purchased by Landry’s, a hospitality company, and reopened in 2003.) More recently, the newly opened Shreveport Aquarium has struggled with almost $500,000 in unpaid construction debt. Many of these spaces are subsidized by tax breaks and bonds, to be paid back when an aquarium becomes profitable. But too often, this goal is not realized. As economic-development projects, aquariums are risky.

The South County Times reports that the St. Louis Aquarium expects 1.5 to 2 million visitors per year. That seems like a curiously optimistic projection. The Shedd Aquarium in Chicago gets just over 2 million visitors per year, and it has 5 million gallons in total volume for tanks and exhibits; the St. Louis Aquarium will have just 1.3 million total gallons.

It’s not clear why planners project the St. Louis Aquarium to nearly the match the Shedd Aquarium in total attendance with a much smaller aquarium in a much smaller city. But if visitor numbers don’t match expectations and revenue lags as a result, (the aquarium is not free; a ticket price of around $24 is expected for adults) will taxpayers be asked to chip in again to cover the shortfall?

If all of this sounds familiar, it should. In 1985, Union Station was renovated in a massive $150 million project that included generous tax breaks. And what was the city left with? A mall in Union Station that was largely abandoned after barely more than 20 years. And thus the cycle begins anew: The mall was sold, was bought by a new developer, and is being renovated with the help of taxpayer dollars.

We all want what’s best for St. Louis, and it’s exciting to see big new projects generate enthusiasm. But the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. That seems to perfectly describe economic development policy in St. Louis.

The post Aquarium Project Repeats Familiar Mistakes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Yes, according to the Hotel Muehlebach, a Kansas City landmark first opened in 1915. A developer is asking the City Council to execute “a Tax Contribution Agreement with Platform Ventures LLC for the purpose of incentivizing the redevelopment of the historic Hotel Muehlebach” (Ordinance No. 180842.)

The developers want tax money to help them redevelop the hotel into offices, residential apartments, and a 144-room hotel. This is a dramatic reduction from the Muehlebach’s current 420 hotel rooms. This is not the first time the Muehlebach has sought taxpayer subsidies. As we pointed out a few years ago in a post about Kansas City’s long history with hotel subsidies, a previous subsidy for the Muehlebach in 1992 was a disaster for taxpayers because there wasn’t enough demand for the hotel rooms to make the venture profitable.

The post Does Kansas City Really Have Too Many Hotel Rooms? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Read more here.

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To which group the new owner of the Chesterfield Mall—Hull Property Group—belongs, we’ve yet to see. Hull acquired the mall earlier this month and, even though it currently has no plans to redevelop it, Hull is already asking taxpayers for a handout.

In a statement, Hull said the mall is “too important to fail,” and that, without community support (read: your money), “the marketplace may dictate an unfortunate and unforgiving future.”

Those don’t sound like a fool’s words to me.

Hull has an impressive portfolio of dozens of malls and redeveloped retail centers across the southeast. It didn’t purchase the mall without a plan, or from some sense of benevolence. Hull knows what it’s doing.

Trickster? Maybe.

“All communities need their enclosed mall and the surrounding retail corridor to succeed as it is a symbol of a thriving community,” Hull’s website reads. Really? Is the entire Chesterfield Valley not such a symbol, with its dozens and dozens of retailers and other malls? And in Chesterfield, where the median household income in Chesterfield is over $97,000—tens of thousands more than most of the region and country—does anyone really believe that the mall—sitting lonesome atop a hill—is the lifeblood of Chesterfield?

Genius? Perhaps.

Hull purchased the property for a cool $13 million, less than 5% of what it was valued at in 2006. For acres and acres of land, replete with infrastructure and a massive improvement, directly adjacent to the interstate, that isn’t a bad deal. Whether because of changes in broader economic trends or a creative repurposing, the mall could become incredibly valuable again. Perhaps the mall is repurposed for retail or a mix of uses, razed and platted for a subdivision, or just sat on and later sold. Whatever happens, the property has a huge upside potential.

Whether fool, trickster, or genius, Hull shouldn’t be given a handout. If its plans are foolish, taxpayers shouldn’t have to bear the risk. If it’s a trickster, the public shouldn’t pad its bottom line. And if it’s a genius, no public money should have to be involved at all. Plus, given how much taxpayer money has already been doled out to developers and landowners in the Valley (especially to the outlet malls, one of which is already slated for redevelopment a mere five years after opening!), now is as good a time as any for officials to turn the spigots off.

Fortunately, Chesterfield officials have intimated that incentives won’t be forthcoming. Given that it is was just last year that other city officials suggested a special taxing district be created to help subsidize the mall, this is very welcome news.

Let’s hope that policymakers in Chesterfield stick to their guns and continue to stand up for taxpayers.

The post Chesterfield Should Protect Taxpayers in Mall’s Redevelopment appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

According to a story from KCUR, a consultant’s report on the Jazz Museum was scathing:

The museum, according to the consultants’ report, is “in need of complete rethinking, akin to starting a new museum.” The report called for a “complete rebirth, starting with its leadership, but continuing with a revamped financial model, visitor experience, and operational infrastructure.”

Among the consultant’s 26 recommendations was to close the museum for a period of time. Again from the KCUR story:

Five recommendations involve immediate action, including the closure of the museum “for a predetermined period of time.” A temporary closure for less than a year, the report said, would allow the organization to “save costs and focus on basic operating needs.”

I am no museum consultant, but that seems like pretty good advice to me. In fact, it was exactly the advice I offered on KCPT’s Ruckus back in October 2017. City leaders may prefer to ignore the advice of the report and further involve government management and taxpayer subsidies. Doing so would be a shame.

The post Jazz Museum Hits A Sour Note appeared first on Show-Me Institute.