That one item is substantial. According to a paper in the December 2024 issue of the National Tax Journal, the total revenue loss to the federal government was $4.3 billion due to the 57 stadia built since 2000 that have benefitted from subsidies.

If that tax break is eliminated, team owners will demand that states make up the difference.

We know that these subsidies fail to generate a return on investment for taxpayers. They don’t drive economic development and their economic impacts are overstated. Maybe they make a metro area feel good about itself—but even then the benefits are too small to justify the costs.

Missouri has a lot on its plate right now with efforts to cut spending and income taxes so that Missouri is a more attractive place to live and work. More and greater handouts to billionaires should not be a priority.

The post Missouri Must Protect Taxpayers from Sports Subsidies appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

This new credit, called the Entertainment Industry Jobs Tax Credit, is just as bad—or perhaps even worse—as the film tax credit, which is truly horrible (as I explained here). The credit, based on a similar program in Pennsylvania, would reimburse a “qualified rehearsal facility” for rehearsal and touring expenses. If this sounds a bit vague, that might be intentional. As has been discussed previously (both here and here), this program is aimed entirely at one company in Chesterfield that has already received significant state and county subsidies.

Missouri already devotes more than $600 million per year to economic development tax credit programs that mostly don’t work, and this new entertainment tax credit is no better. Right now, despite efforts to bring the program to other states, Pennsylvania is the only place in the country that thinks the program is worthwhile. Unfortunately, even Pennsylvania’s own audit shows that the program is a bad investment.

According to a report from the state’s Independent Fiscal Office, the credit “provides substantial benefit to the only Pennsylvania qualified rehearsal facility.” And “the net return on investment (ROI) is 15 to 35 cents of state tax revenue for each tax credit dollar.” In other words, state taxpayers are losing 65 to 85 cents off each dollar to benefit a single private company.

This program is yet another example of Missouri’s legislature taking the wrong approach to getting the state’s economy back on track. If the legislature wants more concerts or live entertainment in the state, it should start by figuring out why there aren’t more already. And if the answer is the state’s taxes are too high, then lawmakers should consider lowering the tax burden for everyone as opposed to creating a specific carve-out for one private business.

A new tax credit isn’t going to make one Missouri city into the next Nashville. With so few days remaining in this year’s legislative session, and with so much left to do, it’s time for our lawmakers to stop fiddling around.

The post Not the Time for Entertainment appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Missouri’s already one of the national leaders in sacrificing state tax dollars for private economic development interests. Over the past decade, our state has devoted nearly $6 billion to tax credits with little to show for it. That’s also why my colleague David cheered when four of the tax credits listed below were allowed to expire last year. But now that the state has a surplus of revenue as a result of a better-than-expected economy (in the year these tax credits were not active), it’s apparently time to bring them back.

I’m not disputing that rural parts of the state would benefit from greater investment. But state tax credit programs are clearly not the way to do it. Government officials cannot predict the future, nor should they be in the business of picking winners and losers, which is something I thought Governor Parson agreed with. When the governor vetoed the tax rebate bill that spurred this special session call, he criticized the legislature’s decision to approve one-time tax benefits for some, instead of favoring permanent tax relief for all Missourians. The governor was correct then. So why is he now supporting tax credits paid for by so many to benefit so few? Here is a list of the tax credit programs being considered in the special session, and how many (actually, how few) entities used each program in the last year credits were issued:

• Wood Energy Tax Credit – 8
• Meat Processing Facility Investment Tax Credit – 13
• Ethanol Tax Credit – NEW
• Biodiesel Retail Sellers Tax Credit – NEW
• Biodiesel Producer Tax Credit – NEW (6 producers)
• Urban Farm Tax Credit – NEW
• Rolling Stock Tax Credit – 0
• Agricultural Product Utilization Contributor Tax Credit – 31
• New Generation Cooperative Incentive Tax Credit – 4
• Specialty Agriculture Crops Act Tax Credit – NEW
• Family Farm Breeding Livestock Tax Credit – 15

As you can see, in total, only 71 entities used these tax credits in the last full year they were active. That’s right, just 71! Forgoing millions of state tax dollars in favor of so few entities seems like the opposite of the governor’s sentiment in the tax rebate discussion. I’d simply ask the same logic to be applied to agricultural tax credits. Research and experience have shown us that these programs do not work. Instead of using the special session to double down on bad policies, a better and fairer solution is to lower taxes for everyone.

The post Agricultural Tax Credits Are Still a Bad Deal appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program is the federal government’s largest tax expenditure on affordable rental housing. In Missouri, LIHTC is the state’s primary housing policy tool and its most expensive tax credit program. Despite the program’s cost and political durability, the question remains: is the LIHTC program an effective and cost-efficient approach to improving housing affordability? This report explores this question, providing details on the structure of Missouri’s LIHTC program and the economic incentives it creates, along with a discussion of the conclusions that can be drawn following the temporary suspension of Missouri’s LIHTC program from 2017 to 2019.

Click here to read the full report.

The post Missouri’s Low-income Housing Tax Credit appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Perhaps the thing that makes bad legislation into terrible legislation is when legislators try to implement programs that have clearly proven to be failures elsewhere (or previously). This is exactly the case for a few bills I have been following closely that seem close to passing this year.

There are many poorly designed tax credit and subsidy plans. Out of all of them, film tax credit programs are among the most studied, probably because of their more high-profile nature. People find films to be more interesting than soybeans, I guess. Those studies are clear in their conclusions: film tax credits do not succeed in growing the economy and do not generate the tax revenues to justify the subsidies. Missouri used to have a film tax credit program and we removed it—how often does that happen?—because it was clear it was not working. Yet, once more, there is legislation moving to reinstate a failed program. Why in heaven should Missourians pay millions of dollars to watch Ben Affleck drink coffee on Main Street for a few days? Missouri is better off without film tax credits. If the people of Georgia or California want to subsidize the shows and movies we watch, go ahead and let them. (Related bills are SB 961 & SB 732, primarily SB 961 at this point.)

Closely related to the zombie-like film tax credit program is the proposed Entertainment Industry Jobs Tax Credit that will provide tax subsidies for businesses that provide rehearsal and touring studios in Missouri. This entire program is aimed at one new company opening in Chesterfield, one that has already received other state and county tax subsidies. Apparently, that is not enough, as this proposal would have taxpayers further fund this new studio and entertainment center. It is simply awful policy for the state to decide that this particular type of business deserves a subsidy as opposed to a thousand other types of businesses. Taxes should pay for public goods such as parks, police, and transportation. There are other public goods, too, but however you define it, a private recording studio doesn’t make the cut. A new business coming to Missouri and, first and foremost, investing in a massive lobbying effort to get taxpayers to fund its operations represents everything that is wrong with our current system. (Related bills are SB 961 & SB 733, primarily SB 961 at this point.)

Another program that has consistently failed in Missouri is land banks. Show-Me Institute researchers produced significant work years ago on how the St. Louis land bank succeeded in accumulating property, not disposing of it (as was the plan), and empowered local politicians further by politicizing the land bank decisions. When Kansas City wanted to institute a land bank, Institute analysts warned those failures would be repeated there. According to investigative reports by the Kansas City Star, that is precisely what happened. The Kansas City land bank has favored local politicians at the expense of local communities, among many other problems. Despite that record, there are bills to now allow any city or county in the state to institute a land bank. This bill would empower local governments to proactively seize or purchase private property under the guise of assisting development. This would be highly troubling even if land banks had a successful track record, but the track record is terrible in St. Louis and Kansas City. (Related bills are HB 2177, SB 1089, and SB 724, primarily HB 2177 and SB 724 at this point.)

In government, nothing succeeds like failure. There is nothing quite as frustrating as watching legislators—many of whom would consider themselves supporters of limited government—trying to pass bills that propose policies with a proven record of failure.

I like a nice vineyard and a good glass of wine as much as anyone, but for these spoiled grapes, I’m hoping they all die on the vine in the last week of the session.

The post Death on the Vine in Jeff City appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

As I’ve written before, the LIHTC program awards tax credits to housing developers to offset construction costs. In exchange, the developers are required to rent a fraction of their units to low-income tenants. Missouri’s program is a supplement to the federal LIHTC and has a long history of poor returns on investment. When Missouri’s version of LIHTC was revived last year after a three-year hiatus, LIHTC boosters promised reforms to address some of the program’s much-discussed shortcomings. This pilot program was one of those reforms.

The purpose of the pilot program is to increase the sales price of LIHTCs by allowing housing developers to claim them more quickly. One of the biggest problems with these credits is that they’re awarded to developers over ten years—but upon being rewarded, developers often immediately sell the credits to investors to raise the capital necessary to fund the project’s construction. When something is sold today that can’t be claimed for a decade, it has to be sold at a discount, in part because of the time value of money. In many cases, Missouri’s LIHTCs have sold for as little as forty cents on the dollar. This means is state taxpayers are basically guaranteed a bad return on investment, because the thing they’re paying $1 for is being immediately sold for less.

The new pilot program allowed 20 percent of the state’s approved projects to claim their credits more quickly over the first five years, and more slowly the final five. The total cost to state taxpayers remains the same, the value of the credits for investors is increased because of the time value of money. Initial reports suggest this change worked and increased the market value of each credit by roughly $0.10. However, if credits were previously selling for $0.40 and now are selling for $0.50, that still means taxpayers are still losing half of their investment immediately.

Going into next year, the number of projects eligible for this pilot will be bumped up to 50 percent. And with more projects receiving accelerated redemptions, that should mean more credits are sold for higher prices, which in turn could slightly improve the dismal return on investment for state taxpayers. Supporters of the pilot also say that higher sales prices will allow the MHDC to subsidize more projects, because each developer will request fewer credits. It remains to be seen whether these claims will hold true with additional years of data.

Make no mistake, I still think the LIHTC program is a bad deal for Missouri. It is truly remarkable that such a meager improvement in credit sale price is being celebrated as a big win for the troubled program, when taxpayers are still expected to lose so much of each credit sold.  Much more needs to be done before LIHTC even comes close to being considered a worthwhile investment for our state.

The post LIHTC Pilot Finds Permanence appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Despite having some of the most affordable housing costs in the country, historically Missouri spent the second most of any state on LIHTC, which is consistent with research finding that the LIHTC program is poorly targeted. What’s worse, multiple state audits in Missouri have found that less than $0.42 cents of each dollar are spent on actual construction. It wasn’t until 2017 that Missouri finally faced up to the failures of its LIHTC program and suspended it. But no longer.

After a three-year shutdown, Missouri is now reviving its LIHTC program with grand promises of reform. Specifically, the Missouri Housing Development Commission (MHDC) stated that it will cap the state’s yearly LIHTC awards at 70 percent of the annual federal allotment, and the legislature is considering enshrining the cap into law. The benefit of the cap is that instead of state taxpayers being on the hook for $180 million per year, they might only be out $135 million. However, a smaller loss is still a loss, and good stewardship of taxpayer funds means insisting that programs deliver value and achieve results.

Given the structure of the LIHTC program, even the aforementioned savings are likely to take years to materialize, if ever, assuming that legislators don’t backtrack on reforms. In particular, the LIHTC awards credits not all at once but rather in equal allotments over ten years. As a result, the savings from any reduction in credits will also take a decade to gradually phase-in.

The tendency of the federal allotment to rise each year and the creation of a new MHDC pilot program that increases the payout rate for some state projects both may lead to further backloading of savings. Specifically, the pilot program will allow 20 percent of projects awarded credits to redeem the awards on an accelerated schedule that matches the federal yearly allotment at the full 100 percent in the first five years before evenly spreading out the remaining funds over the final five years.

The table below gives a concrete illustration. Before 2017, a project that was eligible for $1 million in federal credits would also have been eligible for $1 million in state credits with awards distributed over ten years. Under the new cap, the total state credit falls to $700,000, which amounts to $70,000 each year. However, under the pilot, the project could receive $500,000 of the $700,000 in just the first five years—matching the $100,000 per year that it would have received before 2017—and then claim the final $200,000 in the last five years. In short, taxpayers would not see any savings from the cap until after five years, which gives vested interests more time to reverse reforms before they ever take hold. Though the idea behind the pilot program may have some merit, the bottom line for taxpayers is still delayed and potentially uncertain savings.

Spending less on an inefficient LIHTC program is better than spending more, but it will do taxpayers a disservice if lawmakers use this superficial change as an excuse to declare success, move on, and not undertake more fundamental reforms.

The post Capping LIHTC Isn’t Enough appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Prior to being halted in 2017, the state’s LIHTC program was plagued by several serious problems. As I’ve written many times before, Missouri’s program was one of the biggest in the country and was repeatedly shown to be ineffective, costly, and utterly lacking in accountability. Sufficiently addressing each of the program’s shortcomings has proven to be elusive for the state’s elected officials, with legislative attempts to reform the program failing over the past three years. Absent any legislative action, the governor and MHDC decided to bring the program back on their own terms by administratively implementing changes.

The MHDC’s changes include a yearly cap on state credits, a scoring rubric for project applications, and a new pilot program that allows more credits to be redeemed over the first five years (of ten total) of the project. At first glance, the changes seem to touch on each of the major issues with the program outlined above. But do they make the program worthy of taxpayer expense?

In theory, the yearly cap should make the program less costly because Missouri used to match each federal LIHTC on a dollar-for-dollar basis. A cap would mean that is no longer possible. The scoring rubric could add some accountability by showing how the chosen projects stack up against those that aren’t awarded funding. And the pilot program should make the credits more enticing to investors, and in turn, increase the value for which they can be sold.

After details of the revived program were made public, an optimistic real estate developer was quoted saying he expected the new state LIHTCs to sell for roughly sixty cents on the dollar. It is important to keep in mind what this means: Developers are happy to trade each taxpayer dollar they receive for a little more than half its value. How can LIHTC be a good investment for Missourians if the people who profit off the program believe what they’re receiving is worth much less than what state taxpayers are paying? It will be some time before there are enough data to determine the full effect of these changes, but even if this estimate of improved sale value is proven true, Missourians would still be receiving a very poor return on their investment.

The program’s revival is certainly a good deal for already-wealthy developers. But shouldn’t the governor and MHDC instead ensure that Missourians have an affordable housing policy that’s good for everyone?

The post More to Be Done on LIHTC appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Kingsway Commercial Tax Increment Redevelopment Plan involves developing multiple projects where the Central West End meets Delmar Boulevard. But perhaps more importantly, a big chunk of funding for these projects would come via a tax-increment financing (TIF) district that would raise $6.2 million. This project will also be financed by a mixture of state and federal tax credits. There are additional plans to create a community improvement district (adding to Missouri’s growing special taxing district problem).

These economic development tools would help to finance this project at the expense of taxpayers; they give developers cash, reduce their tax burdens, and could increase sales taxes in the area. North of the “Delmar Divide” is generally a low-income area, so should we really be redistributing tax dollars from low-income residents to developers instead of using these dollars for public services? Especially when other publicly funded ventures like the Cerner headquarters in Kansas City or the Loop Trolley right down the street from this project haven’t delivered on their promises?

While I’m sure most can appreciate the “bridging the gap” intention of this project, TIF is a flawed economic development tool that often gives no benefit to taxpayers. TIF requires that an area be blighted (for which Missouri has a very broad definition), and that the development would not happen without the public funding. With the thriving Central West End neighborhood just steps from this development, it’s hard to believe that development in this area would not occur without millions of public dollars. Moreover, even if this area were blighted, does it really need these perks for the next 23 years? Is diverting tax dollars to a private development project really the best way to develop this area of St. Louis?

The post Fixing the “Delmar Divide” with a TIF? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

First was the $100 million Waddell & Reed deal, supposedly under negotiation prior to the truce, in which the company captured corporate tax incentives for itself by exposing its employees to higher income taxes. Now we learn of another deal for BlueScope, which is seeking perhaps as much as $20 million worth of incentives from Kansas to hop across the state line. The company is playing the states against each other. According to The Kansas City Star, Kansas City and Missouri are taking the bait:

All told, the company could receive about $14 million from Missouri and Kansas City to remain in the West Bottoms and add 15 jobs per year. That also includes $5.6 million from the state and a sales tax exemption on construction materials for improvements to the building.

Supporters of such business subsidies argue that this round of incentives won’t affect the various taxing jurisdictions. But they are wrong. As a representative for the Kansas City Public School District noted, the existing incentives are set to expire in 2022, meaning BlueScope would finally be paying its full tax burden. This new deal extends a 75 percent tax exemption for over a decade, thus robbing schools of funds they would otherwise receive. This gives the lie to the claim by then–Mayor Sly James that incentives are good because “when the incentives roll off then the tax base rises.” What if they never fully roll off?

Such incentives don’t live up to their claims of creating jobs or spurring investment. Kansas City has no business extending tax breaks when the city is already looking to cut five percent of its budget due to the economic hit of COVID-19. If BlueScope wants to leave, the city ought to let them go.

The post About That Border War Truce . . . appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The USDA office is moving into 805 Pennsylvania, a piece of land designated an Advanced Industrial Manufacturing (AIM) Zone by Port KC. According to state statute, this designation allows 50 percent of the state withholding tax collected from the new jobs to be redirected to the USDA, totaling just over $26 million dollars, per The Kansas City Star. To offset the cost of developing the site for a new employer, Port KC is allowed to charge an administrative fee of 20%, which comes to $6 million dollars in this case.

But wait, there is another subsidy for the project, this time coming from Kansas City taxpayers. From the Star:

On top of that, Kansas City could offer up to $6 million through the redirection of 75% of city taxes, according to a document outlining the local and Port KC incentives obtained by The Star. The Kansas City Council would have to vote to approve the redirection of local taxes for the USDA relocation; an ordinance is expected within weeks.

“City taxes” and “local taxes” are euphemisms for the earnings tax, as there will be precious little other tax generated at the USDA site. Kansas City leaders, who argue breathlessly that the earnings tax is such a vital source of income for things like public safety, are willing to forgo $6 million of earnings tax revenue for the USDA.

There is a better way. If city leadership wanted to protect Kansas City taxpayers from losing vital tax dollars, council members would demand—and Port KC would agree—to waive its administrative fee, which is coincidentally the same amount that city taxpayers are being asked to give up. Without such a demand by the city council, however, this deal includes a transfer of millions of dollars from Kansas City taxpayers into Port KC’s pocket.

The post USDA Deal Is Great for Port KC, Less Great for KC Taxpayers appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In 1986, the federal government enacted the LIHTC program with the second round of President Reagan’s tax cuts. The idea was simple: provide a supply-side incentive to make housing more affordable. LIHTC represented a new approach to government-funded housing policy. Instead of directly subsidizing the rents of low-income individuals, the program forgoes future federal tax revenues to incentivize developers to build more housing. And in exchange for the tax credits, the developers must agree to reserve a portion of the subsidized units for low-income tenants and to cap rents for low-income tenants for thirty years.

Each year, the Internal Revenue Service allocates federal LIHTCs across all 50 states based on population. It is then the responsibility of each state’s housing agency to distribute those credits for approved projects. Last year, Missouri was allocated $2.75 per full-time resident from the federal government, which translated to $17 million in tax credits available for new projects. But not every project is eligible for the same amount of tax relief. Within the federal program, there are actually two types of tax credits: one for new construction projects and another for rehabilitations. The credits for new construction are the most popular, and can cover up to 90% of all construction costs over 10 years. The rehabilitation tax credits are less lucrative and cover closer to 40% of construction costs over the same period.

Awarding tax credits for the cost of construction lowers the investment required by the project developers, but not in the way you’d expect. Developers rarely use the credits to build housing directly; instead, developers typically sell the tax credits to independent investors at a discount to finance the originally approved project. The project’s investors then use the credits as dollar-for-dollar reductions in their business or individual income tax liability over the following 10 years.

And the way Missouri has implemented its state LIHTC program has made things worse. In response to claims from developers that the federal program alone cannot make projects profitable, Missouri’s LIHTC program fully matches each federal credit dollar for dollar with a state credit.

Over a series of upcoming blog posts, I’ll discuss how the LIHTC program as described fundamentally fails to effectively or efficiently improve Missouri’s affordable housing landscape.

The post LIHTC 101: Program Basics appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Perhaps it shouldn’t be surprising that Burns & McDonnell is at it again, benefitting from a little-debated tax credit expansion passed by the state legislature and signed by the governor that could net them $300 million over 15 years. The Kansas City Star, in a piece worth reading in its entirety, reports that:

Since 2011, Missouri has issued $39 million in tax credits to Burns & McDonnell, according to state records. The company can receive credits for every 25 new jobs it creates and $1 million it invests in its headquarters.

The expanded credit, inserted into the economic development package with almost no debate, will cover not just its physical assets but investment in cloud computing services. It would allow the company to claim 8 times the value of a software license.

Hand-picking which companies have their taxes reduced puts a great deal more power in the legislature, encourages businesses to invest in lobbyists rather than in their core competency, and creates an unjust situation where businesses that don’t receive handouts subsidize their competition through the tax code. If taxes are too high, lower them for everyone—don’t play favorites.

Perhaps most importantly, such tax schemes are so poorly managed that they hardly work. It should not be surprising to learn that the men and women elected to local and statewide office are imbued with no magical forecasting powers to divine the growth industries of tomorrow. It’s a crapshoot.

As a result, Missourians are left holding the tax bill while corporate cronies and their amen chorus in the legislature congratulate themselves. It is unjust, unworthy of the Show-Me State, and an indelible stain on the records of those who would call themselves small-government, free-market conservatives.

The post Taxes for Thee, But Not for Me (Part 2) appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

During the debate on the House floor, several legislators discussed the program’s benefits for communities and low-income individuals alike. It bears repeating that individuals can support increasing the supply of affordable housing without supporting the LIHTC. The LIHTC program is notoriously expensive given its low return on investment. One legislator commented that the last year the Missouri program issued credits, the state’s investment of more than $160 million only resulted in around 1,000 low-income developments. When combined with the federal portion of the credit, taxpayers are on average subsidizing each new development to the tune of at least $320,000. If most Missourians wouldn’t spend that amount on their own homes, why should they be expected to subsidize that amount for others?

Additionally, multiple legislators discussed the reform efforts as a way to improve the program’s efficiency. While it was good to hear legislators admit many of the faults of the program outlined in multiple auditor reports, their “reforms” are not enough. If policymakers accept the program is currently ineffective and inefficient, why not consider a different program that could work even better? As I’ve said before, the LIHTC program is far from the only way to improve housing options for Missouri’s low-income population. And even if it was, why wouldn’t lawmakers discuss including a provision that guarantees the program is revisited in future years to ensure newly added reforms offer measurable improvement?

Of course, the best outcome for Missouri taxpayers would be to leave the state’s LIHTC program dormant. This would save more than a billion dollars over a decade. With such little time left remaining this legislative session, why are lawmakers rushing to restart the LIHTC program when there is still a better deal for taxpayers to be made? Every bad idea deserves an endpoint; let this year be the LIHTC’s.

The post What’s the Rush to Restore the LIHTC? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

As my colleagues have discussed many times before, three consecutive state auditors (both Democrat and Republican) have concluded that the LIHTC program spends less than $0.42 of each dollar on affordable housing. As of 2017, there were over a billion dollars of LIHTCs outstanding or available to be issued, and those are dollars that won’t be available for spending on existing state services. It should be obvious that Missourians deserve better stewardship of their hard-earned tax dollars, but the program’s supporters argue those figures don’t adequately capture the economic benefits the state receives.

The target of the proponents’ critique is the economic modeling tool the state uses to measure the impact of government programs. One conclusion from the 2017 audit that used the model in question was, over a span of 15 years, Missouri received only $0.12 return for each dollar invested in LIHTCs. But proponents argue the model is “incomplete and thus questionable,” and as one elected official recently noted regarding LIHTCs, “value and effectiveness can’t always be quantified in data.”

It is important to note that the critique relating to the audit’s findings does not mention the inefficiencies of the program. Literature on the topic is clear that the regulations surrounding the construction and development of low-income housing inflate project costs. And there are now multiple academic studies that show the federal program does not significantly increase the amount of available affordable housing.

While the LIHTC program is considered a tool for economic development, its effectiveness should be measured by its ability to achieve its defined purpose—increasing the availability of affordable housing in Missouri. More specifically, how have the credits Missouri has issued in addition to the credits offered by the federal government induced additional development of affordable housing, and at what cost?

As the research indicates, the LIHTC program is not an effective or efficient way to increase the amount of affordable housing across the state, regardless of the claims of economic impact made by the program’s supporters. As policymakers consider reviving the state’s practice of issuing LIHTCs, their decision should be based not on the emotional appeal for new housing, but on whether the program as currently constructed is a justified use of their constituents’ tax dollars. The evidence indicates it is not.

The post No, Low-Income Housing Tax Credits Aren’t Effective appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

• Freeing Missourians from red tape
• A look back at policy progress in 2017
• Accountability for public schools
• Tax carveouts for tech companies
• Our municipal checkbook project
• A special taxing district in Chesterfield

Click on the link below to read more.

The post Show-Me Institute’s December 2017 Newsletter appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The auditor notes that the fiscal impact of proposed pieces of legislation was not followed up by analysis after the fact. 

State law does not require a post-implementation review of fiscal notes to determine the actual fiscal impact of legislation enacted in comparison to fiscal note estimates. Post-implementation reviews would be especially beneficial for legislation impacting the tax base or for which the fiscal note included an estimated impact on tax revenues.

For example, the auditor finds that the estimated fiscal impact of a particular bill (SB 19 in 2015) was estimated at $15.2 million annually, but she claims the actual cost for the first two years of implementation was about five times greater. To reach that number, the auditor simply examines revenue from before adoption with revenue post-adoption and assigns all the impact to a single bill. Officials from the Department of Revenue make this exact point in the text of the auditor’s report (page 9):

DOR personnel could not identify the actual cause in the reduction in corporate income taxes, but indicated SB 19 (2015) was likely one of the contributing factors along with other potential factors including “other legislative changes” and “changes in the overall economic market.”

The point the auditor is making is valid and laudable: we don’t know the actual cost of the tax laws we’re adopting. Public policy is only as good as the information it relies upon. The Show-Me Institute welcomes any thorough analysis of tax policy—but the auditor’s report may be worse than doing nothing at all as it ascribes all the change in revenue to a single legislative act.

The DOR indicated in the report that such data are often misleading and collecting it can be a burden to businesses, but that the department is implementing a revenue system that may allow for more analysis. Undertaking such an analysis “would require a substantial increase in full-time employees,” which is politically unlikely.  Perhaps allocating more resources to track fiscal impact of legislation is something the legislature should consider—if only to guard against the overly broad assumptions being made in the auditor’s report.

The post Auditor Report on Tax Incentives and Exemptions appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

What did the auditors find? A lot. For starters, HPTC tax credits have cost the state nearly $600 million over the last five years alone and more than a billion dollars over the last 10. Missouri leads the country in “qualified rehabilitation expenses” (QRE) for historic preservation, which relates to the expenses against which the HPTC could be applied. Broadly speaking, the higher the QRE that rehabbers claim under the HPTC, the more money the state will be spending on it.

So, how big is Missouri’s QRE lead? Check out this chart from page 8 of the audit.

For perspective, Massachusetts, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York are all original U.S. colonies. Are we to believe that Missouri should have been subsidizing preservation spending at almost twice the rate as the next closest state… and not only that, subsidizing it at that level for more than a decade?

I can appreciate that we love our old buildings in Missouri, but if anything and everything can get the stamp of being “historic,” then we degrade the things that are, in fact, historic and waste limited taxpayer resources in the process. Could some projects be worthy of taxpayer support? Possibly, but those cases would be an exception, not a billion dollar rule.

To name a fraction of the examples that underscore this reality, Norwood Hills Country Club should not have received taxpayer money. A whole host of private mansions that the HPTC subsidized should not have received taxpayer money. Check out this story, from the audit:

In 2011, the DED issued about $296,000 in credits to an applicant who renovated a 3-story, 5,400 square foot home in an affluent neighborhood in a metropolitan area. The applicant purchased the home in 1993 for nearly $300,000 and reported about $1.2 million in qualified rehabilitation expenditures. The home has a fair market value of approximately $434,000.

So the owner buys a $300,000 house, drops $1.2 million into it, gets nearly $300,000 (almost what he paid for the house originally!) in credits from the state, and the value of the house rises… about $130,000? On what planet does subsidizing a private residence in a wealthy neighborhood make any sense for taxpayers? Why did Missourians have to effectively reimburse this person the purchase price of their home? Who’s looking out for the taxpayers here? And who in their right mind and looking at the numbers thinks this is a good “investment” for the state?

The HPTC is a mess of a program. The least the legislature could do is set a date for this madness to end.

The post State Audit Recommends Sunset Of Historic Preservation Tax Credit appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Governments often grant public subsidies, tax breaks, and other incentives to powerful corporate interests and other groups at the expense of taxpayers. In Missouri cities, this type of information is not always easily available to the public. But our governments should readily share spending information. Otherwise, taxpayers may not even know when special interests gain unfair advantages through government spending. It is impossible to ensure that government decisions are efficient and reasonable unless information is publicly available.

A few weeks ago, I blogged about Saint Louis’ failing grade in the  U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) report on the largest cities’ spending transparency online.

Saint Louis has major improvements to make, with the 28th lowest ranking out of 30 cities. Kansas City ranked much higher, at 14th, but still only received a letter grade of “C.”

Kansas City has made a more visible effort to show residents how the city spends funds. The city allows residents to view checkbook level spending, which Saint Louis should allow, but does not. This transparency helps keep Kansas City accountable to taxpayers.

But Kansas City does have room to improve. Some other cities have created centralized transparency websites and provide comprehensive information on tax subsidies. New York City’s “Open Book” website is the perfect example of what Kansas City and Saint Louis should strive to implement.

The post Missouri Cities Should Open The Books appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) revealed unsettling results for Saint Louis in its report on the largest cities’ spending transparency websites. Saint Louis City received a grade of ‘F’ in spending transparency, and ranked 28th lowest on the list of 30 cities.

Other cities provide valuable “checkbook-level” information online. But Saint Louis fails to provide this information, keeping us in the dark on expenditures. This means we cannot easily track who receives taxpayer dollars.

Tax Increment Financing (TIF), tax credits, exemptions, incentive-based abatements, and other tax subsidies all affect the city’s budget the same way as direct spending. But cities can more easily hide these types of indirect spending.

The Saint Louis Development Corporation (SLDC), which supports the city’s TIF commission, provides almost no TIF information on its website. And, the SLDC fails to provide financial information for the other economic development authorities it supports.

As a result, it is challenging to track the details on Saint Louis tax expenditures. And if we cannot easily track spending details, we have a limited ability to hold recipients accountable for delivering on their promises. Without providing this information online, it is unnecessarily difficult to scrutinize the city’s decisions and to determine whether our tax money is being spent wisely.

No one could argue that this is a good thing — yet we see no attempts from Saint Louis City to provide more transparency.

The post Where Does The Money Go? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.