For this reason, when Governor Greitens blocked the issuance of low-income housing tax credits—a practice that Show-Me analysts have written for years should be exposed, sunsetted, and discontinued—it appeared that the state might have begun a journey toward putting tax credits in their proper place. Likewise, analysts have written about the wastefulness of stadium subsidies, and so we read with pleasure that Lt. Governor Parson voted against tax credits to build an ice rink and practice facility for the St. Louis Blues.

Unfortunately, further investigation reveals that there is less here than meets the eye.

Regarding the St. Louis Blues tax credit, the St. Louis Post Dispatch wrote that all three of the Governor’s appointments to the Missouri Development Finance Board voted in favor of issuing $2 million in tax credits for the ice rink. Parson was the sole vote against. His lone voice of opposition might be comforting to Missouri taxpayers until one reads further. According to the Post-Dispatch:

Parson said that while he appreciated the boost the project could give St. Louis’s economy, he could not vote to issue tax credits for a new sporting complex at a time when the state is refusing to issue any low-income housing tax credits.

The logic here is all wrong. We don’t need counterproductive tax credits to be evenly distributed (and for the record, the low-income housing credit is indeed counterproductive). What we need is for these credits to be eliminated.

If Missouri is to thrive, it needs a system of taxation that treats everyone equally, is efficient, and is dedicated to supporting the important functions of government. The tax credit system is none of those things. Even if the credits weren’t subject to abuse—and they are—and even if the state were good at delivering on economic development promises—and it isn’t—it’s long past time for Missouri’s leaders to focus on policies that hold promise for helping everyone by creating real jobs and real growth.

The post A Plague on Both Your Tax Credits! appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

I am not a lawyer, and I have no intention of commenting on the legal merits or demerits of the suit. Rather, I’d like to use this as an opportunity to think about the policy fundamentals underlying the public funding of arenas.

But first, some facts about the current project*:

• The city owns the property and leases it out for $1 a year.
• Scottrade currently brings in about $6 million in sales and other tax revenue a year to the city.
• The bonds would cost the city a total of $106 million over 30 years.
• Based on projections, renovations will bring in an additional $145 million in tax revenue over 30 years, meaning the city would make a $40 million “profit” over that period.
• If the facility isn’t renovated, it is projected to generate less and less, finally bottoming out at $4 million a year. (These are just projections from the Scottrade Center’s consultants—click on the link below to see their full 32-year set of estimates).

*For arguments sake, I am assuming the projections are accurate. But, as an aside, these figures were produced by a consulting firm which regularly is off by margins of 50%.  

So what are we to make of the current situation? For one, “investing” in the facility is not a get-rich-quick (or even a get-rich-slow) proposition for the city. Taxpayers could see a much higher return on a similar investment in a diversified portfolio. Alternatively, no taxpayer investment could be made at all, and the city would still see $4 million come in every year.

Nor will investing in Scottrade significantly contribute to urban core revitalization. For one, if the city doesn’t fund these improvements, the facility will not disappear from the face of the earth. In addition, stadiums and mega-events are overwhelmingly considered by economists as poor ways to grow an economy. It is radically unscientific to claim stadiums and arenas are boons for the economy.

Now one might say that the city owns the building, and so, like any decent landlord, should pay to keep things up. This line of thought is understandable (though some claim the city doesn’t own the facility, but just the land it sits on), but it appears misguided. I understand that a landlord has an obligation to keep property in good shape if a tenant pays rent. The Blues pay neither rent nor property taxes. (Sure, events at Scottrade generate sales tax revenue, but that’s an ancillary benefit of the arena, not an excuse to avoid paying for use of the building or for upgrading it.) Plus, many of the slated improvements are things like new scoreboards and sound systems, not just building fundamentals like piping, furnaces, and other mechanical improvements. Demanding the city pay for upgrades is akin to demanding a landlord install big screen TVs for the squatters living on his or her property.

If the Blues have had the facility rent and tax free, and take in all the revenue from NHL and other events it hosts, isn’t it reasonable for them to pay for upgrades themselves? Perhaps the city can help put in new pipes, but is there any good reason for city, and potentially state, taxpayers to fix up a facility that primarily benefits wealthy team owners?

Why is our city so desperate to hand out tax dollars it simply doesn’t have? 

The post Stadium Subsidies, All Over Again . . . appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Stanford economist Russ Roberts summarized the phenomenon thusly: “If you’re paying, I’ll have top sirloin.”

But in Chesterfield, it’s more like: “If you’re paying, I’ll have an ice rink.”

News of the Hardee’s Iceplex closure in Chesterfield was quickly followed by calls to find a new home for the Chesterfield Hockey Association. Quicker than a winger can flank the defense, a proposal for a new, $22.6 million facility came forward. The only catch? Taxpayers would have to cough up $7 million.

Those funds could come from a special taxing district, better known as a transportation development district (TDD), which levies an extra sales tax in the Chesterfield Valley retail area. If voters in the district—which encompasses less than a single percent of Chesterfield households—approve the tax, shoppers in the valley will help buy and improve land for a narrow special interest, adding yet another chapter to what’s become Missouri’s never-ending-story of public-cost/private-benefit development.

The problems with this deal are obvious and myriad.

For one, there’s the issue of “investing” in an ice facility when one just went out of business. The developer’s own market analyses show there is a glut of ice facilities in the region, which has “resulted in creating a ‘buyer’s market’.” If an ice rink isn’t a good use of private resources, what reason is there to think it’s a good use of the public’s resources?

Second, despite tax dollars being used to buy and improve land for the developer, there will be no public ownership of the facility. In fact, there isn’t even an agreement in place to let the public use the facility! If the facility changes hands or goes under, the city could end up owning the associated parking lot, but the last time I checked, there was no dearth of parking in the valley. 

Then there’s the white elephant just up the road: the $45 million complex proposed by the Blues for Creve Coeur Lake Park. The duly-subsidized complex will undoubtedly compete with the Chesterfield facility, but—incredibly—proponents claim their project is insulated from economic pressures.

And the (unreported) cherry on top? Last month it was announced that a private investment group acquired a new facility for the Chesterfield Hockey Association to use as an ice rink. So even though the group has a new “home,” they still want you to build them an ice palace.

All in all, this project makes little economic sense. So why is it moving forward? Because Missouri’s loose TDD laws sanction (or rather, encourage) special interests to tax the pubic for private gain. And when you’re spending other people’s money, you’ll “invest” in just about anything.

TDD reform is long overdue. Until things change, I suggest we update Roberts’ adage so it reads: “If taxpayers are paying, I’ll have whatever I darn please.”

The post If You’re Paying, I’ll Have an Ice Rink appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Senate Bill 469 (SB 469) would have allowed for up to $6 million a year in state funding for renovations to the hockey arena. All in all, proponents of the bill were asking state taxpayers for $70 million. Fortunately for taxpayers across Missouri, the bill didn’t make it to the governor’s desk.

SB 469 was poor policy. It would have forced all Missourians, from Maryville to Branson to Kirksville, to subsidize an arena benefiting wealthy team owners. While proponents touted a variety of economic benefits, from construction jobs to gushing tax revenues, they failed to acknowledge decades of economic consensus: stadiums and sports teams don’t grow the economy. As Dennis Coates and Brad Humphreys put it in their 2008 Econ Journal Watch paper:

No matter what cities or geographical areas are examined, no matter what estimators are used, no matter what model specifications are used, and no matter what variables are used, articles published in peer reviewed economics journals contain almost no evidence that professional sports franchises and facilities have a measurable economic impact on the economy.

Does SB 469’s demise mean the Scottrade Center will fall into disrepair? Almost certainly not, as local policymakers in Saint Louis have already committed 64 million in taxpayer dollars to the facility earlier this year—without a public vote. And since the facility is abated from all property taxes, it should have cash on hand to make some of the upgrades it wants.

But just because SB 469 wasn’t codified into law this legislative session doesn’t mean a similar bill cannot or will not be introduced next year. Before state policymakers conjure up another package of subsidies, they would do well to take a sober look at the research on sports stadiums.

(For more on the economics of stadium subsidies, see here, here, here, and here.)

The post Another Stadium Subsidy Bites the Dust appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

One facility, planned for construction in the Chesterfield valley, would include $7 million in taxpayer handouts from a special sales tax district known as a transportation development district (TDD). If the TDD is approved (by the less than 1% of households in Chesterfield who get to vote), anyone who shops in the valley retail area will pay extra sales taxes to help subsidize the private venture. The other facility, which would double as a new practice facility for the Saint Louis Blues, would entail $6 million in taxpayer help from the City of Maryland Heights and 40 acres of free land in Creve Coeur Lake Park from Saint Louis County.

At least two aspects of these proposals warrant further discussion.

1. Proponents of both projects claim there is high demand for hockey and ice time in the Saint Louis region. This may or may not be true (though a recent market analysis concluded it is not). One would think the closure of the current ice complex in Chesterfield is telling of the market for hockey and ice time. But, suppose it isn’t, and that subsidy proponents’ claims are true; let’s say there is genuine demand for ice time in the region. If so, why does the public need to subsidize private ice facilities? If Saint Louis (or Chesterfield, or Maryland Heights) is a “hockey town,” and if these facilities will be such powerful economic engines, why are project boosters panhandling? If a project is meeting a real demand, it shouldn’t need taxpayer help.
2. One facility is leaving the market, and two are trying to take its place. This would be fine—if no public money were involved. Subsidizing a private business (especially in a depressed market) is questionable policy, but it is even harder to justify asking taxpayers to subsidize competing businesses. Suppose one facility puts the other out of business. What then? Are taxpayers left holding the bag as their “investment” in one facility goes down the drain? It should go without saying that it isn’t the taxpayers’ responsibility to subsidize one facility to siphon business away from another taxpayer-subsidized facility.

The region dodged a bullet when cash-hungry millionaires were denied $60 million in public funds for a professional soccer stadium in downtown Saint Louis. But some local officials, along with those on the receiving end of subsidies, still appear to have taxpayer dollars in their sights. Policymakers who want to know where demand exists for ice time (or anything else) would do well to listen to the market instead of special interests.

The post Why Subsidize It Once When You Can Subsidize It Twice? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Saint Louis appears to have gotten the memo.

Earlier today, Alderman Christine Ingrassia said that a bill that would raise $80 million for a stadium will not be moving forward. City officials have asked the ownership group to lower the amount of money they’re asking for.

And the city’s request is completely reasonable. If stadiums do little to boost local economies, then what is the rationale for using public funds to help build them?  This question took center stage last week when Gov. Eric Greitens completely ruled out state funding for stadiums. As a result, the prospect for public subsidies for SC STL does not appear to be good.

Time and again, stadiums fail to spur the economic growth that developers promise. Subsidies can help bring a beautiful new stadium to a city, and people may well attend the events held at the new venue.  But much (if not most) of the economic activity taking place at the stadium isn’t actually new; instead, it reflects spending reallocation.  In other words, if people purchase game tickets, they won’t eat out as often or spend money on other forms of entertainment.

With two weeks left before the Board of Aldermen’s deadline for approval, public funding for MLS is not completely off the table, but economists everywhere may rejoice to learn that people are acknowledging their research. 

Avoiding wasteful spending is definitely a step in the right direction, but we should keep in mind that Ballpark Village recently received $16 million in public funding, the Blues are asking for assistance with $138 million in renovations, and many, many, many non-sports–related projects are in line for similar subsidies.  The MLS discussion has engaged many citizens, but the issues with tax subsidies run far deeper than one project.  

The post Prospects Bleak for MLS Proposal-and That’s a Good Thing appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The post Out with Football, in with Fútbol? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The post Show-Me Now! The Blues’ Multi-Million Dollar Handout appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Scottrade Center, originally Kiel Auditorium, cost $135 million to build and first opened its doors in 1994. While private interests covered most of the price tag, the city of Saint Louis provided $15 million in construction subsidies (the city also built the stadium’s western parking lot at a cost of nearly $10 million). Aside from direct handouts, Saint Louis worked to reduce the stadium’s tax liabilities. Like Busch Stadium and the Dome formerly known as Edward Jones, the Scottrade Center sits on public land, shielding the Blues’ ownership from standard tax rates. In addition, the LCRA (a city body), and not the stadium’s owners, issued all the bonds for the stadium’s construction, making those bonds tax-exempt.

Now, a little over two decades after the Scottrade Center opened, the Blues no longer find their accommodations adequate. They want a larger scoreboard, better seating, and an expanded team store. Perhaps with a jealous eye toward Ballpark Village, the Blues hope to build a year-round beer garden at the stadium. They estimate that these upgrades will cost $160 million, which, adjusting for inflation, is slightly more than the original cost estimate of the Scottrade Center when financing got underway in 1990 (yet more evidence that cities should only expect about 20 years out of their stadiums before they have to pay for them all over again). But who will pay this time around?

All we know right now is that, like in the ‘90s, the Blues expect the city to issue the bonds for the stadium’s construction so they can avoid taxation. But for the city’s bottom line, who will pay those bonds back is the most important question. Last time around, the city covered about 10% of those costs and stadium owners paid 90%. There’s no guarantee that the Blues won’t ask for more support this time, especially after the city last year showed itself willing to spend well over $100 million to keep the Rams in town. Of course the Blues could pay the whole cost themselves, although the fact they are negotiating with the city to come up with a financing deal likely means that’s out of the question.

Still, it will be better for Saint Louis residents if the Blues pay for the costly upgrades themselves. The proposed improvements, from a larger team store to a “Blues-park Village,” are clear examples of nice-to-have amenities that would greatly add to the Blue’s assets. The impact of the improvements on city’s bottom line or its economy is difficult to determine, but given the evidence, it’s likely negligible.  It’s time the city focused on getting the basics of civic governance right instead of involving itself once more in how Saint Louisans spend their spare time.

The post Who’s Paying for $160 Million in Blues Upgrades? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Last week, Student Life, a WashU college paper, published a story about the Rams stadium. For the story, the author interviewed five WashU faculty from different disciplines. The faculty spoke nearly unanimously against using public money to fund the stadium. Here are some of the faculty’s comments, as reported in the article, the Longest Con:

“It’s really hard to see this as overall a good idea. It’s going to be very expensive…That’s not a very good way to spend government money.”—Glenn MacDonald, an economics professor in the Olin Business School

“We’ve known since the mid-’70s that sports teams don’t bring fast economic benefits, certainly nothing that offsets the kinds of credits they’re getting…Ten times a year, 12 times a year, you get a huge influx of people in, [but] that’s it.”—Sunita Parikh, an associate professor of political science

“What it does is it destroys the area so it vanquishes the blight that it identifies by just knocking everything down,” and “decimates the existing urban character.”—Michael Allen, a University College coordinator and American culture studies lecturer

“I think it’s pretty clear to anyone that spends any time here…that this town’s civic sporting identity is Cardinals first, second, third, fourth, fifth, down through 10, then Blues probably and then Rams. So they’re already the low man on the totem pole… I think it’s kind of silly that some people in cities feel like they need to measure their city by how many teams from the Big 4 leagues they have”—Noah Cohan, a recent Ph.D. and adjunct instructor in English who studies the relation of sports fandom to identity and politics,

The only WashU faculty member interviewed who supported the stadium plan, Rich Ryffel (senior lecturer of finance in the business school who helped finance the Edward Jones Dome), admitted a stadium was “not a good public investment. In other words, if the public puts in a dollar, they’re not going to get a dollar out of it.”

In other news, stadium proponents are touting the final initial design (which I guess is kind of like jumbo shrimp?) of a planned stadium. It will even have a new brew pub. Will policymakers heed the advice of experts or opt for beer and circuses? 

The post Washington University Faculty Oppose Public Dollars for Stadium; Planners Promise Brew Pub appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The map above shows the proposed MetroLink expansion, along with the prime candidates for the first Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lines in Saint Louis. One of those routes runs through North Saint Louis along West Florissant and Natural Bridge Road (West Fl-NB), while the other BRT route runs along I-64/40. The proposed MetroLink expansion would mostly mimic the route of the West Fl-NB BRT, but it also would serve South Saint Louis City. None of these proposals run cheap. The proposed BRT routes would cost around $40 million to implement per line, but they have funds from Proposition M, passed in 2010. The proposed MetroLink expansion would be much more expensive, between $1 billion and $1.6 billion, and would almost certainly require additional tax revenue from Saint Louis City and County. Read more from the Show-Me Institute on the MetroLink plan here.

The post Map Series: III. Proposed MetroLink and Bus Rapid Transit Routes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In this video, the Show-Me Institute’s David Stokes and Amy Lutz interviewed several Chicago Blackhawks fans visiting for a Saturday night hockey game against the Blues. Many, but not all of them, knew that Missouri’s tax rates were lower. But after learning of the lower tax rates, all of them planned on purchasing items such as gasoline while in town.

Lower taxes can lead to higher revenues — and keeping taxes low will keep the money flowing into the state of Missouri.

The post Gasoline, Cigarettes, Alcohol and Taxes: When Less Is More appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

• An $11 million mortgage loan.
• A combined $2.9 million in developer equity.
• $12 million in equity from federal historic tax credits.
• $2.7 million in equity from New Markets Tax Credits.
• $12.4 million in state historic tax credit equity.
• $872,100 in Brownfield tax credit proceeds.
• $13.5 million in Series A bonds.
• $18.7 million in Series B bonds.

The above sources total more than $74 million, of which only $13.9 million appears remotely like private capital that flows independent of a government guarantee. Thinking about it, though, even the private mortgage loan has implicit public backing, because the project that it supports would not exist in the absence of a legislative quagmire of market distortion.

First, in 2009, Ordinance 68380 amended the city of St. Louis’ 5-percent gross receipts tax on ticketed entertainment productions, intending to incentivize the “owner, primary tenant, occupant or operator, or [a]ffiliate” of a “Contiguous Recreation Facility […] contiguous to a historic theatre, opera house or concert hall” to redevelop said historic theater for “$50,000,000-$99,999,999” (hyperlink added). The redevelopment would be subject to the following guideline:

• “[with] a redevelopment plan approved by the City by ordinance and a Redevelopment Agreement approved by the LCRA.”

Lo and behold, the development team for the upcoming Kiel Opera House renovation — which includes the ownership group for the St. Louis Blues hockey team and Scottrade Center — sought and received each of the above approvals. St. Louis Ordinance 68381 authorizes a redevelopment plan for the Kiel Opera House and affirms LCRA’s approval of the project.

St. Louis did not stop there, however, as Ordinances 68382, 68383, 68384, and 68385 collectively tweak the terms of a lease agreement on the city-owned Kiel Opera House facility, earmark funds from a previously approved Community Improvement District (Ordinance 68377) to support the Opera House’s redevelopment, and bring the entire legislative morass full circle by using taxes abated in accordance with Ordinance 68380 to provide debt service on the project’s city-issued bonds.

If the project’s bonds ultimately find buyers, then a combination of federal, state, and St. Louis taxpayers, hockey fans, and service users would foot the vast majority of the costs for restoring one of St. Louis’ architectural gems. Most will do so unwittingly, because St. Louis city does not examine, account for, or consider fiscal and economic impacts when passing legislation.

Please do not hear me wrong; the last thing that I want to see is another building sit vacant for decades on end. That said, I cannot cheer a rehabilitation project that relies so heavily on bloated and unwieldy allocations of taxpayer capital. Can Kiel Opera House return to life as “a 3,200-seat theater for concerts, Broadway shows, and family and holiday programs [with] four side banquet halls […] available for weddings, conferences and other events” in the absence of public subsidy?

Perhaps not.

But, then again, did you know that the Fabulous Fox Theater in St. Louis sprang back to life without state tax credits or city-backed bonds?

I predict that Kiel’s future success — whatever form it may take — will come at the expense of other performing arts venues throughout the region. The failure of the Kiel project to attract private capital investment suggests to me that it may simply displace performance activities that would otherwise occur elsewhere, at privately supported venues throughout St. Louis.

Although there are strong arguments that markets tend to underproduce artistic work relative to growth in other sectors of the economy and that public subsidy can increase access to art and yield positive externalities, these arguments do not apply to the question of whether St. Louis city is underproducing space for such art downtown. At present, the vacancy rate in downtown’s myriad office buildings is nearly 19 percent, which means that competition for tenants is fierce and that already-low lease rates are falling still lower. Simply stated, the facilitation of architectural space is the last thing that St. Louis City needs to subsidize. Of Kiel’s proposed $74 million renovation cost, $43.4 million will go to the contractor and an indeterminate amount will fund professional services like attorneys’ and bond underwriters’ fees. None of the project’s costs will fund artistic production.

Many contend that tax credits create jobs. However, I see no evidence to suggest that they ever have or ever will.

The post Can St. Louis Really Support Another Performing Arts Facility? Local Government Certainly Thinks So appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

It is not exactly groundbreaking research for me to state that teams and players pay substantial income taxes in various forms. Here are the most recent payrolls and league ranking for the five Missouri teams:

1. Rams, $62,384,821 (32)
2. Chiefs, $83,187,156 (31)
3. Cardinals, $93,540,751 (12)
4. Royals, $71,405,210 (21)
5. Blues, $46,485,000 (22)

As far as I know, the location in which a team plays its regular season home games is the primary determinate for which taxes must be paid. So, the city of St. Louis, which hosts the home games of all three St. Louis teams, gets $1,518,079 per year in earnings and payroll taxes just from the Cardinals, Rams, and Blues players. Kansas City gets $772,962 from Chiefs and Royals players. (This post originally mistakenly said that the KC stadiums were outside of Kansas City proper. Thanks to David Nicklaus of the Post-Dispatch for sending me a correction, and for reading our blog!) Of course, when you account for team employees and the profit tax levied on each organization, the earnings tax receipts grow even larger.

Missouri receives an estimated $10,710,088 each year from applying the 6-percent income tax rate to athletes from each of its five sports teams. (With deductions, etc., this figure would be a little lower.) Missouri, like many other states, enforces its income taxes on visiting athletes, too. However, just as players from visiting teams must pay the income and earnings taxes, all the players get credit for taxes paid to other cities and states. The result is that the total taxes paid are just moved around between jurisdictions, as our former editor Tim Lee first pointed out when writing about the “jock tax” in 2005:

But Missouri athletes who pay other states’ jock taxes are able to subtract those tax payments from their Missouri tax bills. When you subtract the revenue lost from other states’ jock taxes, the result is practically a wash. If all 20 states repealed their jock taxes simultaneously, states would get virtually the same revenue with a lot less administrative overhead.

Two lists help us determine whether players pay more or less taxes: states without an income tax, and cities with an earnings tax. The Cardinals players don’t appear to do so well here. They pay both a state income tax and city earnings tax at home, and regularly travel to Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, New York, and Philadelphia. Only when they travel to play the Astros — and, less frequently, the Marlins — do they really get a pay raise. The Royals also pay the local earnings tax when they travel to Detroit, Cleveland, or New York. Both the Cardinals and Royals pay the other city’s e-tax each year when they travel across I-70 for the annual “rivalry” series.

The Blues pay a local tax on their frequent visits to Detroit or Columbus, but get a nice tax vacation when they head to Nashville. Of course, Canadian taxation becomes a issue for any hockey player, and for the Royals to a lesser extent.

The NFL schedule rotates from year to year more than other leagues, but the Rams players have to like getting to play one guaranteed road game in Seattle each year, because Washington has no state income tax and Seattle has no earnings tax. The Chiefs and Rams play this year in the regular season, so both teams will be paying the host city’s e-tax then, as well. (The two football teams usually play in the pre-season for the much-coveted “Governor’s Cup” but I don’t think athlete’s salaries are based on pre-season games so no earnings tax would be collected in that case.) If you are looking to avoid taxes, the AFC south is where you want to play — aside from the smallish earnings tax in Indianapolis, of course. The Chiefs have to pay high California state taxes for at least two games per year. (Disclaimer: All team opponent and schedule info listed here has been pulled from my own memory, with a little help from ESPN.com.) Of course, other factors such as where an athlete keeps his primary residence, the agressiveness of his accountant, etc., will all play a factor here. A player who lives full time in Missouri is going to pay Missouri income tax on salary earned, but not taxed, playing in Texas, while someone who lives in another state might not. I am a policy analyst, not a CPA.

What does all of this prove? Nothing really, yet. This post is less debatable than future posts in the series might be, because in these cases the teams and players are treated just like other businesses, and the taxes paid are substantial. That does not mean I think they should be substantial, just pointing out that the applicable tax policies show no favoritism. Also, it is simultaneously difficult to say that the athletes and teams are not paying enough in taxes when around 100 individual players generate more than $1.5 million per year to the city of St. Louis alone, and it is almost as hard to seriously complain about the taxes paid by modern professional athletes, who earn enormous salaries to play a game for a living. (Am I jealous? Absolutely!)

Future posts in this series will deal with areas in which teams are not treated like other businesses, for better or worse.

The post Taxes and Sports: The Earnings Tax (Part One in a Series) appeared first on Show-Me Institute.