Though I never met the man, I feel a debt of gratitude to Ronald Coase, the Nobel Prize-winning economist who died on Labor Day at age 102. Reading his “Nature of the Firm” – one of the most cited essays in all of economic literature – encouraged me to start my own business.

Two decades ago, I persuaded John McDonnell, the CEO of McDonnell Douglas, then the nation’s 23nd largest industrial company, to outsource the biggest part of my job (writing his speeches) back to me as an independent writer. I left the company with an annual contract that paid me no less money than I was making before and that allowed me to pursue other clients. But as I told John McDonnell, I also knew that I had to perform at a high level – being painfully aware of the fact that the company could cancel my contract at any time if I did less well as an independent contractor than I had as a “salary-man” (to use the Japanese expression) or employee.

Anyone familiar with Ronald Coase’s work will recognize that I had struck a classic “Coasian” bargain – finding an efficient free-market solution to a particular problem (my unhappiness with the corporate environment and desire for independence) that worked for both parties: The CEO accepted the notion that I would be a hyper-motivated non-employee, and I became my own boss.

Coase was the first to ask – and provide a plausible answer to – the question of why companies exist . . . and why a critical part of their success comes from getting large numbers of people to submit to a form of voluntary servitude – punching a time clock and giving employers the right to direct their performance in exchange for predetermined wages or salaries and protection from sudden or arbitrary dismissal.

His answer was that companies exist for the purpose of reducing “transactions costs” – meaning all the costs of trying to order economic activity through voluntary exchange. That includes the costs of searching out and evaluating other parties; negotiating contracts; maintaining communication; and policing and enforcing the terms of those contracts.

Imagine the extraordinary difficulty that a Henry Ford or a William Boeing would have faced in trying to contract out for every part and every task going into the assembly of a car or airplane. Hence the need for the visible hand of management in coordinating the allocation of resources.

At the same time, Coase fully appreciated the disciplines and rewards of free enterprise, and he was acutely aware of the tendency of corporate (or government) bureaucracies to stifle individual initiative and kill any sense of real ownership that people have over the quality of their own work. Within a large, publicly owned corporation, no one, including the CEO, is spending his own money.

Citing the picturesque words of another economist (D. H. Robertson), the British-born Coase, who spent most of his working life in the United States, described companies as “islands of conscious power” – or central planning – in an “ocean of unconscious (i.e., spontaneous free-market) cooperation . . . like lumps of butter in a pail of coagulating buttermilk.”

The “lump of butter” of which I was a part in the early 1990s was a shrinking rather than a growing mass: In just three years, the company shed more than 50,000 jobs, or 42 percent of the workforce. In the midst of all the downsizing, people were angry and confused – not knowing where the axe would fall next and bitterly resenting a sudden loss of the personal security that they had gained (and felt entitled to) through years of fealty to the same company. What they didn’t see was that a whole way of life was disappearing.

And now it is gone. Today, no one – not even someone graduating from a top business school – expects to spend his or her entire adult life with a single company. Everyone accepts that big companies really aren’t built to last. More like lumps of butter than castles of perpetual growth and stability, they may dissolve at any moment and disappear into the liquid churn.

One may think of the quarter of a century from 1955 (the first year of the Fortune 500) to 1980 as a golden age for big business in America. During that time, Fortune 500 companies ruled the roost – growing at about twice the rate of GDP growth and enjoying robust profitability from one year to the next – even during recessions. In 1975, the last year of the virulent recession touched off by the Arab oil embargo, only 15 Fortune 500 companies, or 3 percent of the total, reported losses, and all of the top 50 companies were solidly in the black.

Compare that to 1993 – which happened to be my last year as an employee at McDonnell Douglas. This was a brutal year for many big companies. Even though the 1990-91 recession was officially over, no fewer than 151 Fortune 500 companies – or just more than 30 percent – lost money in 1993, and that included 4 out of the top 10 (GM, Ford, IBM, and DuPont) and 22 out of the top 50 ranked by revenues.

To add just one more statistic gleaned from sifting through old issues of the Fortune annual survey, it is worth noting that Fortune 500 companies shed close to 3 million jobs in the 10-year period ending in 1993.

So what happened to bring the era of big business dominance to a close and set the stage for a new era of entrepreneurship and greater dispersal as opposed to centralization of economic activity?

We may turn to Ronald Coase for what I believe is the key insight. In his essay on the nature of the firm – published in 1937, when he was a young professor at the London School of Economics – he addressed the different ways in which technological advancements could affect the size of companies:

It should be noted that most inventions will change both the costs of organizing and the costs of using the price mechanism. In such cases, whether the invention tends to make firms larger or smaller will depend upon the relative effect on these two sets of costs. For instance, if the telephone reduces the costs of using the price mechanism more than it reduces the costs of organizing, then it will have the effect of reducing the size of the firm.

But of course, I thought, when I read those words for the first time. This was a year before John McDonnell and I struck our Coasian bargain. With his encouragement, I had agreed to take part in a research project by the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis examining how U.S. firms (including McDonnell Douglas) were responding to the twin challenges of the information revolution and globalization . . . and to write sections of a book (The Dynamic American Firm) summarizing the findings.

Coase’s thinking loomed large in the book and in my own subsequent decision to go out on my own.

The mainframe computers that came into existence in the 1950s were so big and expensive that only the biggest companies could use them. With the help of these early computers in reducing the costs of organizing production and marketing, Fortune 500 companies became bigger and more prosperous throughout the sixties and seventies.

Then came the information revolution – which (even before the Internet) had the opposite effect of reducing the size of firms. It reduced the need for corporate bureaucracy. Still more, it caused many big companies to disassemble their carefully constructed vertical empires and to contract out for just about everything outside of their own core competencies. I knew that writing was not one McDonnell Douglas’s core competencies, and I reasoned that I should set a price for my work as an outside contractor that would be equal to the cost that the company would incur in having to hire a full-time speechwriter to replace me. Because the drafting of speeches and annual reports took maybe 50 percent of my time at McDonnell Douglas, I figured I would free up many hours that would go into serving other clients.

The Dynamic American Firm did not become a best-seller, but in re-reading some passages of the book, I can relive some of the excitement that I felt in pondering the next step in my own life:

Like “de-industrialization,” the rapid rise in business services and self-employment over the past several years has set alarm bells ringing in enlightened centers of thought. “In the future,” one displaced executive told Time magazine, “we are going to be moving from job to job in the same way that migrant workers move from crop to crop.”

Perhaps. But unlike the migrant worker, today’s corporate refugee, equipped with a personal computer, printer, copier and fax machine – all purchased for about $7,000 – can earn a good living toiling in the comfort of his, or her, home. That is so because the information revolution has greatly reduced transactions costs – for big firms and small contractors alike.

Coase may have done more to extend our understanding of business and commerce than any thinker since Adam Smith. But his influence did not stop there. He also had a profound influence in challenging the belief that government regulations, taxes, or subsidies were the best and, indeed, the only way of dealing with actions of business firms that have harmful effects on others, with a commonly cited example being the emission of sparks from a train that causes damage to a farmer’s crops along the railroad’s right-of-way.

In a “The Problem of Social Cost,” his second most famous essay, published in 1960, Coase argued that most disputes of this nature are best resolved by negotiation, rather than regulation or imposing strict penalties on the damaging party.

As Coase pointed out, both the railroad and the farmer would be better off if the latter agreed not to cultivate the vulnerable portion of his land in exchange for a payment that would equal or exceed the opportunity cost incurred in foregoing its cultivation. In other words, without regulation, the two sides could easily reach a mutually beneficial solution.

“The Problem of Social Cost” gave rise to a whole new body of literature in the field of “economics and the law.”

In awarding him the 1991 prize in economics, the Nobel committee observed that “Coase may be said to have identified a new set of ‘elementary particles’ in the economic systems.” Coase himself made no such claims, saying in a 2012 interview, “I’ve never done anything that wasn’t obvious and I didn’t know why other people didn’t do it.”

Andrew B. Wilson is a resident fellow and senior writer at the Show-Me Institute, which promotes market solutions for public policy in Missouri.

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Wisconsin had 5,800 student tickets to sell. They went up for purchase on uwbadgers.com at 9 p.m. Sunday and were sold out by 9:20 p.m.

The above students had the nerve to put their Rose Bowl tickets up for sale on Facebook Marketplace within two hours of tickets selling out. Face value was $150. Some were trying to get the tickets for more than $400 a pop.

Truly, there is a special place in Hell for people who buy Rose Bowl tickets with the sole intention of profiting from them. It is entirely unfair to those who actually love this football team and were counting on a cheap face value ticket in order to make the trip to Pasadena an economic reality.

I understand more about economics than sports, so in my opinion, we’re simply seeing a correction of the market inefficiency resulting from setting the price of a ticket lower than equilibrium. For an individual whose utility from attending the Rose Bowl game is less than $400, it is rational to resell the tickets at a price that exceeds their face value. Instead of being labeled “the worst people on campus,” the individuals listed in the Badger Herald article should be admired for possessing the insight to forecast a market opportunity.

Contributors to Show-Me Daily have discussed previously how ticket scalping improves efficiencies in the market. Last summer, David Stokes led a team of Show-Me Institute interns and staffers on a free-market field trip that demonstrated how ticket scalping is a type of market transaction that can improve the welfare of both buyers and sellers.

The graph below illustrates the market for tickets to the Rose Bowl game. The face value of a ticket, P₀, equals $150 and the equilibrium price, P_e, is higher than this level. From the article, it appears that the equilibrium price is currently approximately $400. At P₀, the quantity of tickets demanded, Q_d, exceeds the quantity supplied, Q_s (i.e., there is a shortage). When individuals are prohibited from reselling a ticket at a price higher than its face value (i.e., when the price ceiling is enforced), dead-weight loss results.

Market for Rose Bowl Tickets

In the presence of scarcity (and tickets to the Rose Bowl are indeed scarce), the price system works to allocate goods and services. Prices coordinate individual action efficiently by communicating relative scarcities and preferences, and individuals signal their relative levels of demand through their willingness to pay. In order to buy a ticket, a person either gives up disposable income, or he reduces his consumption of some other good. When the price system is allowed to work unrestricted, the tickets will more likely end up with the people who have the greatest willingness to pay.

Critics of scalping say that these $400 prices prevent current students who have low incomes from buying a ticket because they tend to lack disposable income. However, tickets to this particular game are already scarce, and capping the price does nothing to alleviate this. This is illustrated in the graph above; when the price ceiling is enforced below the equilibrium price, then the quantity of tickets demanded exceeds the quantity supplied. In other words, even if an administrative entity prevented reselling the tickets at a price higher than P₀, some individuals who have willingness to buy will still miss out on purchasing a ticket. For example, if the tickets were restricted to current students, then then fewer alums who have the means to pay $400 for a ticket will be able to buy one. Furthermore, banning scalping would harm low-income students more than it would help them, because scalping is a potential means for them to generate income.

Critics also say that the event is better off when the student section is packed with loud, rowdy fans. Because the secondary market drives up prices, fewer students may be able to attend, resulting in a crowd that’s more reserved. A rowdy student section certainly has some positive externalities, but these are impossible to measure.

Students at the University of Wisconsin routinely resell tickets at a premium for home games at Camp Randal. During my time as a student, I bought and sold Badger football tickets on several occasions. Why are tickets to the Rose Bowl game any different? Tickets to games against big rivals, like Ohio State or Northwestern, can sell for more than $150 each. This is simply a result of the law of demand. For certain football games (e.g., bowl games), just like any other product, the demand curve shifts to the right and results in a price increase.

The Coase theorem says that transactions will lead to an efficient outcome in situtations in which trade in an externality is possible, transaction costs are zero, and property rights are clearly defined (here, to students). It says that those who will be able to put the tickets to the most highly valued use will end up owning them. Because non-students are buying tickets on the secondary market in this scenario, it’s apparent that this group is not restricted to current students.

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If you care about sustainability, you should care about property rights.

Why do I bring this up? According to an article over at the Post-Dispatch, Jefferson City has been chosen as one of five state capitals to receive extensive attention from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in the form of plans intending to make the city greener and more sustainable. The project is called “Greening America’s Capitals,” and calls for “a team of designers to produce illustrations on how targeted neighborhoods in chosen capitals can be improved,” with funding provided by taxpayers nationwide the EPA. The Show-Me Institute’s book club is currently reading a lot about public choice economics, and I could write an entire post about the dispersed costs and concentrated benefits of this particular scheme. Instead, I’ll focus on how everything that is proposed by this federal agency would be better handled by a reduction in hands-on government management.

First, the obvious (at least to me): Strong property rights lead to good stewardship. When the costs of harming things falls on those doing the harm, they tend to try to reduce the harm as much as possible. Namely, when something belongs to you alone, you tend to treat it with more care than if it belongs to someone else. Moreover, when the benefits of improving something accrue to those doing the improvement, more improvements happen. Namely, you’re more likely to work to improve your own things than someone else’s things. There are plenty of historical examples, including the dramatic improvement in crop yield and work participation among the early European settlers in America after switching from a communal system to one based on private property.

When I hear “sustainable” and “going green” I think “good environmental stewardship.” There are two components to this, the first of which is taking care to maintain or improve your own property. The second part involves externalities. For the unfamiliar, externalities are any cost or benefit that falls on someone not directly or willingly involved in an exchange. Maintaining a classic car provides a positive externality to those who enjoy seeing one driven around town but who don’t pay for its upkeep. Pollution is the classic example of a negative externality: harming people who had no say in the pollution’s production. This is a problem with no obvious solution, but (as public choice has clearly shown) a lot of bad possible solutions from the government. Ronald Coase is a Nobel Prize–winning economist who demonstrated that the problem of externalities is really a problem of transaction costs (such as the cost of information). Show me a government solution to an externality problem that doesn’t involve internalizing costs and I’ll show you the law of unintended consequences in action.

Greening America’s Capitals will not help the state of Missouri. It’s a fundamental waste that distracts from the real problems of insufficiently robust property rights and, especially, transaction costs. But these difficult technical problems will never be as broadly appealing as a visible, heart-in-the-right-place EPA program. This is not a new problem in politics.

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We have all undoubtedly felt overworked and underpaid, and during a recession, the proportion of the labor force feeling this way has surely increased. As Judge Price pointed out, those who make some of the most important decisions throughout the entire criminal justice system — state prosecutors — are being spread thin. This is a worrying state of affairs if we want prosecutors to make well-considered decisions. People work better when they are happier — it’s as simple as that.

One of the most pressing issues mentioned in Judge Price’s address is the state’s overspending on the incarceration of nonviolent criminals, something that Show-Me Institute research assistant John Payne mentioned in an earlier blog post. This is a situation resulting from too many restrictive laws that have resulted in the criminalization of nonviolent offenses, such as transactions involving drugs, alcohol, and even prostitution. Regardless of how one feels about the morality of such activities, it’s hard to justify expending so many resources on their prosecution when the core functions of the judicial system — protecting life, liberty, and property from actual direct, measurable harm — is suffering from a lack of resources.

Too many people are being arrested and tried for crimes that have no complaining victim. As Reason editor Radley Balko has observed, “Because there is almost never a complaining victim in vice crimes, law enforcement officers must go to extraordinary lengths to investigate and prosecute these crimes. This leads to all sorts of other problems, including invasions of privacy, entrapment, and police corruption.” The situation has also led to inconsistency in prosecution throughout Missouri. The toughest counties are prosecuting five times as many offenders as the most lenient counties.

Judge Price has has offered a rather convincing reason to change these policies, and to decrease the rate of prosecution and incarceration of nonviolent criminals — because we can’t pay for it. What’s even more convincing is that we cannot afford to pay for the proper treatment and rehabilitation for these offenders. Price outlines how poorly the system treats people who haven’t directly harmed anybody else, by tearing them from their lives, throwing them in a “concrete box with very expensive guards, feeding them, providing them with expensive medical care, surrounding them with hardened criminals for long periods of time, and separating them from their families who need them and could otherwise help them[.]” What’s worse, while in prison, some of them are being trained by full-fledged violent criminals on how to further divide themselves from mainstream society. These people are also citizens, and deserve to be given a chance to reintegrate into society.

Price provides some sobering numbers:

In 1994, shortly after I came to the Court, the number of nonviolent offenders in Missouri prisons was 7,461. Today it’s 14,204. That’s almost double. In 1994, the number of new commitments for nonviolent offenses was 4,857. Last year, it was 7,220 — again, almost double. At a rate of $16,432 per offender, we currently are spending $233.4 million a year to incarcerate nonviolent offenders … not counting the investment in the 10 prisons it takes to hold these individuals at $100 million per prison. In 1994, appropriations to the Department of Corrections totaled $216,753,472. Today, it’s $670,079,452. The amount has tripled. And the recidivism rate for these individuals, who are returned to prison within just two years, is 41.6 percent.

Price observes that if the state government were run like a business, these wasteful practices would have been done away with years ago. “Business” may not be the most convincing metaphor to use, because one of the classic economic justifications of government action, particularly the justice system, is that public goods are not optimally provided by markets. Some economists, however, have suggested that many aspects of government action that are commonly justified in terms of their status as public goods, including some within the justice system, can’t correctly be considered public goods:

The standard economics approach to delineating the optimal set of the state’s functions is unsatisfactory.² In particular, when economists such as Joseph Stiglitz (1988: 24) indicate that “a primary role of government” is to provide the legal framework “within which all economic transactions occur,” not much is said about the desired content of the laws, and how it might affect the desirability or efficiency of their enforcement. Besides, there is typically no mention of nonstate enforcement mechanisms and their relationship to those of the state. The impression is created that all conflict resolution in economic life is in the unavoidable domain of the state. That impression is in contrast with the empirical evidence (see, e.g., Greif 1997, Gow and Swinnen 2001, and Waldmeir 2001).

This confusion is related to the use that is made of the concept of public goods as being nonrival in consumption and nonexclusive (Samuelson 1954: 387–89). If these goods are to be provided at all, taxes and the related state’s coercion are necessary. However, which goods are truly public? Is the justice system the domain of the state because the relevant services are a public good? Clearly, that cannot be said of all such services. Then, which “justice services” constitute a public good? Is the lighthouse, the favorite textbook example of a public good, a public good? Ronald Coase (1974) has shown that lighthouses in 19th century Britain were operated and financed privately. This finding, however, has not prevented the lighthouse to continue serving as the primary example of a public good in many textbooks (e.g., Stiglitz 1988: 75).

There may be fewer public goods in real life than typically assumed. As a result, the necessary (or desirable) scope of the state’s activity may be narrower, too. Some of the goods declared “public” may in fact be private goods, pushed into the state’s domain by public intervention that has eliminated or undercut the possibility of voluntary private financing of these goods. In other words, some uses of the theoretical concept of public goods may inadvertently constitute ex post justifications for the results of previous expansion of state activity.

Judge Price is not an economist, but by questioning whether the routine prosecution and incarceration of nonviolent offenders for committing consensual crimes actually provides more value than cost for the people of Missouri, this may well be the type of argument he was trying to make, using different terminology. Price is suggesting that it’s time for a more thorough analysis of which interests are truly being served by prosecuting many types of nonviolent offenders, and whether such prosecution actually provides results that could be considered a public good. His address doesn’t contain all the answers, but it’s the starting point for a worthy debate.

In times of fiscal crisis, it sometimes becomes necessary to embark upon a new policy path, and welcome changes that we might otherwise avoid. Whether Judge Price’s recommendations are inspired by a concern for justice or for more practical financial reasons, this would be a positive step for the government to take. The judiciary appears to be willing to do its part in order to withstand the jolts of the recession, but are the other branches of government also up to the task?

The post Judge Suggests That Missouri Should Be Run Like a Business appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The noise disturbance, the rezoning, and the (at least temporary) loss of property value are certainly among the reasons that residents might choose to protest, even though these reasons might be counterbalanced by the long-term growth in economic activity that would occur as a result of such a store opening. Today’s protesters could be tomorrow’s shoppers. As Nobel laureate economist Ronald Coase observed, projects of this type would have a much smoother process if developers could focus on economic factors like compensation for property owners with legitimate complaints, rather than having to jump through political hoops.

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