I’ve argued for years that Kansas City’s lavish subsidies distort the market while failing to deliver on economic promises. New reporting from the Kansas City Business Journal suggests the process itself may be just as broken.

Reporter Thomas Friestad reconstructed negotiations among Kansas City Public Schools (KCPS), PortKC, and Gillon Property Group over incentives tied to Country Club Plaza. The emails, obtained through an open-records request, depict a rushed and opaque decision-making process worthy of public distrust.

The original proposal reportedly included roughly $309 million in incentives over 30 years. KCPS officials objected not only to the size of the package, but also to shifting valuation methods that obscured the true public cost. The district also sought protection for voter-approved bond revenues and more time to evaluate major revisions before approval by PortKC.

That timeline is the real story.

The emails show negotiations continuing until the night before a scheduled PortKC meeting. KCPS officials argued they were being asked to evaluate a substantially revised proposal in just two business days. One consultant for the district described the timeline as “concerning even with the highest level of independent analysis.”

This is a recurring problem in Kansas City’s incentive culture. Complex tax arrangements are negotiated behind closed doors and then presented to affected taxing jurisdictions with little time for meaningful scrutiny. The result is confusion over the true public cost and distrust among taxpayers expected to finance these deals.

Kansas City has seen this pattern before. Similar concerns surrounded the Power & Light District and continue to emerge in discussions over a proposed downtown ballpark. Political machinations routinely take precedence over transparency and accountability.

Notably, KCPS did not oppose subsidies outright. District officials simply asked for clear terms, accurate projections, and adequate time to evaluate a deal that could affect school finances for decades. The fact that negotiators appeared unwilling to provide sufficient time to evaluate the deal speaks volumes.

Kansas Citians have grown understandably skeptical of these taxpayer-funded deals. Too many projects promised economic transformation and delivered little beyond long-term public cost. The Country Club Plaza negotiations are, at best, an example of rushed incompetence. At worst, they suggest an effort to push a massive subsidy package through before taxpayers and public schools could fully evaluate it.

The post Country Club Plaza Subsidy Deal Reveals What’s Broken in Kansas City appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Across Missouri, public officials routinely delay, dodge, or deny access to information that taxpayers are entitled to. They charge outrageous fees, cite vague exemptions, lose track of requests, or hide behind non-disclosure agreements, treating transparency as a nuisance rather than a requirement.

Years ago my colleagues wrote about the prohibitively high fees municipalities sought just to turn over the most basic financial data—the city checkbook. That’s just the beginning.

Consider Kansas City’s downtown ballpark negotiations. Mayor Quinton Lucas indicated he was willing to share details, so I took him up on it. I filed an open records request through the city website. Having received no response for almost two weeks (state law requires action be taken within three days), I followed up only to be told that the request had been wrongly assigned and had been sitting idle. A city employee resolved the issue, adding, “Let’s keep our fingers crossed” that it works this time. Two weeks later I was emailed: “All responsive records pertaining to this request are closed records pursuant to Sec 610.021(12) because such records are related to negotiations for a contract prior to its execution.”

The Kansas City Star reports that the city is again in negotiations with the Royals to subsidize a downtown park. Elected leaders are apparently eager to make sure the deal is not only kept secret, but also that it avoids any public vote.

In August 2025, I asked the Kansas City Streetcar Authority for records about the construction costs of its new Main Street extension—reported to be the most expensive streetcar line in the country at over $100 million per mile. My request was redirected to city staff who told me the matter was under review. I followed up in late October and was told the city would contact me by the end of that week. It’s been almost three months with no update.

In one recent case, a state employee told me the data I needed would take just 20 minutes to find—but only after a formal Sunshine Request was submitted and processed. This person did not know how long that would take. I got the information five days later, and I was grateful. But it underscored a troubling reality: a process meant to promote transparency is now often used to delay it.

Then there are the NDAs. The director of Missouri’s Department of Economic Development signed one with both the Royals and Chiefs—and indicated in a legislative hearing that she may not be able to answer questions. PortKC even requires companies sign an NDA in its application. While sealed bids may serve public interest in competitive contracting, secrecy around subsidies undermines the very idea of public oversight.

Missouri’s Sunshine Law could be a valuable tool, but it needs to be refreshed and its exceptions narrowed. Doing so would not merely combat waste, fraud, and abuse, but would also encourage better public policy.

The post Missouri’s Sunshine Law Needs More than Good Intentions appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

That result should raise alarms—but not eyebrows. Set-aside requirements like this often function less as solutions and more as stumbling blocks. Rather than spur construction, Kansas City’s policy has become something to work around. Developers have leaned on other incentive-granting agencies or opted for minimal in-lieu payments instead. Meanwhile, regulation continues to inflate costs and suppress supply. As I’ve written before, regulation can be a root cause of unaffordability.

The KCBJ analysis looked at 114 development incentive applications since 2021. None resulted in affordable units under the set-aside rule. Many projects qualified for exemptions—using low-income housing tax credits (LIHTCs), being historic rehabs, or receiving incentives from agencies outside the city’s economic development corporation (EDCKC).

Examples:

• Of six qualifying EDCKC projects since August 2022, just one plans to meet the 20% set-aside (16 of 78 units at 60% MFI).
• Larger developments often went through the Port Authority of Kansas City (Port KC) or other entities, thereby sidestepping the requirement entirely.

The result is a policy with good intentions but poor results—and plenty of incentive for developers to seek workarounds.

Two themes stand out.

First: Incentives, not mandates, are doing the real work. Port KC has become the go-to agency for developers. Since mid-2023, it’s reviewed 17 housing proposals totaling over 5,000 units and $2.6 billion in investment. Because Port KC isn’t bound by the set-aside ordinance, many developers simply pay a lower in-lieu fee and move forward. A city spokesperson even admitted that some of these workarounds were done “at the request or with the blessing of city leaders.”

Second: Regulation continues to push costs up. Developers cited permitting delays, costly energy codes, and other burdens as key barriers. As one put it, requiring reduced rent on top of high costs is a “double negative.”

This tracks with previous findings: When regulation increases costs, it restricts the market’s ability to deliver lower-priced housing. If the goal is more affordability, then cities must lower the baseline costs—not just impose mandates.

The post Shocker! Kansas City’s Affordable Housing Set-Asides Nets Zero Housing Units appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

But the concerns with Port KC don’t end with finances alone. A series of audits from 2021 through 2024 flagged serious internal control problems, including one where the finance director had full authority over journal entries, deposits and account reconciliation—with no oversight. Port KC has repeatedly promised to fix these issues and repeatedly failed to act.

PortKC’s most recent audit, dated April 30, 2025 (but which seems to have been posted to the website on August 29, 2025), contains the same financial concerns on page 52. Specifically, a “significant deficiency in internal controls over financial reporting.”

My column was published after the 2025 audit but before it was made publicly available. PortKC could not have effected any changes for the 2025 audit—but I wish someone at PortKC had alerted me that I was actually undercounting the years auditors were pointing out the same, unaddressed shortcomings. So much for claims of transparency.

The post Correction: PortKC Ignoring Its Own Audits for Five Years, Not Four appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Mr. Collins did not appreciate my conclusion. He called it “misleading and inflammatory,” and wrote that I was dealing in “political spin.”

I welcome the opportunity to respond. Collins wrote:

The claim that PortKC’s NDA signals secrecy is misleading and inflammatory. The NDA applies only during early negotiations, and thus, to protect complex deals before terms are finalized. That is standard in any serious public-private partnership. It doesn’t block legal disclosures, doesn’t hide information from taxing jurisdictions, and doesn’t erase public accountability. It protects taxpayers from leaks that can tank deals or drive-up costs.

PortKC literally—and I am not being figurative—requires in writing that applicants sign an NDA. I do not know what the justification is for requiring secrecy, but I do know that it is not “standard in any serious public-private partnership.” The Economic Development Corporation of Kansas City (EDCKC), which also provides a raft of public subsidies, requires no such NDA. As I wrote, I can understand why a developer would want such secrecy, but it is another thing completely to have the public body handing out taxpayer subsidies to be the one demanding discretion.

If you doubt that PortKC maintains a level of secrecy throughout its deals, search online for the terms Project Mica and Project Kestrel.

Collins continues:

PortKC’s process requires more upfront disclosure from developer’s ownership, litigation history, financials, job creation, wage data, and community impact than many.

If this is the justification, it doesn’t appear to be working. It was only three years ago that PortKC failed to discover that a developer to which it was prepared to issue subsidies, Lux Living, had a few Securities and Exchange Commission violations in its past. So much for “more upfront disclosure.”

Separately, in its most recent financial audit, PortKC was faulted for failing to demonstrate that it searched federal databases to determine if any vendors were “suspended and debarred entities” prior to payment. Again, PortKC is not demonstrating that it carefully vets applicants.

Collins continues:

Critics, like this guy [that’s me!], also ignore that PortKC posts its full fee schedule, limits its own ability to rack up costs without approval, and requires developers to follow workforce, equity, and wage policies from day one.

Yes, PortKC posts an impressive fee schedule. I can’t say that it’s complete, but it does make quite a buck from issuing taxpayer subsidies. That’s part of the problem.

Most organizations that grow as quickly as PortKC face similar growing pains, and PortKC has taken action.

Has it, though? The financial audits of 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 all point out that PortKC failed to provide “effective internal control” of finances. One such finding may be the result of growing pains, but four consecutive findings suggest an inability or an unwillingness to right the ship.

Mr. Collins concludes:

The idea that PortKC is “insisting on secrecy” is political spin. This is about protecting sensitive financial negotiations; not hiding public subsidy. If you’re serious about transparency, deal with the facts; not headlines.

Again, it’s very clear from the PortKC application that it insists on secrecy.

I understand that Mr. Collins and others in the “public-private real estate development” industry are either happy with things just as they are or are hesitant to be critical of a scheme from which they stand to gain. But the argument that taxpayers are also benefitted by “protecting sensitive financial negotiations” from taxpayer scrutiny is just silly.

Organizations like PortKC and the groups they fund want public funds dispersed in the dark. If PortKC were serious about serving the public, its leadership would remove its NDA requirement and heed the counsel of its financial auditors. Until then, it should be viewed skeptically.

The post Responding to PortKC’s Defenders appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Secrecy isn’t standard practice. The Economic Development Corporation—which oversees the TIF Commission and other incentive bodies—does not require NDAs.

These agencies also hold more public meetings, solicit community input, and include representation from schools and libraries. Mayoral appointments to the TIF Commission must be confirmed by the city council. In contrast, the mayor appoints PortKC board members unilaterally.

This lack of transparency disserves the public. While developers might prefer NDAs when pursuing public subsidies—which is a separate concern—here, it’s the public agency itself insisting on secrecy. That’s even more alarming.

PortKC has other problems, some of which I detail in a recent column for The Kansas City Star:

A series of audits from 2021 through 2024 flagged serious internal control problems, including one where the finance director had full authority over journal entries, deposits and account reconciliation — with no oversight. Port KC has repeatedly promised to fix these issues and repeatedly failed to act.

PortKC’s transparency problem is compounded by persistent failures in oversight. A string of audits from 2021 through 2024 flagged major internal control issues. In one case, the finance director had sole authority over journal entries, deposits, and account reconciliation with no checks in place. PortKC acknowledged the problem and pledged reform but never followed through.

The 2024 audit revealed yet another compliance failure: the agency hadn’t verified whether its development partners were barred from receiving federal funds—a basic federal requirement known as “Suspension and Debarment.” Given PortKC’s increasing intake of federal money, this oversight is especially serious.

These aren’t isolated lapses. PortKC also failed to properly vet Lux Living in 2022. The pattern is clear and ongoing. With long-standing problems still unaddressed, the question is no longer whether something will go wrong, but when.

These issues matter more than ever. At the time of my Star column, I noted PortKC might be involved in financing a downtown park for the Royals. That’s now more likely: the Kansas City Business Journal reports that tax-free bonds via PortKC are under discussion.

Meanwhile, city officials are exploring ways to approve deals without a public vote. Combine that with PortKC’s built-in secrecy, and the result is troubling: public funds deployed without public oversight.

The post Why Is PortKC Keeping Secrets? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

This is just the latest example over the years of City Hall favoring wealthy, connected corporations with taxpayer subsidies and special treatment.

Port KC CEO Jon Stephens framed the incentives as a “small, supportive element” aimed at ensuring Kansas City retains high-quality jobs. The project promises to add 150 jobs with an average salary of $126,000 while retaining 600 current employees. Yet no precise value for the tax exemptions was disclosed. Its not clear if PortKC attached performance requirements to the deal, but Friestad indicates there was no such discussion of it among the commissioners when the subsidies were approved.

Readers may recall Stephens backed subsidies for an independent baseball team in Kansas back when the team couldn’t pay its utilities. If nothing else, he is consistent in his apparent desire to redirect taxpayer money to private corporate interests

Such a deal is nothing new for JE Dunn. The company received a lucrative incentive package when building its headquarters in 2009. That project fell under the East Village tax-increment financing plan, redirecting $19 million in public funds for a parking garage, demolitions, and blight removal.

This latest deal follows a familiar script in which major corporations, including Cerner, H&R Block, Burns & McDonnell, and Commerce Bank have secured public funding for their private office projects. Research has indicated for years that such incentives do not significantly impact corporate decisions on location.

Port KC has repeatedly played a central role in funneling public dollars into private hands. Its recent involvement with JE Dunn reflects a long history of negotiating deals that often leave taxpayers holding the bag, such as the millions each year taxpayers must fork over to cover bond payments on the Power & Light District owned and operated by Cordish Company. (Stephens is a former manager of that project.)

As Kansas City grapples with persistent infrastructure needs, ballooning public debt, and limited funding for essential services, its continued reliance on subsidies for corporate renovations raises questions about priorities. For now, Kansas Citians can only watch as the city’s public funds are diverted to underwrite private gains.

The post KC’s Corporate Welfare: JE Dunn’s HQ Renovation Gets Public Support appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The question: how much over the $34.9 million budgeted for the project could 0.7 miles of rail cost taxpayers? The answer: another $10 million, and possibly more:

“We determined that both of the (contractors) were qualified, the technical proposals were sound, but their costs were above the estimate, and both of their costs were above the budget, significantly so,” KCATA Deputy CEO Dick Jarrold said during a Tuesday presentation to the agency’s Finance Committee. The KCATA is one of four groups heading the riverfront streetcar project, alongside Kansas City, the Kansas City Streetcar Authority and Port Authority of Kansas City. . . .

The Mid-America Regional Council (MARC) has authorized about $9.6 million in additional federal dollars for the riverfront streetcar through the Surface Transportation Block Grant program, and a MARC committee has recommended an additional $1 million in federal Carbon Reduction program grant funds. The programs require local matching funds, which Jarrold said are anticipated from Port KC and the Streetcar Authority in an as-yet undetermined amount. [emphasis mine]

Keep in mind that the estimate for the original plan to extend the streetcar to the riverfront was $22.2 million, meaning the apparent final (?) cost of the line is on course to double that estimate, with or without the local match considered.

Yet, that’s been the track record for this toy train for over a decade now. I wrote here in 2011, 2012 and 2013 and for Forbes in 2014 that the Kansas City streetcar was a profligate and bad idea. And yet, despite the many opportunities to prove naysayers wrong, the streetcar remains a remarkably poor fiscal and policy decision to this day.

The post To Nobody’s Surprise, Riverfront Extension of Kansas City Streetcar Going over Budget appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

To review, there were two offerings to get the USDA to relocate to Kansas City, Missouri. The first was a state subsidy that allowed half of the withholdings tax paid to the state to be used to offset the costs of preparing the new site. Under the statutes relevant to the particular incentive package being used, 20 percent, amounting to $6 million, was to be paid to PortKC in administrative fees.

The second subsidy (unrelated to the first) redirected local Kansas City taxes to the project. This amount also happened to total to about $6 million. So rather than have local taxpayers give up all that money, the city council simply directed PortKC to forgo some of its administrative fee so that Kansas City taxpayers didn’t have to cough up as much. The amount given to the USDA is the same, but PortKC’s windfall is dramatically reduced.

Monday, Steve Vockrodt reported in The Kansas City Star that PortKC followed suit, albeit begrudgingly:

Last month the Kansas City Council passed an ordinance that reduced by about $4 million what the city would contribute to the USDA incentive package. In turn, the Port Authority felt compelled to cut the $6 million it had counted on from the AIM Zone by $4 million to make up the difference and keep the USDA interested in relocating to Kansas City.

This is a victory for Kansas City taxpayers and a necessary limitation placed on PortKC. Back in August I called for further restrictions to be placed on PortKC’s authority and jurisdiction. This is a good start, but more should be forthcoming.

The post Show-Me Gets Results? PortKC to Refund Taxpayers appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The EDC’s primary job seems to be the promotion of economic development subsidies in Kansas City. It lobbies on behalf of such subsidies before the city council and is funded largely through fees collected on projects that are approved to receive taxpayer subsidies. Nothing is wrong with any of that, in a vacuum.

The problem is that the EDC is also funded out of the city’s general fund to provide staffing assistance to the city’s several economic development agencies, such as the Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Commission, the Planned Industrial Expansion Authority (PIEA), and the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA). The EDC even assists PortKC, which many fear is facilitating and approving subsidies that elected leaders would oppose. It is important to note that the members of these commissions and authorities are not paid and are free to vote as they see fit. But the staff they depend upon for advice and council have a financial interest in every vote. The more subsidies these agencies hand out, the fatter the EDC’s bottom line—and the EDC’s budget has doubled since 2000.

In 2015, for example, $1 million of the EDC’s $5 million organizational budget was funded through the Kansas City general fund, but $3 million came from fees the EDC received from the TIFs it approved. So the EDC is getting three times more money from TIF projects than from the general fund.

Show-Me Institute analysts have published concerns about this before, and others—including those at the Kansas City Business Journal—have as well. Steve Vockrodt and Steve Roberts wrote this in the Business Journal back in 2010:

Among the options the EDC executive committee has explored are consolidating boards that deal with tax incentives—the Tax Increment Financing Commission, Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority and others—and having the city finance the agency to remove the potential for conflict that exists because the EDC is partly financed by revenue and fees from development projects.

The manifestations of the EDC’s conflict of interest are numerous. Consider the following:

• Back in 2015 members of the TIF Commission were so frustrated with the lack of financial transparency and professional services that they threatened leaving the EDC. Mayor James and the city council intervened and changed the process. TIF recipients now pay fees to city hall instead of the EDC, and financial reporting and auditing of TIF projects is now contracted out, instead of being handled by the EDC.
• The EDC apparently adheres to no long-term vision of what is best for Kansas City. Instead, it merely acts to assess each developer request as they are submitted. The EDC’s online application form suggests no particular policy goals that subsidies are meant to achieve, only that “Applications will be reviewed by EDC staff to determine the best course of action.” The recent discovery that at least one hotel was seeking a subsidy to protect itself from the overdevelopment of hotels suggests that no one at the EDC is taking a long-term view.
• The recent Strata deal—in which developers claimed a downtown office tower project was infeasible without public subsidies—was reworked by the city council to dramatically reduce overall subsidies and remove them completely for the tower itself. One wonders whether the EDC is capable and willing  to substantively vet developer applications for subsidies.
• Back in 2017 when Kansas City was trying to measure the value of its economic development policies, the then-CEO of the EDC wrote to the city hall staffer overseeing the study:

We need a report that explains and supports the city’s economic development policy in the context of local and regional competition. Such a report would be helpful in dealing with the KCMO Library and citizen petitioners interfering with an orderly eco-devo policy.

Kansas City spends at least $175 million each year on economic development subsidies. The organization charged with helping city leaders discern good subsidies from bad has demonstrated it is not up to the task, not looking out for the interests of Kansas City, and possessing an attitude of self-preservation that creates significant conflicts of interest. The EDC’s role should be significantly reformed or discarded altogether.

The post Kansas City’s Economic Development Corporation Is in Need of Overhaul appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The USDA office is moving into 805 Pennsylvania, a piece of land designated an Advanced Industrial Manufacturing (AIM) Zone by Port KC. According to state statute, this designation allows 50 percent of the state withholding tax collected from the new jobs to be redirected to the USDA, totaling just over $26 million dollars, per The Kansas City Star. To offset the cost of developing the site for a new employer, Port KC is allowed to charge an administrative fee of 20%, which comes to $6 million dollars in this case.

But wait, there is another subsidy for the project, this time coming from Kansas City taxpayers. From the Star:

On top of that, Kansas City could offer up to $6 million through the redirection of 75% of city taxes, according to a document outlining the local and Port KC incentives obtained by The Star. The Kansas City Council would have to vote to approve the redirection of local taxes for the USDA relocation; an ordinance is expected within weeks.

“City taxes” and “local taxes” are euphemisms for the earnings tax, as there will be precious little other tax generated at the USDA site. Kansas City leaders, who argue breathlessly that the earnings tax is such a vital source of income for things like public safety, are willing to forgo $6 million of earnings tax revenue for the USDA.

There is a better way. If city leadership wanted to protect Kansas City taxpayers from losing vital tax dollars, council members would demand—and Port KC would agree—to waive its administrative fee, which is coincidentally the same amount that city taxpayers are being asked to give up. Without such a demand by the city council, however, this deal includes a transfer of millions of dollars from Kansas City taxpayers into Port KC’s pocket.

The post USDA Deal Is Great for Port KC, Less Great for KC Taxpayers appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The mayor’s irritation may have been exacerbated by Port KC CEO Jon Stephens’ reaction to the border war truce. He oddly offered that despite the truce, the port authority could “proactively recruit” businesses from the Kansas side of the border but that it wouldn’t. The quote does not present Stephens as a team player on economic development reform.

When asked if the port authority was just a way to grant tax incentives while avoiding city council and public scrutiny, Stephens answered [starts at 19:38):

I would say that that’s certainly is not something that I would consider. I view everything [Prima facie] on exactly what is the net benefit. And I can tell you that we’re working very hard on our social equity: how we roll out to communicate exactly what we’re going to do, how we’re going to do it, and how we’re going to communicate to the citizens and their elected officials.

I’m not sure what any of that means, but it’s a disappointment for anyone hoping the answer was simply “no.”

Even if the port authority is a subdivision of the state of Missouri, Kansas City leaders have the ability to rein it in. Its board is appointed by the mayor and state statute allows the city council to, “from time to time enlarge or reduce the area comprising any port district” with the approval of the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission. Perhaps restricting future Port KC activity to within a quarter mile from the Missouri River is a good way to make sure that it cannot keep issuing incentives downtown or even, as Helling points out, south of Country Club Plaza. In appointing a new board, the mayor could make sure that within that quarter mile of the river, Port KC is acting in the best interests of taxpayers.

Missouri’s economic development policy is littered with legislative good intentions warped by subsidy-seeking developers and consultants. Such legislation must be revisited to clamp down on abuse. In many cases it’s the statutory definitions that must be revisited; in this case it may be port authority boundaries. Port KC has demonstrated it is unable—and perhaps unwilling—to restrain itself to development along the river. The mayor and city council—and perhaps the state legislature—should do it for them.

The post Plugging the Port Hole appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Port Authority, or Port KC, ultimately could issue up to $25 billion in bonds over 35 years for the Google data center project, a figure that represents the company’s maximum investment in Kansas City. Think of the $25 billion as a credit limit on a personal credit card. It’s not necessarily an indication of how much Google will invest.

The benefit to Google is that the Port KC can issue Chapter 68 bonds that give Google a property tax exemption for 25 years. Vockrodt goes one step further and makes clear in the story that such subsidies for data centers don’t offer a great return, if any, for taxpayers:

Good Jobs First, a research group often skeptical of corporate incentives, in a 2016 report identified a Google data center project in Oregon from 2006 that received $360 million in subsidies in return for 175 jobs, or $2 million per job. Good Jobs First advised cities and states to treat data center subsidies with caution.

“Internet-based companies have to grow the cloud and they will choose stable areas with cheap electricity,” the report said. “They will barely benefit your local economies because they create so few jobs and often import top-wage labor.”

Once again, Kansas City through its port authority is playing handmaiden to large corporations even when there is so little to gain. (Rest assured, this same story will unfold if/when the USDA considers locations in Missouri.) How is Kansas City supposed to fund infrastructure, education, public safety and all the other basic needs on which we depend if we continually offer exemptions from the taxes needed to provide them?

If taxes are too high for Kansas City to be a competitive place to attract business, then that needs to be addressed fairly for everyone. Offering sweetheart deals to a few while the rest of us pull their weight is no way to operate a city.

The post Port KC Versus Taxpayers appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The proposal, which is being considered by the Kansas City Council, seeks funding to help build an office tower and parking garage combination (requiring $27 million and $36 million in subsidies respectively). The building site is at the corner of 13^th and Main, right in the heart of downtown. Supporters of the project argue that the subsidies would help provide needed office space.

As ludicrous as the idea of government subsidizing private development in a popular area already is, it gets better—there are no tenants lined up to occupy the space. In other words, economic development officials want the government to spend $63 million on office space . . . just in case.

Jon Stephens, CEO of Port KC (which is currently an active participant in this proposal), attempted to explain this reasoning: “The demand for ready-to-occupy space has been proven in other markets. The demand appears to be present here.”

The editorial board is asking the correct questions in response to Stephens’ comment. If the demand is there, why are taxpayer dollars needed? If the demand isn’t, why would you ask taxpayers and government to take on that risk?

If downtown Kansas City is attractive to a company, then the company should pay for building its own office space. Private developers should be building based on market forces, without being cushioned from risk by taxpayer subsidies.

The Star’s editorial board is right: “It’s time for downtown projects in Kansas City to stand on their own merits, not on public dollars subsidizing private development.”

The post Kansas City Star Editorial Gets It Right on Tax Subsidies appeared first on Show-Me Institute.