Earlier this month the Saint Louis Board of Aldermen’s Housing, Urban Development and Zoning Committee voted 4-3 to approve the release of a $2.8M TIF note and to establish a community improvement district (CID).  This decision would impose an additional 1% sales tax in the area to assist with the development of a $20M grocery store and gas station that Paul McKee announced back in March.

Both residents and city officials pushed back on this decision in part due to their frustrations with NorthSide’s history, and in part because the CID would increase the burden on residents in the area who may not be able to afford it.  The proposed CID would bring the area’s sales tax up to 9.679% (Missouri’s average is 7.86%).

When we consider how heavily subsidized the development already is, the argument for a CID becomes less convincing.   The development’s costs are estimated at $20M.  Considering that $10M of funding is coming from a U.S. Department of Agriculture grant, $5M from New Market Tax Credits and $2.8M from TIF, the project is almost entirely being taken on with funds from taxpayer pockets. Is such heavy incentive use appropriate for a venture that includes a dime-a-dozen gas station? 

The Northside Regeneration fiasco has received a staggering amount of incentives and has little to show for it.  The bills in question now move on to the Saint Louis Board of Aldermen to determine whether this development needs yet another subsidy. 

The post The North Side’s Unlearned Lesson appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

According to Ballparks of the Ozarks COO Bob Ramsey,

[the investors] didn’t want chain link fences [for their baseball development.] We didn’t want dusty, aluminum bleachers, with mom and kids baking in the sun and everybody complaining.

What did we want? We wanted [a] destination. We wanted amenities.

Our fields as constructed will be state-of-the-art. What will push our ballparks beyond what competitors have to offer will be our amenities. Families and teams from across the nation will be drawn to the “America’s Baseball Resort” experience.

As a former little leaguer, I’m actually pretty fond of chain-link fences, dusty fields, and aluminum bleachers, but we all know that resorts are supposed to be glitzy and glamorous. If given the choice between little league and big league amenities, developers will understandably pursue the big league amenities.

Folks may not know that to get those big league amenities, this proposed baseball-themed complex may be swinging for the fences to get financial assistance from the government. Novogradac, a national accounting firm that among other things helps “prepare tax credit applications,” hosts on its website what appears to be a New Markets tax credit allocation request for Ballparks of the Ozarks. New Markets tax credits are intended to

foster the construction and rehabilitation of real estate and the expansion of operating businesses in order to create jobs, generate economic activity and improve the quality of services in low-income communities and to low-income persons.

Unsurprisingly given those requirements, the request specifically says that the resort will “support existing ‘lake’ area businesses which struggle during off peak seasons” and will provide “opportunities for low-income, minority and disadvantaged youth to utilize high quality athletic facilities through affiliated organizations.”

In other words, to help the poor, the project summary suggests that the government should help pay for a baseball resort—and indeed, quite a lot of it. Novogradac’s page suggests Ballparks of the Ozarks is seeking to have $14 million in tax credits allocated to the project, and not only that, the summary implies that but-for the federal money, the project might not go forward.

How that jibes with the project’s recent “groundbreaking,” I don’t know.

I wish the developers of Ballparks of the Ozarks the best of luck, but there may be cause for concern from the perspective of sound public policy. If a resort can’t make it on private funds alone, taxpayers shouldn’t have to cover the gap.

The post Is Ballparks of the Ozarks Swinging for the Tax Incentive Fences? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

While the federal government is expected to pay for more than half the project through an Urban Circulator grant and New Markets Tax Credits, local residents still will have to shoulder a hefty portion. One way Saint Louis residents will pay to build the trolley is through Tax Increment Financing (TIF).

According to Loop Trolley planning documents, $3.5 million of the Loop Trolley’s capital costs will come from TIF raised from the Delmar East Loop Redevelopment area. For those unfamiliar with TIF, the government allows a developer to use the additional taxes a development might generate as a revenue stream to finance bonds to get the development started. In order to receive TIF, the government usually has to declare a property “blighted,” meaning it damages the welfare of the area due to its condition.

But how can TIF, designed to subsidize new developments, be used to fund a transportation device?

First, the city previously passed an ordinance that allows TIF money to be spent on anything that can be seen as an improvement to an area, not just subsidizing new development. Second, the city entered into a redevelopment agreement with a non-profit corporation (Loop TIF Inc.), which would receive and distribute any TIF revenue instead of granting it to an actual property development.

Of course this still leaves a major problem: who in the area is going to generate the TIF revenue in the first place? If the city designated truly depressed areas as blighted, and the future TIF revenue goes to Loop TIF Inc., there would be no upfront TIF subsidies to lure development into the blighted area.

In other words, if a TIF is genuinely needed to subsidize development that will pay for the TIF bonds by increased tax revenues, how can it possibly work if the “development” is a non-profit streetcar that won’t generate any revenue that the TIF can use?

The solution? Include areas in the TIF that were going to be developed anyway. The largest part of the TIF area includes Washington University in St. Louis’ north campus, built on land the university acquired for that purpose two years before it was included in the TIF district. That project will generate plenty of employee earnings taxes that the TIF can capture. The TIF also includes parcels that contain the Pageant theatre and commercial property that houses restaurants such as Pie Pizza. Plenty of sales taxes already are available there. Blight must truly be within the eye of the beholder.

TIF supporters claim TIF is necessary to spur economic development in areas where it would not occur otherwise. This TIF clearly does not do that, as the city purposely chose to use TIF for areas already being developed. Instead, it is, in fact, a bookkeeping tactic through which taxes that would have gone to the city are diverted to an unelected corporation to spend as it desires. And what it desires is a streetcar.

The post Diverting City Tax Dollars To Subsidize The Loop Trolley appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

We provide Residential Development Consulting services to both non-profit and for-profit organizations. We provide expertise in structuring developments utilizing a variety of public and private resources, including federal CDBG and HOME funds; tax-exempt bond financing; and low income housing tax credit, historic tax credit and new markets tax credit transactions.

That probably should have come up at least in the author’s bio. Unfortunately, it did not.

While we are discussing the RHCDA’s portfolio of tax credit expertise, it should be noted that the Associated Press made this revelation about the New Markets tax credit program just this weekend (emphasis mine):

Missouri has authorized more than $120 million of tax credits through a program intended to entice wealthy investors to pour money into businesses in low-income areas, but the initiative has yet to produce even half the jobs that were anticipated, according to state figures provided to The Associated Press….

At the request of the AP, the state Department of Economic Development compiled a spreadsheet documenting every New Markets tax credit that has been authorized. The 9,679 “anticipated jobs” associated with the tax credits far exceeds the 823 “actual new jobs” and 3,141 “jobs retained” under the program, though those numbers could continue to rise.

This “tax credit job-shortfall” storyline is not unique. Indeed, the AP report on the New Markets program follows earlier, similar revelations about the Quality Jobs tax credit program, which I testified about earlier this year. In the case of the Quality Jobs program, 45,000 jobs were promised; according to state records, only about 7,000 jobs were created in reality. As I said then (emphasis mine):

In practice, there is no particular consequence to the state and its public officials claiming that new jobs will be coming, even if the jobs never materialize. That may explain the difference between the number of jobs state officials promise when a tax credit project is announced and the number of jobs actually created when the project winds down. To some officials, big tax credit promises look better than small tax credit promises, even if those promises do not pan out.

The same can be said of the consultants who go to bat for these credits. Acree even has the audacity to claim that the historic preservation tax credit is “Missouri’s most useful economy-boosting program.” A program that returns 23 cents on the dollar is our “most useful economy-boosting program”?! Does this suggestion horrify anyone else?

I have a better idea: Cut taxes with the money instead and let taxpayers invest their money themselves in their own businesses. Better yet, eliminate a tax or two instead of underwriting the projects of the politically well-connected. Missouri’s most useful economy-boosting program is the hard work and innovation of its taxpayers, not some bloated, special-interest government handout.

As story after tax credit story bears out, tax credit proponents/consultants have a terrible track record of substantive, sustainable, and enduring successes. The historic preservation tax credit is a central player in this ongoing, budget-busting, decade-long state development debacle. Suffice to say, I am looking forward to the findings of the state audit of the program, due to come out later this year.

The post Nota Bene: Historic Preservation Tax Credit ‘Consultant’ Supports Historic Preservation Tax Credit appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Willingham should be commended for recognizing the results of this spending binge. However, the author then advocates increasing the New Markets Tax Credit (a credit that goes to taxpayers who make a qualified equity investment into a qualified community development entity). This is going in the wrong direction. Expanding the government’s power to pick winners and losers through the tax code is not the way to move forward.

In fact, many bipartisan tax reform plans have called for moving in the opposite direction. Plans like the Simpson-Bowles Commission and Congressman Paul Ryan’s Roadmap for America’s Future call for eliminating most credits and deductions while lowering tax rates.

Missouri has issued billions of dollars in economic development tax credits and yet its economic performance has been dismal. If issuing more and more in tax credits really is the answer, Missouri should be booming. Why should the federal government follow Missouri’s example?

The post Yes, There Is A Problem, But The Prescription Is Wrong appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Worse News? It looks like taxpayers could end up paying almost as much for Stifel’s new business plan as Stifel is.

In this case, according to the application, Stifel is seeking $2.8 million in Build Missouri Bonds, a state program designed to defray the cost of expansions. That request will go before the Missouri Development Finance Board next week.

The company also plans to apply for $2.6 million in Missouri Quality Jobs tax credits, which reimburse companies that create jobs paying above-average wages.

Stifel predicts the average new employee will earn $65,000 a year.

From the city of St. Louis, it plans to request a $15 million allocation of federal New Markets Tax Credits, which translates into $3 million in equity for the project. Stifel also will seek property and earnings tax breaks worth $5 million over 10 years, and up to $500,000 a year in breaks on other local taxes — though Stifel agreed to make payments to St. Louis Public Schools.

Much of that aid, including all the state incentives, are dependent on Stifel actually creating the jobs it is promising. All of it, after expenses are counted for, will amount to $17.1 million in public financing for the $35 million project. The rest will come out of Stifel’s pocket.  (Emphasis mine).

“The rest will come out of Stifel’s pocket.” Thankfully.

The Post-Dispatch’s Bill McClellan highlights the contradiction at play here.

Of all the businesses that ought to understand the business of business, it’s Stifel. It’s a brokerage and investment banking firm. The people who run Stifel profess a belief in capitalism.

Except, of course, when it comes to their own affairs. Risk and reward? Nonsense! No investment without incentives.

Well, fine. I can understand the sentiment. If you can get public money, why not get it? What I can’t understand is the way the public always goes along with this stuff.

Just two days ago, David wrote a blog post about how some young entrepreneurs are looking for government assistance to get their businesses off the ground. Unfortunately, it seems they learned the wrong lessons from their predecessors.

The post So, Does This Mean Taxpayers Will Own Half of Stifel Nicolaus’ New Building? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The vacancy rate for commercial space in downtown St. Louis is higher than 22 percent, yet the state of Missouri continues to fund the construction of new commercial buildings within walking distance of each other. In this particular case, the proposed use of the building (pictured below) as a movie theater raises its own questions. Why will this theater succeed where two others failed? And why is the government stepping in to pick up part of the tab for people to watch movies and eat popcorn? Where’s the sense in that?

The Parking Garage Formerly Known as St. Louis Centre, View to Northwest

Located at Sixth and Washington, the St. Louis Centre redevelopment combines public funding from a variety of sources, including federal New Markets Tax Credits, Recovery Zone Facility Bonds, and equity from the Missouri Development Finance Board. In total, the project to convert the former shopping mall into a parking garage with a ground floor movie theater will cost more than $30 million.

Stadium Cinema Grand Opening, 1967, 1967-68 Downtown St. Louis, Inc. Annual Report

Undoubtedly, some will herald the opening of a new downtown movie theater as a sign of great progress and excitement to come. For downtown observers, however, the prospect of yet another publicly subsidized movie theater recalls St. Louisan Yogi Berra’s saying, “It’s like déjà vu all over again.” Consider this: Downtown St. Louis, Inc., celebrated the first theater to open on the ground level of a parking garage in 1967. The Stadium Cine at Chestnut and Broadway operated until May 1984, when the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported in a front-page article: “The last of the first-run movie houses in the city, the Stadium 1 and 2 Cine downtown, will close indefinitely after Sunday’s movies.” Today, the space is fully leased to other retail tenants.

Union Station 10 Movie Theater, View to Southwest

The same is not true of the next movie theater to open downtown after the Stadium Cine’s closure: The Union Station 10 Cinema — which opened in 1988, closed briefly between 1996 and 1998, and ceased operating in 2003 — stands vacant and available for use today. A leasing guide for the facility describes “The Theater at Union Station” as containing a “[l]arge glass vestibule, open lobby area and expansive ceilings” in addition to its “10 existing theaters, concession area and seating area.” How its vestibule differs from the shiny state-funded parking garage on Washington Avenue is anyone’s guess.

A July 10, 1988, column by St. Louis Post-Dispatch film critic Joe Pollack, “First-Run Movies Come Back To City,” offered a description of Union Station 10: “In the pattern of today’s movie houses, the new theater will have a luxurious look and, more important, big concession areas. It will house a delicatessen, an ice cream parlor, and a bar.” From available information sources, the only difference between it and the new, new downtown theater on Washington Avenue is that Union Station 10 had seven more screens but no touch pads for placing beer orders. Apparently, that’s the reason for taxpayers to subsidize another new facility.

We’ve seen this movie before — not once, but twice. I did not expect Missouri to fund a third. For taxpayers, this deal deserves two thumbs down.

The post Two Thumbs Down for Downtown Theater Subsidy appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

• An $11 million mortgage loan.
• A combined $2.9 million in developer equity.
• $12 million in equity from federal historic tax credits.
• $2.7 million in equity from New Markets Tax Credits.
• $12.4 million in state historic tax credit equity.
• $872,100 in Brownfield tax credit proceeds.
• $13.5 million in Series A bonds.
• $18.7 million in Series B bonds.

The above sources total more than $74 million, of which only $13.9 million appears remotely like private capital that flows independent of a government guarantee. Thinking about it, though, even the private mortgage loan has implicit public backing, because the project that it supports would not exist in the absence of a legislative quagmire of market distortion.

First, in 2009, Ordinance 68380 amended the city of St. Louis’ 5-percent gross receipts tax on ticketed entertainment productions, intending to incentivize the “owner, primary tenant, occupant or operator, or [a]ffiliate” of a “Contiguous Recreation Facility […] contiguous to a historic theatre, opera house or concert hall” to redevelop said historic theater for “$50,000,000-$99,999,999” (hyperlink added). The redevelopment would be subject to the following guideline:

• “[with] a redevelopment plan approved by the City by ordinance and a Redevelopment Agreement approved by the LCRA.”

Lo and behold, the development team for the upcoming Kiel Opera House renovation — which includes the ownership group for the St. Louis Blues hockey team and Scottrade Center — sought and received each of the above approvals. St. Louis Ordinance 68381 authorizes a redevelopment plan for the Kiel Opera House and affirms LCRA’s approval of the project.

St. Louis did not stop there, however, as Ordinances 68382, 68383, 68384, and 68385 collectively tweak the terms of a lease agreement on the city-owned Kiel Opera House facility, earmark funds from a previously approved Community Improvement District (Ordinance 68377) to support the Opera House’s redevelopment, and bring the entire legislative morass full circle by using taxes abated in accordance with Ordinance 68380 to provide debt service on the project’s city-issued bonds.

If the project’s bonds ultimately find buyers, then a combination of federal, state, and St. Louis taxpayers, hockey fans, and service users would foot the vast majority of the costs for restoring one of St. Louis’ architectural gems. Most will do so unwittingly, because St. Louis city does not examine, account for, or consider fiscal and economic impacts when passing legislation.

Please do not hear me wrong; the last thing that I want to see is another building sit vacant for decades on end. That said, I cannot cheer a rehabilitation project that relies so heavily on bloated and unwieldy allocations of taxpayer capital. Can Kiel Opera House return to life as “a 3,200-seat theater for concerts, Broadway shows, and family and holiday programs [with] four side banquet halls […] available for weddings, conferences and other events” in the absence of public subsidy?

Perhaps not.

But, then again, did you know that the Fabulous Fox Theater in St. Louis sprang back to life without state tax credits or city-backed bonds?

I predict that Kiel’s future success — whatever form it may take — will come at the expense of other performing arts venues throughout the region. The failure of the Kiel project to attract private capital investment suggests to me that it may simply displace performance activities that would otherwise occur elsewhere, at privately supported venues throughout St. Louis.

Although there are strong arguments that markets tend to underproduce artistic work relative to growth in other sectors of the economy and that public subsidy can increase access to art and yield positive externalities, these arguments do not apply to the question of whether St. Louis city is underproducing space for such art downtown. At present, the vacancy rate in downtown’s myriad office buildings is nearly 19 percent, which means that competition for tenants is fierce and that already-low lease rates are falling still lower. Simply stated, the facilitation of architectural space is the last thing that St. Louis City needs to subsidize. Of Kiel’s proposed $74 million renovation cost, $43.4 million will go to the contractor and an indeterminate amount will fund professional services like attorneys’ and bond underwriters’ fees. None of the project’s costs will fund artistic production.

Many contend that tax credits create jobs. However, I see no evidence to suggest that they ever have or ever will.

The post Can St. Louis Really Support Another Performing Arts Facility? Local Government Certainly Thinks So appeared first on Show-Me Institute.