Even after reinstating fares, the Kansas City Area Transportation Authority (KCATA) is warning of route reductions because the agency says city funding will fall short of maintaining current service levels. KCATA estimates it needs more than $100 million to preserve existing operations, well above the city’s proposed contribution.

The immediate concern is fewer routes and longer waits for riders. But the larger issue is institutional: KCATA is confronting the long-term consequences of policy decisions that weakened its financial position and eroded confidence among regional partners.

Those problems did not emerge overnight. For years, KCATA relied on temporary funding, emergency appropriations, and optimistic revenue assumptions. Pandemic-era federal aid masked those weaknesses but did not resolve the structural imbalance between operating costs and recurring revenue.

The clearest example was KCATA’s heavily promoted fare-free transit initiative. Supporters argued eliminating fares would improve mobility and reduce barriers for low-income riders. But even at the time, research and the experience of other cities suggested the policy was financially unsustainable.

Fare-free transit eliminated one of the system’s few direct revenue streams while increasing dependence on taxpayer subsidies. Transit fares rarely cover operating costs, but they still provide revenue and impose some fiscal discipline. When federal pandemic aid expired, KCATA faced familiar financial pressures with even fewer tools available to address them.

Acknowledging that reality, KCATA recently announced fares will return next month. Restoring fares amounts to an acknowledgment that the model was not sustainable.

The consequences extend beyond Kansas City itself. Regional transit systems depend on trust among local governments—trust that erodes when the central agency faces recurring fiscal problems.

Some regional governments have already moved to retain greater operational control over their own transit services. In 2022, Johnson County, Kansas, ended KCATA management oversight of its transit operations while continuing limited coordination through the RideKC brand. More recently, several suburban municipalities—including Gladstone, Grandview, and Raytown—have reduced or ended participation in RideKC service.

Obviously, public transit serves a purpose. Many Kansas City residents still rely on buses to reach work, school, and appointments. Like transit agencies nationwide, KCATA is operating in a difficult post-pandemic environment shaped by inflation, labor shortages and changing ridership patterns.

But those challenges make competent governance more important, not less. Municipalities are hesitant to rely on an agency caught in recurring fiscal crises driven by its own policy failures. Fare-free transit generated national attention, but reality eventually intervened.

KCATA’s budget problems are not simply the result of this year’s funding gap. They are the cumulative consequence of years of policy decisions that weakened the authority’s financial position and damaged its credibility.

The post KCATA Is Still Paying for the Fare-Free Experiment appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Last week in The Kansas City Star, I argued the earnings tax is harmful. The responses suggest the Show-Me Institute is winning the argument, regardless of the vote’s outcome. What’s striking is that even those who acknowledge the tax’s flaws remain unwilling to act on their supposed principles. (St. Louis will also be voting on the earnings tax.)

I argued that the tax is regressive, drives workers and businesses away, and fuels the city’s subsidy culture.

David Hudnall, a reliably left-of-center columnist for the Star, urged a yes vote but largely conceded my points. In a column titled, “Just hold your nose and vote for Kansas City’s earnings tax,“ he agreed the tax is regressive and supports lavish subsidies for wealthy developers.

Weirdly, Hudnall then lamented that the tax requires a public vote in the first place. But he wistfully concluded, “I’d welcome a little more fiscal discipline at City Hall.”

The Star’s Editorial Board also endorsed a yes vote but conceded the tax is regressive and “economically harmful”—a significant admission. The piece further conceded, “The earnings tax is not the best way to fund such a large proportion of our city services.” Another notable concession. The piece closed not with a demand for action, but with little more than meek, wishful thinking:

We hope to see future City Council candidates campaigning on a pledge to reform the system. We also hope to see council members who vow to keep the basics of what makes a city hum fully funded—and ratchet back the incentive handouts.

Back in 2021, the last time Kansas City voted on the earnings tax, the Editorial Board urged a yes vote after admitting the tax was regressive and fed the city’s incentive culture. (They even admitted that the sales tax was too high.) Yet they feared reform would be worse.

In 2015, another reliably left-of-center columnist for the Star, Yael Abouhalkah, lamented that the city has neither explored alternatives nor held a meaningful discussion about the tax. He also observed that the tax is regressive and hits the poor hardest.

The problem, then as now, is that city leaders have no incentive to explore alternatives or discuss a 10-year phaseout of a tax widely acknowledged as harmful. Why? Because rather than demand better, the Star’s opinion class and business leaders reliably fold at the slightest scare tactic.

Hand-wringing about Kansas City’s flawed tax structure is not enough. We need city leaders, including those at the Star, to live up to their principles. Otherwise, what is the point of having a platform?

The Mayor and Council have failed to address these issues. There is no reason to expect that will change until voters demand it.

The post Earnings Tax Defenders Unable to Defend Earnings Tax appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

For some reason, film tax credits remain popular in Jefferson City. They are much less popular with economists.

Missouri lawmakers are once again debating whether to extend the state’s film tax credit program. Earlier this month, I testified against legislation that would continue the subsidy. For those who don’t remember, this is a debate the state has already had.

Missouri operated a film tax credit program before ending it more than a decade ago. In 2010, the state’s Tax Credit Review Commission examined the program and concluded it served too narrow an industry to justify its cost to taxpayers. Lawmakers shut it down soon after. The idea never fully disappeared, though, and in 2023 the subsidy returned, this time with the promise of better results. The current program allows up to $16 million per year in credits for film and television productions.

So far, there is little evidence that anything has changed. Supporters point to production spending as proof that the program works. The Missouri Film Office reports that productions spent more than $40 million in the state in 2025 while receiving roughly $15.7 million in credits. But production spending is not the same as fiscal return. Much of that activity consists of temporary wages, lodging, equipment rentals, and other short-term expenses tied to a shoot. When filming ends, much of that spending leaves with it. What matters for taxpayers is how much tax revenue actually makes its way back to the state.

On that measure, film subsidies perform poorly almost everywhere they have been tried. Research summarized by the Tax Foundation estimates governments recapture between eight and twenty-eight cents in new tax revenue for every dollar of credit issued. Even Georgia, often cited as the model for film incentives, struggles to demonstrate that the program pays for itself. A 2020 performance audit by the Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts found that tax revenue generated by film production activity fell well short of the credits the state awarded.

There is also a basic budget reality lawmakers should keep in mind. Film tax credits are sometimes treated as something different than spending because the state only grants them after a production films in Missouri. But the fiscal effect is the same. Each credit issued is a commitment to collect less revenue in the future.

Meanwhile, the productions most closely associated with Missouri often film somewhere else entirely. A new HBO series set in St. Louis, DTF St. Louis, was filmed in Georgia. The Netflix series Ozark, which was set at Missouri’s Lake of the Ozarks, was also largely filmed in Georgia.

Though it should go without saying, Missouri’s lawmakers should be focused on using state tax dollars as effectively as possible. And there’s no disputing that film tax credits have repeatedly failed that test. Extending the credit today would mean ignoring the state’s past experience and choosing to repeat it.

The post Missouri’s Film Tax Credits Still Don’t Add Up appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The post Income Tax Elimination and Sales Tax Modernization appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Neglecting a problem doesn’t make it go away, or cheaper to fix. Missouri is learning that lesson with regard to its IT systems right now.

As I’ve written before, many of Missouri’s government computer systems are critically out of date. COVID relief funds helped jumpstart long-needed modernization efforts, but the passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill last July means new federal requirements will soon depend on those upgrades.

Missouri’s Department of Social Services (DSS) has been tasked with integrating its Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid eligibility systems while preparing for new community engagement requirements. This integration has been needed for years, but the new federal rules make it urgent. The goal is straightforward: simplify how benefits are administered while reducing costly errors. If Missouri cannot bring those error rates down, the state will be responsible for a larger share of program costs.

Some officials have warned that meeting the new requirements could force the department to shift resources away from other modernization work. There is no doubt funding plays a role. Modernizing large government IT systems can be expensive. But in this case, stronger systems are exactly what will make complying with new federal mandates possible.

There are reasons to worry about how this effort will go. This is not the first time DSS has faced a difficult administrative task, and the last major one did not go smoothly. When federal pandemic rules suspended Medicaid eligibility reviews, states had time to prepare for the return of normal operations. Missouri did not use that window to get ahead or fully modernize its systems. When eligibility reviews resumed and the state had to reassess hundreds of thousands of enrollees, Missouri struggled immensely.

More recently, Missouri’s experience with large IT modernization efforts across state government offers another warning. Lawmakers were told a few weeks ago that completing upgrades to the state’s financial management system will cost more than $250 million. This is a project that is already significantly behind schedule and over budget. It should be noted that Missouri’s difficulty with modernization is partly the result of how long these systems were allowed to fall behind. It‘s not surprising that the longer upgrades are delayed, the harder and more expensive they become.

The challenge Missouri faces now is that many of the policies it must implement depend on the very systems still awaiting modernization. Community engagement requirements require technology capable of tracking employment data. More frequent eligibility renewals require information that can move accurately between programs. Lower error rates require systems that can catch mistakes before they turn into federal penalties.

As lawmakers finalize Missouri’s budget in the weeks ahead, this issue should remain front of mind. Modernizing the systems that run the state’s safety net is not a project the state can afford to ignore any longer.

There’s no getting around the fact that Missouri will ultimately have to upgrade these systems. The only real question now is whether the state does it in time to avoid more costly mistakes and federal penalties.

The post Cost of Delaying Safety-Net Modernization appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Property tax relief has become a rallying cry for state policymakers across the country. Frustration over rising home values and the cost of living has driven lawmakers in states including Indiana, Ohio, and Wyoming to enact sweeping property tax cuts in recent sessions. But while these measures may look attractive on the campaign trail, they are already putting real strain on local governments that depend on property taxes to fund schools, public safety, and other essential services.

An article in the publication Governing titled “State Property Tax Relief Pushes Local Budgets to the Brink” highlights this emerging dynamic. Lawmakers in several states have pursued homeowner tax credits, rate caps, or other limitations without fully compensating counties, cities, and school districts for the revenue they lose. The result? Significant budget shortfalls, belt-tightening by local governments, and even more political pressure from local leaders to revisit state legislation cutting their revenue.

These developments matter to Missouri because they illustrate the unintended consequences of well-meaning tax cuts. As my colleague David Stokes has written in testimony before the Missouri Legislature, Missouri depends on property taxes to fund local services efficiently, and ill-designed state interventions can do more harm than good. Stokes emphasized that “Missouri’s property assessment and tax system needs reforms, but efforts to reduce it dramatically or eliminate it entirely go too far,” and that the state should not trade one revenue problem for another by hollowing out the tax base localities rely on.

What’s happening outside of Missouri mirrors Stokes’ concerns. In Indiana, a roughly $1.2 billion homeowner tax relief package enacted in 2025 will cost local governments an estimated $1.5 billion over three years, forcing many towns and counties to cut services or revise budgets mid-cycle. Wyoming’s 25 percent cut on assessed home value for tax purposes similarly leaves schools—which receive roughly 70 percent of property tax revenue—scrambling to balance their books.

Stokes has warned that limiting property tax growth without careful policy design reduces the property tax base, shifting the burden to other, more distortionary taxes. He argues that property taxes—particularly on land and real estate—are among the least harmful taxes to economic growth compared with income or sales taxes. Wholesale caps or freezes discourage local fiscal responsibility.

Missouri’s recent property tax changes—including the creation of “zero percent” and “five percent” counties where valuations can’t drive tax increases without voter approval—reflect a similar temptation to cut taxes without addressing the broader revenue implications. Stokes has noted that such approaches may do little to improve fairness while shrinking the tax base that supports schools and local services.

If policymakers in the Show-Me State pay attention to the experience of other states, they’ll proceed with caution. Cutting property taxes without sustainable alternate revenue exacerbates budget stress for counties and schools and shifts costs to taxes that are more damaging to growth, such as income or sales taxes. Ensuring that relief targets those most in need—as opposed to broad caps that change how local governments fund core services—preserves local autonomy and avoids the fiscal cliff other states are now confronting.

Missouri’s leaders should focus on reforms that improve fairness and economic efficiency—not simply reducing bills at the expense of services Missourians value.

The post David Stokes Was Right: Property Tax Caps Are Squeezing Local Budgets Nationwide appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Elias Tsapelas, and I’m the Director of State Budget and Fiscal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, Missouri-based think tank that advances sensible, well-researched, free-market solutions to state and local policy issues. The ideas presented here are my own and are offered in consideration of proposals that will affect tax credits in Missouri.

Senate Bill 1079 consolidates Missouri’s existing film and series production tax credit sub-caps into a single $16 million pool for both, leaving the state’s total commitment the same. The only substantive effect of the bill would be to give the Film Office more flexibility in how the same dollars are allocated. That flexibility does not address the fundamental problem with this program.

Current and Past Tax Credit Failures

Despite the Missouri film tax credit’s recent revival, our state has a long history with this troubling incentive. Until its sunset in 2013, Missouri’s previous iteration made promises similar to what supporters are touting today. Missouri’s own Tax Credit Review Commission recommended the credit be eliminated because it served too narrow an industry and failed to provide a positive return on investment.¹

Research confirms that pattern holds nationally. Film tax credits have not resulted in job growth, have not affected market share or industry output, and have produced only short-term wage gains for those already in the industry.² Credits in many states generated just cents on the dollar. As one Tax Foundation analyst notes, “non-favored activities and businesses remain on the hook to bear the full impact of the state’s tax code.”³

The Missouri Film Office has pointed to the number of projects approved and production spending in the state as evidence the program is working, but that is not the right measure for determining whether the program is a good investment for state taxpayers.⁴ The relevant question is how much the state receives back in tax revenue and broader economic activity—and by that measure, the research is consistent: film tax credits do not generate a positive return.

The Competitiveness Argument Doesn’t Hold

Supporters of SB 1079 argue that pooling the sub-caps will make Missouri more competitive for productions. Even setting aside the ROI question, that argument doesn’t hold.

Steven Conrad, the showrunner who created a new HBO series set in St. Louis and filmed it entirely in Atlanta, recently suggested that governments may not be well-served by chasing the film industry at all.⁵ His observation reflects a structural reality: Georgia has spent two decades building the studios, crews, soundstages, and production infrastructure that make large productions possible. Missouri has not. No reallocation of $16 million changes that.

Georgia’s own state auditor found that even Georgia’s fully developed, deeply established program returned just 10 cents to the state for every dollar of credit granted, producing a net revenue loss of $602 million in a single year.⁶ If one of the most mature film-incentive programs in the country cannot generate a positive return on investment, a program at a fraction of its scale operating in a state without comparable infrastructure has no prospect of doing so.

Targeted Credits Are Poor Economic Policy

Targeted economic development tax credits are just another way for lawmakers to pick winners and losers, a job that is better left to consumers in the market. When tax breaks are given to some, other taxpayers have to make up for the lost revenue. The impulse to do something to support an industry is understandable, but tax credits are a poor substitute for the conditions that make industries thrive organically. A dollar of film tax credits reduces state revenue by exactly the same amount as a dollar of direct appropriations—the difference is that credits bypass the appropriations process and receive less scrutiny.

Prioritize Tax Relief That Benefits All Missourians

Missouri is already a national leader in state spending in the name of economic development. Over the past few decades, Missouri has forgone billions in state tax revenue in favor of a host of narrow incentives that have consistently shown poor results. In FY2025 alone, Missouri redeemed more than $961 million in tax credits—nearly double the $521 million redeemed in 2010.⁷ The General Assembly is simultaneously weighing whether to eliminate the state income tax, a reform that would deliver broad economic benefits to every Missourian. The legislature should consider whether a growing tax credit portfolio is consistent with that goal. Expanding targeted credits that erode the income-tax base works against broad-based tax relief, and Missouri would be better served by pursuing the latter.

The film tax credit is a small program, but it exemplifies the approach to tax policy that makes comprehensive reform harder to achieve. Tax credit programs have not been successful in Missouri in the past, there is little evidence to suggest the film tax credit is succeeding now, and there is no reason to believe this program will perform differently under a restructured allocation. If increasing economic opportunity is the goal, the research is clear: Instead trying to manufacture more opportunities at the expense of taxpayers, lawmakers should provide broad-based tax relief to every Missourian.

NOTES

1. “Report of the Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission.” Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission. 2010; https://www.semissourian.com/files/tcrcfinalreport113010.pdf.
2. “Lights, camera and no action: How state film subsidies fail.” USC Press Release. August 18, 2016; https://pressroom.usc.edu/lights-camera-and-no-action-how-state-film-subsidies-fail.
3. Loughead, Katherine. “Illuminating the Hidden Costs of State Tax Incentives.” Tax Foundation. 2021; https://taxfoundation.org/state-tax-incentives-costs.
4. “Made-in-Missouri Film and TV Productions Spent $40.7 Million in 2025.” Missouri Department of Economic Development. February 2026; https://ded.mo.gov/press-room/made-missouri-film-and-tv-productions-spent-407-million-2025.
5. Neman, Daniel. “HBO’s DTF St. Louis has a dream cast, but it wasn’t shot here.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. February 26, 2026; https://www.stltoday.com/life-entertainment/local/movies-tv/article_cfa2d34c-435a-40fd-9fa5-75933d716915.html.
6. “Impact of the Georgia Film Tax Credit.” Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, Performance Audit Division. Report No. 18-03B. January 2020; https://www.audits.ga.gov/ReportSearch/download/23536.
7. “Fourth Quarter Tax Credit Report, Fiscal Year 2025.” Missouri Department of Revenue. 2025; https://dor.mo.gov/public-reports/documents/Fourth-Quarter-FY25-Tax-Credit-Report.pdf.

The post Senate Bill 1079: Film Tax Credits appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Elias Tsapelas, and I’m the Director of State Budget and Fiscal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, Missouri-based think tank that advances sensible, well-researched, free-market solutions to state and local policy issues. The ideas presented here are my own and are offered in consideration of proposals that will affect tax credits in Missouri.

House Bill 2142 consolidates Missouri’s existing film and series production tax credit sub-caps into a single $16 million pool for both, leaving the state’s total commitment the same. The only substantive effect of the bill would be to give the Film Office more flexibility in how the same dollars are allocated. That flexibility does not address the fundamental problem with this program.

Current and Past Tax Credit Failures

Despite the Missouri film tax credit’s recent revival, our state has a long history with this troubling incentive. Until its sunset in 2013, Missouri’s previous iteration made promises similar to what supporters are touting today. Missouri’s own Tax Credit Review Commission recommended the credit be eliminated because it served too narrow an industry and failed to provide a positive return on investment.¹

Research confirms that pattern holds nationally. Film tax credits have not resulted in job growth, have not affected market share or industry output, and have produced only short-term wage gains for those already in the industry.² Credits in many states generated just cents on the dollar. As one Tax Foundation analyst notes, “non-favored activities and businesses remain on the hook to bear the full impact of the state’s tax code.”³

The Missouri Film Office has pointed to the number of projects approved and production spending in the state as evidence the program is working, but that is not the right measure for determining whether the program is a good investment for state taxpayers.⁴ The relevant question is how much the state receives back in tax revenue and broader economic activity—and by that measure, the research is consistent: film tax credits do not generate a positive return.

The Competitiveness Argument Doesn’t Hold

Supporters of HB 2142 argue that pooling the sub-caps will make Missouri more competitive for productions. Even setting aside the ROI question, that argument doesn’t hold.

Steven Conrad, the showrunner who created a new HBO series set in St. Louis and filmed it entirely in Atlanta, recently suggested that governments may not be well-served by chasing the film industry at all.⁵ His observation reflects a structural reality: Georgia has spent two decades building the studios, crews, soundstages, and production infrastructure that make large productions possible. Missouri has not. No reallocation of $16 million changes that.

Georgia’s own state auditor found that even Georgia’s fully developed, deeply established program returned just 10 cents to the state for every dollar of credit granted, producing a net revenue loss of $602 million in a single year.⁶ If one of the most mature film-incentive programs in the country cannot generate a positive return on investment, a program at a fraction of its scale operating in a state without comparable infrastructure has no prospect of doing so.

Targeted Credits Are Poor Economic Policy

Targeted economic development tax credits are just another way for lawmakers to pick winners and losers, a job that is better left to consumers in the market. When tax breaks are given to some, other taxpayers have to make up for the lost revenue. The impulse to do something to support an industry is understandable, but tax credits are a poor substitute for the conditions that make industries thrive organically. A dollar of film tax credits reduces state revenue by exactly the same amount as a dollar of direct appropriations—the difference is that credits bypass the appropriations process and receive less scrutiny.

Prioritize Tax Relief That Benefits All Missourians

Missouri is already a national leader in state spending in the name of economic development. Over the past few decades, Missouri has forgone billions in state tax revenue in favor of a host of narrow incentives that have consistently shown poor results. In FY2025 alone, Missouri redeemed more than $961 million in tax credits—nearly double the $521 million redeemed in 2010.⁷ The General Assembly is simultaneously weighing whether to eliminate the state income tax, a reform that would deliver broad economic benefits to every Missourian. The legislature should consider whether a growing tax credit portfolio is consistent with that goal. Expanding targeted credits that erode the income-tax base works against broad-based tax relief, and Missouri would be better served by pursuing the latter.

The film tax credit is a small program, but it exemplifies the approach to tax policy that makes comprehensive reform harder to achieve. Tax credit programs have not been successful in Missouri in the past, there is little evidence to suggest the film tax credit is succeeding now, and there is no reason to believe this program will perform differently under a restructured allocation. If increasing economic opportunity is the goal, the research is clear: Instead trying to manufacture more opportunities at the expense of taxpayers, lawmakers should provide broad-based tax relief to every Missourian.

NOTES

1. “Report of the Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission.” Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission. 2010; https://www.semissourian.com/files/tcrcfinalreport113010.pdf.
2. “Lights, camera and no action: How state film subsidies fail.” USC Press Release. August 18, 2016; https://pressroom.usc.edu/lights-camera-and-no-action-how-state-film-subsidies-fail.
3. Loughead, Katherine. “Illuminating the Hidden Costs of State Tax Incentives.” Tax Foundation. 2021; https://taxfoundation.org/state-tax-incentives-costs.
4. “Made-in-Missouri Film and TV Productions Spent $40.7 Million in 2025.” Missouri Department of Economic Development. February 2026; https://ded.mo.gov/press-room/made-missouri-film-and-tv-productions-spent-407-million-2025.
5. Neman, Daniel. “HBO’s DTF St. Louis has a dream cast, but it wasn’t shot here.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. February 26, 2026; https://www.stltoday.com/life-entertainment/local/movies-tv/article_cfa2d34c-435a-40fd-9fa5-75933d716915.html.
6. “Impact of the Georgia Film Tax Credit.” Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, Performance Audit Division. Report No. 18-03B. January 2020; https://www.audits.ga.gov/ReportSearch/download/23536.
7. “Fourth Quarter Tax Credit Report, Fiscal Year 2025.” Missouri Department of Revenue. 2025; https://dor.mo.gov/public-reports/documents/Fourth-Quarter-FY25-Tax-Credit-Report.pdf.

The post House Bill 2142: Film Tax Credits appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

TO THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Elias Tsapelas, and I’m the Director of State Budget and Fiscal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, a nonprofit, nonpartisan, Missouri-based think tank that advances sensible, well-researched, free-market solutions to state and local policy issues. The ideas presented here are my own and are offered in consideration of proposals that will affect tax credits in Missouri.

House Bill 2058 consolidates Missouri’s existing film and series production tax credit sub-caps into a single $16 million pool for both, leaving the state’s total commitment the same. The only substantive effect of the bill would be to give the Film Office more flexibility in how the same dollars are allocated. That flexibility does not address the fundamental problem with this program.

Current and Past Tax Credit Failures

Despite the Missouri film tax credit’s recent revival, our state has a long history with this troubling incentive. Until its sunset in 2013, Missouri’s previous iteration made promises similar to what supporters are touting today. Missouri’s own Tax Credit Review Commission recommended the credit be eliminated because it served too narrow an industry and failed to provide a positive return on investment.¹

Research confirms that pattern holds nationally. Film tax credits have not resulted in job growth, have not affected market share or industry output, and have produced only short-term wage gains for those already in the industry.² Credits in many states generated just cents on the dollar. As one Tax Foundation analyst notes, “non-favored activities and businesses remain on the hook to bear the full impact of the state’s tax code.”³

The Missouri Film Office has pointed to the number of projects approved and production spending in the state as evidence the program is working, but that is not the right measure for determining whether the program is a good investment for state taxpayers.⁴ The relevant question is how much the state receives back in tax revenue and broader economic activity—and by that measure, the research is consistent: film tax credits do not generate a positive return.

The Competitiveness Argument Doesn’t Hold

Supporters of HB 2058 argue that pooling the sub-caps will make Missouri more competitive for productions. Even setting aside the ROI question, that argument doesn’t hold.

Steven Conrad, the showrunner who created a new HBO series set in St. Louis and filmed it entirely in Atlanta, recently suggested that governments may not be well-served by chasing the film industry at all.⁵ His observation reflects a structural reality: Georgia has spent two decades building the studios, crews, soundstages, and production infrastructure that make large productions possible. Missouri has not. No reallocation of $16 million changes that.

Georgia’s own state auditor found that even Georgia’s fully developed, deeply established program returned just 10 cents to the state for every dollar of credit granted, producing a net revenue loss of $602 million in a single year.⁶ If one of the most mature film-incentive programs in the country cannot generate a positive return on investment, a program at a fraction of its scale operating in a state without comparable infrastructure has no prospect of doing so.

Targeted Credits Are Poor Economic Policy

Targeted economic development tax credits are just another way for lawmakers to pick winners and losers, a job that is better left to consumers in the market. When tax breaks are given to some, other taxpayers have to make up for the lost revenue. The impulse to do something to support an industry is understandable, but tax credits are a poor substitute for the conditions that make industries thrive organically. A dollar of film tax credits reduces state revenue by exactly the same amount as a dollar of direct appropriations—the difference is that credits bypass the appropriations process and receive less scrutiny.

Prioritize Tax Relief That Benefits All Missourians

Missouri is already a national leader in state spending in the name of economic development. Over the past few decades, Missouri has forgone billions in state tax revenue in favor of a host of narrow incentives that have consistently shown poor results. In FY2025 alone, Missouri redeemed more than $961 million in tax credits—nearly double the $521 million redeemed in 2010.⁷ The General Assembly is simultaneously weighing whether to eliminate the state income tax, a reform that would deliver broad economic benefits to every Missourian. The legislature should consider whether a growing tax credit portfolio is consistent with that goal. Expanding targeted credits that erode the income-tax base works against broad-based tax relief, and Missouri would be better served by pursuing the latter.

The film tax credit is a small program, but it exemplifies the approach to tax policy that makes comprehensive reform harder to achieve. Tax credit programs have not been successful in Missouri in the past, there is little evidence to suggest the film tax credit is succeeding now, and there is no reason to believe this program will perform differently under a restructured allocation. If increasing economic opportunity is the goal, the research is clear: Instead trying to manufacture more opportunities at the expense of taxpayers, lawmakers should provide broad-based tax relief to every Missourian.

NOTES

1. “Report of the Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission.” Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission. 2010; https://www.semissourian.com/files/tcrcfinalreport113010.pdf.
2. “Lights, camera and no action: How state film subsidies fail.” USC Press Release. August 18, 2016; https://pressroom.usc.edu/lights-camera-and-no-action-how-state-film-subsidies-fail.
3. Loughead, Katherine. “Illuminating the Hidden Costs of State Tax Incentives.” Tax Foundation. 2021; https://taxfoundation.org/state-tax-incentives-costs.
4. “Made-in-Missouri Film and TV Productions Spent $40.7 Million in 2025.” Missouri Department of Economic Development. February 2026; https://ded.mo.gov/press-room/made-missouri-film-and-tv-productions-spent-407-million-2025.
5. Neman, Daniel. “HBO’s DTF St. Louis has a dream cast, but it wasn’t shot here.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. February 26, 2026; https://www.stltoday.com/life-entertainment/local/movies-tv/article_cfa2d34c-435a-40fd-9fa5-75933d716915.html.
6. “Impact of the Georgia Film Tax Credit.” Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, Performance Audit Division. Report No. 18-03B. January 2020; https://www.audits.ga.gov/ReportSearch/download/23536.
7. “Fourth Quarter Tax Credit Report, Fiscal Year 2025.” Missouri Department of Revenue. 2025; https://dor.mo.gov/public-reports/documents/Fourth-Quarter-FY25-Tax-Credit-Report.pdf.

The post House Bill 2058: Film Tax Credits appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In his January 30 op-ed for the Post-Dispatch, Kansas political scientist Michael Smith called Governor Mike Kehoe’s proposal to cut income taxes in Missouri a “near carbon copy” of Governor Sam Brownback’s 2012 income tax cuts in Kansas.

But Kehoe’s proposal for Missouri has large and important differences from Brownback’s. It isn’t a “carbon copy” at all.

The single largest flaw in Brownback’s tax cut was a peculiar change that eliminated all income taxes on “pass-through” business entities such as limited liability corporations (LLCs) without changing the tax code for other types of businesses. Even the right-leaning Tax Foundation criticized the provision at the time. Put simply, it didn’t encourage investment; it ended income taxes for one type of business while keeping them for others.

Not surprisingly, many businesses changed their corporate structure to suddenly become pass-through entities. The Tax Foundation found that over 390,000 entities claimed the exemption by 2015, more than double what was projected. These businesses didn’t invest in the state, hire more workers, or do anything other than change their legal status. Tax revenues declined significantly, and little growth followed.

Kansas also made critical mistakes in how it implemented income-tax cuts. The state slashed its top income-tax rate by nearly 30 percent immediately in 2012, with plans to cut even further. At the same time, Kansas’s elected officials failed to rein in spending. The combination of the pass-through exemption, immediate and deep rate cuts, and lack of spending discipline during this period fostered a fiscal crisis that could have been avoided. Even worse, the timing of these actions gave the state little room to adjust when projections weren’t borne out.

Kehoe’s proposal is fundamentally different. It asks Missouri voters whether they want to eliminate the income tax. If they do, the state can then expand and adjust its sales tax to replace the lost revenue. While many details remain to be finalized (and Missourians have every right to be skeptical while awaiting those details), the plan ensures that income tax rates can only be lowered after meeting revenue benchmarks, meaning Missouri would only cut taxes when it has the fiscal capacity to do so.

Setting aside the phasing out of the income tax, addressing Missouri’s outdated sales tax system is long overdue. While states nationwide are broadening what they tax, Missouri’s system remains narrow, with much of what is sold today escaping taxation entirely. Larger exemptions like home sales and healthcare services might make sense, but other current exemptions clearly don’t.

When you buy a book in person at Barnes & Noble or have the same book delivered to your house by Amazon, you pay the sales tax. However, when you buy the same text as a download to your Kindle, you pay no sales tax. Correcting such inconsistencies in Missouri’s tax code can level the playing field while expanding the sales tax base at the same time.

Opponents can point to Missouri’s western border all they want, but Missouri has other neighbors besides Kansas. Look at Iowa, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, which have all cut income tax rates significantly in recent years without any of the issues Kansas had. Look to our southeast border to see Tennessee, a state that has been growing rapidly for years thanks, in part, to having no state income tax. This isn’t surprising, as decades of economic research have shown consistently that states without income taxes grow faster economically than those with them.

As the Tax Foundation, which was highly critical of Kansas’ tax cut, wrote in 2024 about the larger picture of state tax cuts between 2012 and 2022:

In fact, far from tax cuts precipitating a Kansas-like crisis, tax collections have risen more on average in the past decade in the 25 states that cut income taxes (31.9 percent in inflation-adjusted terms) than in the four states and D.C. that raised them (27.8 percent).

The lesson from Kansas isn’t that eliminating the income tax is a bad idea, it’s that implementation matters. There’s no doubt that states without income taxes are growing faster than Missouri, and our state needs a new approach to keep pace in the national competition for families and businesses. Voters deserve the full picture, not an overly simplistic “Kansas” bogeyman, when debating our state’s tax future.

The post Missouri Doesn’t Have To Be Kansas appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Dave Helling recently responded to my Show-Me Institute colleagues’ piece on what Missouri should learn from Kansas’s tax changes a decade ago. He questions whether Missouri’s current discussion is meaningfully different from what happened under former Kansas Gov. Sam Brownback.

I respect Dave and welcome the debate. Kansas belongs in this conversation. But if we are going to invoke it, we should be clear about what it demonstrates.

Kansas did not experience instability simply because it lowered tax rates. It ran into trouble because revenue fell precipitously and the state did not appropriately adjust its fiscal structure. Lawmakers enacted sharp tax reductions, created a large pass-through exemption, and left spending commitments largely intact. The result was a structural imbalance.

That is the lesson.

Dave suggests that state tax policy has only a marginal relationship to economic growth. It is true that no state controls the national business cycle. But it does not follow that tax structure is economically irrelevant.

Growth reflects millions of individual decisions—where to work, invest, expand, or relocate. Tax policy influences those decisions at the margin. And marginal decisions, aggregated across an economy, shape long-run performance.

If tax policy does not meaningfully affect behavior, it becomes difficult to explain why businesses restructured to qualify for Kansas’s pass-through exemption, why cities such as Kansas City offer tax abatements and other tax incentives to attract employers, or why area policymakers worry about the Border War. Incentives matter. They always have.

Both Kansas City and St. Louis are about to vote on retaining their 1% earnings taxes. Does anyone doubt the tax is one more incentive to live and work outside city limits?

None of this means that tax cuts guarantee prosperity. Lower rates increase the after-tax return to work and investment; they do not override broader economic conditions. But acknowledging limits is not the same as declaring irrelevance.

Kansas was not a clean test of “supply-side theory.” It did not eliminate its income tax. It reduced rates quickly, carved out a significant exemption, and failed to align revenue reductions with sustainable fiscal adjustments. When revenues declined more than expected, the state lacked sufficient buffers.

That was a structural failure, not proof that tax policy is immaterial.

Missouri’s debate, then, should center on structure and discipline. Any serious reform would require conservative revenue estimates, a modernized and stable tax base, adequate reserves, and spending aligned with realistic collections. Without those elements, skepticism is warranted. With them, instability is not inevitable.

There is also a tension in arguing that tax policy has little influence on economic outcomes while simultaneously warning that changing it risks serious harm. If tax structure truly operates only at the margins, its effects—positive or negative—cannot be dismissed when convenient and amplified when politically useful.

The more accurate position lies between extremes. Tax structure is neither a magic lever nor a null variable. It is one component of competitiveness, and like any component, it must be designed responsibly.

Kansas offers a caution about execution. But the Kansas story does not settle the broader question of how Missouri should structure its tax system going forward.

That question deserves a debate grounded in fiscal mechanics and economic incentives instead of caricatures.

The post The Lesson from Kansas—and the Question for Missouri appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The post Income Tax Elimination and Sales Tax Modernization appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Shortly before the end of last year, the auditor’s office released a report urging lawmakers to take “immediate action” to curb the trend of deficit spending before more drastic cuts become necessary. For longtime readers of the Show-Me Institute blog, this assessment will sound familiar. The report reinforces concerns that have been visible in Missouri’s budget data for more than half a decade.

Reviewing recent revenue and spending trends helps illustrate the problem. Between 2020 and 2025, Missouri’s general revenue collections increased by 45.8 percent, largely driven by income and sales tax growth. Over the same period, general revenue expenditures increased by 53.4 percent. That spending growth more than doubled the rate of inflation, which rose 24.5 percent during those years. Even strong revenue growth was not enough to keep pace.

This imbalance was made possible by a temporary windfall. Although Missouri operates under a constitutional balanced budget requirement, lawmakers were able to commit to higher spending because of a large influx of federal COVID relief funds, combined with stronger-than-expected tax collections. That surge produced a record general revenue balance of nearly $6 billion in 2023. Rather than treating those conditions as temporary, the state locked in higher ongoing spending through pay raises and program expansions, among other things. Since then, the surplus has been largely exhausted.

Looking ahead, fiscal pressures are likely to get worse. Governor Kehoe’s recent budget recommendations project a decline in expected revenues this fiscal year and only minimal growth in Fiscal Year 2027. The outlook deteriorates further when you consider the chance of an economic downturn. Using the worst three-year revenue decline Missouri experienced between 2003 and 2025, the auditor estimates the general revenue fund would be depleted by 2027. Under that scenario, the state would face a deficit exceeding $3.8 billion. And while Missouri’s Budget Reserve Fund (rainy day fund) holds approximately $950 million, as I’ve written before, constitutional restrictions sharply limit its usefulness in addressing an ongoing budget shortfall.

As the general assembly begins working on next year’s budget, the auditor’s report should remain front of mind. There’s still time to rein in the state’s out-of-control spending if Missouri’s lawmakers are willing to start making the tough decisions that right-sizing government entails. The question is no longer whether adjustment is needed, but instead how long until fiscal disaster strikes.

The post The Auditor Confirms Missouri’s Budget Problem appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

When Governor Kehoe signed the FY 2026 budget into law last June, after vetoing more than $2 billion in spending approved by the legislature, the total came to nearly $51 billion, with $15.4 billion coming from state general revenues. Given that Missouri’s budget totaled barely $27 billion less than a decade ago, it may seem hard to believe that a $51 billion budget could still understate the cost of state government. Nevertheless, the budget left out more than $1 billion in anticipated Medicaid spending.

This is not a matter of miscounting or bad estimates. While projecting costs more than a year in advance is never perfect, what is happening here is more straightforward. State lawmakers are knowingly approving budgets that do not include enough funding to last the full fiscal year. Missouri’s budget director acknowledged as much when he testified before the House Budget Committee this past week.

Although the issue likely extends beyond Medicaid, the program provides the clearest illustration of the problem. For the vast majority of enrollees, Medicaid costs the state a predictable monthly payment to a managed care provider (essentially a health insurance company). Enrollment today is roughly the same as it was one year ago. Yet the supplemental funding request for FY 2026—the amount needed to carry the budget through June 30—exceeds $3.2 billion, with more than $1 billion devoted to Medicaid alone. That increase far outpaces any reasonable measure of inflation and reflects a budget that did not include a full year of known costs.

This is not a new pattern. When I wrote about Missouri’s budget mirage last year, the legislature was facing a nearly $2 billion supplemental request, with Medicaid again serving as a significant driver. In practical terms, the $51 billion budget approved last year is now expected to end closer to $54 billion in total spending. With the governor’s FY 2027 budget recommendations totaling $54.5 billion, including $16.3 billion from general revenue, taxpayers are left to wonder how closely that figure will track reality.

Much has been said about the need to rein in Missouri’s out-of-control spending. But a necessary first step in rightsizing state government is being clear about how much it costs in the first place. Systematically underfunding known obligations and backfilling them later makes it difficult for taxpayers to understand the true size of the budget and the choices policymakers are making. Perhaps more importantly, an understated baseline makes it harder for lawmakers to evaluate new spending proposals or identify meaningful savings because they aren’t aware of the true cost of their existing commitments.

As legislators begin work on next year’s budget, the best place for them to start is with transparency.

The post The Budget Mirage Reappears appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In St. Louis County, parts of the county are still recovering from the tornado, the county executive is under indictment (everyone is innocent until proven guilty), and county government’s 2026 budget forecast says there is an $80 million budget shortfall. The last part is the focus of this post.

Every government budget can be cut, and in every government budget there is enough waste and fat to be trimmed to make a difference. That said, cutting government spending is hard (I wish it weren’t). County governments in Missouri are not bloated bureaucracies wasting money hand over foot. They tend to operate fairly efficiently, at least by government standards. So, while making cuts should be the highest priority for the budget shortfall, I doubt that there is $80 million in waste and fraud to be trimmed. Some tough choices are going to have to be made. So, beyond cutting all the waste that it can, what should St. Louis County do?

First, if you are in a hole, stop digging. St. Louis County continues to inexplicably grant tax abatements and other subsidies that never live up to their promises. If these subsidies worked—and by “worked” I mean generated long-term revenues that outweighted the short-term costs—then St. Louis County wouldn’t be in this predicament in the first place. St. Louis County needs to stop giving away taxpayer money as part of a delusion that government planning grows the economy. And yes, this includes getting rid of the senior property tax freeze among other subsidies.

Privatization and outsourcing some services are always an important option for local governments. St. Louis County’s options here are limited, in that the county doesn’t operate any public utilities and it already provides many services via outsourcing. (This is, of course, all a good thing.) The biggest mistake county government has made in recent years is the debacle with the animal shelter. The county should never have taken the animal shelter back in-house. St. Louis County officials should admit their mistake and once again outsource management of the animal shelter.

One of the reasons St. Louis County is in this situation is that it has gone over a decade without a qualified county auditor catching mistakes and making suggestions for fiscal improvements. Hopefully, the recently hired county auditor can change that.

Now let’s talk about the revenue side. Nobody likes tax increases, but sometimes they are necessary. If the county were to consider raising taxes, what taxes should it either institute or increase?

St. Louis County voters have rejected a use tax several times, most recently in April, 2022. A use tax (which is a sales tax on online purchases) is probably the best tax option for the county from a revenue perspective. Two other options could be imposing a small county gas tax to help fund roads or a modest property tax increase. Both of these would be politically complicated.

Beyond all of this, cuts will have to be made. Those may be cuts to services people like, such as the police department or highway projects. But elected officials are there to make hard choices.

The post What Should St. Louis County Do about Its Budget Shortfall? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Reason study finds that U.S. state and local governments held approximately $6.1 trillion in debt at the end of FY 2023. That figure breaks down roughly as $2.66 trillion at the state level, $1.4 trillion among municipalities, $1.27 trillion in school districts, and $757 billion in counties.

For state governments alone, Reason reports $2.7 trillion in debt as of end of 2023, which is about $8,000 per person nationally. The methodology includes near‑term liabilities (like unpaid bills and payroll) plus long‑term obligations (bonds, pensions, and retiree health).

Missouri ranked 25th in combined state and local debt at $53.34 billion. Broken down per capita, Missouri ranked 43rd at $8,829.

Truth in Accounting’s evaluation looked only at the state budget and divided the amount by taxpayer—while Reason considered state and local debts and divided by population. TIA concluded Missouri had a Taxpayer Surplus™ of approximately $200 per taxpayer. Lastly, Reason relied on 2023 data while TIA used 2024 numbers.

The TIA result is reassuring at first glance—but that’s because it looks only at the state obligations. Reason’s analysis reminds us that local governments carry significant obligations beyond what the state government balance sheet shows.

Missouri’s fiscal position is better than many states—but neither the TIA nor Reason analyses justify complacency. Policymakers at every level of government in Missouri should focus on liabilities, funding discipline, and structural reform. This includes being mindful of the long-term commitments we have made to fund government employee pensions and healthcare plans.

A lot of attention is focused on cutting taxes, and that is worthwhile. But fiscal restraint is not merely about cutting taxes—we must rein in our spending too, and that includes long-term commitments.

The post New National Debt Analysis Offers Fresh Lens for Missouri’s Fiscal Picture appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Susan Pendergrass is joined by Elias Tsapelas, director of state budget and fiscal policy at the Show-Me Institute, to explain what was actually at stake in the recent federal government shutdown. They break down the debate over extended Affordable Care Act subsidies, why health insurance costs keep rising, how COVID-era provisions distorted the marketplace, and what Congress may do next.

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Timestamps

00:00 Understanding the Government Shutdown
06:31 The Debate Over ACA Subsidies
09:10 Impact of the Affordable Care Act
13:24 Proposals for Health Care Reform
17:53 The Future of Health Care Costs

Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:00)
Well, this is going to be a very timely and interesting conversation with the Show-Me Institute’s own Elias Tsapelas. You are the Director of State Budget and Fiscal Policy, two things that are front and center right now, but I really wanted to just have you on to talk about a little bit of stuff around the recent government shutdown.

And I just want to say upfront, if I understand this correctly, the federal government can’t pay its bills unless it’s got an approved budget to pay the bills, right? And the fiscal year runs October 1st to September 30th. And if you don’t have a new budget for the next year, you can’t pay your bills. So it’s up to the Senate, the House, and the President to agree on a budget. And this past September, as has happened before, they could not agree, and Democrats were holding out, and that caused the government to shut down. What were Democrats saying they were holding out for?

Elias Tsapelas (00:52)
Well, I guess I should start with just a little caveat that some of what the Democrats were saying they were holding out for was not precisely what was on the table. So no matter what happens, health care premiums are going to be going up, that’s just a fact, because health care costs are up. Health care costs are going up everywhere. Hospitals, Medicaid, we see it everywhere.

Susan Pendergrass (00:56)
You know, fix it up for me. Why?

Elias Tsapelas (01:20)
What they were holding out for were these extended or expanded ACA subsidies, Affordable Care Act subsidies. We’re talking about the marketplace here. This is typically for people making between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty limit. For example, a couple of two: 100 percent of the federal poverty limit is about $21,000 per year, 400 percent is about $85,000 per year. That’s roughly the range you’re looking at.

Now, some small employers do purchase plans through the marketplace, but the big piece here is that the ACA provides subsidies for people. And the way it works, essentially, is that people pay a proportion of their income. If your income is 100 percent of the federal poverty limit, you’re going to pay roughly 2 percent of your income. Now, there are extended subsidies that change that calculation. But the point being, the law set out that if you make this amount of money, you’re only going to pay this much on health insurance, and the government is going to subsidize the rest. You are not sensitive to costs at all, because your costs are tied to your income.

Susan Pendergrass (02:54)
So, for example, if you earn $4,000 a month, theoretically, and I don’t know the numbers, the government would say you won’t pay any more than $300 in insurance premiums?

Elias Tsapelas (03:05)
Yep. And so that is a percentage that you pay scaled off how much income you have from that 100 to 400 percent. That is a core piece of how the Affordable Care Act worked, and everyone paid a portion based on the base subsidies.

Now, what the debate was about, or what Democrats were holding out for, was expanded subsidies, which came about during COVID as part of the American Rescue Plan, ARPA. And it did a couple things, but they were subsidies on top of regular subsidies. So this was not, “If this doesn’t happen, everyone is going to be paying unsubsidized plans.” This was an additional type of subsidy. These additional subsidies were set to expire at the end of the year, at the end of December. ARPA gave four years of subsidies.

Susan Pendergrass (04:04)
Because it was COVID related, temporary, and they said, “We’ll cover more of your premium through December 31, 2025.”

Elias Tsapelas (04:14)
Yes, I think part of the calculation was that people were going to like it so much that it would be hard to get rid of. And it’s certainly the case: if these subsidies go away, people will be paying more.

Susan Pendergrass (04:15)
Ahem.

Elias Tsapelas (04:27)
But that is not to say there would be no subsidies at all. These extended subsidies did a couple things. For people between 100 and 150 percent of the federal poverty limit, quick caveat: in Missouri, if you make under 138 percent, you’re on Medicaid, so you don’t pay anything, but in many states without Medicaid expansion, people go on the marketplace. What these expanded subsidies did is: if you made between 100 and 150 percent of the federal poverty limit, you paid zero percent of your income. You got a plan for free.

You would still have some cost sharing, and the sliding scale up to 400 percent that the normal subsidies used was lowered, so people under regular subsidies who made 400 percent of the federal poverty limit were paying about 10 percent of their income. With the expanded subsidies, you’d only pay 8.5 percent, and the subsidies no longer stopped at 400 percent. They would go all the way up. You would never pay more than 8.5 percent of your income.

Susan Pendergrass (05:30)
Okay.

Elias Tsapelas (05:42)
But typically, people above 400 percent of the federal poverty limit don’t want to buy ACA plans because 8.5 percent of income is expensive. Still, a decent number of people were impacted. It costs a decent amount of money. The Congressional Budget Office says extending these expanded subsidies costs about $350 billion over 10 years. Very expensive. But there are a lot of issues here, which Republicans are pushing back on as they negotiate whether to extend these by the end of the year.

Susan Pendergrass (06:31)
So now we’re in this argument of whether we extend COVID subsidies or not. And like you said, Republicans seemed willing to say maybe a year, or maybe we’ll vote on it in December. Essentially the Democrats didn’t get any of what they asked for, right?

Elias Tsapelas (06:48)
Yeah. A key piece is that when Democrats passed this in ARPA, no Republicans voted for it. There’s a variety of reasons, but a big one is that it exacerbates problems with the Affordable Care Act. People buying health insurance are seeing higher prices, high deductibles, high copays, so people don’t want to buy it. These additional subsidies got more people into the market, but at a very expensive cost. And because people are not cost sensitive, their share is tied to their income, the subsidies scale regardless of what insurance companies charge. That creates unintended effects. There were allegations of fraud. And a larger discussion: if we’re going to spend $350 billion per 10 years, is there not a better way to get healthier people to buy health insurance? Is there a better way to help people?

And the people most impacted are those around 400 percent of the federal poverty limit, not very low income people. Higher income people. And often near retirement folks who aren’t working anymore but aren’t yet on Medicare. They need health insurance, they have health needs, and insurance gets very expensive. That was something the Affordable Care Act tried to deal with. But doubling down on continuously funding this subsidy system is something Republicans didn’t want to do.

Susan Pendergrass (09:10)
Yeah. So we had Brian Blase of Paragon on the podcast, and he absolutely did not want those COVID related subsidies extended. He claimed that the Affordable Care Act caused health related expenses to go up. Do you know how that works?

Elias Tsapelas (09:45)
There are a couple things going on. One big thing Brian talks about is likely enormous fraud from the expanded subsidies. Bloomberg had a good article about what happened in Florida. As soon as the federal government offered zero premium plans for people between 100 and 150 percent of the federal poverty limit, background: Florida hasn’t expanded Medicaid, so people enroll on the marketplace. What happened is that it became a business for insurance brokers to get people enrolled. Brokers make money off enrollments, and people don’t care if they aren’t paying premiums.

So you had an enormous increase in people supposedly making between 100 and 150 percent of the federal poverty limit. Census data suggests far fewer people actually make that income. Tons were getting health insurance for free, and many weren’t using it. You’d expect higher usage. There are reasons to think there was widespread fraud.

More broadly, ACA plans must cover many things people don’t need, which drives up costs. And the marketplace risk pool is heavily made up of sick people, fewer healthy people, which makes insurance expensive.

So the bigger discussion is: how do you get healthier people into the market? How do you offer plans people want? Republicans are taking a stand that doubling down on the ACA model, with subsidies disconnected from costs, won’t work long term.

Susan Pendergrass (13:24)
Correct me if I’m wrong on this, but didn’t Senator Thune or somebody suggest just sending people $5,000?

Elias Tsapelas (13:30)
I don’t know if it was exactly that amount, but yes, there have been proposals essentially saying: maybe there will need to be a one year extension of subsidies because new plans start soon and it would be hard to roll out big changes in a month. But some ideas, from Senator Cassidy, Senator Thune, and others, propose approving the same amount of money but sending it directly to people instead of insurance companies. For many people, subsidies are worth over $30,000 a year. If people got $30,000, they might not spend it all on an ACA plan costing that much. They might buy a cheaper plan, use out of pocket spending, or seek non ACA compliant plans. There are ideas: HSAs, short term plans, specialized plans. A key piece is giving the money to people, not insurance companies, so someone has an incentive to reduce costs.

Susan Pendergrass (15:47)
Yeah. Well, the shutdown ended. Nothing really changed, right?

Elias Tsapelas (15:52)
Yeah. Congress will have to work a lot in the last month of the year. I’m a little disappointed. There were almost some very interesting budget related court cases that could have come from the shutdown. One argument was whether the government must fund food stamps, or SNAP, during a shutdown, whether they must give out money not appropriated. Some judges said yes. That raises major questions: can courts tell the executive branch to spend money Congress didn’t appropriate?

Susan Pendergrass (16:54)
I think they were told that they don’t, right, in the end?

Elias Tsapelas (16:59)
The Supreme Court basically said courts needed to wrestle with the issue. It got resolved before a final answer. We don’t know for now. Judges were on different sides. Democrats pushed back noting that in previous budgets, they fought to fund things, but the executive branch simply didn’t spend the money. There’s a lot of interesting stuff: can courts force funding, can the executive disregard congressional appropriations? I’m upset that didn’t get resolved. But the ACA issue is big enough that Congress has its hands full.

Susan Pendergrass (17:53)
Some folks said that because of the SNAP benefit question, we were just getting to the point where Americans were paying attention to the shutdown and then it ended. And what’s interesting is the amount of misinformation and hard to follow information. I saw headlines about someone’s insurance premiums going from $300 to $2,600. I don’t know if any of that was right, but it got a lot of play.

Elias Tsapelas (18:28)
I don’t think it was covered especially well in terms of what was being argued, because the government shut down far before these subsidies expired. There was a lot of muddying of the waters. Some people thought if subsidies weren’t extended, no one would have subsidies, even though the people most impacted would just go from paying 8.5 percent of income to 10 percent. Not nothing, but not catastrophic.

Health care costs are going up broadly. Medicare enrollees are getting renewal notices. Everything is going up. ARPA was designed to be temporary. If it were supposed to be permanent, Congress could have made it permanent. Whether Democrats thought it would be continued forever or just help temporarily is unclear. But if Congress comes up with something that makes health insurance better, I’m all for it. There are tough decisions. Congress has struggled with ACA reform for a decade.

Susan Pendergrass (20:20)
I think we know the answer to that. At the federal level, when they want to do big splashy things, ARPA, the ACA, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, they make expenses short term to reduce the fiscal note, assuming someone will renew them later. Same thing with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. They assume future lawmakers will extend them. So it’s not unreasonable that ARPA had temporary provisions assuming they’d get extended. I guess not this time.

Elias Tsapelas (21:12)
People’s health care costs going up is a big issue. People won’t be happy regardless. But returning to issues that should have been addressed when the ACA passed is important. The marketplace is dysfunctional and too expensive. Hopefully Congress finds something better. And I don’t want to minimize issues for people close to retirement. That’s a big issue: people between 55 and 65, not on Medicare yet, often have significant health needs. If you tell a 60 year old who isn’t working that coverage is $40,000 a year, that won’t work.

Susan Pendergrass (21:53)
Yeah. That’s right.

Elias Tsapelas (22:23)
More options will be good. That is an important group that needs to be addressed.

Susan Pendergrass (23:07)
Well, thanks for explaining it so clearly and helping our listeners understand what was actually on the table. It’s a complicated topic, but we’ll watch it unfold over the next year, and hopefully you’ll come back and explain what’s happening as it unfolds.

Elias Tsapelas (23:23)
Hopefully something does happen, so there is something to explain. That would be the best case scenario.

Susan Pendergrass (23:25)
That’s right. All right, well, thanks so much, Elias. Really appreciate it.

Elias Tsapelas (23:31)
Thank you.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post What the Government Shutdown Was Really About with Elias Tsapelas appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

TIA uses full accrual accounting, which tracks not just current bills but also long-term promises such as pensions and retiree healthcare. Unlike state budget reports that can hide liabilities, TIA’s numbers tell the fuller (and often less flattering) story.

This year, Missouri reported a Taxpayer Surplus™ of $200 per taxpayer, meaning the state had enough money on hand to pay all its current bills with a small cushion left over. By TIA’s definition, that just clears the bar for a “B” grade, which applies to states with a surplus between $1 and $9,999 per taxpayer.

The grade reflects a genuine, if modest, improvement. In 2023, Missouri’s shortfall stood at $700 per taxpayer. That was enough to earn a “C” and a middling 25th-place finish nationally. In years prior, the story was worse: in 2020, the state’s Taxpayer Burden™ was $4,400.

So what’s behind the jump from “C” to “B”? Mostly, factors outside the state’s control. According to TIA’s report (page 83): “Missouri may lose $6.5 billion in federal funding (16 percent of expenses) if allocations return to 2019 levels, adjusted only for inflation.” That funding came largely through pandemic-era support, and it helped cover immediate costs. But it isn’t permanent.

Meanwhile, strong stock market returns—especially in 2022—helped reduce Missouri’s reported pension liabilities. Yet these gains are fragile. They can quickly disappear in volatile markets, as TIA’s report explains, and they don’t fix structural imbalances in how pension systems are funded.

Those structural issues remain. As Sheila Weinberg, founder and CEO of TIA, put it in a recent correspondence: “even with a 26% investment return in 2022 and an additional $1.1 billion contribution in 2023 . . . the state’s contributions and investment income are not enough to keep pace with the interest and new benefits accruing on the pension debt.”

That’s a concern taxpayers should take seriously. Missouri’s pension systems, especially the Missouri State Employees’ Retirement System (MOSERS), have long carried unfunded obligations. The surplus reported today is in part a reflection of how those liabilities are calculated—not a signal that they’ve been resolved.

That brings us back to the bigger issue: standards. Missouri, like nearly every other state, follows Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules, which permit states to understate liabilities and delay recognizing certain costs. TIA recommends moving instead to the standards used by publicly traded companies: full accrual accounting and ERISA (Employee Retirement Income and Security Act)-like funding requirements for pensions.

Judi Willard, TIA’s communications director, summarized the case for changing standards plainly: “[these reforms] will create long-term stability for the states, create transparency in government spending and protect the taxpayers from unscrupulous elected officials who would rather spend now and pay later, which sadly the current accounting standards allow.”

There’s merit to that argument. Missouri’s improved ranking may be encouraging, but it is not a sign that long-term fiscal problems have been solved. The gains are largely circumstantial. Without broader reform in how the state budgets and reports its obligations, today’s surplus could just as easily become tomorrow’s deficit.

So yes—credit where it’s due. Missouri’s “B” grade reflects careful budgeting, a resilient economy, and a short-term boost from federal aid. But structural pension pressures remain. Federal dollars are fading. And the state’s accounting standards still obscure the true cost of government.

A budget that only looks balanced on paper won’t protect taxpayers in the long run.

The post Missouri Earns a “B” in New Fiscal Report—but Don’t Pop the Champagne Yet appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Susan Pendergrass speaks with Marty Lueken, director of EdChoice’s Fiscal Research and Education Center, about the 2025 Fiscal Fact Book. They discuss how much is really spent per student, where the money comes from, why staffing has grown even as enrollment has declined, the fiscal impact of school choice programs, and more.

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Timestamps

00:00 Understanding School Funding in the U.S.
10:03 The Impact of School Choice Programs
20:30 Challenges and Misconceptions in School Funding

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post The Fiscal Facts Behind School Choice with Marty Lueken appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

At the center of the issue is what’s called the “Thrifty Food Plan,” which is the formula the USDA uses to set SNAP benefits every year. In short, the formula is designed to determine the cost of a basic but nutritious diet, given the USDA’s dietary guidelines. For decades, the Thrifty Food Plan was adjusted yearly to account for the increased costs families saw in their grocery bills. But in 2021, the formula was changed to boost benefits by around 21%, far exceeding inflation.

The precise way the formula was adjusted is complicated and goes beyond the scope of this post, but suffice it to say that both the foods included in the calculation and their cost were changed to increase national SNAP expenditures by roughly $200 billion over ten years, all without an act of Congress. Historically, major changes to the Thrifty Food Plan beyond inflationary cost increases have been the result of legislation. Such a significant change without explicit approval led many to call for its immediate reversal, arguing the move violated federal law and years of precedent.

After several years of higher SNAP spending, the OBBB finally addresses the issue created in 2021. The law now ties Thrifty Food Plan increases to inflation and specifies how often the foods included in the calculation can be re-evaluated. While this may not seem like some groundbreaking change, it’s an important step to protect against future bureaucratic attempts to expand welfare benefits without congressional approval, and could ultimately save Missouri taxpayers money.

As I wrote recently, in an effort to improve SNAP’s program integrity, the OBBB will soon start putting states on the hook for a portion of benefit costs if they can’t get their payment error rates under control. Keep in mind that until the OBBB is fully implemented, the federal government covers 100% of all SNAP benefits. Meanwhile, states have overpaid recipients nearly 10% of the time. By changing the incentives, states now have a reason to lower their error rates, which should reduce wasteful spending. The Thrifty Food Plan change will also help states (maybe including Missouri) that become responsible for a portion of benefit costs (because their payment error rates are too high) from being subject to unanticipated large program cost increases in future years.

The Thrifty Food Plan changes will help rein in the administrative state and encourage states to be better stewards of taxpayer money. Missouri’s policymakers and taxpayers should welcome the return of thrift to SNAP.

The post More SNAP Changes: Restoring Thrift appeared first on Show-Me Institute.