This is wonderful news, also known as great news. The proposed route was simply preposterous. Even by Metro’s own overly generous predictions, it was only going to have about 5,000 boardings a day. (That isn’t very many boardings for a billion dollars.) It was bad enough that it generated significant opposition at the East-West Gateway Board of Directors (EWGBOD) project vote, which almost never happens. At the Show-Me Institute, we released a study by Randal O’Toole in 2023 that highlighted why this project was unnecessary and wasteful, and I provided testimony against it before the EWGBOD in early 2024.

The federal government gives away a lot of money for expensive transit projects, so St. Louis invented an expensive transit project to go get that money. Never mind that few people were going to ride it, and that people along this route could be served much more affordably by buses.

But let’s give credit where it is due. The new mayor of St. Louis and Metro deserve credit for making the right decision now. Whether they did it because they realized it was a bad choice all along, or whether they just succumbed to the political reality that the current administration in Washington, D.C., was highly unlikely to fund this project, doesn’t really matter. I am just happy that it is done for, or at least as done for as a project like this can ever be.

Which brings us to the other part of the good news. The city and Metro are redirecting their efforts along this route to consider a bus rapid transit (BRT) route. BRT has worked well in Kansas City (unlike the streetcar) and deserves consideration for this route in St. Louis. I am still amazed, though, at how expensive BRT itself is. (That will be a topic for a future post.)

An affordable (for both taxpayers and riders), changeable, safe, and on-time bus system is what the St. Louis region needs for public transit. We should stop dreaming about getting suburbanites out of their cars and start focusing on serving the needs of people who depend on public transportation. Cancelling the Green Line is the right move in that direction.

The post Green Means Stop appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Fast forward to today and nothing has changed. Property assessment data received from Jackson County through an open records request show the aggregate annual market value of Kansas City’s downtown streetcar Transportation Development District (TDD) is largely growing at the same rate as the county as a whole.

In other words, the streetcar is still not driving economic development in any substantial way. Were that the case, you’d see market values in the TDD rising at a much faster rate, as properties are quickly snatched up and redeveloped to take advantage of all that commerce and excitement.

There may be arguments for expanding the Kansas City streetcar. But those arguments aren’t about transit (all the streetcar routes were once and could be again served much more economically by buses) and they aren’t about economic development. And because 66% of Missouri electricity is generated by coal, the streetcar isn’t green, either.

Unfortunately, as the FTA reported, few streetcar operators actually check to see if their claims are true. That remains the case in Kansas City.

The post The KC Streetcar Still Isn’t Driving Economic Development appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The biggest problem with the Loop Trolley is that nobody wants to ride it. During its 13 months of operation, ridership was under 10 percent of expectations, which led to equally depressing revenue shortfalls. Time and again, trolley management turned to taxpayers to fill its budget gaps, ultimately pouring $51 million of other people’s money into the project. One of those funders, the Federal Transit Administration, issued an ultimatum to the Loop Trolley Transportation Development District (LTTDD): either restart the trolley or pay back $37 million in federal grants.

Show-Me Institute analysts have been issuing warnings about a taxpayer-funded trolley with minimal demand for more than a decade, so this is not your average “I told you so.” But now that Bi-State has decided to clean up the Loop Trolley’s mess, let’s hope it has a good plan.

Bi-State should do what it can to reduce the overall taxpayer burden. As of now, trolley funding will come solely from the LTTDD’s sales tax on loop shoppers, which will not be enough to run the trolley for long. One way to potentially reduce taxpayers’ burden is to sell advertisement spots on the trolley. (Yes, even park bench personal injury lawyers—somebody needs to represent the owners of the cars the trolley kept managing to hit last time).

Bi-State can also lessen taxpayer burden by charging passengers to ride the trolley. Currently, Bi-State is considering letting passengers ride for free. If the thinking is that this revenue would be too small to make a difference, Bi-State should remember that people voluntarily paying to ride the trolley is better than reaching into the pockets of people who don’t ride the trolley. Charging fares from the start would be better, but if Bi-State decides not to do that, it should at least try to boost ridership to the point of charging fares. Whether that’s seasonally themed rides, reaching out to business and marketing students at Wash U for consulting, or any other novel idea, boosting ridership to the point of charging for fares should be the goal.

The trolley is coming back whether we like it or not. Let’s hope Bi-State finds a way to get taxpayers off the hook.

The post What I Would Like to See from the Resurrected Trolley appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is threatening to claw back the $37 million in grant money it gave to get the Loop Trolley up and (briefly) running. According to the FTA, trolley officials must submit a plan by February 1 to restart the trolley by June 1, and the plan must include at least three cars running four days per week.

According to the FTA’s regional director, any potential litigation over the money the FTA wants back would involve the Loop Trolley Transportation Development District (LTTDD) and the East West Gateway Council of Governments. This is because while most federal money the LTTDD received from the federal government came directly from the FTA, some also came via grants distributed by the East West Gateway.

Saint Louis area officials are concerned that failing to get the Loop Trolley running again would make it harder for the Saint Louis region to receive future federal transportation grants.

So what should be done about the trolley?

At this point, the most sensible decision seems to be whichever would cost taxpayers less—either running the trolley to satisfy the FTA’s conditions or paying back the $37 million.

However, it’s not clear how many years the trolley would have to operate to satisfy the FTA’s terms. According to a letter from the FTA’s regional director to the Saint Louis City mayor, grant recipients must operate the project throughout the useful life of the property, which the regional director specified as between 12 and 40 years in the trolley’s case. But with the Loop Trolley’s operating budget of slightly over $1 million to run only two vehicles (and add in any additional costs from maintenance and indirect costs to Loop businesses), there are a number of variables that make it difficult to accurately calculate  whether operating the trolley will cost less than paying back the grant.

Assuming the variables can be nailed down, it is possible to do the math and see which option is better for taxpayers. The problem is that even if, by the numbers, running the trolley is the less expensive option, that does not mean it actually will be. Any effort to restart the trolley would need to avoid the blunders that dogged the construction and past operation of the trolley in the first place.

If only the federal government guarded its (our) money this closely all the time.

The post New Year, Same Problems with the Loop Trolley appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

One part of the proposed plan was to allow riders to use Metro passes to pay for Trolley rides. The plan also would have used the Loop Trolley Transportation Development District (LTTDD) revenue to develop (page 3) a park-and-ride pass program to encourage—or potentially force—Loop business employees to park at a distance and take the trolley to work. If forcing people to park in inconvenient locations is the best way to get people to ride the trolley, that should tell you all you need to know about actual demand for the trolley.

Since this new plan received no support, it will not be sent to the Metro board of directors. Further, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)—the source of the $34 million federal dollars to construct the trolley—has indicated it may sue the trolley’s tax district for $25 million. If the FTA does file suit, several  entities that benefited from the federal money, such as St. Louis City and County, the LTTDD, and University City, could be on the hook for repayment.

The threatened lawsuit combined with the trolley closing has Metro concerned about future transportation grants being jeopardized. However, sinking millions of dollars more into the trolley is a poor way to try and save face. Bad projects should be allowed to end to make way for better ones, not kept alongside them.

St. Louis County has reiterated that no additional county funds will be spent on the trolley. The question of what to do will now be passed to the LTTDD. The LTTDD board members that have commented indicated they did not know what would come next, while the mayor of the City of St. Louis would like Bi-State to reconsider. If there is a market-based solution to keep the trolley running, let’s hear it. Until then, no more taxpayer money should be spent.

The post Beating A Dead Trolley appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

But who knows what city taxpayers will end up getting for their “investment?”

Taxpayers likely won’t get the 17-mile route they were presented last year. After more than a year of study, it was recently announced that the first phase of expansion will run some 9 miles, roughly from Chippewa St. to the NGA site north of downtown, and will cost $700 million. The project is also totally dependent on federal funding, which is a big if at this point, and will begin operations, best case scenario, in a decade.

It’s also unclear whether the expansion will get St. Louisans out of their cars. While consultants project the line will carry some 9,200 riders a day, my colleague Joe Miller has pointed out that it runs through neighborhoods with relatively low population density—density about a quarter of what’s needed for light-rail to be successful. Also, overall MetroLink ridership is trending downward; not only has it lost 3.9 million annual rides since 2014, but the rail system carries fewer passengers than it did prior to the 2006 Shrewsbury expansion. And crime on and around MetroLink trains has, according to Metro, contributed to an 11% decline in ridership since last year. While I don’t doubt that an expanded system will (at least initially) carry more passengers, experience—and more than 15 years’ worth of data—suggest we shouldn’t get our hopes up.

Source: National Transit Database, Federal Transit Administration

But perhaps the biggest if is the economic renaissance promised by MetroLink officials and proponents. Transit advocates claim that rail spurs economic development, that, once you put the rails in, the traffic generated by riders will induce all sorts of business growth. Unfortunately, this claim just doesn’t hold up. Many MetroLink stations are surrounded by land that’s either (a) already developed (and likely heavily subsidized), or (b) relatively empty. In fact, transit-oriented and adjacent development is so scarce in St. Louis that rail advocates have to cast an incredibly wide net for any evidence of it. For instance, Citizens for Modern Transit, the region’s major transit advocacy group, includes investments on Interstates 64 and 70 and parking garages as development “spurred” by MetroLink. And Metro, which operates MetroLink, seems to think any investment within a half-mile of a rail station is causally linked to the presence of their trains. (Or, all they present is data on development within a half-mile of their stations.) Perhaps this is why consultants are now saying that MetroLink could “spur possibly millions of dollars in economic development….” (my emphasis).

At this point, it’s unclear what, if anything, taxpayers will get in return for hiking up their sales taxes. Although rail proponents may have inexhaustible faith, history and facts suggest taxpayers won’t get much for their investment.

The post What Will the City’s New MetroLink Tax Get Us? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Trolley officials “hope” their project will be up and running within the next month or two.

It feels as if I’ve written or said this more times than the project has actually been delayed, but: it’s hard to see the Loop Trolley as anything besides a policy disaster. Not only is there little evidence that the Trolley will accomplish all that its proponents promise, like increased transit-oriented development, but its leadership has rolled things out so poorly that it seems hard for the public to take the project seriously at all (see Exhibit A). It’s also hugely over-budget.

So, at this point, what do we do? How can we, or policymakers, try to make the current, regrettable situation any better? My suggestion is this: Spare us all the misery and simply admit you’ve got no clue when the Trolley will be up and running. Maybe you (Loop Trolley officials) have an idea of when it will be up and running, and maybe this time that idea is based on reliable information—who knows? Even so, the public has been toyed with so much that the best thing to do—the least damaging, that is—is to just say, “We don’t know when the Trolley will be up and running.”

As an academic and researcher, I’ve learned that sometimes (a lot of the time, actually) you need to admit that you just don’t know the answer to a question. Sometimes you can do far more damage by providing an answer that you’re unsure of than admitting you just don’t know the answer. Officials involved with the Loop Trolley project should, more than many others, understand this point.

The post Please, Just Give Us All a Break appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Taxes will not be collected until construction is ready to begin.

But the tax funds will not come close to covering the cost of building the new line. The KC Streetcar Authority will also seek $100 million in federal funds. Earlier this year Congress rolled back the Trump administration’s proposed deep cuts in transit funding. But the outlook for help from Washington remains uncertain.

That assertion isn’t wrong, but it is woefully incomplete. As we’ve reported previously, the Jackson County court ruling allowing for the creation of the transportation development district that will levy taxes for the streetcar includes an important restriction: No taxes or assessments are to be collected from within the district until enough external funding—in this case federal funds—is available.

And those federal funds are indeed uncertain. The Trump administration position seems to be that it won’t hand out construction money for transit capital grants unless a previous administration signed a full-funding grant agreement, and no such agreement is in place for Kansas City’s streetcar. The Federal Transit Administration has previously called for the New Starts/Small Starts grant program—on which the Kansas City effort is dependent for funding—to be scrapped. As of now it is authorized only through 2021, after which it will cease to exist. Congress seems unwilling to reauthorize it.

Even if the occupants of Congress or the White House change significantly in 2018 or 2020, we are a long way from receiving any federal money for the streetcar, money necessary to permit the TDD to collect taxes and assessments. In the meantime, expect streetcar advocates to start looking elsewhere for their financial support.

The post The Asterisk in Streetcar Reporting appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

It was recently announced that the opening of the over-budget historic streetcar line will be delayed yet again. This is, by our estimates, at least the fifth time the project’s opening has been delayed. Besides these delays, other snags have caught the project up along the way too.

The trolley line, which will run between University City Hall and the Missouri History Museum on Delmar Blvd and DeBaliviere Ave, was originally slated to begin operations in mid-2016. Since then, it’s been bailed out by taxpayers and private firms, threatened by the Federal Transit Administration, and under such financial strain it had to reduce its planned operating hours. It’s become increasingly hard to see the project as anything besides a policy and infrastructure disaster.

Whether you ultimately think the trolley will be a welcome addition to the Loop or just an eyesore and a money pit, all parties can agree the process of getting it up and running has been slow, painful, and embarrassing. This just doesn’t seem like how good policy is rolled out.

St. Louis, University City, County, and federal taxpayers deserve far better.

The post (Yet) Another Chapter in the Loop Trolley Bungle appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A number of initial deficiencies were closed prior to the issuance of the final report, often because the city addressed the concerns after receiving a draft of the report. The city has until October 19 to address the remaining items. Of the seven initial deficiencies, one that remains concerns maintenance, including vehicle preventative maintenance, facility/equipment maintenance, and oversight of contracted maintenance.

It is a shame to learn that the city isn’t properly maintaining its streetcars—or at least is not complying with federal grant guidelines for reporting maintenance procedures. These are complicated machines, and cities such as Seattle, Atlanta, Charlotte, and Toronto have had maintenance and safety issues with their streetcars.

Cincinnati’s streetcars—which were manufactured by the same company as Kansas City’s—have had myriad maintenance problems. At one point late last year, several streetcars were offline at once.

[Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority spokeswoman Sallie] Hilvers cited “manufacturing defects” that caused the service issues that resulted, at one point Thursday night, in all but one of the city’s five streetcar vehicles being removed from city streets.

It is possible that Kansas City has had no significant streetcar maintenance problems—despite an embarrassing shut down on at least one occasion. And it is possible that the deficiencies cited by the FTA are easily addressed. We’ll know more when the city responds to the outstanding issues. 

Click below to see the entire FTA report

The post Feds Find KC Streetcar Deficient appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Bringing the palm of one’s hand to one’s face, as an expression of disbelief, shame, or exasperation.

It’s what I did when I read that the Delmar Loop Trolley, supposed Millennial-magnet and urban-revitalizer extraordinaire, is yet again over-budget and likely delayed. Joe Edwards, who’s leading the trolley effort, says he needs an additional half-million to cover signage and vehicle restoration costs, and to ensure the system can operate over “reasonable hours.” In other words, the Loop Trolley needs another bailout to help pay its regular bills—not to cover unexpected costs.

This request is not fake news, and unfortunately it shouldn’t come as a surprise. The Trolley has an expensive and protracted history. Sometimes past performance really is the best indicator of future results.

First, in 2014, bids for building the vintage streetcar line came in $11 million over-budget. A second round of bids came in $3 million lower, but that still put the project—originally estimated to cost $43 million—nearly 20% over-budget. County taxpayers coughed up the extra cash to bail the trolley out, after they were told cost-overruns would be paid by a special taxing district, the loop trolley transportation development district, which levies an extra sales tax for the project.

And then there were the delays.

Before construction even began, the Federal Transit Administration, which pledged to pay for most of the trolley’s capital costs, threatened to withdraw its financial support because of a lack of engineering and design progress. Then the University City council had to extend the terms of a special building permit six months so construction would be legal when it actually began. At that time, the line was slated to open in late 2016.

But then the public was told the line would open in spring of 2017. It didn’t. Trolley proponents later said the opening date would be sometime in summer of 2017. It wasn’t. Then they said the opening date would be in August. It no longer is. And then they said it would be sometime later in the fall of 2017. I wouldn’t be surprised if the trolley actually starts moving people sometime closer to 2018.

The Loop Trolley is a textbook example of government mismanagement. Proponents over-promised and under-delivered, and ultimately, taxpayers are on the hook. Unfortunately, the trolley’s foundering was entirely predictable. Projects like it are consistently over budget and often delayed for years. Perhaps policymakers will take this as a learning opportunity. It looks like the federal government may be doing just that.

The St. Louis Business Journal reports that:

Edwards also said he has been told by Federal Transit Administration Regional Administrator Mokhtee Ahmad that if the trolley is not completed in the immediate future and does not operate successfully for the first three years, future federal funds for other St. Louis-area projects could go to other cities. [emphasis mine]

Is the federal government really so displeased with the Loop Trolley that it is questioning whether regional leaders can competently manage infrastructure projects? On top of taxpayers not being able to ride the trolley they were promised, will they miss out on other, more meaningful projects?

The post Face-Palm: Loop Trolley Over-Budget, Likely Delayed, Again appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

To see why this is the case, remember first that building the proposed North–South MetroLink expansion may cost upwards of $2 billion, not including the increased costs of operating the system. That’s a huge price tag, one that the region would likely not consider if not for the possibility of getting federal grants, which can cover as much as 50% of transit infrastructure costs. However, getting these grants is a competitive process, and the County’s vocal opposition could harm (if not destroy) Saint Louis’s chances. No federal dollars would all but guarantee no new MetroLink.

However, let us imagine that the city moves forward over the county’s objections and, despite the disharmony, the federal government agrees to cover half the costs of MetroLink’s expansion. Even then, the city’s ability to go it alone is questionable. The city would still need to cover a billion dollars in capital costs and increased MetroLink operating expenses, requiring a new city-wide sales tax of more than 2 percent. Such an increase would put the city’s total average sales tax above 10 percent, with many areas in the city charging a tax of more than 12 percent on all goods and services. Even if the state legislature would allow a vote on it, Saint Louis’s residents and businesses would likely reject a tax hike of that size.

The other prime option for circumventing County opposition, the use of a transportation development district (TDD), is also unlikely to succeed. Creating a new taxing district near the proposed route could help fund the expansion, but creating a district large enough to raise a billion dollars would be difficult. TDDs, by state law, can charge a maximum of a 1% sales tax and a property tax of 10 cents on each $100 of assessed valuation (imposing the property tax would require a supermajority approval) in the district’s boundaries.  To fund a MetroLink expansion, the TDD would have to extend well beyond the city and reach economically productive areas in Saint Louis County, all of which would be far away from the North–South expansion’s route. These areas would be less likely to vote in favor of a high-tax TDD.

Unfortunately for the city, the only logical way to fund a multibillion-dollar MetroLink expansion is the same method used to fund past expansions: sales tax increases in both the city and the entire county, to tune of 0.5%. The city might find Stenger’s opposition embarrassing, but what’s more embarrassing here is that the MetroLink, with its massive expense and low ridership, requires financial support from those who will rarely, if ever, ride. In the end, if the city and transit activists want more rail, they are going to have to start begging the county, as they are now begging the federal government, to get on board. 

The post To Pay for North-South MetroLink, the City Will Need the County appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In making the case for expanding the streetcar, Kansas City officials have claimed that the streetcar (despite the fact that it only recently opened) has spurred development within the rail’s transportation development district (TDD). But the data on the market value of property within the TDD tell a different story. In fact, as the chart below shows, property values within the streetcar’s TDD follow largely the same trajectory as property values did in the county as a whole. According to data provided by Jackson County, market values grew in the early 2000s, fell during the recession, and began rising again in 2014. While the market value of property within the TDD has grown faster than values in Jackson County as a whole from 2000 to 2015, that growth occurred before the TDD’s creation, and is mainly due to the construction of the Power and Light District (which opened in 2007).

If we simply look at market values after the streetcar’s TDD was finalized in 2012, Jackson County as a whole performed better than the TDD. This directly contradicts the idea that the Kansas City Streetcar is boosting development downtown:

So why the disconnect between city hall’s streetcar rhetoric and the actual property data? Findings from the latest report from the Federal Transit Administration on streetcar development may shed some light on the situation:

Almost all [civic] representatives interviewed believed that streetcars positively affected the built environment, particularly in attracting new development or enhancing revitalization, although the degree of impact varies. Few systems, however, reported the types of ancillary changes in the built environment, such as reduced parking garage construction, increased pedestrian or bike lane investments, or explicit parking reductions that often are associated with light rail systems. Few, if any, streetcar system operators seek information on their impact on economic activity, although most interviewed consider economic-related questions to be vital and desire further research on this topic. [emphasis added]

Put another way, never let the truth get in the way of a good story.  

The post Is the Streetcar a Development Magnet? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

To their credit, Kansas City's streetcar aficionados rarely make the claim that streetcars are good transit. They aren't. They are woefully expensive for the service they offer, are inflexible, and are slow. Bus rapid transit such as the MAX on Troost is a much more effective method of moving people.

In Kansas City and elsewhere, the matter comes down to one of correlation versus causation. Streetcar proponents want desperately to claim that the streetcar causes economic development downtown. It doesn't. In fact, all sorts of literature in the United States and around the world fails to show that streetcars cause economic development. There might be a correlation, however, as economic development often occurs along streetcar routes. Why? Because cities such as Kansas City lard their streetcar routes with all sorts of taxpayer subsidies such as tax increment financing and property tax abatements that are much more likely to drive development. Economic development may occur along streetcar routes, but it is not caused by them.

In fact, a 2010 study sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration found that,

The literature regarding empirical measurement of actual changes in economic activity, such as changes in retail sales, visitors, or job growth, is almost nonexistent for streetcars.  

This finding undercuts the primary claim made by advocates of streetcars—that they spur economic development. The same report adds,

Given that federal funding for streetcars emphasizes economic development, along with many local policymakers’ objectives to stimulate economic development, the literature is particularly weak on impacts of streetcars on economic development, such as the attraction of jobs, retail sales, and tax revenue.

In Kansas City, officials have strung together a laughable list of projects supposedly caused by the streetcar. We've debunked them here and here and here. While there may be a correlation between development and the streetcar, it isn't plausible to claim that the streetcar caused the development.

Consider that in the 2013 and 2014 seasons up to May 22, 2014, when ground was broken on the Kansas City streetcar line, the Royals record was 109-99, for a winning percentage of .524. Since the streetcar tracks were laid, however, the Royals went 183-126, including two World Series appearances and one world championship. That's a winning percentage of .592. If I suggested that the relationship between the streetcar construction and Royals’ success was one of causation—the streetcar caused the Royals to win two pennants and the World Series—I'd be laughed out of the room.

Yet this is exactly the sort of specious argument streetcar proponents make when they point to downtown development. The progress of the streetcar and the Royals’ success may run in parallel, but there is no relationship between them or among their causes. Like the streetcar and many developments attributed to it, the relationship is illusory.

The post Streetcars and the Error of Confusing Correlation vs Causation appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

On January 8, the Huffington Post published a piece titled “A Streetcar Named Deception,” by Lawrence Hanley, president of the Washington, D.C., transit workers union. Hanley echoes many of the concerns made in this blog and elsewhere:

Streetcars today are of little, if any, use to those who actually depend on public transit as their primary means of mobility. Unlike light rail, heavy rail, and bus rapid transit, streetcars don’t have dedicated lanes to keep them moving free of automobile traffic. And in many cases, they run slower than a standard bus. And unlike a bus, a streetcar can’t shift out of its lane to avoid an obstacle, causing more traffic.

Streetcars also divert taxpayer money away from mobility-focused transit that helps working people and into boutique transit loops meant for “choice riders.” Meanwhile, bus service that takes people where they really must go gets short shrift, with routes being cut and fares going up. Adding insult to injury, streetcars are usually marketed as “sleek,” “premium,” “clean” ways for the rising urban class to get around. Rather than investing in and improving transit for everybody, politicians and their corporate backers are intentionally developing parallel transit systems—one for the well-to-do and one for the rest of us.

A month later, the New York Times published a piece arguing that money spent on streetcars is largely wasted:

“Bus-based public transit in the United States suffers from an image problem.”

That fact, laid out in a 2009 report from the Federal Transit Administration, isn’t surprising, but it has led to a perverse outcome: Transit agencies are spending millions of dollars on new rail infrastructure that is no faster than existing bus service, simply because riders perceive a train as better than a bus.

Many who are serious about effective transit have abandoned streetcars as a viable option. Why do Kansas City leaders persist when no one, especially Kansas City voters, thinks this is a good idea?

The post Streetcars Have Lost the Left appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Clearly, one thing streetcar proponents do not want to do is wait to see the results of the initial streetcar line, but why the rush? Why do city officials think the streetcar expansion proposal is a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity”? Some streetcar proponents fear that the Republicans might win the presidency and stop giving money to transit, and at more than $50 million a mile, streetcar projects are just too expensive for cities to undertake without federal help. As one streetcar supporter put it, “Do you think President Ted Cruz would fund urban transit?”

The answer to that question is yes, actually, if history is any guide. Below is a chart of federal spending on capital improvements for transit, through two Republican and Democratic presidents.

While the Obama administration has increased support for transit, the George W. Bush administration was also a big spender. What’s more, a future Republican administration is unlikely to be catastrophic for transit funding, as almost 80 percent of funds come directly from a federal Mass Transit Account. This account will continue to provide a baseline of transit funding under any new administration.

What streetcar advocates really have to fear is not the defunding of urban transit, but the defunding of streetcars in favor of other forms of transit. Past administrations favored transit projects that reduced congestion or improved mobility, so streetcars received few federal dollars. The Obama administration’s desire to use transit projects to create “livable communities” has made federal streetcar funding possible.

But if the more than 10 planned streetcar projects are as successful as proponents hope – both in terms of development and boosting transit – the next administration (Team Red or Blue) would likely fund more streetcar projects. Only if the streetcars fail to meet expectations, given their massive cost, would federal money dry up for streetcars.

Perhaps it’s that possibility – that streetcars face a tough accounting in future– that has supporters in a rush. What’s certain is that federal transit funding is not going anywhere, and if streetcars are so great for urban areas, the money will be there if Kansas City ever decides to expand its streetcar line. And if streetcars turn out to be an urban planning fad and that funding disappears? Kansas City will be better off for its caution. When it comes to expanding the streetcar, Kansas City residents should feel free to emulate the streetcar and take it slow.

The post Streetcar Fever: Is it Now Or Never To Expand The Kansas City Streetcar? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

On Monday, Mayor Sly James said the work being performed by Kansas City’s Parson & Associates LLC and Scott Hall & Associates will help the city fulfill a federal requirement to incorporate an environmental assessment into the expansion routes so the city is eligible to receive federal funding.

“If this assessment is not completed, then the city will have no opportunity to receive federal funding,” James said in the statement.

The effort is the subject of an ethics complaint that opponents to the streetcar sales and property taxes have filed, claiming it is electioneering. Alonzo followed up with the federal agency awarding the grants and found there is no such requirement.

No federal mandate requires Kansas City or its contractors to hold door-to-door meetings before part of the city votes on a proposed extension of the streetcar project, according to the Federal Transit Administration.

This is not the first time the mayor and Kansas City officials have been caught trying to blame federal regulators for forcing the city to adopt questionable policies. Steve Vockrodt, at The Pitch, just penned a piece pointing out that the EPA has never cited the Kansas City airport for environmental shortcomings:

City officials distributed a fact sheet in April 2013 that said KCI couldn’t meet U.S. Environmental Protection Agency guidelines for capturing de-icing runoff.

“The current terminal infrastructure does not allow the airport to meet the EPA’s new standards for capturing deicing fluids, which require capturing about 30 percent of the run-off,” the fact sheet reads. “The new single terminal will capture nearly 100 percent of the runoff and resolve Environmental Protection Agency issues the airport is currently facing.”

But there is no such EPA guideline.

Two EPA officials contacted by The Pitch could not identify any published guidelines that call for the capture of 30 percent of de-icing fluids.

And let us not forget the recently ended bid for the GOP convention, in which Mayor James argued that it was necessary to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars, in secret, just to keep up.

The Show-Me State’s Harry Truman once famously quipped, “The buck stops here.” But in Kansas City, Mayor James and Kansas City government officials point the finger elsewhere and the bucks don’t stop at all.

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“The stated goal of this project is economic development. That’s the dominant goal,” [Russ] Johnson said. “The dominant goal is not to have a lot of people ride it. The dominant goal is to develop the city.”

During remarks at the meeting, supporters, including Kansas City Mayor Sly James, presented as evidence of economic development the construction that has already taken place downtown. However, this employs a logical fallacy — post hoc ergo propter hoc. Municipalities often claim credit for development simply because it occurred after their policies were enacted, but it is disingenuous.

Below is an incomplete list of studies that demonstrate that economic development is not a result of fixed rail. We encourage everyone to read these, and we encourage streetcar supporters to provide contrary evidence that stands up to scrutiny.

• “The Great Streetcar Conspiracy,” Cato Institute, June 2012. Randal O’Toole has written extensively about the topic. If one questions this research because it comes from the libertarian Cato Institute, there are plenty of other sources.
• The Atlantic Cities published an article which makes clear that evidence for economic development due to streetcars is lacking. The author writes:

But while the Portland streetcar was the anchor or at least the featured element of this growth, it wasn’t responsible for this boom by itself. Rather, it was part of a broader development plan in which zoning, public-private investment, street upgrades, and other renewal efforts also played considerable roles.

• A 2010 study by the Federal Transit Administration concluded there was little information on the matter:

The literature regarding empirical measurement of actual changes in economic activity, such as changes in retail sales, visitors, or job growth, is almost nonexistent for streetcars. Indeed, this lack of empirical data was cited by many of the streetcar system survey respondents described in this report.

The same report also addressed the notion that streetcars attract the creative class:

Although occasionally the literature forecasting economic benefits for proposed streetcar systems posits that streetcars will attract more “creatives” to the area, this idea cannot be substantiated.

• Even the folks in Portland, whose work Kansas City streetcar proponents often cite, admit that results were dependent upon many programs, not just the streetcar. And even then, Portland’s ridership revenue is far less than they expected, making the effort a “money pit.”
• One attendee at the meeting referenced Cincinnati’s rail efforts, which, as one gentleman in attendance pointed out, has become a financial mess that voters rejected.
• A 1997 Georgia State University study of Atlanta’s trail transit system concluded

Taken together with earlier evidence that the social costs of rapid transit are higher than those for buses, the results suggest that it may be difficult to justify rapid rail investment on the basis of a benefit-cost analysis. In the absence of local economic development around stations, the benefits of rail are limited to those that might occur at the regional level. Future work should seek to quantify these benefits.

• A 2004 report from the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis also concluded:

. . . the increase in property values and economic development are subsidized benefits and may not be greater than the subsidy costs. Both citizens and local officials should have an understanding of the costs of light-rail transit relative to the potential benefits. Given the size of costs relative to the benefits, the creation of light-rail transit systems or the expansion of existing systems in American cities may be difficult to justify.

Indeed, building commercial-grade rail lines through 100-plus-year-old neighborhoods is difficult to justify. Study after study indicates no support for the city’s “dominant goal” of economic development. If streetcar boosters are aware of research that supports the claim that streetcars themselves — and not the tax-subsidized construction that goes with them — results in economic growth, we are eager to learn of it. Presumably, everyone else cited here would welcome seeing the research as well.

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Streetcars once operated throughout Saint Louis, but the combined competition of car travel and more efficient buses made their operation uneconomical. As a tool of public transportation, or moving people around the city, streetcars are not optimal. Compared to buses, they are inflexible, require expensive infrastructure, and are relatively slow. However, local planners are attempting to bring these relics back to the streets of Saint Louis, starting with the Loop trolley and a plan for a streetcar downtown.

Planners do not propose that streetcars are primarily superior people movers. Instead, they claim that streetcars raise property values, promote economic development, and attract “choice” travelers.  Planners point to examples in Portland and other cities where streetcars supposedly attracted huge investment because they are a fixed infrastructure system upon which developers can depend. However, even the friendliest studies of streetcars state that large tax subsidies were integral to the development in places such as Portland, Seattle, and Kenosha. If streetcars do attract housing or retail development, it is likely because they are coupled with, or signal the arrival of, government largess. Those payouts will ultimately cost the taxpayer or reduce funds for other needed services.

Planners also claim that streetcars attract “choice users,” or those who could drive but choose transit if the level of service is high. These riders, according to streetcar advocates, will not ride buses, as they provide low-quality service. However, a U.S. Department of Transportation study found that the low opinion of buses versus other forms of transit stems largely from their image of serving low-income passengers and economically depressed areas. These opinions change when buses are re-branded and built to serve more affluent customers. Hence, it is more likely that trolleys through disadvantaged neighborhoods will lower residents’ opinions of streetcar service instead of transforming local neighborhoods.

In most American cities, including Saint Louis, buses carry the majority of travelers and the vast majority of low-income transit users. If Saint Louis plans to subsidize public transportation, it should aim to improve the system that provides the greatest public service. Building an expensive toy to attract affluent riders is a lower priority. With the Loop trolley in danger of losing its $22 million grant from the Federal Transit Administration, it is time to revisit both the costs and benefits of streetcar service in Saint Louis.

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If you want to travel from the Loop to Forest Park in Saint Louis, there is no shortage of options: You can walk, bike, drive, take the bus, or ride the Metrolink. As if that were not enough, government planners, who are more than happy to spend your tax money for services you never even thought you needed, have dreamt up yet another alternative.

The Federal Transit Administration recently approved a $25 million grant to develop a trolley system running from the Missouri History Museum in Forest Park to the University City Library on Delmar, a distance of 2.2 miles. The total construction cost will reach close to $45 million — almost $20 million per mile of track. Private donations will pay for just a small portion (less than 12 percent) of this exorbitant cost; taxpayers will finance most of the project’s construction and operational costs. Local sales taxes, federal grants, and rider fares will pay for the trolley. However, fares will only cover 30 percent of annual costs. A meager 6 percent will come from advertising and sponsorship from private funds, with sales taxes funding 64 percent.

What is wrong with simply expanding bus service, which could be done at a tiny fraction of the cost? The government estimated rubber tire trolley (buses disguised as trolleys) capital costs to be $4.5 million, about 10 percent of the cost to build a fixed track trolley. Expanding bus service, without purchasing new buses that look like trolleys, would cost even less to start up and maintain.

Believe it or not, a 2011 environmental assessment explained that a fixed track system was chosen not just in spite of, but because of, the high cost, which supposedly proves the government’s commitment to revitalizing the area. According to the report that the Federal Transit Administration and the East-West Gateway Council of Governments prepared, a rail system “cannot be removed without substantial expense and time,” whereas rubber tire options “can be cancelled or rerouted with little expense or effort.” By this logic, the planners of the system are bound to create a white elephant — defined as a burdensome possession whose cost is out of proportion to its usefulness or worth.

There is no evidence to suggest that building a streetcar along Delmar will result in an economic windfall to the area. The plan’s proponents have not presented any kind of cost-benefit analysis to the public.

Proponents of the Loop Trolley like to throw around the term “economic development” as if it is an automatic result of spending lots of money. They assume that the creation of a streetcar will magically revitalize the less desirable areas of the neighborhood between the Loop and Forest Park. If that is the case, then why is it so difficult to obtain private financing for this system? Many of the trolley’s supporters are Loop business owners. If they believe in the project so strongly, why don’t they fund it? Instead, government is using money that could otherwise be spent on education or public safety — or remain in taxpayers’ pockets.

Supporters of the Loop Trolley may point to other streetcar projects, such as the one in Portland, Ore., as purported evidence that the Trolley will generate millions of dollars of economic development. What they do not mention, however, is the hundreds of millions of dollars of infrastructure subsidies, tax breaks, and other incentives Portland gave to developers to entice them to build in the streetcar corridor. Former Portland Transportation Commissioner Charlie Hales even admitted that rail transit alone will not stimulate development along transit corridors.

Saint Louis does not need another white elephant conjured up through the misdirection of taxpayer money.

Kacie Galbraith is a research assistant at the Show-Me Institute, which promotes market solutions for Missouri public policy.

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