Susan Pendergrass speaks with Aaron Renn, author and consultant, and David Stokes, Director of Municipal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, about the recurring debate over whether the city of St. Louis should rejoin St. Louis County. They explore what city county mergers have actually accomplished in places like Indianapolis, Louisville, Nashville, and Lexington, why a full merger in St. Louis would be extraordinarily difficult to pull off, and whether the benefits would even outweigh the costs. They also discuss St. Louis’s demographic challenges, what the Pittsburgh model might offer as a path forward, the cultural barriers that make it hard to attract and retain people from outside the region, and more.

You can find Aaron’s work here.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:05): Welcome back, Aaron Renn, to the podcast. So happy to have you and David Stokes, our own expert on cities and counties and all things municipal. I appreciate you coming on, Aaron. There have been murmurings around St. Louis again on a topic that we have revisited for probably a hundred years: should the city of St. Louis be a separate county from St. Louis County?

Before we get to that, I want to ask you something because I was reading the news this morning, and I know that you’ve written about city county mergers before, like cities that are kind of dying and then either pulling in parts of their closest suburbs to sort of make everything look better, broaden their tax base, make their crime numbers look better. I was reading something you wrote a year or two ago about that, and you said that Louisville is a failed example of that. Is that right, basically?

Aaron Renn (01:01): Yeah, I’m a little skeptical of how these things have worked out in practice.

Susan Pendergrass (01:05): Yeah, in terms of losing the flavor and the coolness of the city. Literally this morning I saw an article about how Louisville is having a renaissance and these young professionals are all moving there because they didn’t tear down all their beautiful old Victorian homes, so you can still get one for close to a million dollars. They’ve got a cool art scene and a bourbon scene. So it sounds like maybe Louisville did not lose its personal flavor in the merger. I would be curious to know what you think of that.

Aaron Renn (01:33): Well, I like to put St. Louis in context. I’m glad you mentioned Louisville because many of these river cities have similar characteristics. I like to look at St. Louis as well as three cities in the Ohio Valley: Louisville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. All of them heavily German Catholic in their demographics. All of them are very geopolitically fragmented with many small tiny suburbs throughout. They all have very fragmented neighborhood systems as well, where everybody has a strong sense of neighborhood identity. Where you go to high school is a big social marker. They all have phenomenal collections of urban assets and great historic buildings. They all still have their own unique character in a country where that has sort of bled away.

Aaron Renn (02:31): And they also have curiously underperformed demographically and economically in terms of growth. They’re slow growth places. So one thing I always encourage people is to pan back the lens and don’t just look at St. Louis in isolation. Look at it in comparison or dialogue with some of these other places and see what you can learn from them.

Louisville is actually a quite troubled city in important ways. From a white collar employment perspective it’s doing well, from a blue collar perspective less so. It’s one of the 10 least educated major metros in the country. I don’t want to spend too much time on Louisville, but I want to talk about the city county merger, which is distinct from recombining the city and the county. This has been considered urban planning best practice for 30 or 40 years. There was a book written by David Rusk called Cities Without Suburbs. The idea is that cities that were able to expand their boundaries through either annexation or city county mergers were prospering, whilst cities that did not, like the Clevelands, the Cincinnatis, and the St. Louises, were struggling. So the idea is we need big box government.

Indianapolis, where I live now, had a city county merger in 1970. Louisville did a city county merger, I grew up near Louisville. Jacksonville, Florida, Lexington, Kentucky, and Nashville, Tennessee did as well. What I would say is a few things. Merger is not necessarily bad. For Indianapolis, merger did prevent the city from essentially going down the tubes in important ways. So it really was a win in important ways.

But it did not prevent the historic city from going into the exact same demographic decline as St. Louis. The historic city of Indianapolis has lost almost exactly the same share of its population since 1970 as St. Louis has. Secondly, these are very politically difficult to pull off. They take enormous effort. They often fail multiple times. Louisville had multiple failures.

The most precious resource is always management time and attention. Is this where you want to put all your political chips? And in order to get it passed politically, what happens invariably is that most entities are actually not consolidated. In Louisville, none of the existing incorporated suburban governments were in fact merged. In Indianapolis, the school districts weren’t merged.

This means you don’t necessarily get all of the benefits you think from consolidation, because many things are excluded. And then unlike a corporate merger, where there’s typically a lot of downsizing and cost rationalization, in city county mergers nobody ever loses their job and salaries and benefits might even be harmonized upward to the high watermark. So don’t expect it to save any money. Personally, city county merger might have some benefits for St. Louis. I’m not saying it would have no benefits, but in my opinion it’s not going to be a needle mover and most likely it would be extraordinarily politically difficult and uncertain to pull off.

Susan Pendergrass (06:00): Yeah, no question. It’s been very politically difficult. People don’t want to do it. However, we do have these little tiny school districts and police districts. We have, I don’t know, 28 911 systems. We have a lot of what looks like bureaucratic waste and red tape. To the extent that doesn’t get resolved in a merger, then what’s the point? But I do think, you know, we’ve been talking about the demographics of St. Louis. There were over 800,000 people in the city once. Now there are maybe 280,000 and declining, and we’re in the death spiral of more people dying than being born. We’ve been in that for a while. And I guess it brings up the question of what is St. Louis to do if we are in this death spiral? We’re not having the babies. We’re having fewer babies than we did 15 years ago. So school enrollment is only declining. What is the prescription in that situation?

I’ve been to Cincinnati quite a bit. They’re trying to get people downtown with sports stadiums. It doesn’t really work. Louisville has sports stadiums downtown. I don’t know if people really want to move down there. I don’t see it working in St. Louis. So what is a city in that situation to do?

Aaron Renn (07:18): It’s going to be challenging in a sense because your problems are a little over determined. St. Louis was once a regional capital city, much like a Dallas or an Atlanta or a Denver or a Minneapolis. And it lost a lot of those functions. Many of its headquarters have left. It used to have a lot of professional services firms like ad agencies that did business all over the country, not just for the local market. Now St. Louis, although it’s still bigger than Indianapolis, looks a lot more like an Indianapolis or a Columbus, Ohio, where you have fewer corporate headquarters and most of the service firms are just there to serve the local market. St. Louis has essentially shrunk a little bit in relative importance, and it’s hard to get that back.

The demographics are also quite difficult and create a situation where it’s hard to attract business when you have a shrinking labor force, weak demographic growth, and a weak ability to bring people in from the outside. So it’s a very complicated situation and I don’t think there’s any silver bullet for St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (08:39): That’s what I’m asking you for. You have the answers. What’s the silver bullet?

Aaron Renn (08:43): So here are the things I would look at if I were in St. Louis. One of the clear issues that affects all of these river cities is that their wonderful, unique local cultures come with a downside, which is an extreme parochialism that has two negative effects. One, it makes it difficult for the communities to cohesively work together, which I’m not telling you anything you don’t already know. City-suburb divides tend to be bigger. In Indianapolis, regional leadership is mostly all on the same page about the big issues. Same with Columbus, Ohio. Secondly, it makes it very difficult to attract people from out of town because they come there and they can’t make friends, they can’t penetrate the social networks.

Susan Pendergrass (09:15): 100%, yes.

Aaron Renn (09:40): You hear it over and over again in places like St. Louis, Cleveland, even Minneapolis, Minnesota. There are some sayings there. If you want to make friends in Minnesota, go to kindergarten, because that’s when everybody makes their friends. Or Minnesotans will give you directions anywhere but their house. They’re never going to invite you over. St. Louis has that reputation. I don’t think it’s just a reputation. And I know you just had Ness Sandoval on.

Susan Pendergrass (09:53): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (10:08): He’s talking about you need to get better on migration. Migration isn’t going to improve if migrants are not going to be able to join the social networks here. And that’s not even just international migration, that’s domestic migrants. So I think that’s a huge issue for the city. Cultural issues are hard to solve, but maybe less intractable than infrastructure.

The other thing is looking at Pittsburgh as a sort of model. Pittsburgh hasn’t solved really most of its problems by any means, but it has been able to regenerate in the city a sort of high value economy around Carnegie Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. It’s done quite well. Many Silicon Valley firms have set up shop there. What’s happened in Pittsburgh, although it’s still a demographic decline story, is there’s been a demographic transition in the city. Pittsburgh went from one of the least educated cities in America to now one of the youngest and most educated. Part of it is old people moved and died off and young educated people replaced them. So the total number of people in the city was declining, but there was a churn happening underneath. And the same thing is already happening in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (11:13): How did they do that?

Aaron Renn (11:33): College degree attainment in the city is now well north of 40%. So the people who live in the city of St. Louis are very educated. That demographic churn has raised educational attainment and thus incomes in the city a lot. Now Pittsburgh was different because it was an almost entirely white city. There’s a racial divide in St. Louis and gentrification concerns become more salient. But St. Louis is now an educated city. This is not an old post-industrial blue collar city. The city of St. Louis itself is very educated. And also being very small, it doesn’t necessarily need a massive change to move the needle. In Indianapolis we have a population of over 900,000. Moving that behemoth takes a lot. St. Louis now being smaller has a situation where there could be a big impact from lower numbers of things. So I think a knowledge economy built around Washington University and your medical centers has some possibilities, somewhat similar to Pittsburgh.

Susan Pendergrass (12:45): So much medical.

Aaron Renn (12:58): Carnegie Mellon’s engineering and computer science areas will be a little different. I might also look at Vanderbilt, what’s going on there? What are some peer schools you could watch to see what’s going on? But I think there are actually some reasons to think that the city of St. Louis, believe it or not, could be sort of turning a corner. It has now demographically renewed itself to a higher educational attainment state. Being small, it probably doesn’t have that much further to fall, and you can start building from there. Obviously there are governance challenges, but looking at the Pittsburgh model, studying similar complexes around peer schools, and addressing the culture issues is where I’d look.

David Stokes (13:33): Hopeful.

Susan Pendergrass (13:47): So as a spokesperson for St. Louis, what do you see for the future?

David Stokes (13:52): Well, I would be curious to get Aaron’s thoughts on that size question, about how the city of St. Louis has in fact gotten so small. It’s about 10% of the metro area. How does that affect the pros or cons of any type of a merger? These would not be a merger of equals. St. Louis County would almost subsume St. Louis City into it. How do you think that would affect things for better or worse?

Aaron Renn (14:28): Well, that was the critique of the Louisville merger by two academics at the University of Louisville. I mentioned the book Cities Without Suburbs. They wrote an academic paper called Suburbs Without a City, which basically said if the merger passed in Louisville, it would essentially mean the suburbs take over the city, not the city taking over the suburbs, because the old city of Louisville only had about 260,000 people and the suburbs would numerically dominate. The same thing would certainly happen in St. Louis. If there were a merger, suburban St. Louis County would control the city in essence.

Another consideration, and this is a Cincinnati issue, I interviewed about 15 years ago the mayor of Cincinnati, John Cranley. Here’s what he said, and I think this is an important point. He said, 30 years ago, city county merger was the thing because cities were in decline and you wanted to tap that suburban tax base to fund the city. But now it’s reversed. Now the cities are coming back and it’s the inner suburbs that are actually going down the tubes. And so in Cincinnati today, we have all the corporate headquarters, we have the universities and the medical centers, and we don’t have to share our tax revenue with anybody. If we were merged with the county government, we’d have to prop up all these failing suburbs. And so I think you’re in a similar situation in St. Louis, where the high value activity, not all of it is in the city of St. Louis because of Clayton and so on, but the St. Louis County suburbs are mostly places that are themselves on negative trajectories. Merging the city, which may be on the cusp of being able to bottom out and turn around, with all of these still declining inner suburban areas, might actually be an albatross around the city’s neck.

Susan Pendergrass (15:16): What would that mean?

David Stokes (16:37): I just think one of the differences between St. Louis and Cincinnati, and I don’t know the property tax base of Cincinnati, is that so much of the city of St. Louis is tax exempt right now. Between Washington University, Saint Louis University, and all the government entities, there’s just so much of it. I say that as somebody who supports property tax changes to make them pay something towards it. But I just don’t think the Cincinnati argument applies to the city of St. Louis right now. That property tax exemption part is a huge factor because the most growing, thriving part of it is the entire giant Barnes-WashU-Cortex complex, and the amount of property taxes they pay is miniscule.

Susan Pendergrass (16:38): Hmm.

Aaron Renn (17:26): Well, some of that is a planning issue. And I think the reality is, when you have a complex like that, are all these people going to move to St. Charles? Maybe not. I’ll tell you, I live in the suburb of Indianapolis named Carmel, and a lot of the hospitals and things have been opening facilities here. When these nonprofit hospitals come up here, we will not approve zoning changes for those hospitals unless they agree to make payments in lieu of taxes. You want to come up here and you want a zoning change, you’re going to have to pay. We were actually quite prescient in that one of the local hospital chains opened a for-profit hospital. As part of the approval deal, we said, if you ever convert to nonprofit status, you will continue paying property taxes. And we did that.

So I think there probably is leverage from the city over some of these entities. You don’t have a lot of leverage over a corporation deciding where to put their office, but that’s not a tax exempt situation. The stuff at Cortex is probably not going to leave if you make them pay a little money the next time they come to you for a zoning approval. I think you need to start looking at how to get more money out of these entities that are nonprofits in name only. These universities and hospitals are effectively gigantic hedge funds. Their executives are extremely well compensated and billions of dollars are flowing through there. Undoubtedly the better solution there is to figure out how to tax them rather than figure out how to tax the soon-to-be-dead mall in the suburb over the border.

David Stokes (19:24): Well, yeah, and that’s sort of the trade off, unfortunately, is that they do pay earnings tax. The employees, many of them very highly compensated, pay the earnings tax. And that’s what makes the city more dependent on local income taxes, not less, because they’re either tax exempt or in the case of Cortex, have tax abatements that make them essentially tax exempt.

Susan Pendergrass (19:25): We do have earnings taxes, right? So the folks who work there have to pay an earnings tax.

Aaron Renn (19:53): Yeah. Again, I don’t know exactly the fiscal architecture there. But I would say you don’t want to do a merger simply to do a tax dollar grab. The lesson of Indianapolis is we did that. We grabbed suburban tax dollars and we used it to rebuild our downtown successfully. But here we are 50 years later, and now we have enormous tracts of decayed suburbia that are an enormous problem. Our entire core county is now in a sense the inner city. We have big challenges because we were not able to invest in ways that allow those suburban areas to retain their allure over the long term.

And I’m not saying that’s impossible, but any short term juice you get, cities always rise and fall. Core cities have proven more resilient and more able to regenerate themselves than suburbs. Part of it is because state governments cannot afford to let their state’s largest city or major urban center go down the tubes.

Susan Pendergrass (21:06): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (21:16): Missouri cannot let St. Louis and Kansas City implode. Michigan cannot just write off Detroit and say who cares. But these suburban areas have proven a lot tougher to save. We don’t have a good model. We’ve spent decades thinking about how to rebuild cities and build districts. There are certain things you can pull off in a city around conventions, civic events, gathering spaces, museums, and government that are very hard to translate to suburban settings. So there’s not a great playbook, especially in declining markets, for renewing suburbs. The playbook for suburban renewal, if you want to call it that, is places like Carmel, Indiana, which are growing and affluent, and therefore can build large mixed use centers, new urbanist developments, trails, and parks. The suburbs of St. Louis County are probably tremendously deficient in infrastructure as we would understand it today.

So again, there may actually be some benefits in having St. Louis City rejoin the county in a sense, because then the county functions are spread and amortized across a larger population.

Susan Pendergrass (22:45): It would immediately improve our murder rate because we would be mixing it in.

Aaron Renn (22:48): Yeah, there is some of that. The murder rate is an artifact of the size of the city more than anything. There are places in Chicago with higher murder rates. A former colleague of mine at the Manhattan Institute, Rafael Mangual, did an analysis of Chicago. He said there are areas on the South Side of Chicago that are larger and have more people than St. Louis with far higher murder rates than St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (22:56): We get called out because of the small denominator.

Aaron Renn (23:17): And so there is that. The other thing is Chicago is a good example. New York City was essentially a city county merger. In 1898, the five counties that are the five boroughs of New York were consolidated into one city. Philadelphia was also a city county consolidation from the 19th century. But what happens when you create a very large city of say a million people or more is you really have to scale up your government. You have to have a government that operates at that scale.

What happened with Indianapolis was we merged city and county government, but we didn’t really have a government that could effectively manage this new larger territory. It never built out the infrastructure in the suburbs. In New York, the Bronx has subways, great parks, everything built out with proper infrastructure, because it was part of New York and New York had to expand governance to become a city of eight million. Chicago got big in the 19th century and built a city government that could run a city of three million people. And some of the stuff that gets critiqued there, for example, is a lot of city services were organized by ward or city council district. There are 50 city council districts and every city councilor is sort of a little mini mayor of their district. The alderman essentially has veto power over any zoning changes. It’s called aldermanic privilege. So there are a lot of constraints there.

But if it’s just one mayor and one city council trying to think about a huge city of 77 neighborhoods and three million people, they can’t keep that much in their head. All they can think about is downtown. And that’s what happened in Indianapolis. The mayor and city council can really only think about downtown. We should have built out structures in townships throughout the city so that you had leadership focused on that area and money focused on that area. That’s what made the suburbs work really well. A suburb like Carmel is basically township sized. We have 100,000 people, big enough to do things, but not so big that our mayor and council can’t keep the whole city in their head and plan and manage the whole city.

So if you merge with the county government, you’re going to have to create an entirely new government structure that allows you to essentially manage every sub area of the whole thing and bring it all up to a standard of services. That’s the other thing they often did in Louisville and Nashville. They merge, but they have a two tier service system where there’s an urban services district for the old city which gets more services, and then the others get less. They didn’t do that in New York. There’s one standard of service in New York, one in Philadelphia, one in Chicago. So if you can’t commit to a single standard of service, you’re basically creating a bogus merger in my opinion. If you’re going to do a merger, you need to obliterate every government and entity in St. Louis County and city, merge them all into one with one standard. That’s not going to happen.

Susan Pendergrass (26:35): That’s not going to happen. What do you think, David?

David Stokes (26:37): Yeah, that’s not going to happen.

Aaron Renn (26:43): So you end up with a lot of problems. Louisville didn’t merge any fire departments. Imagine a city that doesn’t have a consolidated fire department. Imagine a city without a single police department. That was actually Indianapolis. When we merged, the Indianapolis Police Department still patrolled the old city, but the new parts of the city that were consolidated in from the county were still controlled by the sheriff.

Susan Pendergrass (27:13): That is 100% what would happen in St. Louis. Everyone would retain their school system and their police department and their fire department. I lived for a long time in Fairfax County, Virginia, which is a single county government. It’s massive, 150,000 students in their school system. It seems to function with a single police department and fire department. But I don’t think you can backwards engineer that into a place that for hundreds of years has been operating as it has been operating.

Aaron Renn (27:43): Lexington, Kentucky worked pretty well because one, the schools were already consolidated, as in the South it’s typically county school districts. Secondly, there were no other government entities, no township governments, no other incorporated municipalities. So it merged everything. And they were sort of able to solve the urban services district issue because the outer areas of Fayette County were horse farms. They actually put in a kind of green belt rule, you can’t develop out there, because they wanted to protect these scenic landscapes. So there was actually a good reason to treat that differently, because it was a very unique American landscape. Lexington, I think, was pretty successful.

Susan Pendergrass (28:15): They are. I appreciate it when I drive across Route 64.

Aaron Renn (28:39): Lexington was pretty successful and wasn’t especially controversial when they did it, in part because there weren’t all these entrenched interests like there are in other places. If you look at places that did the mergers, they weren’t the Cincinnatis and Pittsburghs. They’ve been talking about consolidation in Pittsburgh forever. It was very hard. And Louisville did it, but it was one of the least consolidated so-called consolidated governments. What the Louisville merger functionally did was dissolve the city of Louisville and reorganize county government. The county government now has a mayor and a council instead of the old fiscal court with the judge executive and all that.

Susan Pendergrass (29:21): That’s kind of what would happen in St. Louis, right?

Aaron Renn (29:36): That’s essentially what they did. They basically dissolved the city and the county government was reorganized, but nothing was merged.

Susan Pendergrass (29:43): Did you have a question?

David Stokes (29:45): I want to get back to the fire district point. We’re talking about why this would be so hard. There’s actually a law in St. Louis that only applies in St. Louis County that makes it impossible to consolidate fire districts. Even if a modest mid-sized suburb annexes an unincorporated part of town, they’re not allowed to provide fire services to that new annexed area, or they can, but they have to pay so much to the old unincorporated fire district that it makes it impossible to do so. That’s just one example of how even if you wanted a full scale merger, it would just be impossible to actually carry through.

Susan Pendergrass (30:34): Why do you think people float this idea, David? Why does it come back every couple of years?

David Stokes (30:38): You know, it’s the old line. I remember a study I read about Pittsburgh and St. Louis many years ago. The question was, are the St. Louis and Pittsburgh areas really inefficient with all the fragmented government? And the conclusion was, well, you would never design a metro area like this, but they’ve both made it work over the last century better than you would think. The conclusion was that St. Louis and Pittsburgh aren’t actually as inefficient as you might assume when you run the numbers.

I think people have trouble accepting that. People look at so many small municipalities, many of them dysfunctional, many of them until recent times funded themselves primarily with traffic tickets, which is a terrible way to fund local government, and that’s not even an exaggeration. And there’s just this fundamental belief that if you can just plan it better you’ll create a better place. I just think it fails.

One of the reasons it would fail, going back to what Aaron led this conversation off with, is that if St. Louis County and St. Louis City joined together, they’re not actually going to lay any government employees off to save any money. St. Louis City government is not going to fire city employees. It’s never going to happen. So you’re not going to save any money and it’s all just going to collapse.

Aaron Renn (32:12): Yeah, New York City and large governments are not more efficient.

I look at it and say, look, I think merger is a solution for failed states, if you want to call them that, in the St. Louis suburbs. Take some micro-suburb that’s a complete scam or is bankrupt and merge it in with its neighbor. Do some consolidation like that, that probably needs to be led by state government, almost like a receivership sort of thing. That’s just kind of good government as you work through it. But I just don’t think the benefits you would gain from trying to do a complete governmental merger of St. Louis City with St. Louis County would outweigh the opportunity cost of how much time and effort you spend on it, when you could be spending that on other things that I think will actually move the needle more.

The downsides are arguably as high as the upsides. There’s no guarantee it’s even net positive in this environment. The time to have merged was when Indianapolis did it in 1970, not in 2026. Nashville did it in the 60s. Jacksonville did it a long time ago.

And then I think it doesn’t fix the fundamental issues around the culture. You’ve got to take a hard look at that and say, it’s maybe very difficult to change. The idea that people who aren’t from here have to be able to move here and get connected and feel like they belong in the city. There’s a couple we know who lived in St. Louis. The wife taught in St. Louis public schools. They’re big urban people. The husband was from St. Louis, and they moved here to Carmel, Indiana.

Susan Pendergrass (33:47): Tell me more about that.

Aaron Renn (34:10): Basically they said, man, people are just so much friendlier here. They make better eye contact, they engage more. It’s just so much more welcoming than it was in St. Louis, even though they were actually in a sense connected because the husband was from there.

So when even people who lived in St. Louis and liked it notice a difference when they leave, that is a killer when you’re already struggling demographically. I had a guy who owned a business in Cleveland who said to me one time, I learned the hard way never to recruit anyone from out of town to work for my company unless that person or their spouse is from Cleveland, because otherwise they will never stay. When that’s where you are as a place, that is just rough. I think that is one of the killers for these river cities.

Susan Pendergrass (35:16): Yeah, what’s the fix for that? I don’t know what the fix is.

Aaron Renn (35:38): I think the optimistic case for St. Louis, and I actually tweeted this a year or two ago, is that St. Louis City educational attainment is really high now. In a sense, it’s a small, highly educated city that is probably going to continue growing more educated. So I think the Pittsburgh option looks viable in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (36:00): And certainly great medical care. I know that the average age is getting older in St. Louis. I think within 10 years, one in four people will be over the age of 65. But we also have an Alzheimer’s research center and access to medical care, which as you get older gets more important. I do think there’s an opportunity to lean in to the medical services that are available, as the country as a whole gets older. I think St. Louis looks more attractive for that reason. So I think you’re right that with universities and medical centers, there’s an opportunity.

Aaron Renn (36:35): Yeah, I think if America’s demographics keep on this trend, a lot of other places are going to get to where St. Louis is. And the thing to be careful of is that when you’re in a declining market, that often prompts centralization of activity and population. What happened with Japan is that once Japan’s population started falling, everybody started moving to Tokyo. It’s Tokyo and a handful of other cities where everything is concentrated, and they literally have ghost towns there.

I don’t think it’s any accident that Indianapolis’ growth really took off once the Rust Belt era and deindustrialization hit the state. Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio have grown in large measure through drawing people out of the rest of the state as those states declined. Huge numbers of people move from Cleveland to Columbus every year.

Missouri is a little different than that. One of your challenges is that St. Louis does not draw people from rural Missouri. When I looked at the data, it’s not like there’s a massive flow into St. Louis from the rest of the state. So you don’t have that siphon bringing people in.

Susan Pendergrass (37:55): There are public safety issues around that, but yes.

Aaron Renn (38:00): And the issue we have is that we’ve now eaten our seed corn. There’s not going to be next generations of children in the towns I grew up in in rural Indiana to move to Indianapolis anymore. The cohort sizes are going to be smaller. So that pump, even Tokyo is declining now in population. That siphon is draining the water table. We can only rely on that so long.

But I think this is the risk for St. Louis in that kind of environment. People with opportunity might avoid or flee St. Louis and go to Austin, Texas or Nashville. They go to the handful of places in America that are really still growing. That’s a threat even for Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio. In a declining market, it’s very hard to get people to want to come to a shrinking city because the opportunity space is shrinking. St. Louis’s opportunity space has been shrinking because you’re losing corporate headquarters and your working age population is declining. That dynamic is really going to be a challenge. But within that, the city of St. Louis might end up doing okay. Again, being small actually helps it here.

Susan Pendergrass (39:25): Any closing thoughts on that, David?

David Stokes (39:27): Just that the part of Missouri that is definitely still growing, and that probably is attracting those young rural people who are moving to a city, is going into southwest Missouri, the Springfield-Branson area. That’s absolutely the growing part of the state. And even Kansas City is growing certainly more than St. Louis is.

Aaron Renn (39:48): Yeah, it’s not a culturally cohesive state. Springfield and that area are definitely growing, and growing despite the fact that they have nowhere close to the urban assets of a St. Louis. It’s interesting to watch, and we’ll just have to see what happens.

Susan Pendergrass (40:05): It is. I think about it a lot. I’ve been talking about this in terms of school enrollment for years and years, where you could see the biggest kindergarten cohort was after the Great Recession of 2009. You know that that’s the biggest kindergarten cohort for the last 15, 16, 17 years. We do nothing but build schools and hire teachers. We are slow to catch on to these things happening. But I think your perspective is certainly very interesting. On the question of the merger, it’s not worth the cost for whatever benefits there might be. But it still gets talked about, so I appreciate you coming and giving us your thoughts on it. Maybe we’ll have to have you back to talk about it again.

David Stokes (41:02): And Aaron, I want you to come back. I want to find out how we get more roundabouts in Missouri. I love roundabouts. I go to Carmel it seems like once a year for these gigantic youth sports tournaments up at Westfield, just a little bit north of you. My kids’ sports take me there. And I love the roundabouts. You cannot get enough of them.

Aaron Renn (41:09): I’d love to talk about that. My favorite topic.

Aaron Renn (41:24): Yeah, it’s great. We hardly ever have to stop. There are barely any stoplights or stop signs left in our city. It’s amazing. We’re one of the few growing places in America where traffic is better today than it was 20 years ago.

Susan Pendergrass (41:32): They’re awesome.

David Stokes (41:45): People don’t realize how good that is for air quality and everything. You just keep moving along, not stop and start. We need 100 times more roundabouts in this area.

Susan Pendergrass (41:55): Are you pretending that people stop at stop signs in St. Louis? Because let’s be honest, people don’t stop at stop signs.

David Stokes (42:00): Well, they roll them, but it’s still wrong when they roll them. Maybe all the people blowing red lights on Kings Highway at 50 miles an hour are just being environmentally conscious. I need to give them more of the benefit of the doubt, I guess.

Susan Pendergrass (42:12): That’s exactly right. All right, thanks so much. I really appreciate it.

Aaron Renn (42:19): Thank you.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post The St. Louis City-County Merger with Aaron Renn and David Stokes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Susan Pendergrass and Patrick Tuohey join Zach Lawhorn to discuss their new report, The Public Safety Climate in the City of St. Louis. They explore what the data actually show about crime trends over the past two decades, how St. Louis compares to similar cities like Cincinnati and Memphis, why crime perception lags so far behind the data, the challenges facing the 911 system and police staffing, why public disorder in high-traffic neighborhoods may be doing as much damage to the city’s reputation as violent crime itself, what it would take to make residents actually feel safer, and more.

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Episode Transcript

Zach Lawhorn (00:00) Welcome to the Show Me Institute podcast. I’m Zach Lawhorn from Show Me Opportunity, and today I’m joined by Susan Pendergrass and Patrick Tuohey from the Show Me Institute. Today we’re going to be talking about some work that the two of you have done on public safety and crime, specifically in the city of St. Louis. But before we get into the project, I want to talk to you both about your perception of crime as people who have both lived in and frequently visit the city of St. Louis. So Susan, I want to start with you. Before you started this project, before you started looking at the data, when someone said “Is the city of St. Louis dangerous?” what was your perception before you started this project?

Susan Pendergrass (00:38) I only moved to the city of St. Louis in 2015, so there’s a long period of time before I lived there. I was in D.C. for part of that, and my perception before I moved there was that it was dangerous. The Ferguson incident had just happened and I knew that there was a lot of crime. But then when I moved to St. Louis, my husband and I decided to live in the city itself and we loved our neighborhood. It was the coolest with this super cool house built around the time of the World’s Fair. It was amazing. But I never felt really safe. We started leaving our car doors unlocked because our cars would get rifled through. We had a smash-and-grab right within two weeks. I called to report the smash-and-grab and was told that they don’t take reports on them. That was new for me. We had to keep a lot of lights on outside. We didn’t really walk our dogs after dark. I felt like lots of times I would go by police cars sitting on corners idling, but it didn’t necessarily make me feel safer because I wasn’t sure how much they were doing. I also realized people run stoplights, run stop signs, use the right parking lane to pass, and that was all new for me. So I got this feeling that the rule of law wasn’t enforced very well in the city, and that just doesn’t feel good as somebody who has bought a house there and lives there.

Zach Lawhorn (02:06) Patrick, as someone who lives in Kansas City across the state, two questions. What do you think the perception is over there on the western half of the state? And then as someone who comes into St. Louis regularly, what was your perception of the safety situation in the city?

Patrick Tuohey (02:22) A lot of the issues that Susan and I explored in this paper bore out here in Kansas City. I’ve lived in cities my whole life. I understand that every city is going to have the parts you don’t want to go to, the parts that are rougher than others. Kansas City certainly has that. I’ve had my car broken into here in my driveway a number of times, no real damage, and it’s not something I reported to the police. As far as traveling to St. Louis, I’ve been going to St. Louis since the late nineties. Before I lived in Kansas City, I was in Washington, D.C. And I loved St. Louis. I still do. I would visit Creve Coeur, the Central West End, sometimes stay at the Westin downtown. But living in D.C. and growing up in D.C., I understood that every city is going to have the places that you don’t want to go. I understood that St. Louis often gets ranked higher than it should because the city’s footprint is so small. But it never felt to me that what was going on in St. Louis was way outside the normal limits of what we see in U.S. cities. There are those dangerous parts and you generally know not to go there. There is kind of an urban decline, which can be seen in a lack of services, graffiti, uncut grass. But I didn’t navigate St. Louis or think of St. Louis any differently than I thought of Kansas City, Washington D.C., Boston, or any other place I had been.

Zach Lawhorn (04:03) Yeah, and I’m glad you brought up the population of the city, the MSA. It seems like when there are national or even local news stories written on crime statistics in St. Louis, people will point out that if you’re not talking about the larger metropolitan area, you get down to actually a pretty small population number for U.S. cities. So for this work that we’re going to be talking about, can you define what area you guys looked at? When we say murders are a certain number, what area are we specifically talking about?

Patrick Tuohey (04:38) We looked at the city of St. Louis specifically, just those few square miles. We did not look at the metropolitan area and we did not look at the county. It is fair to want to combine all that data into one region, but oftentimes I think people want to do that to mask the seriousness of homicide and violent crime and property crime in the city. And that’s what we wanted to talk about. What is true in St. Louis is not unique to St. Louis. Kansas City has a crime problem that is not reflected in our metropolitan area. That’s true in Washington D.C., Atlanta, Los Angeles, everywhere. So I understand why people who live in St. Louis feel that you can cook the numbers by just looking at the city, but that’s true in every urban environment.

Susan Pendergrass (05:30) We also compared St. Louis to four other cities, and one of them in particular, Cincinnati, ended up being very similar. We wrote a paper and at the back of the paper there’s a table with variables on which we compared them. Similar size, similar poverty, similar median income, very similar. So to say that St. Louis is this very unique outlier and is the only city in the United States that has this situation where, essentially 100-plus years ago, St. Louis was so much better and more metropolitan and forward-thinking than the rest of the state of Missouri, and safer and wealthier, that they drew a line around the city of St. Louis and said we are going to be our own thing and we’re going to have our own police. It was called the Great Divorce. Now that line, the arrows are sort of pointing different ways, where St. Louis County isn’t necessarily excited to absorb the city of St. Louis and its services, systems, police departments, and 911 systems, because it is a uniquely crime-ridden area in parts. So while it would be nice to, as Patrick mentioned, just water down all the numbers by mixing them into a safer pot, it would really mask what’s going on.

Zach Lawhorn (06:47) Susan, you used the word “unique” there to describe the setup. Patrick, does that genuinely make it harder to talk about this topic? In the last few months you’ve had some public events, and we’re going to talk about those in a minute. But as you’ve gone through this process, do you think the unique setup has made it harder? Is there more throat-clearing and definitional work that goes into it?

Patrick Tuohey (07:12) I don’t know that what St. Louis is dealing with is unique. Yes, the city has a particularly small footprint. It is as if you drew a line around just the bad neighborhood in your community and tried to use that small footprint to describe the whole area. I get that argument. But if it’s true by a matter of degree, it’s not uniquely true of St. Louis. And it’s something that the city needs to deal with and understand rather than try to paper over. As Susan said, there are real problems in the city. Their population decline is only exacerbating those problems because there’s less revenue. And frankly, the history of the city going back decades has been that the image of the city is dysfunctional, and not just on public safety, on lots of issues. So although I understand that people say they don’t just want to talk about the city when it comes to crime, St. Louis, while it’s got lots of opportunities and strengths, doesn’t do itself any favors by combining all this stuff and whistling past the graveyard. People in this country know that St. Louis has a crime problem. You don’t solve it by redirecting people.

Zach Lawhorn (08:30) Okay, and let’s talk about that crime problem. Susan, when we use the word “crime” in this context, what are we talking about? Murders? Car break-ins? Lay it out for us.

Susan Pendergrass (08:42) We have violent crime and property crime. Violent crime is murders, aggravated assault, and robbery. Property crimes are larceny and motor vehicle thefts. In our report, we break them all out separately. Murders are the one crime area that the media likes to focus on: how many murders, which city is the murder capital, did we have 150, did we have 200, are they down? They are certainly down in the last two years, to be clear. Murder rates are down. Aggravated assault rates are not down by as much. And sometimes the difference between aggravated assault and murder is how fast the ambulance drives. We still have a lot of violent crimes against people happening. We certainly have a lot of motor vehicle thefts. That’s an area of crime that spiked during COVID, particularly for Kias and Hyundais, and it’s come down, but it’s still a very high number. While it is wonderful that crime has come down across these areas in many cases, the numbers are still pretty high, particularly on a per capita basis, which is how we translate all the crime rates so we can compare them with other cities.

Zach Lawhorn (10:00) So you said crime is down. Is it fair to classify it as it was really bad and now it’s just bad? It was terrible, now it’s just bad. How would you summarize what you found with the drop in crime?

Susan Pendergrass (10:13) Crime’s been dropping since the 80s, so we had much worse crime decades ago. It’s been dropping, it spiked during the pandemic, and it is continuing basically down. Now, when you look at the murder rate per capita in the city of St. Louis, it is still on a slightly upward trend, the number of murders per people, and that could be driven by the fact that Missouri is losing population at a pretty good clip. We have more deaths than births. So on a per capita basis maybe not quite the same, but in terms of actual numbers, crime has been coming down for some time. Crime overall peaked in the late 80s and 90s.

Zach Lawhorn (10:58) Patrick, we talked about your perception and the relevance of many other cities. Did that surprise you, the finding that crime is down? Or was that kind of what you expected?

Patrick Tuohey (11:09) No, the data showing that crime in St. Louis was down wasn’t a surprise. It’s certainly been nice to see that it’s been down year after year. This doesn’t appear to be just a one-off good year. And I’ve known that the mayor and the police chief have been talking about these positive numbers for a while. What I was really interested in with this paper was perception of crime. That’s what I’ve really wrestled with, both at events in the city and in the county. It is a difficult problem to overcome because you can have good numbers like St. Louis has and yet people still rely on that decades-old impression. That’s not something you can address just by waving away the numbers downtown. You have to wrestle with it. You have to admit it, and you have to figure out how do you get people to accept good news, and then how do you make them confident that that good news is going to continue? It’s so easy these days, especially with cities, to just be a pessimist and to say that things are down and won’t ever continue to go down. It is a problem that St. Louis has, but St. Louis isn’t alone in having it. The news on crime is good all over the country, yet perceptions about crime all over the country are still very much with us.

Susan Pendergrass (12:43) There’s a survey question that’s often asked: do you feel safe walking outside alone at night? And those numbers aren’t down. As Patrick mentioned, you have graffiti and trash not being picked up and panhandling and homelessness. Those numbers aren’t necessarily down. But we did look at St. Louis on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis, and it is true that out of 16 neighborhoods, four or five have basically no crime, they’re crime-free. But then there are some other pockets that have most of the murders concentrated in one neighborhood. So it isn’t equal across all the neighborhoods. There are some that have very little crime, but it’s hard to convince folks of that when they drive through the ones that have public disorder and still don’t feel safe.

Zach Lawhorn (13:29) Susan, as a researcher trying to ultimately figure out why things happen, you mentioned that crime is down across the country. Would it be easier if it was just a few select cities, so you could actually go and say what is Boston doing different, what is Memphis doing? Does it make it harder to find the “why” since it seems like it’s kind of across the board?

Susan Pendergrass (13:45) Yeah. There have been other periods of time when crime has gone down and then gone back up again. I personally believe, and this is not based on any research I’ve done, that cameras being absolutely everywhere makes it harder to commit crimes. You cannot basically travel through the world anymore without being on a camera somewhere. Police body cams probably make it harder to commit crimes too. I feel like we’re getting into more of a surveillance state, and maybe that’s what’s bringing crime down. I’ve heard that Detroit has brought crime down faster than other cities, that Pittsburgh is feeling safer, Chattanooga is feeling safer, Memphis feeling less safe. So it would be worthwhile to look into some of these differences. But I don’t think our research has yet pointed to a clear reason why it’s happening.

Patrick Tuohey (14:41) Let me follow up on that because Susan’s exactly right, and I think your question gets to that point. Crime is down nationwide, down in all cities if I remember correctly, and we don’t really know why. And it’s not just Susan and I that don’t know why. Susan has spoken with public safety and crime experts from all over the country, and that’s really frustrating from a public policy research point of view, because you would love to have that outlier, that one city, maybe Boston or Omaha, that tried something novel and got results unlike everybody else. But crime is so difficult because there are so many contributors. Some people want to point to the availability of guns. Some people want to talk about root causes. Some people want to talk about the number of police, the severity of crime, the clearance rate, population growth, new development, basic services like picking up the trash and making sure the streetlights work. And all of those things are right, all those things contribute. So it’s really difficult to figure out which one is driving the change. And sometimes, as Susan pointed out, you may just get a dip and there’s no explaining it. In 2014, in Kansas City, our mayor and police chief at the time came out and had a press conference because they were so proud of the homicide drop the previous year. There was a lot of back-slapping and self-congratulation. Then when the homicide rate went back up the next year, you couldn’t get those guys to answer a basic question. Policymakers are, and maybe rightly so, really shy about claiming credit, because they don’t want to be called to task a year later when the numbers reverse. The good news is that the numbers are trending down, and that’s always good. The frustration is it’s very difficult to figure out why and then make recommendations. We’re all kind of scratching our heads. Although again, this is a good problem to have. The numbers are heading in the right direction and we ought to be happy about that.

Zach Lawhorn (16:58) Patrick, to get a better idea of the perception side, you did the hard work of going to the people. In January and February you moderated events. We had one in the city of St. Louis and one in St. Louis County. There are full recordings of the events available at showmeinstitute.org. You had a panel of experts and spent a lot of time getting feedback from attendees who lived in the city and the county. What were your takeaways? Are they buying that crime is getting better?

Patrick Tuohey (17:33) No, in a word, they don’t. We gave them a short survey before the event. A lot of them believed that crime was important, certainly, but they didn’t necessarily believe that crime was getting better. They weren’t necessarily optimistic that crime was going to be better in St. Louis City in the next five years, and that was certainly true in the county. I wanted to press these audience members: what would it take for you to believe this good news? And I think sometimes they just didn’t want to believe anything. We got the frustrating line: “there are lies, damn lies, and statistics.” That’s a cute thing to say, but it really doesn’t help you explain your own view. If you’re just going to say you believe it’s bad and always going to be bad, that doesn’t get us anywhere. We were happy to have representatives from the Circuit Attorney’s office at both events, and they struggle with this too. They can do a better job. They can prosecute more and different cases, they can do it faster. The police can certainly improve their clearance rate. But public policymakers in those cities, in every city, are going to have to realize that they may have to continue that grind, doing the hard work of lowering crime, and they’re not going to get the attaboys from the people in their city or the communities around them. That’s just a reality. One of the panelists talked about how perception of crime is often a lagging indicator. When crime goes up, people feel it immediately. But when crime goes down, it may take a few years. The tough news for the people who lead St. Louis City is you may have to keep doing this for another 10 years before you get any credit for being successful. And that’s really tough in politics because people want that immediate payoff, that immediate

Susan Pendergrass (19:15) You

Patrick Tuohey (19:31) applause, that immediate press conference and support.

Susan Pendergrass (19:34) Patrick and I have been thinking about the things that could happen that could make a difference, that could maybe make people feel safer. Number one: when you see a crime happening, you need to be able to have faith that you can report it and somebody will respond. And that is not happening right now in the city of St. Louis. We’ve called several times about crimes and nobody showed up. You need to have faith in the 911 system, and the 911 system needs to function. We have about 28 different systems in the county. They’re building a new 911 center in the city that’s going to consolidate services, but it’s not finished. It’s going to be some time before it’s fully functioning. We also need to know that the police will be able to solve these crimes. They need resources. They need to be able to do DNA testing and rape kits and DNA. They need money to do those things. They need detectives. We need to know that these crimes can get solved, and then we need to know that the crimes are prosecuted. I think if these pieces on the front end, not just the “lock them up” approach, but on the front end, people would feel safer if they felt like they could call somebody and somebody would respond and something would happen. I’m not sure that’s happening right now. And until it does, people, especially when they start having small children, are probably going to move out.

Patrick Tuohey (20:59) What we’ve known since at least 1961, when Jane Jacobs wrote The Death and Life of Great American Cities, is that you sometimes just need eyes on the street. Shop owners, pedestrians, people walking around. Cameras can reduce crime, but they’re kind of abstract and tucked in corners. When a street is vibrant, when it’s got people living there, when you’ve got kids playing in the street and families on the porch, there’s that sense of being watched, being seen. But because St. Louis has been in this population spiral, how do you bring people back into the city? The city talks about economic development subsidies all the time, but that’s about bringing in amenities and employers. Maybe what the city needs to do is figure out how to bring in people. And oftentimes it’s the non-crime-related policies, the housing policies, the regulations, the tax structure, that keep people out. Crime is one of those, but the city could open itself up to urban homesteaders who want to come in and rehab these old houses. What has struck me about St. Louis for the decades I’ve been going there is just the absolutely beautiful old neighborhoods, the incredible housing stock. Susan talked about living in a house that was built for the World’s Fair. There are gorgeous neighborhoods in St. Louis, and it’s the barriers to entry, red tape and government regulation, that are keeping people out, I have to believe. Crime is one of them, to be sure. But I am confident there are people who would love to move into those old houses and revitalize those old neighborhoods, because they’re just so gorgeous and so walkable. And it’s been done in other cities. DuPont Circle in Washington D.C. was a slow process of rehabbing neighborhoods block by block, and now 30 years later it is a vibrant community.

Zach Lawhorn (23:03) Susan, you mentioned the 911 system. I know in the report you don’t get into specific solutions, and I know we’re still kind of in the measuring-the-problem stage and trying to figure out next steps, but beyond the 911 system, are there any areas you’d consider low-hanging fruit worth considering moving forward?

Susan Pendergrass (23:25) The legislature passed and the governor signed a violent crime clearance grant program last year that cities like St. Louis could apply for, funding to hire detectives, do DNA testing, collect data, and other activities directly focused on solving crimes. The legislature has not appropriated any money for that program. If they did, St. Louis could apply for those funds. We also have, and I don’t know the exact number as I say this, but at least 100 open police positions in the department. Those are hard to fill. The policies that have been tried, like no longer requiring officers to live within the city and across-the-board raises, none of those have really made a difference. So we need recruitment and retention policies that could actually work. And as I mentioned with the 911 system, triaging calls and making sure the correct agency responds when a crime has been committed. There are community violence intervention programs that have been tried in some places, and using neighborhood-by-neighborhood data to focus in on where crimes are really happening. Those are all things we’d like to explore further: what is the cost of these programs, what is the likelihood that they’ll improve things, and what are some feasible ways to get them done.

Zach Lawhorn (24:54) So there’s the PR part of it. The city’s got a PR problem. There’s the need for more cops. We need people to be able to call 911. We need people to actually be prosecuted for crimes. That all seems doable.

Susan Pendergrass (24:58) Yeah.

Zach Lawhorn (25:06) Where do you think the city of St. Louis is at right now? Are we in a good place? Are we in just an improved place where it could still be a few years? How are you feeling about public safety in the city of St. Louis right now?

Susan Pendergrass (25:21) I don’t want to be a wet blanket. I love the city of St. Louis and I want it to succeed wildly. But I’m concerned that they’re going to say murders are down and these other crimes are down, but people are still running stop signs and stoplights, there are still panhandlers, and trash still isn’t being picked up. They’re not really fixing the small things that make people feel safe. They’re sort of focused on these big numbers. It could be like a school improving ACT scores. You have to be really careful if you’re just focusing on one aspect, because these big crime numbers being down could be hiding a lot of other stuff that really needs to be done and focused on. So I’m cautiously optimistic, I guess.

Patrick Tuohey (26:05) I’m optimistic because crime is going down everywhere, and I think it will probably continue to go down at least for the next few years, for reasons that may have nothing to do with the management of St. Louis. Part of it is because Susan and I have been reviewing the research for the last few months, and there is so much out there, primary research on crime and secondary, that talks about exactly the things Susan hit upon: the environment, picking up trash, cleaning up graffiti, fixing sidewalks, making sure the streetlights are lit. We know so much more about what drives crime, or at least what can ameliorate it, that even if we don’t know the specifics of what’s going on now, city leaders and state leaders are much more aware of what they can do to make communities not just safer but feel safe. And again, it is frustrating because you can say the numbers are down, but until people feel safe and want to go downtown and take advantage of what the city has to offer, we’re not going to see that public perception change. So yes, I think the public perception is accurate in as much as that is what people feel, but I don’t think it reflects what’s actually going on in St. Louis or in the county.

Zach Lawhorn (27:20) And we will leave it there. The report, The Public Safety Climate in the City of St. Louis, is available at showmeinstitute.org. If you want to watch the full recordings of the events that Patrick moderated, those are available right now at showmeinstitute.org. Susan, Patrick, thank you very much.

Susan Pendergrass (27:36) Thank you.

Patrick Tuohey (27:36) Thank you.

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post The Public Safety Climate in the City of St. Louis with Susan Pendergrass and Patrick Tuohey appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

For the past several years, the Missouri Legislature has considered letting parents choose a public school in another public school district than the one in which they live—also known as open enrollment. It seems that DESE and the BOE are preparing for the moment that the legislature takes another crack at this idea. And by preemptively adding the word “voluntary,”, they have signaled that they prefer a weak and less effective version of this policy.

Currently, there are sixteen states, including our neighbors Kansas, Iowa, Arkansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, that require all public school districts to accept transfer students, provided that there is an open seat available. According to the Reason Foundation, students using open enrollment accounted for about 7 percent of publicly funded students in those states. In other words, open enrollment doesn’t have a massive impact on the system, but it can be a game changer for the students who use it.

In states such as Ohio, which have limited open enrollment to only those districts that voluntarily agree to accept students, high-income suburban districts have declined to participate. Thus, kids in Ohio’s largest urban districts, such as Akron or Cincinnati, don’t have any feasible open enrollment options. They would have to leapfrog over the suburban rings that surround their cities.

Missouri was called out last year in a national study for having district lines that mimic old residential red lines. That legacy could be ameliorated by making those lines more porous and less exclusionary. Regardless of the executive branch’s stated priorities, let’s not start the conversation on open enrollment with an eye toward a weak policy.

The post Voluntary Open Enrollment Means No Open Enrollment appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

These are average values, of course, and not everyone can afford an average mortgage or rent payment. However, the United Way also ranks St. Louis second in the nation (tied with Pittsburgh and trailing only Cincinnati) for the highest number of affordable rental units (80) per 100 households.

It’s good to see St. Louis earn a high national ranking in something other than crime; nevertheless, 80 rental units for every 100 households that need a place to live still isn’t enough housing. So, what can St. Louis do to meet the remaining affordable housing demand?

First, local governments need to get out of the way and let the free market work its magic. My colleague Patrick Tuohey has highlighted the harm that misguided government intervention has done to housing markets in both St. Louis and Kansas City:

Kansas City’s adoption of the 2021 International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) stifled new home construction by inflating costs. Builders, facing steep regulatory burdens, simply stopped building. In St. Louis, a reliance on tax credits and incentives for flashy developments has left vast swaths of the city with vacant lots and dilapidated buildings. In both cities, the results are clear: policies that ignore basic market principles fail to deliver desired results.

Second, the demand for low-income housing can be met indirectly by constructing more expensive or luxury housing. More housing, whether low-income or luxury, is beneficial and will positively impact the availability of affordable housing. Even if the construction of luxury housing occurs when there is a greater demand for profitable low-income housing, the filtering effect will help address the need.

Andrew Cline of The Josiah Bartlett Center for Public Policy extrapolates on the positive effect of luxury housing construction, describing the filtering effects of new apartment development:

Building luxury or higher-end apartments draws higher-income renters out of yesterday’s luxury apartments and into the new luxury apartments. Increased vacancies in yesterday’s luxury apartments attract higher-income residents who’ve been living in mid-level apartments. As new construction creates more vacancies, rents come down. That effect filters throughout the housing supply, lowering rents all the way down. 

It is precisely because of this filtering effect that projects like the one in Town and Country are good news even for those looking for something in a lower price range. While a new luxury condominium development may seem irrelevant to someone seeking a more affordable place to live, it nevertheless represents an increase in supply and exerts downward pressure on housing prices.

The post For More Affordable Housing We Need More Housing, Period appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The number of people who live in the city of St. Louis fell below 300,000 in 2021 and the metropolitan area also saw a decline in population as the region for the first time recorded more deaths than births. That puts it among just a handful of large urban areas hit by outmigration and a negative birth rate. . . .

As of July 1, the Census Bureau estimated that just 293,310 people resided in the region’s core city of St. Louis, down from the 301,578 people counted in the 2020 census.

St. Louis City had a population of more than 850,000 in the 1950 census. That means today’s population is about a third of what it once was. Deaths outpacing births for the first time in recorded history does not seem like great news, either.

Not all of this is the fault of the city’s leadership. Structural factors are certainly at play here; there are many reasons St. Louis’s population has been in precipitous freefall for more than half a century. And COVID deaths across the country did depress population gains. But that does not mean decline is inevitable.

As noted in the Post-Dispatch article, several peer cities in the Midwest, including Kansas City, Indianapolis, and Cincinnati, experienced population increases over this period. Those cities have many similarities to St. Louis. And St. Louis retains many key advantages, including its central location as a transportation hub and a low cost of living. To quote the late Charles Krauthammer: Decline is a choice.

So what now? A few quotes from the Post-Dispatch article hint at one possible way forward:

The numbers drew another call from the St. Louis metro’s new business and civic booster group for regional unity and a redoubling of efforts by area leaders to draw residents and focus on “inclusive economic growth.” . . .

“At the start of last year, we established Greater St. Louis Inc. out of the core belief that growth must be a top civic priority for the St. Louis metro,” said Greater St. Louis Inc. CEO Jason Hall. “These numbers tell us what we expected and underscore the urgency of focusing this metro on growth and more opportunities for all. Stagnation is the existential threat to everything we love about the place we call home.”

I’m not exactly certain what “inclusive growth” means—I would think that a region that has been hemorrhaging population since the Eisenhower administration should just be focusing on any growth, absent qualifiers. I am not mentioning this phrase just to be snarky, but instead because it is indicative of how St. Louis leaders have approached this problem.

Greater St. Louis, to much fanfare, introduced a plan at the end of 2020 (revised and improved in early 2021, but without significant changes) that was intended to fix what ailed the St. Louis region. Show-Me Institute analysts pointed out the inadequacies of that plan at the time. One of the major problems with the report is that it’s long on buzzwords and jargon like “inclusive growth” and short on actual concrete policy prescriptions or solutions.

I don’t want to belabor the shortcomings of this one report from two years ago. But that report illustrates how many civic leaders in the St. Louis region think, and it represents a well-trod path: Use taxpayer dollars to bribe companies to move here, use even more taxpayer dollars to pay for splashy but economically dubious projects like aquariums or soccer stadiums or trolleys, and bend to the whims and demands of social justice activists when making key decisions.

It’s not that hard to think of a better way to try and make St. Louis a more attractive place to live and work. St. Louis City still has an economically destructive earnings tax. The city also has massive problems with crime. The city could also focus on reducing regulations to improve its ease-of-doing-business rankings. The region as a whole could stop giving away tax subsidies at every available opportunity and use some of that money to fund critical public services or cut taxes.

It would be easy to keep listing examples of what the St. Louis region could or should be doing. But maybe the best argument for trying something else is a simple one: The old approach is what got St. Louis into its current atrophied state. If we keep trying the same things, why would anyone expect things to change?

The post Honey, I Shrunk the City appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Missouri has eight metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), a term used to describe a city with a population of at least 50,000 and the surrounding area. Below is a graphic from my latest publication, The 2020 Missouri Tax Landscape, which provides an overview of Missouri’s economy and taxes at the state and local levels. The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of these MSAs is a calculated rate helpful for evaluating growth over time. While GDP growth is volatile, the CAGR provides a calculated rate as if the growth had occurred at a steady rate during the period.

Notes: Some MSAs cross state lines, indicated by the inclusion of the states in the label. Real GDP numbers are for the entire MSA. Real GDP numbers are in chained 2012 dollars, meaning they are adjusted for inflation over time with 2012 as the base year.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Real GDP by County and Metropolitan Area.  https://apps.bea.gov/itable/iTable. cfm?ReqID=70&step=1#reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1

Columbia and Kansas City had the highest growth rates from 2009 to 2018, growing by 1.6 percent each year on average. St. Louis grew by less than half of that rate—a meager 0.7 percent. The CAGRs of Missouri’s largest MSAs are nowhere near those of large MSAs in surrounding states. In the same period, Oklahoma City, OK grew by a rate of 2.9 percent; Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN by 2.4 percent; and Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA by 2.2 percent. Additionally, all of Missouri’s MSAs fell below the national growth rate of 2.3 percent during this period.

There are a lot of factors that contribute to a metro area’s growth, and the tax climate is certainly one of them. High tax rates take spending money away from citizens and make cities and states less attractive to people and businesses. There’s a plethora of research showing that taxation (and especially taxation on income) has a negative effect on economic growth. Given the low growth rates of Missouri’s MSAs, it may be time for some tax-related New Year’s resolutions.

The post MSA Growth in Missouri appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A number of initial deficiencies were closed prior to the issuance of the final report, often because the city addressed the concerns after receiving a draft of the report. The city has until October 19 to address the remaining items. Of the seven initial deficiencies, one that remains concerns maintenance, including vehicle preventative maintenance, facility/equipment maintenance, and oversight of contracted maintenance.

It is a shame to learn that the city isn’t properly maintaining its streetcars—or at least is not complying with federal grant guidelines for reporting maintenance procedures. These are complicated machines, and cities such as Seattle, Atlanta, Charlotte, and Toronto have had maintenance and safety issues with their streetcars.

Cincinnati’s streetcars—which were manufactured by the same company as Kansas City’s—have had myriad maintenance problems. At one point late last year, several streetcars were offline at once.

[Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority spokeswoman Sallie] Hilvers cited “manufacturing defects” that caused the service issues that resulted, at one point Thursday night, in all but one of the city’s five streetcar vehicles being removed from city streets.

It is possible that Kansas City has had no significant streetcar maintenance problems—despite an embarrassing shut down on at least one occasion. And it is possible that the deficiencies cited by the FTA are easily addressed. We’ll know more when the city responds to the outstanding issues. 

Click below to see the entire FTA report

The post Feds Find KC Streetcar Deficient appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Could the airport just be a legacy project? Two years ago, then–Aviation Department Director Mark VanLoh made it seem that way when he told the Northland Regional Chamber of Commerce, “You don’t have [all the information] yet. We don’t even have it yet. I know what I want because I want a new airport.” He just wanted it.

VanLoh is gone, but the strange enthusiasm for a single terminal continues. The new plan is just as over-the-top as the old one. The justifications for the spending come and go—claims of EPA mandates, TSA concerns, and airlines’ refusal to expand services—but the project itself remains the same: a $1.2-billion single terminal that is actually a downsizing of what we have now.

What is new in this round of the discussion is the financing and no-bid contracting. But regardless of who finances and builds the airport, the risk to Kansas City comes from the possibility of increased fees to airlines and passengers. Right now, Kansas City’s airport is very cheap for airlines, and travelers benefit with lots of flights from here. Increase the costs to airlines, and we risk losing that competitive advantage. Other airports have suffered after building new terminals for just that reason (Consider Cincinnati, Sacramento, or San Jose.).

The good news is that the city is no longer claiming that the airlines agreed to finance the project. This was never the case, despite incorrect claims from the Kansas City Star and the Kansas City Business Journal. In truth, the airlines merely agreed to pay higher rent for a new terminal while reserving their right to renegotiate once the terminal is built. They did not issue or back any debt; they accepted no risk.

Proponents of a new terminal are fond of telling us that the new terminal idea is not a Taj Mahal. In fact, they’ve been using that curious term over and over again for years (see the Google search here). The Taj Mahal, of course, is a 400-year-old elaborate mausoleum in India built to house an emperor’s wife. Such determination to settle for nothing less than a new terminal, however, combined with the candor of Mark VanLoh and the out-of-hand dismissal of cheaper alternatives, suggests that this is exactly what the new terminal is: a modern monument to political ego—not what is best for Kansas City.

The post Kansas City’s Airport: A Monument to Political Ego appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

• People in Kansas City love their airport. Pride in a local airport probably isn’t very common around the country, but it is a very important aspect of this campaign. Mayor James, before celebrating criticism of the airport, counseled consultants not to criticize the airport for that very reason.
• The plan at hand is to spend $1.2 billion to reduce the number of gates we have now. Where else does a city spend that sort of money to get less service?
• The matter of financing has never been an issue with the Show-Me Institute. Back in 2014, we listed some reasons to oppose the airport terminal, but the cost to taxpayers is not one of them. Financing only became an issue when city leaders said that the airlines agreed to finance the project. They didn’t.
• Regardless of whether the financing is done publicly or privately, it would result in a higher cost to travelers to pay down the debt. That higher cost would make MCI less attractive to airlines and travelers alike. Consider Cincinnati, where ticket prices were so high that local businesses flew employees out of Dayton, an hour away. Or consider Sacramento. Or San Jose.
• We published a piece in 2014, “Five Good Reasons to Reject New KCI Terminal.” At least four of those reasons still stand, and the piece remains a worthwhile read.

According to the Star story, Kansas City engineering firm Burns & McDonnell has proposed to privately build and finance a new single terminal at MCI. However, there appear to be strings attached:

One key to the proposal for Burns & McDonnell is that it would get an exclusive arrangement with the city to provide the design and come up with a guaranteed maximum price.

Other firms would not have access to make their own offer, nor would the city request bids.

Not surprisingly, Steve McDowell, CEO of BNIM (another architectural firm in KC), expressed concern that such a deal would exclude a great deal of area architectural and engineering talent, telling the Star that “some of the best work in the country is coming out of our city, and I’d hate to see that not taken advantage of for the design of our gateway.”

• The Show-Me Institute is aligned with The Kansas City Star editorial board calling for a policy debate that is “open, fair, complete, fact-based and inclusive.” If the past four years are any indication, it’s fair to wonder whether that debate will happen.
• Lastly, the Star mentions that privately financed airports are nothing new; they’re common in Europe. And therein lies an idea worthy of consideration in Kansas City. If Burns & McDonnell is eager to build and operate a new terminal, why don’t they buy the whole thing? The Show-Me Institute published a paper on this not too long ago. (See page 17.) Not only is Branson’s airport privately owned, but the Kansas City Council previously considered privatizing MCI.

If the City is open to private financing and private operations, how far are we from private ownership?

The post Important Background on the Airport Discussion appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

It looks like the city’s “frugality” will be overshadowed by the massive costs of a proposed expansion that would extend the current line 3.75 miles south from Union Station to the Plaza and UMKC.

The projected construction costs for the extension are estimated at $227M (in 2019 dollars), and the downtown line cost $102M (in 2014 dollars) to build. After adjusting for inflation, on a per-mile basis, that makes Kansas City’s proposed expansion one of the most expensive streetcar projects in the nation.

All figures in 2014 dollars

As the chart above shows, the cost per mile of the proposed expansion is over 20% greater than that of the downtown starter line. Even if the city got a good deal—if we can call it that—on the downtown line, it surely won’t if expansion occurs.

The only streetcar more expensive than Kansas City’s proposed expansion is Washington D.C.’s 2.4 mile H-St. line, which cost over $200M to build. But besting D.C.’s line isn’t much to brag about—it’s been described as one of the most poorly handled streetcar projects in the nation. 

So as efforts mount to expand the streetcar beyond downtown, Kansas Citians should ask themselves: Are we willing to pay higher sales and property taxes to fund one of the most expensive streetcar projects in the country?

Although the rail boosters hope to garner a $100M grant from the feds, the city itself will be on the hook for $130M. More on the financial breakdown of the proposed expansion in my next blog!

Note: Figures adjusted to 2014 dollars with CPI deflator, assuming 2% annual inflation 2017-19. 

The post The Ballooning Cost of Streetcars appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Supporters of a new terminal lamented this pause and argued that voters were not sufficiently informed of what was before them. Some even propose a more aggressive public education campaign. Sadly, this is what serious policy discussions often come down to—not thoughtful exchanges of ideas, but rather an uncompromising proposal stubbornly marketed and shouted in various ways at a busy public. And if they still don’t agree . . . shout louder!

In fact, after years of public debate, voters in Kansas City (and everyone who uses the airport) knew exactly what was being asked of them. Few issues have been discussed in more or at greater length than the airport. There have been numerous public meetings, TV and radio segments, and print news articles on the matter. A group of citizens even collected signatures to make sure the public had a vote. The public knew exactly what was being proposed.

Because MCI is a cheap airport for airlines to serve, we get more service. We have more direct flights than other markets our size. American Airlines and Southwest continue to expand service and in recent years we’ve attracted additional smaller discount airlines such as Allegiant and Spirit. These are not warning signs of a failing airport.

There are risks to taking on big builds. In Sacramento, San Jose, and Cincinnati, localities invested heavily in new airports. They increased airline fees to pay down the debt and saw airline service decline. This is a simple enough economic reality: when you charge more for something, you sell less of it. It really is that simple. Any effort to improve MCI must make sure that we retain our competitive advantage: a cheap and convenient airport.

Those in St. Joseph and across the region have a stake in the matter, but they won’t have a vote. Frequent travelers would be well served to make sure their friends in Kansas City are educated on the benefits and risks of a new terminal.

The post An Informed Public: Poor Policy’s Worst Enemy appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Far from it. Of the 77 U.S. cities that KPMG ranked (which was not exhaustive of all major metros), Saint Louis ranked 45th and Kansas City ranked 46th. Among the cities cheaper than Saint Louis (and Kansas City) are regional competitors like Nashville, Omaha, Cincinnati, Memphis, Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Oklahoma City, to name a few. Worse yet, Saint Louis was more expensive than all 18 Southeastern cities KPMG looked at, from Atlanta to New Orleans.

So where did the Post-Dispatch get a top ten ranking for Saint Louis? If we only consider regions with populations greater than two million (of which KPMG ranked 31), Saint Louis is the 9th cheapest. I will leave it to the readers of this blog to decide if Saint Louis should pat itself on back for being cheaper than New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, when it has higher costs for businesses than Nashville, Memphis, and just about every other regional competitor. But if we do decide to use population as criteria, it seems more justified to look at metros with populations similar to those of Saint Louis and Kansas City (between two and three million residents). When we do that, Saint Louis is 7th and Kansas City is 8th out of 14 such cities. That seems awfully middling.

That’s probably why, if one reads the study that the Post-Dispatch reports on, they’ll find that it does not claim that Saint Louis is among the most competitive cities in the country. KPMG didn’t even break down cities by population in the study, choosing instead to do so by region.  The Post-Dispatch story (while citing the study) is actually based on an ancillary KPMG press release, which lauds Cincinnati, and is careful to note context.

Titling an article “St. Louis among most cost-competitive cities for business, report says” when the report in question says no such thing is a questionable decision for a newspaper of record. But this is not just a problem with the headline. The article itself is equally misleading, and it was not a headline writer who placed this story front and center on the Post-Dispatch’s website less than a week before a vote on multiple tax issues (where the city’s business climate is an issue). 

The post Report: Saint Louis, Kansas City *Not* Among Most Cost-Friendly Cities for Business appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

I taught at an urban, historically African-American Catholic school, St. Jude Educational Institute on the west side of Montgomery, Alabama. After 76 years of operation it closed its doors 2014, following the path of many other inner-city Catholic schools. 

You should be worried about urban Catholic schools closing, as they have for decades succeeded where other schools have failed.  Surveying the research, economist Derek Neal wrote, “Although many questions remain unanswered, one result seems clear. Black and Hispanic students in large cities often have the most to gain from private schooling, in particular, Catholic schooling.”

But the story of Catholic schools in America today is not all doom and gloom. Echoing what my good friend Andy Smarick wrote in National Review earlier this week, there are in fact, several promising trends in contemporary Catholic education. I’d like to highlight three:

1. Innovative management strategies. Many dioceses have not kept up with the changing times. Some still rely on parish-based schools tied to neighborhoods whose demographics of both children and parishioners are changing. Others have decided to keep open a large number of under-enrolled schools rather than consolidate resources into a smaller number of more viable schools. Our Lady Queen of Angels is a great example of a school under creative leadership. It is part of the Partnership for Inner City Education, a management consortium of 6 urban Catholic schools in New York. The partnership has a laser-like focus on providing a great education for low-income students, and supplements the Archdiocese, which already has its hands full managing its diverse portfolio of schools. Organizations like this (which already exist in Washington DC, Philadelphia, and elsewhere) can help bring a much more coherent strategy to urban Catholic education and stretch limited dollars the furthest.
2. Blended Learning. Multiple Catholic-school organizations have been working on blended learning models, which can help schools control personnel costs, a huge driver in the increase in the cost of Catholic schooling as the teacher workforce has shifted from priests and religious sisters to lay men and women. Seton Education Partners has implemented a blended learning model at six Catholic schools in San Francisco, Cincinnati, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia. The University of Notre Dame’s Alliance for Catholic Education has piloted a blended learning school in Seattle. Even the much-vaunted Cristo Rey network has started a blended learning school in San Jose, California. These could change the delivery model of Catholic education, lower its cost, and make it available for more and more students.
3. School Choice. Probably the single most promising development in Catholic education over the past two decades has been the emergence and growth of private school choice programs. Catholic schools in Indiana, Florida, and Wisconsin have swelled with students attending with state support in the form of a school voucher, tuition tax credit scholarship, or education savings account. Nationwide, enrollment in school choice programs has grown from less than 30,000 students in 2000 to over 300,000 today. That said, if more low- and middle-income students are going to be able to take advantage of a Catholic school education, more states will need to create or expand these programs.

It was the prophet Jeremiah who said “in this place of which you say it is a waste, there will be heard again the voice of mirth and the voice of gladness. The voices of those who sing.” For years now, many observers have written off Catholic schools as dying institutions that had failed to keep up with the changing times. But across America, voices are singing.

The post Pope Francis Is Visiting a Catholic School. Maybe You Should, Too appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

                Those who have followed our blogs on this topic will be unsurprised to learn that Missouri’s largest cities, St. Louis and Kansas City, rank well on these measures. In terms of overall smoothness, Kansas City and St. Louis rank 8th and 11th, respectively, among the nation’s 75 largest metro areas:

                The relative smoothness of Missouri’s urban highways means lower costs for drivers. According to TRIP, the average driver in St. Louis and Kansas City paid $398 and $438, respectively, in annual additional vehicle operating costs from bad roads. That is far less than the U.S. large metro median ($640 per vehicle). San Francisco’s road conditions cost drivers the most, at an average $1,044 per year.

                The latest TRIP report underscores the fact that Missouri’s major roads are in comparatively good condition, at least in urban areas. However, to maintain and improve road quality, Missouri’s highways need regular maintenance and an adequate user-funding base to back that maintenance, which they currently do not have. 

The post New Report Gives High Marks to Missouri’s Urban Highways appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

According to the Star, the cost of Kansas City’s streetcar is comparable to similar projects in cities like Tucson, Seattle, Cincinnati, and Portland. The paper got their “data” from the Community Streetcar Coalition, which is a pro-streetcar lobbying organization (of which the city of Kansas City and KCATA are members), not a research group.

In dissecting the numbers, the first thing to note is that streetcars are virtually all incredibly expensive for the level of service they provide. That service is comparable to a short bus route, yet they are often an order of magnitude more expensive. That being said, the Star’s claims on the relative expense of the Kansas City streetcar are disputed. According to a report by AECOM (an architectural consulting firm), Kansas City’s streetcar system is more expensive per mile than Tucson, Seattle, and Cincinnati. Furthermore, the system is much more expensive per mile than many “vintage” streetcar lines like the Loop Trolley in Saint Louis, as the following chart demonstrates:

*2014 dollars                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       

Of course, there are different ways of estimating cost per mile, and (being custom projects) no streetcar system is exactly alike. Asking which streetcar has the highest cost per mile is akin to identifying the most costly SUV on the market given factors like gas mileage, amenities, and dealer warranties. However, arguing the Kansas City streetcar is not the most expensive streetcar out there is a little like saying the Escalade is a better value than the Land Rover. It’s an expensive luxury, whether or not it’s the most expensive luxury.

When Kansas City planned its streetcar, it did not plan a cost-effective transportation system. Instead, it opted for an expensive status symbol designed to move money, not people. And while its costs may be comparable to similar vanity projects in other cities, that in no way indicates shrewd spending by Kansas City planners. 

The post Kansas City Streetcar Advocates Argue Expensive Streetcar Not Country’s Most Expensive appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The proposed hotel deal not only will make conventions here more expensive, but it also will remove one of the few remaining charges conventions can keep down: open-bid catering.

Patric Mills works with Educational Testing Service (ETS), which brings over 5,000 people to Kansas City every year for between eight and 23 days—accounting for 26,000 room nights and 173,000 meals. She says that Kansas City is already more expensive than our peer cities. In a phone interview, she told me,

Kansas City is more expensive in general than some of our other site cities, such as Louisville and Cincinnati. Everything—travel, lodging, local transportation, IT support, decorators, security services, etc.—is less expensive in other cities. Being able to save on catering dollars makes Kansas City more attractive than it would otherwise be. 

The deal Kansas City is considering would give up the only cost advantage it has—catering—by giving Hyatt exclusive rights to it. As a result, convention planners like Mills will lose an opportunity to control costs. Mills said,

In most cities, the convention center has exclusive catering. Kansas City has open catering, and that is one of the biggest attractions, because it saves us money. . . . Exclusive caterers will have to bill for overtime and, with no competition, would have no incentive to offer low prices.

This will make Kansas City less attractive to ETS and probably many other conventions. Increasing costs and decreasing choice won't bring Kansas City new convention business. Mills concluded,

The College Board has a budget, and ETS, in managing their programs and events, has an incentive to keep costs low. If Kansas City moved to an exclusive caterer and prices rose as high as I am afraid they might, College Board could ask us to move the Kansas City AP Reading to a less expensive site.

The benefits of a new convention hotel are iffy, but the costs and the risks are real. Kansas City is already an expensive place for conventions—this effort to build a new hotel will make us more expensive and cost us an important competitive advantage: open-bid catering.

Taxpayers and the City Council need to understand these risks. If we're not careful, we may end up pricing ourselves out of contention.

The post The Risks of the New Convention Hotel appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In terms of population distribution, only around 216,000 residents live less than five miles from city hall, whereas the average city of Kansas City’s metro population has close to 400,000 residents living within the first five miles. Cincinnati, the 27th largest city by total metro population, has more than double the total population density of Kansas City within the first two miles outside of city hall, with just over 316,000 residents living within five miles of its city hall.

Kansas City’s low population near its city hall results in low population density at the city core. Similar to Saint Louis, Kansas City’s average population density is lower within two miles of its city hall than it is slightly further away from downtown, as the map below demonstrates:

Also like Saint Louis, the story of Kansas City’s development is actually one of decreasing density. Aside from the area right around city hall, Kansas City’s core (within eight miles of city hall) lost both population and population density on average between 2000 to 2010. Steady population growth only accrued in the city center and in low-density areas further than eight miles from city hall.

Many individual areas close to downtown are doing well. However, much like Saint Louis, those gains are outweighed by losses in other areas equidistant from Kansas City’s downtown. Furthermore, they are decreasing in precisely the areas where residents most rely on transit.

These types of population movements are not exclusive to Kansas City. City governments (especially Kansas City) often spend hundreds of millions adding amenities and subsidizing development downtown. And while the most visible parts of the city show modest improvement, structural problems in the city’s competitiveness and broad economic forces continue to erode population in traditionally poor, working-class, and middle-class neighborhoods.

Whether city hall can alter these trends is debatable. What is not contested is that, despite some increased density right downtown, Kansas City has a comparatively low population density that shows little evidence of rapid, or for that matter any, increase. When it comes to providing public services that depend on high densities to function efficiently, like transit, if the city plans under the pretense that it is as dense and centralized as, say, Cincinnati, it may end up providing worse service to the vast majority of residents, even as it favors certain sections of the city.

The post Ditching City Hall: A Kansas City Development Story appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

“Good, smart transit—a mix of buses rails, and other people movers—is a vital component of any successful city.”

But does a city really need a streetcar, or for that matter any type of light rail, to be successful?

Certainly many cities in the United States, more than 50, have some form of fixed rail transit. The largest rail systems are the New York City Subway and the Chicago L, but many small cities like Kenosha, Wis., Little Rock, Ark., and Tucson, Ariz., also have light rail or streetcars. However, many cities, large and small, do not have rail transit. Cities like Honolulu, San Antonio, Orlando, Indianapolis, and Cincinnati have been popular cities to work and play in for many years without much or any fixed rail. These cities, and many others like Kansas City, rely on bus systems.

There’s no reason why Kansas City cannot continue to rely on buses. Whether it’s rapid transit or simply providing service to wide areas, buses are capable of meeting cities’ needs in most situations. For example, the Chicago Transit Authority’s bus system had more than 314 million boardings in 2012. KCATA only had around 16 million boardings that year. The limits of KCATA’s bus system is yet to be reached.

While rail systems may be necessary in cities with significant congestion and population densities, nowhere does Kansas City have population or traffic to make rail necessary. And while it is not necessary, rail has its drawbacks, paramount of which is cost. For instance, Kansas City’s proposed streetcar expansion (less than 10 miles of routes) costs were more than double the entire capital spending on KCATA’s 250-plus bus fleet from 1992 to 2002.

Rail supporters contend that rail transit creates development, drives density, and is necessary to make Kansas City an attractive city for people to live in. But much of that belief is based on anecdotal evidence from successful cities with rail, usually ignoring places where rail has failed to drive development. Cities like Cleveland, Detroit, Baltimore, Buffalo, and Saint Louis have seen little regeneration from their rail lines, some of which cost more than a billion dollars.

Kansas City needs efficient transit that serves the community. It does not need rail to be successful, and residents should not let city officials with status anxiety waste hundreds of millions just to say Kansas City has rail.

The post Does Kansas City Need Rail Transit? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

“The stated goal of this project is economic development. That’s the dominant goal,” [Russ] Johnson said. “The dominant goal is not to have a lot of people ride it. The dominant goal is to develop the city.”

During remarks at the meeting, supporters, including Kansas City Mayor Sly James, presented as evidence of economic development the construction that has already taken place downtown. However, this employs a logical fallacy — post hoc ergo propter hoc. Municipalities often claim credit for development simply because it occurred after their policies were enacted, but it is disingenuous.

Below is an incomplete list of studies that demonstrate that economic development is not a result of fixed rail. We encourage everyone to read these, and we encourage streetcar supporters to provide contrary evidence that stands up to scrutiny.

• “The Great Streetcar Conspiracy,” Cato Institute, June 2012. Randal O’Toole has written extensively about the topic. If one questions this research because it comes from the libertarian Cato Institute, there are plenty of other sources.
• The Atlantic Cities published an article which makes clear that evidence for economic development due to streetcars is lacking. The author writes:

But while the Portland streetcar was the anchor or at least the featured element of this growth, it wasn’t responsible for this boom by itself. Rather, it was part of a broader development plan in which zoning, public-private investment, street upgrades, and other renewal efforts also played considerable roles.

• A 2010 study by the Federal Transit Administration concluded there was little information on the matter:

The literature regarding empirical measurement of actual changes in economic activity, such as changes in retail sales, visitors, or job growth, is almost nonexistent for streetcars. Indeed, this lack of empirical data was cited by many of the streetcar system survey respondents described in this report.

The same report also addressed the notion that streetcars attract the creative class:

Although occasionally the literature forecasting economic benefits for proposed streetcar systems posits that streetcars will attract more “creatives” to the area, this idea cannot be substantiated.

• Even the folks in Portland, whose work Kansas City streetcar proponents often cite, admit that results were dependent upon many programs, not just the streetcar. And even then, Portland’s ridership revenue is far less than they expected, making the effort a “money pit.”
• One attendee at the meeting referenced Cincinnati’s rail efforts, which, as one gentleman in attendance pointed out, has become a financial mess that voters rejected.
• A 1997 Georgia State University study of Atlanta’s trail transit system concluded

Taken together with earlier evidence that the social costs of rapid transit are higher than those for buses, the results suggest that it may be difficult to justify rapid rail investment on the basis of a benefit-cost analysis. In the absence of local economic development around stations, the benefits of rail are limited to those that might occur at the regional level. Future work should seek to quantify these benefits.

• A 2004 report from the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis also concluded:

. . . the increase in property values and economic development are subsidized benefits and may not be greater than the subsidy costs. Both citizens and local officials should have an understanding of the costs of light-rail transit relative to the potential benefits. Given the size of costs relative to the benefits, the creation of light-rail transit systems or the expansion of existing systems in American cities may be difficult to justify.

Indeed, building commercial-grade rail lines through 100-plus-year-old neighborhoods is difficult to justify. Study after study indicates no support for the city’s “dominant goal” of economic development. If streetcar boosters are aware of research that supports the claim that streetcars themselves — and not the tax-subsidized construction that goes with them — results in economic growth, we are eager to learn of it. Presumably, everyone else cited here would welcome seeing the research as well.

The post An Open Letter To Streetcar Supporters appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A Cincinnati streetcar project, embroiled in controversy in recent years over cost overruns and management, faces an uncertain future after Tuesday’s election ushered in a new mayor who vowed to halt the project that has tied up $148 million of city funds.

Mayor-elect John Cranley, a Democrat who ran on a platform of fiscal responsibility that included stopping the project, won about 58% of the votes tallied, according to unofficial results from the Hamilton County Board of Elections. He beat out current Vice-Mayor Roxanne Qualls, also a Democrat, who supported the project.

Since then, things have become more, well, political. The Associated Press reports that the outgoing city council is trying to erect roadblocks to keep the new council from exercising its power to stop the project.

How long will it be before Kansas City, awash with cost overruns and mismanagement, regrets forcing the streetcar on taxpayers in “the single-most undemocratic election in Kansas City since the Pendergast era?” When Ebeneezer Scrooge looked upon the headstone that the third ghost showed to him, he proclaimed:

“Men’s courses will foreshadow certain ends, to which, if persevered in, they must lead. But if the courses be departed from, the ends will change. Say it is thus with what you show me.”

Let’s hope Kansas City’s leaders depart from the current course, lest we find ourselves in Cincinnati’s position.

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