Even after reinstating fares, the Kansas City Area Transportation Authority (KCATA) is warning of route reductions because the agency says city funding will fall short of maintaining current service levels. KCATA estimates it needs more than $100 million to preserve existing operations, well above the city’s proposed contribution.

The immediate concern is fewer routes and longer waits for riders. But the larger issue is institutional: KCATA is confronting the long-term consequences of policy decisions that weakened its financial position and eroded confidence among regional partners.

Those problems did not emerge overnight. For years, KCATA relied on temporary funding, emergency appropriations, and optimistic revenue assumptions. Pandemic-era federal aid masked those weaknesses but did not resolve the structural imbalance between operating costs and recurring revenue.

The clearest example was KCATA’s heavily promoted fare-free transit initiative. Supporters argued eliminating fares would improve mobility and reduce barriers for low-income riders. But even at the time, research and the experience of other cities suggested the policy was financially unsustainable.

Fare-free transit eliminated one of the system’s few direct revenue streams while increasing dependence on taxpayer subsidies. Transit fares rarely cover operating costs, but they still provide revenue and impose some fiscal discipline. When federal pandemic aid expired, KCATA faced familiar financial pressures with even fewer tools available to address them.

Acknowledging that reality, KCATA recently announced fares will return next month. Restoring fares amounts to an acknowledgment that the model was not sustainable.

The consequences extend beyond Kansas City itself. Regional transit systems depend on trust among local governments—trust that erodes when the central agency faces recurring fiscal problems.

Some regional governments have already moved to retain greater operational control over their own transit services. In 2022, Johnson County, Kansas, ended KCATA management oversight of its transit operations while continuing limited coordination through the RideKC brand. More recently, several suburban municipalities—including Gladstone, Grandview, and Raytown—have reduced or ended participation in RideKC service.

Obviously, public transit serves a purpose. Many Kansas City residents still rely on buses to reach work, school, and appointments. Like transit agencies nationwide, KCATA is operating in a difficult post-pandemic environment shaped by inflation, labor shortages and changing ridership patterns.

But those challenges make competent governance more important, not less. Municipalities are hesitant to rely on an agency caught in recurring fiscal crises driven by its own policy failures. Fare-free transit generated national attention, but reality eventually intervened.

KCATA’s budget problems are not simply the result of this year’s funding gap. They are the cumulative consequence of years of policy decisions that weakened the authority’s financial position and damaged its credibility.

The post KCATA Is Still Paying for the Fare-Free Experiment appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Kansas City’s new Bus Riders Union says city hall and the Kansas City Area Transportation Authority (KCATA) need to listen to riders.

On that point, it is right.

For years, KCATA has made major policy decisions without clearly anchoring them to what riders consistently say they value most. The most consequential example was the move to eliminate fares.

In late 2019, the Kansas City Council voted to subsidize fare-free bus trips tied to city service. In March 2020, as a COVID-era public health measure, fares were suspended regionally across RideKC partners. The pandemic decision effectively made the fare-free policy far broader than the original city-centered framing.

But fare-free did not make bus operations cheaper.

Before 2020, several Missouri-side municipal contracts operated under a net operating cost model: KCATA calculated operating costs, subtracted passenger revenue, and allocated the remaining loss among funding partners. In the year before fares were suspended, passenger revenue covered roughly $9 million of operating costs.

The fare-free policy eliminated that recurring revenue stream, but it did not eliminate operating costs. Fare-collection expenses declined modestly, but those savings were far smaller than the forgone revenue, and additional pressures—including ADA complementary paratransit demand—complicated the balance sheet.

During the pandemic, federal funds offset the lost fare revenue. But as one-time COVID-era funding dwindled, the structural question reemerged: who permanently pays for free fares and full service?

Multiple forces drove the budget stress that followed—expiring federal relief, post-pandemic inflation, and negotiated cost-sharing changes. Fare-free was not the only cause of rising costs, but it was a significant one.

Removing a revenue stream embedded in cost-allocation formulas increased the amount that had to be covered by subsidies. Without a dedicated replacement source, the system became more financially fragile. That coincided with contract disputes, service cut threats, and regional withdrawals—all of which riders experience as instability.

Just as important, fare-free did little to address passenger concerns. It did not fix whether the bus shows up on time or is clean and safe. It may have worsened these issues.

Research across major transit systems shows a similar pattern: riders tend to rank frequency, reliability, and safety above fare reductions as the changes most likely to increase their use.

Kansas City has tested fare-free transit. It proved impossible to sustain without stable, dedicated funding, making the service less attractive to other neighboring municipalities.

If the Bus Riders Union wants to ensure riders are heard, the focus now should be on what riders consistently say they need: buses that run frequently, arrive on time, and feel safe.

Unfortunately, KCATA’s past policy missteps have made this more difficult.

The post Kansas City’s Bus Riders Union Is Right about One Thing appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Then there’s Kansas City. The regional transit authority eliminated fares in 2020, but it did not go exactly as local leaders had hoped.

“We just never found a sustainable funding source to replace the $10 million a year out of the fare box,” said Eric Bunch, a city councilman in Kansas City, Mo., and a board member of the Kansas City Area Transportation Authority.

Rose also included perspectives from urban transit researchers, who note that reducing fares is less critical than improving service speed, frequency, and reliability.

For KCUR’s audience, Rose’s framing may have come as a surprise. While the station occasionally raised funding concerns, it largely avoided discussing how fare elimination could affect service.

In late 2019, a KCUR piece quoted then-Councilwoman Kathryn Shields, who lead the council’s finance committee, as pointing out that no one was addressing how to offset losses at the farebox. Instead, KCUR’s early coverage framed zero fare as a breakthrough, not a policy gamble — quoting advocates and then-KCATA leader Robbie Makinen extensively while declining to examine the underlying “research” he invoked.

None of the KCUR reporting during the debate seriously contended with the service impact of zero fare. None sought out urban transit researchers, as Rose did. None considered the so-called research that Makinen cited in support of the policy. KCUR’s framing heavily favored advocates—including an exceedingly fawning piece on Makinen himself—and did not interrogate claimed benefits.

In May, 2021, KCUR quoted Makinen as saying, “When [zero fare] started, everyone said it wouldn’t work, I believe we’ve proved them wrong.” His confidence was premature.

Early in the debate, research, ridership surveys, and national reporting—some of which I cited in a January 2020 Kansas City Star column—already pointed to the risks of fare-free transit.

KCUR’s most direct acknowledgment of fare-free drawbacks came belatedly, in 2022, when it reprinted a story from The Beacon on unreliable service and long waits faced by bus riders. KCUR’s own reporters only asked, “Should Kansas City Keep Buses Free?” in 2023 when the damage was evident.

Back in that December 2019 piece, KCUR quoted then-Councilman Kevin McManus as saying, “When we take the fareboxes away, nobody wants to be on this council putting them back.” Six years later, six of the 13 council members who voted to remove fares in 2019 voted to reinstate them in 2025.

KCUR deserves credit for eventually publishing more substantive fare-free coverage. But had this level of scrutiny come earlier—before the rise in operator assaults, service cuts, and staffing concerns—the public conversation might have been far more informed. Policymakers might have avoided their embarrassing reversals. And the harmful impact to those who depend on public transit might have been reduced, or avoided altogether.

The post KCUR Finally Confronts the Reality of Fare-Free Transit appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

This is wonderful news, also known as great news. The proposed route was simply preposterous. Even by Metro’s own overly generous predictions, it was only going to have about 5,000 boardings a day. (That isn’t very many boardings for a billion dollars.) It was bad enough that it generated significant opposition at the East-West Gateway Board of Directors (EWGBOD) project vote, which almost never happens. At the Show-Me Institute, we released a study by Randal O’Toole in 2023 that highlighted why this project was unnecessary and wasteful, and I provided testimony against it before the EWGBOD in early 2024.

The federal government gives away a lot of money for expensive transit projects, so St. Louis invented an expensive transit project to go get that money. Never mind that few people were going to ride it, and that people along this route could be served much more affordably by buses.

But let’s give credit where it is due. The new mayor of St. Louis and Metro deserve credit for making the right decision now. Whether they did it because they realized it was a bad choice all along, or whether they just succumbed to the political reality that the current administration in Washington, D.C., was highly unlikely to fund this project, doesn’t really matter. I am just happy that it is done for, or at least as done for as a project like this can ever be.

Which brings us to the other part of the good news. The city and Metro are redirecting their efforts along this route to consider a bus rapid transit (BRT) route. BRT has worked well in Kansas City (unlike the streetcar) and deserves consideration for this route in St. Louis. I am still amazed, though, at how expensive BRT itself is. (That will be a topic for a future post.)

An affordable (for both taxpayers and riders), changeable, safe, and on-time bus system is what the St. Louis region needs for public transit. We should stop dreaming about getting suburbanites out of their cars and start focusing on serving the needs of people who depend on public transportation. Cancelling the Green Line is the right move in that direction.

The post Green Means Stop appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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That certainly is the number Fox4KC reported. And that number does come from the Streetcar Authority itself.

At over $100 million per mile, Kansas City may have just built the most expensive streetcar system in the country. A quick search online seems to support this (see table below). While this places the KC streetcar extension as the most expensive of 2025, we will only hold that title for a short while. California’s Orange Country streetcar—dubbed the Trolley to Nowhere by our friends at the California Policy Center)—will blow past our cost-per-mile when it opens in 2026.

Randal O’Toole, who authored a Show-Me Institute policy study on various streetcar proposals in Kansas City, told me “the average for streetcars is about $91 million a mile.” Although he added, “Seattle wants to connect two streetcar lines together at a cost of $220 million a mile.” So maybe Orange County’s record will itself be short-lived.

Recall that the streetcar system has done nothing to drive up assessed market value of the properties along the route above that of the county as a whole. It has had no measurable economic impact—despite the continuing and unsubstantiated claims made by streetcar supporters.

At best, we in Kansas City can—for a short while—lay claim to the most expensive system in the country. Yay!

The post “It cost what?” —KC Streetcar Announces Opening of New Extension appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A recent article in The Beacon highlighted “Historic renovations, new buildings and empty lots. Twelve projects to watch along the streetcar extension.” These projects may well be real, and perhaps even partially spurred by the streetcar—though that’s a bold assumption. (Consider, for example, the claim years ago that a company moved to be nearer to the streetcar, only to find out the claim was  specious.)  But more to the point, the story misses a crucial journalistic opportunity: comparison.

What if development along the streetcar line is proceeding at the same rate as development elsewhere in the county? Wouldn’t that be a critical piece of context for readers? Unfortunately, the article doesn’t address it.

The piece features an enthusiastic architect praising the streetcar and predicting continued growth—but offers little else in the way of evidence. There are no supporting data or comparative figures, just optimism.

Yet when we look at property value increases within the streetcar development district, the growth mirrors that of the broader county. If the streetcar were truly driving development, we’d expect the district to outperform. But so far, it hasn’t.

In fact, the full picture is more sobering. The city has layered on economic development incentives—tax abatements and similar tools—specifically to attract investment along the line. Still, there’s little sign they’re making a difference.

So, as more coverage emerges touting the streetcar’s economic magic, it’s worth pausing to ask a foundational economic question: “Compared to what?” That kind of framing—rooted in evidence, not enthusiasm—might offer readers a more accurate view of what’s really happening.

The post Don’t Believe the (Streetcar) Hype appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The capital city is making a strategic shift in its public transit approach by significantly expanding its bus services. This decision underscores the cost effectiveness and flexibility of bus transit compared to rail projects.

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) plans to enhance its Metrobus network, recognizing that buses can be deployed more rapidly and at a lower cost than rail systems. The goal of this expansion is to improve service coverage and frequency, making public transit more accessible and efficient for residents.

Kansas City and St. Louis have been caught up lately in schemes to expand fixed-rail transit, which comes with higher costs and longer implementation timelines. By observing Washington’s emphasis on bus transit, these cities can explore opportunities to optimize their public transportation systems through cost-effective and adaptable bus services.

As urban areas attempt to efficiently deliver basic services such as transit, adopting flexible and fiscally responsible solutions like buses can help cities better meet the needs of their communities—something Show-Me Institute writers have been proposing for over a decade.

The post On Transit, Maybe We Can Learn Something from Washington appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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People don’t appreciate things that are free, for good reason. One of the most famous insults in film history is on point here, when Rodney Dangerfield notices Ted Knight’s ugly golf hat in “Caddyshack” and says, “I bet you get a free bowl of soup with that hat.”

The Kansas City Area Transportation Authority (KCATA) didn’t give out free soup to riders when it made all transit free in 2020, but it might as well have. Free transit is great if your goal is to turn buses into mobile homeless shelters. If your goal is to provide quality, safe, affordable transit, then making it free is the last thing you would want to do. It reduces revenues the system needs while making ridership a worse experience for more people.

KCATA head Frank White III has acknowledged that security problems have increased under the free fare system. The agency addressed those problems by adding more security and police, which is better than doing nothing. But it is spending more money on security to address problems caused by collecting zero money in fares. No wonder there is a funding shortfall. Austin, Texas, instituted free fares on buses in the 1990s, and crime dramatically increased. Reinstating fares addressed that problem quickly.

KCATA is finally moving toward reinstating some fares, but it won’t go nearly far enough. According to plans, numerous groups, including the homeless, will remain exempt from paying fares. Politicians and other free-transit backers will blame the inevitable decrease in ridership on the fares while overlooking that the free rides for some will continue to make the bus experience so unpleasant that others who need it will choose not to use it. That’s basically progressive public policy in a nutshell: Make local government services equally awful for everyone.

On another transit front, Independence, Kansas City, and several other cities have been experimenting with a different option for public transit: outsourcing it to a private company. Independence had been contracting for bus services with Transdev bus company, but increased costs and low demand led the city to end those routes and that contract. Now, Independence and Kansas City are contracting with the private company RideCo to offer their own version of Uber or Lyft. To save money and time, the IRIS program in KC takes riders to a general area rather than an exact address, so some walking is required (which most Americans, including the author, could use). The IRIS program is subsidized by taxpayers, as public transit generally is. But it charges a modest fare, as it should. The baseline fare in Independence is $5. Some type of fare is needed both to fund the service and address the (both literal and figurative) free rider problems.

Will this new program succeed? I hope so. Such an experiment with subsidized ride sharing can only be done with the private sector. If it succeeds, wonderful. If it fails, the program can be ended and taxpayers won’t be on the hook for it anymore. Engaging the private sector avoids the complex politics of hiring and firing new government employees.

Successful public transit moves people who depend on it to where they need to be in a safe, efficient, and timely manner. The louder supporters of transit often confuse actual success with more grandiose aims: convincing well-off suburbanites to use transit, designing flashy but useless pet projects, or creating utopia by making everything free. For a perfect example of that confusion, see how KCATA is cutting its bus route hours while the flashy and useless (yet expensive) KC Streetcar route is being expanded.

Reinstituting some bus fares and contracting with private operators for rideshare service will hopefully give KCATA, Independence transit, and the larger region the resources it needs. The purpose of transit is to move people who need it, not to satisfy the dreams of urban planners or ideologues. Free transit and streetcars do the latter, but all actual transit users want is a safe and affordable way to get to work or school on time.

The post “Free” Transit Is Anything But appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In 2020, Kansas City became the first major U.S. city to eliminate bus fares entirely. At the time, city leaders leaned on a slapdash four-page “mini report” that promised an $11 million local GDP boost. To put it mildly, it was wrong.

Since then, ridership dropped, assaults on drivers went up, and the Kansas City Area Transportation Authority (KCATA) is now staring down a $10 million budget gap. The COVID money that kept KCATA afloat runs out next year. KCATA’s new leadership is asking to study whether fares should return. That’s where we are now: back at the beginning, but with less credibility and fewer resources.

The New York proposal has the same weaknesses. The author estimates a 23% increase in ridership, a 12% increase in speed and billions in economic gains—all for the low, low cost of $600 million in forgone fare revenue. But his math is speculative, his benefits are theoretical, and like in Kansas City, the costs are very real.

The problem isn’t just financial. Prices matter. Fares aren’t only about revenue—they’re also a tool to manage demand, discourage misuse, and incentivize better service. Eliminate them and you get overuse, fewer behavioral constraints, and more wear on already stretched systems. You also change the customer’s relationship with the service. When it’s free, expectations fall—for riders and for the agency.

Proponents talk about fairness. But there’s nothing fair about asking everyone to pay for a system that primarily serves a few. The better solution is targeted subsidies for those who need the help, which would preserve incentives, protect the system, and respect taxpayers.

Kansas City tried fare-free transit. It failed. New York doesn’t have to make the same mistake.

The post Free Buses, Costly Lessons appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A Free-Market Guide for Missouri Municipalities is a multi-part series by David Stokes, director of municipal policy at the Show-Me Institute, offering practical, free market–oriented reforms for improving local government across the state. Each installment focuses on a core area of municipal policy—combining real-world examples, historical  context, and academic research to help cities, towns, and villages better serve residents and taxpayers.

The second installment, A Free-Market Guide for Missouri Municipalities, Part Two: Taxation, examines the sources of municipal revenue in Missouri and evaluates the state’s heavy reliance on sales and income taxes. It makes the case for rebalancing local finance by placing greater emphasis on growth-oriented taxes like property taxes and more targeted sources such as user fees, while reducing reliance on volatile and distortionary taxes. Topics include land taxes, special taxing districts, user fees, local gas taxes, and the economic consequences of tax subsidies like TIF. The report offers practical recommendations to make local tax systems more stable, transparent, and conducive to long-term prosperity.

The post A Free-Market Guide for Missouri Municipalities, Part Two: Taxation appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

So here is my contribution to the effort. Just tell St. Louis’s Bi-State Development Agency (also known as Metro) “no” on its application for around $700 million in federal funds for the ludicrous Green Line (formerly known as the North-South Line) proposal. Like Nancy Reagan said to Arnold on Diff’rent Strokes, “Just say no.”

The new leadership in the federal Department of Transportation (DOT) has instituted major changes in how the DOT is going to make decisions. This doesn’t look good for the Green Line, as the St. Louis Business Journal wrote about this week. The new DOT guidelines state that, among many other things, the DOT isn’t funding projects for local political purposes or social justice reasons. The new DOT leadership is focused on moving people and goods, and actually moving people is one thing the Green Line isn’t going to do. Metro’s own estimates—which based on history are probably inflated—claim that the Green Line will have only 5,000 boardings (so, about 2,500 people) per day. That is for a billion-dollar project. That’s absurd.

Whether you call it the “Green Line” or the “North-South Route,” I call it an inevitable failure and a huge waste of tax dollars. Even if you support MetroLink, there is no reasonable argument for the Green Line project. The federal government ought to reject this plan and many other similar, though not quite as bad, applications from around the country.

You’re welcome, Elon.

The post Hey Elon, Here Are Some Cost Savings for You in St. Louis . . . appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The “Green Line” is dependent on approximately $600 million in federal funds; funds I hope it doesn’t get. I suggest that cutting the national debt can start right here. As national politics affects local policy, I am hopeful that upcoming changes to federal policy will be the death of this plan. Indeed, some key voices, including Les Sterman, the past director of the East-West Gateway Council of Government, have recently called for the project to stop.

In 2004, MetroLink planners predicted there would be 80,000 boardings per day on MetroLink trains by 2025 in St. Louis, Missouri (that number excludes Illinois users). In the first quarter of 2024, there were about 18,800 actual boardings per weekday for the entire system, including Illinois (page 23 in link). (Ridership goes up slightly in the summer with baseball games, but not that much this summer, for obvious reasons.) We can just admit that MetroLink usage has been substantially less than projected. St. Louis should focus on serving the existing system as best it can instead of doubling down on failure with this latest expansion fantasy.

The “Green Line” plan only projects 5,000 boardings per day, at best. Even if that turned out to be accurate—and history suggests it won’t be—that is a very low number. Serving about 2,500 people per day (one person equals two boardings, on average) for over $1 billion is a terrible use of tax dollars. This project should not move forward.

The post Absurd Light Rail Project Marches Onward appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Missouri’s roads are often a mixed bag. Urban areas, such as Kansas City and St. Louis, face heavy traffic loads that strain infrastructure, while rural areas contend with neglect stemming from budget limitations. Harsh weather conditions further exacerbate the wear and tear, leaving many roads riddled with potholes and cracks. Rural highways critical for agriculture and trade can quickly deteriorate without sustained investment.

A recent post by the blog Construction Physics contained a chart depicting the road quality of the top 19 cities. It depicts the percentage of non-interstate roads at different quality levels, measured by the International Roughness Index (IRI) and tabulated by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). I’ve added St. Louis and Kansas City for comparison using the same scoring system.

Missouri’s interstates, whose standards and funding largely come from the federal government,  rank 15th out of 50th according to the IRI score. But our non-interstate roads rank 32nd, behind our neighboring state of Kansas (1st) but well ahead of Illinois (37th). Kansas has earned a reputation for relatively well-maintained highways, thanks to strategic funding and regular maintenance schedules. Illinois has committed significant resources to upgrading its aging infrastructure through recent legislative initiatives.

Importantly, both Kansas and Illinois employ toll roads to fund road maintenance. Missouri should, too. Show-Me authors have written extensively on tolling and road maintenance more generally. While Missouri recently increased its gas tax, it’s too soon to know how impactful it will be.

Improving Missouri’s roads requires more than patchwork solutions. Lawmakers and transportation officials must focus on sustainable funding mechanisms, better prioritization of projects, and more efficient use of resources. Policies that balance the needs of urban centers and rural areas will be critical in ensuring that all Missourians benefit from reliable roadways.

The post Kansas City and St. Louis Road Quality appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Several years ago, Kansas City decided to make its public transit free for all. After all, the purpose of local government is to just give things away for free, isn’t it? For several years, the pandemic-related free federal money train has allowed this “free transit” plan to continue, but that train is coming to a stop. Now, Kansas City leadership has some decisions to make. The transit authority has considered ending the “free” part of the ride before, and now it is time to do away with it once and for all.

Nobody is suggesting funding the entire transit system with fares. Subsidizing transit is an accepted part of urban economics, but that doesn’t mean you should make it free. “Subsidized” transit means you help low-income workers, encourage alternate transportation to large events, and help offset traffic problems. “Free” means you get homeless people sleeping on the bus and cuts to bus lines because you don’t have enough funding. “Free” results in fewer people using transit because the bad aspects of “free” are what matter most to people. Here is what happened in Tucson, Arizona when it moved to “free” transit several years ago:

“We have become a mobile refuge from the elements, frequented by drug users, the mentally ill and violent offenders that have made Sun Tran unsafe to ride,” the local Teamsters union warned in a letter to the city.

As one very sensible Kansas City bus rider put it at a transit meeting on November 13: “she doesn’t mind paying a fare as long as it’s affordable and bus lines don’t get cut.”

Fares are an important part of funding for a decent transit system. Perhaps more importantly, they also help keep the elements out of the system that make other people not want to use it. The Kansas City Area Transportation Authority should reinstate fares immediately.

The post It’s Time to End Free Transit in Kansas City appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Let’s recap the proposal. The Green Line would be a five-mile route up and down Jefferson Avenue in St. Louis that then turns west for a few blocks on Natural Bridge near Fairground Park (which is where the JVL group bases its concerns). The entire plan will cost an estimated $1.1 billion, but the line is only predicted to have 5,000 boardings a day. That’s 5,000 boardings, not 5,000 people—most riders would use it both ways —and even that estimate is overly optimistic.

The demand for public transit along this route up and down Jefferson doesn’t currently justify its own bus route, but supposedly large numbers of people will magically ride MetroLink when the Green Line appears.

Why is Metro trying to build this route? Well, to quote Metro’s CEO, Taulby Roach:

A billion dollars sounds like a lot of money, but . . . 60 percent of that investment comes from the federal government, so why wouldn’t we want to get that money?

So, basically, let’s get the federal funds and spend them. Who cares that there is no demand for this route or that Metro’s own underwhelming projections admit that few people will actually use it? Let’s get some of other people’s money to spend! No wonder we are $35 trillion in debt.

I commend JVL’s neighborhood group for publicly asking tough questions about this project, which it calls the “Metro-Leg To Nowhere.” The pressure to support this boondoggle is strong. It’s great to see people stand up to it.

The post One Neighborhood Group Stands Up to Metro appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The federal government has spent billions on internet expansion and hasn’t connected a single new home. California has increased its high-speed rail budget from $33 billion to $135 billion and still hasn’t laid down any track fifteen years after the program began. It’s insanity.

Another huge federal program with local implications that has failed miserably is the program to install thousands of electric vehicle chargers across the nation. $7.5 billion was appropriated toward this goal in 2021 as part of the bloated stimulus package, and by the end of 2023, zero chargers had been installed.

2024 has witnessed the installation of a few new chargers. As of this summer, the program is up to eight. All of this for something the private sector could provide. But if you leave it to the private sector, they might not install chargers exactly how the federal government wants them to, and that’s (apparently) the problem. The federal rules are so unnecessarily yet intentionally complex that they are the cause of the delays. As Reason magazine writes:

Why so little progress? Alexander Laska of the center-left Third Way think tank told Autoweek’s Jim Motavalli that the federal cash “comes with dozens of rules and requirements around everything from reliability to interoperability, to where stations can be located, to what certifications the workers installing the chargers need to have.”

Who cares what certifications the workers have as long as the chargers work? And who cares where they are located as long as they are located somewhere a car can get to? The federal government cares, of course, because the complexity of the rules is exactly what gives bureaucrats their power and allows officials to reward supporters.

EV charging mandates, subsidies, and regulations, are all unnecessary. Where there is a demand for chargers, the private sector will supply them. This is no more complex than the gas stations that have been filling up cars for over a hundred years. (Did you know that the first gas station in America was in St. Louis? I didn’t.)

$7.5 billion for eight EV chargers in three years. So typical.

The post Charging Nothing and Liking It appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Fast forward to today and nothing has changed. Property assessment data received from Jackson County through an open records request show the aggregate annual market value of Kansas City’s downtown streetcar Transportation Development District (TDD) is largely growing at the same rate as the county as a whole.

In other words, the streetcar is still not driving economic development in any substantial way. Were that the case, you’d see market values in the TDD rising at a much faster rate, as properties are quickly snatched up and redeveloped to take advantage of all that commerce and excitement.

There may be arguments for expanding the Kansas City streetcar. But those arguments aren’t about transit (all the streetcar routes were once and could be again served much more economically by buses) and they aren’t about economic development. And because 66% of Missouri electricity is generated by coal, the streetcar isn’t green, either.

Unfortunately, as the FTA reported, few streetcar operators actually check to see if their claims are true. That remains the case in Kansas City.

The post The KC Streetcar Still Isn’t Driving Economic Development appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

But now we have good news out of St. Louis County regarding transit. County government has rejected all of the various options for MetroLink expansion into St. Louis County. (This is different from the proposed MetroLink expansion in St. Louis City, which unfortunately has been approved locally. The East-West Gateway Council of Governments is currently seeking federal funding for this project, which I hope it won’t get.)

The problem for the various proposals to expand into St. Louis County is that there is no dedicated way to pay for them, at least not yet. The route starts in the city but the expansion primarily serves the county—so is the city or the county going to pay for the first few miles of the expansion? Would the county pay for light rail inside the city? Would the city pay for part of a light rail expansion that mostly “benefits” residents of the county? (Note the use of quotation marks as there is no overall benefit.) Who knows?

This doesn’t mean that light rail expansion in St. Louis County isn’t going to happen, but anything that puts it in doubt is good news in my book.

The other good news in the story is that St. Louis County is now considering bus rapid transit (BRT) as an alternative to MetroLink:

AECOM [the county’s consulting firm] also has been asked to study the use of rapid bus lines, either using new rights-of-way just for buses or designated lanes on existing roads. Those could be deployed instead of MetroLink expansion or in conjunction with it.

BRT has been used in Kansas City with success, and it is something that Metro should consider for St. Louis. BRT moves people effectively at a fraction of the cost of light rail, streetcars, or trolleys. Unfortunately, it seems spending enormous amounts of money is a good thing from Metro’s point of view, no matter how much of it is wasted.

Increased use of BRT could be the transit option St. Louis has been looking for.

The post The Light Rail Line Less Traveled appeared first on Show-Me Institute.