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On June 5, Patrick Tuohey, senior fellow at the Show-Me Institute, guest-hosted Mundo in the Morning on KCMO Talk Radio, where Terrence Wise of the Missouri Workers Center announced the organization had collected over 4,500 signatures, more than double the roughly 2,000 required, to force a public vote on any taxpayer subsidy of the proposed downtown Royals ballpark. The city clerk has 10 days to validate the signatures, after which the city council has 60 days to act, with a public vote expected in November.

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Susan Pendergrass speaks with Judge Glock, director of research and senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and contributing editor at City Journal, about the growing debate over data centers in Missouri and across the country. They discuss why some communities are banning data centers while others are welcoming them, how Loudoun County, Virginia became the global epicenter of data center development and what it has meant for local tax revenue, whether concerns about noise, aesthetics, and energy use are valid, and more.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:00): Thank you for coming on the podcast again, Judge Glock. We’re going to talk about something that is certainly in the news and certainly good and bad for Missouri in the past week. We’ve had stories about both new data centers being announced and more communities banning them. What’s your take on that? You live in Virginia. In Missouri, we are certainly at odds with each other between one area that is going to have both a massive Amazon and a massive Google data center and then very close to that a large county that just banned them. Where do you think this is going?

Judge Glock (00:36): In some sense, it’s going the way of a lot of American projects in that there’s going to be a diversity of local responses to them, which I think is actually quite OK. One of the things I gather when I talk to some of my friends across the pond in the UK or in Europe is that they basically have to have this grand national debate about data centers, whether to allow them and where to allow them. That’s obviously an important and worthwhile debate, but in America what we’re going to have, and what we’ve already had, is a near infinitude of local debates about data centers. I think that’s the right path. When you nationalize or centralize these issues, you create more veto points for people who want to refuse any sort of growth. You also force certain kinds of growth on people in areas that aren’t necessarily favorable to them or most likely to benefit from them. The American system of fairly decentralized governance, combined with a fiscal horse-trading side where the main benefit of local data centers is the fiscal bump local communities can get, I think is going to lead to a more positive outcome than a more centralized system that tries to create a single answer for a whole country or state.

Susan Pendergrass (02:07): But we have at least one county in Missouri that within the last few days said, regardless of the money, we’re a community and these things ruin towns and communities. I wonder if it isn’t going to be like driving across some states like West Virginia where the biggest, ugliest, most pollution-spewing plants are there. I wonder if it’s because Virginia was willing to have them. Now you have these communities in Missouri that are like, we’ve got acres and acres of land and we don’t care what it looks like, versus these other communities that are saying we don’t want big white buildings everywhere. That to me is a very interesting dynamic, because I feel like they’re going to end up in places where nobody wants to build anything else.

Judge Glock (03:02): Yeah, and that might not be the worst outcome. Can I give a quick segue into the history of something called environmental racism? This was a movement started to some extent in the South in the 1970s and 1980s to meld general anti-industrial, pro-environmental sentiment with the burgeoning civil rights movement. The argument at that time was that evil polluters were forcing their factories into places that were poor and largely Black or minority-majority areas, and that this was a travesty because it was burdening people with increased environmental harm, pollution, and factory soot. The problem with that analysis, which has been carried out by the federal government for decades, is that a lot of times poor and minority communities really, really wanted these factories. They were willing to accept the trade-offs of the environmental harms for the fiscal and monetary benefits in a way that wealthier communities were not. Precisely because they were poor, they usually put a lower value on the environmental concerns that exercised a lot of high-income people and put a much higher value on getting good jobs and all the rest. There’s a famous case from the 1990s where I believe the Clinton administration sued a Louisiana parish and a company that was trying to place a factory in a majority-minority district, claiming it was an example of environmental racism. It actually turned out that the largely Black politicians in the local area were saying this was insane, that they were being sued by the federal government for being racist against themselves when they wanted the factory. That’s a long segue into environmental racism, but I think it’s the sort of analysis we should apply to data centers. There are going to be some areas that put a higher value on the fiscal benefits of data centers than others. On the whole, I imagine those will be poorer areas that care a bit more about reducing property taxes and perhaps the fairly small but not insignificant job benefits of data centers. Estimates suggest a finished data center will create around 50 or so permanent jobs, though certainly hundreds during construction. Some of those communities will be more likely to accept them than maybe wealthy suburbs or other areas that don’t want them for various reasons. Now there are exceptions to that general framework, and I’ve written a bit about Loudoun County, which is a very strange case study.

Susan Pendergrass (06:02): Tell me about that, because I’m surprised that it’s the data center capital of the world given what I’ve seen in Loudoun County.

Judge Glock (06:08): I happen to live in Fairfax, Virginia, in part of the suburbs, and grew up in the general area. So it surprised me to learn not too long ago that Loudoun County, just a little further west from Fairfax, a county generally considered ex-urban and rural, and by one measure, median income, the richest county in America, with a median household income of around $170,000 a year. And yet despite this reputation as a wealthy Northern Virginia ex-urban community, what Loudoun has actually become is the global epicenter of data centers. By some measure, the amount of gigawatts used by data centers, the only place close is Beijing, and they’re not even close, at about half the level of what Loudoun and Northern Virginia have. As I showed in an article I wrote for City Journal that got some attention, that came from a particular confluence of events, a history of Defense Department buildup that left a lot of what’s called dark fiber in the area, which created what’s known as low latency, meaning data centers there could communicate with each other very quickly. That made it a good place to locate internet and communication-focused data centers, and today data centers focused on inference for AI, that is the answering of AI queries. That history made it a particular location. But the other side of the Loudoun story is that for decades, and especially in the last decade, the county just recognized the fiscal benefits. Right now data centers are paying for 45% of all taxes in the county, which is pretty remarkable.

Susan Pendergrass (08:12): How much are they taking in from data centers in person?

Judge Glock (08:15): For the next fiscal year, the estimate is that data centers will bring in $1.3 billion in county revenue. That’s about 45% of all local tax revenue. But maybe an even more startling way to frame it is that all local government uses and projects outside of schools are a little less than what Loudoun raises from data centers alone. So the local residents of Loudoun County effectively get free police, free firefighters, free animal control, free roads, and so on.

Susan Pendergrass (09:00): Have they lowered their property taxes?

Judge Glock (09:02): Yes. Thanks to this absolute boom in data center revenue, Loudoun not only has very well-appointed and well-funded schools, roads, and police departments, but they’ve also lowered their property tax rate pretty continuously for over a decade. It’s about 40% lower than it was in the early 2010s. Now that’s offset to some extent by increases in assessments and other rates, but it is much lower than what I pay over here in Fairfax, about a third lower. So data centers for Loudoun, which can kind of be seen as the first area to really embrace them, and home to one of the first significant data centers in America built by a now large firm called Equinox in the late 1990s, has worked really, really well for that county. I don’t think it’s necessarily going to work as well for every possible county that doesn’t have the same advantages Loudoun does, but it does show that for those that embrace them, there can be real benefits. It clearly hasn’t hampered the ability to attract high-income, well-funded residents with good jobs and a nice community. On the whole it seems to have been beneficial, even if you’ve seen growing opposition there as you’ve seen elsewhere.

Susan Pendergrass (10:46): Virginia horse country. But now it feels like the word is out and people are hearing that there could be health risks, that the buildings buzz, that they use all the water. I’ve seen some recently that have like some blue stripes and stuff on them, but the originals were pretty plain. The latest vote in Missouri was in St. Charles, and people cheered and wrote all these emails saying we don’t want them in our backyard because of health risks and noise. How valid are those concerns?

Judge Glock (11:22): Before I was celebrating the local diversity of responses to data centers relative to the alternative, but I don’t want to slight the classic concerns with local NIMBYism, the not-in-my-backyard movement, or the idea that local governments often try very hard to restrict new development of housing or other projects in their area, which can be a substantial burden for people looking for housing or hoping for jobs and fiscal revenue. On the whole, I think the competitiveness of local governments will help wash that out. If St. Charles or another county refuses to build a data center, it’s often not too difficult to find another county willing to accept one. But I do think a lot of this anti-data center hysteria is driven by people with not just local concerns, which can be legitimate though to my mind often vastly overblown, but with a general anger at technological civilization and AI writ large. A lot of that has been strangely channeled into specific local opposition to data centers. That old leftist slogan of think globally and act locally presents a problem here: a lot of local issues don’t really map well to global concerns about climate change or AI. If someone has an issue with AI and they ban a local data center, that is in no way going to stop AI. Stopping a data center nearby is not going to stop the revolution. It will barely even slow it down. There is a lot of generalized opposition to modernity and technology that gets channeled into opposition to local data center construction, which is totally irrelevant to that debate. As for the actual local concerns, when I was reporting on the story for Loudoun, I spent some time driving around and checking out these data centers. For those who have not seen one, or frankly a park of them, it’s a pretty amazing sight. These things can be huge, nearly approaching a hundred feet tall, very solid concrete boxes, not often the most beautiful structures you’ve ever seen. The trend now is placing blind windows in them randomly to make them look better, though depending on your preference that may or may not help. I think a lot could be done to address the aesthetic concerns. Those are real. If you look at some parts of Loudoun and elsewhere, there are data centers built right next to housing subdivisions, and it can feel uncomfortable to have a looming concrete block right next door. The other local concern I think is somewhat legitimate but again overblown is the noise. Data centers, mainly because of their cooling systems, emit a fairly regular hum. It’s a low frequency, low decibel hum, but at a low frequency it can go through walls and subtly shake things. It can be irritating. I personally would not like a low frequency hum right next door. But the solution, as with the visual impact, is simply to push them back a bit. This is not like a local school that needs to be right next to a subdivision. If you’re talking a few hundred yards down the road, you’ve pretty much solved most of the hum and visual impact issues, especially if you surround it with some trees or berms or other methods to both hide the structure and limit the noise. Those two issues, the noise and the visual impact, are real. I understand why people are concerned, but they can be and have been easily addressed. In most of the debates you see, that’s not really the issue. It’s these generalized concerns about AI or false concerns about water.

Susan Pendergrass (16:03): What about the use of energy?

Judge Glock (16:19): Again, to some extent this is another local versus global problem where the local energy use of a data center is not really going to change the price people pay on their local residential energy bill. Most energy here in Virginia and elsewhere is part of a big interconnection, which is a market where different energy producers and power plants share electricity across large transmission lines. The price for electricity, besides state-level mandates, laws, or environmental regulations, is usually determined in that general market. Yes, a data center will drive up electricity costs somewhat in that general market, but it’s not necessarily a substantial driver of that. One new data center will have a very minimal impact on anybody’s bills across the whole region and will have no real effective impact on somebody’s local energy bills. To some extent, data center builders have also been doing a lot more work to construct what’s called off-the-grid or behind-the-grid energy production attached to the data centers. That can be problematic because of increased noise, even in Loudoun and elsewhere where a lot of places just have backup diesel generators that can produce a loud crack when the backup energy turns on, since data centers want to be running constantly. But in general, as before, you have very localized concerns about noise that you want to address with very localized attempts to limit those impacts, either through distancing the data center or finding ways to cover it and limit the noise it emits. The electricity issue is real in the sense that demand for electricity is going up because of data centers, and as economists like to say, supply is inelastic, meaning supply of energy is not going to ramp up as quickly as demand. That means prices are going to go up a little bit nationally because of that. But as long as the value of these data centers is there and people are going to build them, they’re not really going to have a meaningful impact on local electricity prices, and the data center builders are going to find other ways to get electricity and make sure that generation capacity comes online.

Susan Pendergrass (19:28): Missouri is building these two massive data centers not far from our one nuclear plant, and I know that’s something that has been discussed. When I hear that Loudoun County was the first to do this in such a massive way that they could bring in half of their income from data centers, it feels to me like when Colorado legalized cannabis and was the only state to do so. They took in so much money that residents got money back on their income taxes, and every other state said they were going to be just like Colorado. But Colorado was the one that did it first. Maybe Loudoun is the one that did it first with data centers. So now when a community brings in a data center, it’s not going to have the same impact it had in that first wild test case that was Loudoun County, right?

Judge Glock (20:18): I think that’s correct. I would note though that for some smaller communities, especially small rural communities with relatively small populations, such as some of these Texas counties, a single data center can become a third or more of the city’s or county’s budget overnight. So they can have a huge impact on smaller and poorer areas. But do most data centers as they’re built today have the huge fiscal impact that Loudoun got? Absolutely not. The other side of the fiscal story, though, and one that will apply more universally, is that data centers require very little in the way of services. When a city allows a new subdivision or apartment building, it gets more property taxes but also has to pay for schooling for the kids, roads, fire departments, and all the rest. When a city allows a new office park, there are similar property tax benefits but fewer service costs than residential development. According to one estimate I saw, for every dollar a typical office building or commercial retail project generates, a city spends about 25 cents on actual services to it. For data centers, because there’s basically no one in them, that number drops to about four or five cents. They basically need nothing. As I talked to some of the local officials in Loudoun, they said these things don’t send kids to school, they don’t even put cars on the road. There’s basically no impact on anything else. Once it’s built, it just sits there and throws off property tax revenues. No trash pickup, no breaking up fights at a local bar. It’s just money that keeps flowing in. So even if the property taxes aren’t as massive as they are in Loudoun, local communities still aren’t going to have to worry much about services, and they’re still likely going to see a big net benefit. Some people point out that data centers don’t offer many jobs over the long run, and a lot of industrial projects get approved because of job creation. But the flip side is that very few jobs also means low services and low impact. A big concern with local communities approving projects is traffic, and data centers just don’t create much of it for their size. So yes, other counties are not going to get the kind of deal Loudoun got and still is getting, because it remains the epicenter and data center builders want to build next to other data centers. But they are going to get a project that really doesn’t cost much of anything, still throws off at least some money, and doesn’t really burden local communities as long as it’s placed ever so slightly out of the way.

Susan Pendergrass (24:16): That brings me to another point. I’ve read that there are a lot of very smart engineers working on the problem of AI inference and how much energy and space it requires, and how to make it more productive. Eventually I think they’re going to solve this. We used to have server rooms that every business kept cool, and then everyone ended up with a laptop or even a phone. Eventually I think people are going to address this problem of requiring so much physical space to do what we need to do. I wonder if in a decade we’re just going to have empty white blocks sitting around because it’ll be too expensive to demo. What do you think?

Judge Glock (25:08): It could happen. You mean the data centers will be depopulated of their servers because they’ll be so miniaturized. That’s true, and it could be. To some extent, counties like Loudoun that have benefited massively from these data centers can and have set up rainy day funds, similar to counties that get a sudden oil influx, to say that if this ever starts to peter out, they’ll still have a long-term benefit they can continue placing into their budget and at the service of their residents. Right now I think we’re so far away from a potential data center bust that it really shouldn’t be a concern. As I’ve also pointed out, right now about one and a half percent of our whole economy is spent building data centers. This is just from basically zero just a few years back. This is a wild building boom, absolutely wild. We’re talking hundreds of billions of dollars a year. We need, if anything, to make sure that people can build out those data centers to do the other things that the AI revolution is going to require and demand, no matter what local opposition one county or another expresses. When you talk to people in the industry, the consensus is that we just can’t even build them fast enough. If very smart companies and very smart people are willing to invest hundreds of billions of dollars a year in data centers, and when I say data centers I mean mainly the servers and computers in them, I think they know it’s going to be a good return.

Susan Pendergrass (27:09): Well, it’s going to be interesting to see it play out in Missouri, because there’s definitely been backlash coming through the local town councils and the voters have been pretty loud in some areas. Have any Virginia counties banned them that you know of?

Judge Glock (27:29): Virginia has not only been the epicenter of the growth of data centers, it has been the epicenter of the opposition to data center movement as well. There is a group, something like Data Center Reform Watch, that has been monitoring local opposition. You’ve seen a bunch of counties take pretty strong steps against new data center construction. I forget if they’ve gone all the way to a formal and complete ban, but you definitely have votes in major counties either to block individual sites or to ban them from large swaths of the county. My take is that some other county is going to want and find ways to get those data centers, and when some of these counties realize they may have gone a little too far, they’re going to look at ways to pare it back and focus more on where to place the data centers rather than banning them outright and everywhere. I really struggle to find the logic in a local community banning a data center that’s going to be two and a half miles from anybody else. Frankly, as weird and big as they are, are they that different from, say, a local warehouse? A warehouse has trucks coming in and out all day, spewing pollution. One of these fulfillment centers is a big concrete box just like a data center, but with all that traffic on top of it. Data centers just seem much less problematic in that regard. In some sense they’re like a warehouse without all the trucks. If not for this huge generalized concern with AI, which is a separate debate, there doesn’t seem to be a lot of logic to just banning them completely.

Susan Pendergrass (29:42): Well, it is early days. I would love to have you come back again to talk to us when the dust settles a little bit, especially in Missouri. One of the first places I remember reading about a ban was Festus, Missouri, and now there are more. I’m also hearing about some of the biggest data centers going in there. So we’d love to have you back.

Judge Glock (30:02): That’d be great. I look forward to it.

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The post Are Data Centers Good for Communities? with Judge Glock appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Susan Pendergrass speaks with Aaron Renn, author and consultant, and David Stokes, Director of Municipal Policy at the Show-Me Institute, about the recurring debate over whether the city of St. Louis should rejoin St. Louis County. They explore what city county mergers have actually accomplished in places like Indianapolis, Louisville, Nashville, and Lexington, why a full merger in St. Louis would be extraordinarily difficult to pull off, and whether the benefits would even outweigh the costs. They also discuss St. Louis’s demographic challenges, what the Pittsburgh model might offer as a path forward, the cultural barriers that make it hard to attract and retain people from outside the region, and more.

You can find Aaron’s work here.

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Episode Transcript

Susan Pendergrass (00:05): Welcome back, Aaron Renn, to the podcast. So happy to have you and David Stokes, our own expert on cities and counties and all things municipal. I appreciate you coming on, Aaron. There have been murmurings around St. Louis again on a topic that we have revisited for probably a hundred years: should the city of St. Louis be a separate county from St. Louis County?

Before we get to that, I want to ask you something because I was reading the news this morning, and I know that you’ve written about city county mergers before, like cities that are kind of dying and then either pulling in parts of their closest suburbs to sort of make everything look better, broaden their tax base, make their crime numbers look better. I was reading something you wrote a year or two ago about that, and you said that Louisville is a failed example of that. Is that right, basically?

Aaron Renn (01:01): Yeah, I’m a little skeptical of how these things have worked out in practice.

Susan Pendergrass (01:05): Yeah, in terms of losing the flavor and the coolness of the city. Literally this morning I saw an article about how Louisville is having a renaissance and these young professionals are all moving there because they didn’t tear down all their beautiful old Victorian homes, so you can still get one for close to a million dollars. They’ve got a cool art scene and a bourbon scene. So it sounds like maybe Louisville did not lose its personal flavor in the merger. I would be curious to know what you think of that.

Aaron Renn (01:33): Well, I like to put St. Louis in context. I’m glad you mentioned Louisville because many of these river cities have similar characteristics. I like to look at St. Louis as well as three cities in the Ohio Valley: Louisville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. All of them heavily German Catholic in their demographics. All of them are very geopolitically fragmented with many small tiny suburbs throughout. They all have very fragmented neighborhood systems as well, where everybody has a strong sense of neighborhood identity. Where you go to high school is a big social marker. They all have phenomenal collections of urban assets and great historic buildings. They all still have their own unique character in a country where that has sort of bled away.

Aaron Renn (02:31): And they also have curiously underperformed demographically and economically in terms of growth. They’re slow growth places. So one thing I always encourage people is to pan back the lens and don’t just look at St. Louis in isolation. Look at it in comparison or dialogue with some of these other places and see what you can learn from them.

Louisville is actually a quite troubled city in important ways. From a white collar employment perspective it’s doing well, from a blue collar perspective less so. It’s one of the 10 least educated major metros in the country. I don’t want to spend too much time on Louisville, but I want to talk about the city county merger, which is distinct from recombining the city and the county. This has been considered urban planning best practice for 30 or 40 years. There was a book written by David Rusk called Cities Without Suburbs. The idea is that cities that were able to expand their boundaries through either annexation or city county mergers were prospering, whilst cities that did not, like the Clevelands, the Cincinnatis, and the St. Louises, were struggling. So the idea is we need big box government.

Indianapolis, where I live now, had a city county merger in 1970. Louisville did a city county merger, I grew up near Louisville. Jacksonville, Florida, Lexington, Kentucky, and Nashville, Tennessee did as well. What I would say is a few things. Merger is not necessarily bad. For Indianapolis, merger did prevent the city from essentially going down the tubes in important ways. So it really was a win in important ways.

But it did not prevent the historic city from going into the exact same demographic decline as St. Louis. The historic city of Indianapolis has lost almost exactly the same share of its population since 1970 as St. Louis has. Secondly, these are very politically difficult to pull off. They take enormous effort. They often fail multiple times. Louisville had multiple failures.

The most precious resource is always management time and attention. Is this where you want to put all your political chips? And in order to get it passed politically, what happens invariably is that most entities are actually not consolidated. In Louisville, none of the existing incorporated suburban governments were in fact merged. In Indianapolis, the school districts weren’t merged.

This means you don’t necessarily get all of the benefits you think from consolidation, because many things are excluded. And then unlike a corporate merger, where there’s typically a lot of downsizing and cost rationalization, in city county mergers nobody ever loses their job and salaries and benefits might even be harmonized upward to the high watermark. So don’t expect it to save any money. Personally, city county merger might have some benefits for St. Louis. I’m not saying it would have no benefits, but in my opinion it’s not going to be a needle mover and most likely it would be extraordinarily politically difficult and uncertain to pull off.

Susan Pendergrass (06:00): Yeah, no question. It’s been very politically difficult. People don’t want to do it. However, we do have these little tiny school districts and police districts. We have, I don’t know, 28 911 systems. We have a lot of what looks like bureaucratic waste and red tape. To the extent that doesn’t get resolved in a merger, then what’s the point? But I do think, you know, we’ve been talking about the demographics of St. Louis. There were over 800,000 people in the city once. Now there are maybe 280,000 and declining, and we’re in the death spiral of more people dying than being born. We’ve been in that for a while. And I guess it brings up the question of what is St. Louis to do if we are in this death spiral? We’re not having the babies. We’re having fewer babies than we did 15 years ago. So school enrollment is only declining. What is the prescription in that situation?

I’ve been to Cincinnati quite a bit. They’re trying to get people downtown with sports stadiums. It doesn’t really work. Louisville has sports stadiums downtown. I don’t know if people really want to move down there. I don’t see it working in St. Louis. So what is a city in that situation to do?

Aaron Renn (07:18): It’s going to be challenging in a sense because your problems are a little over determined. St. Louis was once a regional capital city, much like a Dallas or an Atlanta or a Denver or a Minneapolis. And it lost a lot of those functions. Many of its headquarters have left. It used to have a lot of professional services firms like ad agencies that did business all over the country, not just for the local market. Now St. Louis, although it’s still bigger than Indianapolis, looks a lot more like an Indianapolis or a Columbus, Ohio, where you have fewer corporate headquarters and most of the service firms are just there to serve the local market. St. Louis has essentially shrunk a little bit in relative importance, and it’s hard to get that back.

The demographics are also quite difficult and create a situation where it’s hard to attract business when you have a shrinking labor force, weak demographic growth, and a weak ability to bring people in from the outside. So it’s a very complicated situation and I don’t think there’s any silver bullet for St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (08:39): That’s what I’m asking you for. You have the answers. What’s the silver bullet?

Aaron Renn (08:43): So here are the things I would look at if I were in St. Louis. One of the clear issues that affects all of these river cities is that their wonderful, unique local cultures come with a downside, which is an extreme parochialism that has two negative effects. One, it makes it difficult for the communities to cohesively work together, which I’m not telling you anything you don’t already know. City-suburb divides tend to be bigger. In Indianapolis, regional leadership is mostly all on the same page about the big issues. Same with Columbus, Ohio. Secondly, it makes it very difficult to attract people from out of town because they come there and they can’t make friends, they can’t penetrate the social networks.

Susan Pendergrass (09:15): 100%, yes.

Aaron Renn (09:40): You hear it over and over again in places like St. Louis, Cleveland, even Minneapolis, Minnesota. There are some sayings there. If you want to make friends in Minnesota, go to kindergarten, because that’s when everybody makes their friends. Or Minnesotans will give you directions anywhere but their house. They’re never going to invite you over. St. Louis has that reputation. I don’t think it’s just a reputation. And I know you just had Ness Sandoval on.

Susan Pendergrass (09:53): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (10:08): He’s talking about you need to get better on migration. Migration isn’t going to improve if migrants are not going to be able to join the social networks here. And that’s not even just international migration, that’s domestic migrants. So I think that’s a huge issue for the city. Cultural issues are hard to solve, but maybe less intractable than infrastructure.

The other thing is looking at Pittsburgh as a sort of model. Pittsburgh hasn’t solved really most of its problems by any means, but it has been able to regenerate in the city a sort of high value economy around Carnegie Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. It’s done quite well. Many Silicon Valley firms have set up shop there. What’s happened in Pittsburgh, although it’s still a demographic decline story, is there’s been a demographic transition in the city. Pittsburgh went from one of the least educated cities in America to now one of the youngest and most educated. Part of it is old people moved and died off and young educated people replaced them. So the total number of people in the city was declining, but there was a churn happening underneath. And the same thing is already happening in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (11:13): How did they do that?

Aaron Renn (11:33): College degree attainment in the city is now well north of 40%. So the people who live in the city of St. Louis are very educated. That demographic churn has raised educational attainment and thus incomes in the city a lot. Now Pittsburgh was different because it was an almost entirely white city. There’s a racial divide in St. Louis and gentrification concerns become more salient. But St. Louis is now an educated city. This is not an old post-industrial blue collar city. The city of St. Louis itself is very educated. And also being very small, it doesn’t necessarily need a massive change to move the needle. In Indianapolis we have a population of over 900,000. Moving that behemoth takes a lot. St. Louis now being smaller has a situation where there could be a big impact from lower numbers of things. So I think a knowledge economy built around Washington University and your medical centers has some possibilities, somewhat similar to Pittsburgh.

Susan Pendergrass (12:45): So much medical.

Aaron Renn (12:58): Carnegie Mellon’s engineering and computer science areas will be a little different. I might also look at Vanderbilt, what’s going on there? What are some peer schools you could watch to see what’s going on? But I think there are actually some reasons to think that the city of St. Louis, believe it or not, could be sort of turning a corner. It has now demographically renewed itself to a higher educational attainment state. Being small, it probably doesn’t have that much further to fall, and you can start building from there. Obviously there are governance challenges, but looking at the Pittsburgh model, studying similar complexes around peer schools, and addressing the culture issues is where I’d look.

David Stokes (13:33): Hopeful.

Susan Pendergrass (13:47): So as a spokesperson for St. Louis, what do you see for the future?

David Stokes (13:52): Well, I would be curious to get Aaron’s thoughts on that size question, about how the city of St. Louis has in fact gotten so small. It’s about 10% of the metro area. How does that affect the pros or cons of any type of a merger? These would not be a merger of equals. St. Louis County would almost subsume St. Louis City into it. How do you think that would affect things for better or worse?

Aaron Renn (14:28): Well, that was the critique of the Louisville merger by two academics at the University of Louisville. I mentioned the book Cities Without Suburbs. They wrote an academic paper called Suburbs Without a City, which basically said if the merger passed in Louisville, it would essentially mean the suburbs take over the city, not the city taking over the suburbs, because the old city of Louisville only had about 260,000 people and the suburbs would numerically dominate. The same thing would certainly happen in St. Louis. If there were a merger, suburban St. Louis County would control the city in essence.

Another consideration, and this is a Cincinnati issue, I interviewed about 15 years ago the mayor of Cincinnati, John Cranley. Here’s what he said, and I think this is an important point. He said, 30 years ago, city county merger was the thing because cities were in decline and you wanted to tap that suburban tax base to fund the city. But now it’s reversed. Now the cities are coming back and it’s the inner suburbs that are actually going down the tubes. And so in Cincinnati today, we have all the corporate headquarters, we have the universities and the medical centers, and we don’t have to share our tax revenue with anybody. If we were merged with the county government, we’d have to prop up all these failing suburbs. And so I think you’re in a similar situation in St. Louis, where the high value activity, not all of it is in the city of St. Louis because of Clayton and so on, but the St. Louis County suburbs are mostly places that are themselves on negative trajectories. Merging the city, which may be on the cusp of being able to bottom out and turn around, with all of these still declining inner suburban areas, might actually be an albatross around the city’s neck.

Susan Pendergrass (15:16): What would that mean?

David Stokes (16:37): I just think one of the differences between St. Louis and Cincinnati, and I don’t know the property tax base of Cincinnati, is that so much of the city of St. Louis is tax exempt right now. Between Washington University, Saint Louis University, and all the government entities, there’s just so much of it. I say that as somebody who supports property tax changes to make them pay something towards it. But I just don’t think the Cincinnati argument applies to the city of St. Louis right now. That property tax exemption part is a huge factor because the most growing, thriving part of it is the entire giant Barnes-WashU-Cortex complex, and the amount of property taxes they pay is miniscule.

Susan Pendergrass (16:38): Hmm.

Aaron Renn (17:26): Well, some of that is a planning issue. And I think the reality is, when you have a complex like that, are all these people going to move to St. Charles? Maybe not. I’ll tell you, I live in the suburb of Indianapolis named Carmel, and a lot of the hospitals and things have been opening facilities here. When these nonprofit hospitals come up here, we will not approve zoning changes for those hospitals unless they agree to make payments in lieu of taxes. You want to come up here and you want a zoning change, you’re going to have to pay. We were actually quite prescient in that one of the local hospital chains opened a for-profit hospital. As part of the approval deal, we said, if you ever convert to nonprofit status, you will continue paying property taxes. And we did that.

So I think there probably is leverage from the city over some of these entities. You don’t have a lot of leverage over a corporation deciding where to put their office, but that’s not a tax exempt situation. The stuff at Cortex is probably not going to leave if you make them pay a little money the next time they come to you for a zoning approval. I think you need to start looking at how to get more money out of these entities that are nonprofits in name only. These universities and hospitals are effectively gigantic hedge funds. Their executives are extremely well compensated and billions of dollars are flowing through there. Undoubtedly the better solution there is to figure out how to tax them rather than figure out how to tax the soon-to-be-dead mall in the suburb over the border.

David Stokes (19:24): Well, yeah, and that’s sort of the trade off, unfortunately, is that they do pay earnings tax. The employees, many of them very highly compensated, pay the earnings tax. And that’s what makes the city more dependent on local income taxes, not less, because they’re either tax exempt or in the case of Cortex, have tax abatements that make them essentially tax exempt.

Susan Pendergrass (19:25): We do have earnings taxes, right? So the folks who work there have to pay an earnings tax.

Aaron Renn (19:53): Yeah. Again, I don’t know exactly the fiscal architecture there. But I would say you don’t want to do a merger simply to do a tax dollar grab. The lesson of Indianapolis is we did that. We grabbed suburban tax dollars and we used it to rebuild our downtown successfully. But here we are 50 years later, and now we have enormous tracts of decayed suburbia that are an enormous problem. Our entire core county is now in a sense the inner city. We have big challenges because we were not able to invest in ways that allow those suburban areas to retain their allure over the long term.

And I’m not saying that’s impossible, but any short term juice you get, cities always rise and fall. Core cities have proven more resilient and more able to regenerate themselves than suburbs. Part of it is because state governments cannot afford to let their state’s largest city or major urban center go down the tubes.

Susan Pendergrass (21:06): Yeah.

Aaron Renn (21:16): Missouri cannot let St. Louis and Kansas City implode. Michigan cannot just write off Detroit and say who cares. But these suburban areas have proven a lot tougher to save. We don’t have a good model. We’ve spent decades thinking about how to rebuild cities and build districts. There are certain things you can pull off in a city around conventions, civic events, gathering spaces, museums, and government that are very hard to translate to suburban settings. So there’s not a great playbook, especially in declining markets, for renewing suburbs. The playbook for suburban renewal, if you want to call it that, is places like Carmel, Indiana, which are growing and affluent, and therefore can build large mixed use centers, new urbanist developments, trails, and parks. The suburbs of St. Louis County are probably tremendously deficient in infrastructure as we would understand it today.

So again, there may actually be some benefits in having St. Louis City rejoin the county in a sense, because then the county functions are spread and amortized across a larger population.

Susan Pendergrass (22:45): It would immediately improve our murder rate because we would be mixing it in.

Aaron Renn (22:48): Yeah, there is some of that. The murder rate is an artifact of the size of the city more than anything. There are places in Chicago with higher murder rates. A former colleague of mine at the Manhattan Institute, Rafael Mangual, did an analysis of Chicago. He said there are areas on the South Side of Chicago that are larger and have more people than St. Louis with far higher murder rates than St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (22:56): We get called out because of the small denominator.

Aaron Renn (23:17): And so there is that. The other thing is Chicago is a good example. New York City was essentially a city county merger. In 1898, the five counties that are the five boroughs of New York were consolidated into one city. Philadelphia was also a city county consolidation from the 19th century. But what happens when you create a very large city of say a million people or more is you really have to scale up your government. You have to have a government that operates at that scale.

What happened with Indianapolis was we merged city and county government, but we didn’t really have a government that could effectively manage this new larger territory. It never built out the infrastructure in the suburbs. In New York, the Bronx has subways, great parks, everything built out with proper infrastructure, because it was part of New York and New York had to expand governance to become a city of eight million. Chicago got big in the 19th century and built a city government that could run a city of three million people. And some of the stuff that gets critiqued there, for example, is a lot of city services were organized by ward or city council district. There are 50 city council districts and every city councilor is sort of a little mini mayor of their district. The alderman essentially has veto power over any zoning changes. It’s called aldermanic privilege. So there are a lot of constraints there.

But if it’s just one mayor and one city council trying to think about a huge city of 77 neighborhoods and three million people, they can’t keep that much in their head. All they can think about is downtown. And that’s what happened in Indianapolis. The mayor and city council can really only think about downtown. We should have built out structures in townships throughout the city so that you had leadership focused on that area and money focused on that area. That’s what made the suburbs work really well. A suburb like Carmel is basically township sized. We have 100,000 people, big enough to do things, but not so big that our mayor and council can’t keep the whole city in their head and plan and manage the whole city.

So if you merge with the county government, you’re going to have to create an entirely new government structure that allows you to essentially manage every sub area of the whole thing and bring it all up to a standard of services. That’s the other thing they often did in Louisville and Nashville. They merge, but they have a two tier service system where there’s an urban services district for the old city which gets more services, and then the others get less. They didn’t do that in New York. There’s one standard of service in New York, one in Philadelphia, one in Chicago. So if you can’t commit to a single standard of service, you’re basically creating a bogus merger in my opinion. If you’re going to do a merger, you need to obliterate every government and entity in St. Louis County and city, merge them all into one with one standard. That’s not going to happen.

Susan Pendergrass (26:35): That’s not going to happen. What do you think, David?

David Stokes (26:37): Yeah, that’s not going to happen.

Aaron Renn (26:43): So you end up with a lot of problems. Louisville didn’t merge any fire departments. Imagine a city that doesn’t have a consolidated fire department. Imagine a city without a single police department. That was actually Indianapolis. When we merged, the Indianapolis Police Department still patrolled the old city, but the new parts of the city that were consolidated in from the county were still controlled by the sheriff.

Susan Pendergrass (27:13): That is 100% what would happen in St. Louis. Everyone would retain their school system and their police department and their fire department. I lived for a long time in Fairfax County, Virginia, which is a single county government. It’s massive, 150,000 students in their school system. It seems to function with a single police department and fire department. But I don’t think you can backwards engineer that into a place that for hundreds of years has been operating as it has been operating.

Aaron Renn (27:43): Lexington, Kentucky worked pretty well because one, the schools were already consolidated, as in the South it’s typically county school districts. Secondly, there were no other government entities, no township governments, no other incorporated municipalities. So it merged everything. And they were sort of able to solve the urban services district issue because the outer areas of Fayette County were horse farms. They actually put in a kind of green belt rule, you can’t develop out there, because they wanted to protect these scenic landscapes. So there was actually a good reason to treat that differently, because it was a very unique American landscape. Lexington, I think, was pretty successful.

Susan Pendergrass (28:15): They are. I appreciate it when I drive across Route 64.

Aaron Renn (28:39): Lexington was pretty successful and wasn’t especially controversial when they did it, in part because there weren’t all these entrenched interests like there are in other places. If you look at places that did the mergers, they weren’t the Cincinnatis and Pittsburghs. They’ve been talking about consolidation in Pittsburgh forever. It was very hard. And Louisville did it, but it was one of the least consolidated so-called consolidated governments. What the Louisville merger functionally did was dissolve the city of Louisville and reorganize county government. The county government now has a mayor and a council instead of the old fiscal court with the judge executive and all that.

Susan Pendergrass (29:21): That’s kind of what would happen in St. Louis, right?

Aaron Renn (29:36): That’s essentially what they did. They basically dissolved the city and the county government was reorganized, but nothing was merged.

Susan Pendergrass (29:43): Did you have a question?

David Stokes (29:45): I want to get back to the fire district point. We’re talking about why this would be so hard. There’s actually a law in St. Louis that only applies in St. Louis County that makes it impossible to consolidate fire districts. Even if a modest mid-sized suburb annexes an unincorporated part of town, they’re not allowed to provide fire services to that new annexed area, or they can, but they have to pay so much to the old unincorporated fire district that it makes it impossible to do so. That’s just one example of how even if you wanted a full scale merger, it would just be impossible to actually carry through.

Susan Pendergrass (30:34): Why do you think people float this idea, David? Why does it come back every couple of years?

David Stokes (30:38): You know, it’s the old line. I remember a study I read about Pittsburgh and St. Louis many years ago. The question was, are the St. Louis and Pittsburgh areas really inefficient with all the fragmented government? And the conclusion was, well, you would never design a metro area like this, but they’ve both made it work over the last century better than you would think. The conclusion was that St. Louis and Pittsburgh aren’t actually as inefficient as you might assume when you run the numbers.

I think people have trouble accepting that. People look at so many small municipalities, many of them dysfunctional, many of them until recent times funded themselves primarily with traffic tickets, which is a terrible way to fund local government, and that’s not even an exaggeration. And there’s just this fundamental belief that if you can just plan it better you’ll create a better place. I just think it fails.

One of the reasons it would fail, going back to what Aaron led this conversation off with, is that if St. Louis County and St. Louis City joined together, they’re not actually going to lay any government employees off to save any money. St. Louis City government is not going to fire city employees. It’s never going to happen. So you’re not going to save any money and it’s all just going to collapse.

Aaron Renn (32:12): Yeah, New York City and large governments are not more efficient.

I look at it and say, look, I think merger is a solution for failed states, if you want to call them that, in the St. Louis suburbs. Take some micro-suburb that’s a complete scam or is bankrupt and merge it in with its neighbor. Do some consolidation like that, that probably needs to be led by state government, almost like a receivership sort of thing. That’s just kind of good government as you work through it. But I just don’t think the benefits you would gain from trying to do a complete governmental merger of St. Louis City with St. Louis County would outweigh the opportunity cost of how much time and effort you spend on it, when you could be spending that on other things that I think will actually move the needle more.

The downsides are arguably as high as the upsides. There’s no guarantee it’s even net positive in this environment. The time to have merged was when Indianapolis did it in 1970, not in 2026. Nashville did it in the 60s. Jacksonville did it a long time ago.

And then I think it doesn’t fix the fundamental issues around the culture. You’ve got to take a hard look at that and say, it’s maybe very difficult to change. The idea that people who aren’t from here have to be able to move here and get connected and feel like they belong in the city. There’s a couple we know who lived in St. Louis. The wife taught in St. Louis public schools. They’re big urban people. The husband was from St. Louis, and they moved here to Carmel, Indiana.

Susan Pendergrass (33:47): Tell me more about that.

Aaron Renn (34:10): Basically they said, man, people are just so much friendlier here. They make better eye contact, they engage more. It’s just so much more welcoming than it was in St. Louis, even though they were actually in a sense connected because the husband was from there.

So when even people who lived in St. Louis and liked it notice a difference when they leave, that is a killer when you’re already struggling demographically. I had a guy who owned a business in Cleveland who said to me one time, I learned the hard way never to recruit anyone from out of town to work for my company unless that person or their spouse is from Cleveland, because otherwise they will never stay. When that’s where you are as a place, that is just rough. I think that is one of the killers for these river cities.

Susan Pendergrass (35:16): Yeah, what’s the fix for that? I don’t know what the fix is.

Aaron Renn (35:38): I think the optimistic case for St. Louis, and I actually tweeted this a year or two ago, is that St. Louis City educational attainment is really high now. In a sense, it’s a small, highly educated city that is probably going to continue growing more educated. So I think the Pittsburgh option looks viable in St. Louis.

Susan Pendergrass (36:00): And certainly great medical care. I know that the average age is getting older in St. Louis. I think within 10 years, one in four people will be over the age of 65. But we also have an Alzheimer’s research center and access to medical care, which as you get older gets more important. I do think there’s an opportunity to lean in to the medical services that are available, as the country as a whole gets older. I think St. Louis looks more attractive for that reason. So I think you’re right that with universities and medical centers, there’s an opportunity.

Aaron Renn (36:35): Yeah, I think if America’s demographics keep on this trend, a lot of other places are going to get to where St. Louis is. And the thing to be careful of is that when you’re in a declining market, that often prompts centralization of activity and population. What happened with Japan is that once Japan’s population started falling, everybody started moving to Tokyo. It’s Tokyo and a handful of other cities where everything is concentrated, and they literally have ghost towns there.

I don’t think it’s any accident that Indianapolis’ growth really took off once the Rust Belt era and deindustrialization hit the state. Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio have grown in large measure through drawing people out of the rest of the state as those states declined. Huge numbers of people move from Cleveland to Columbus every year.

Missouri is a little different than that. One of your challenges is that St. Louis does not draw people from rural Missouri. When I looked at the data, it’s not like there’s a massive flow into St. Louis from the rest of the state. So you don’t have that siphon bringing people in.

Susan Pendergrass (37:55): There are public safety issues around that, but yes.

Aaron Renn (38:00): And the issue we have is that we’ve now eaten our seed corn. There’s not going to be next generations of children in the towns I grew up in in rural Indiana to move to Indianapolis anymore. The cohort sizes are going to be smaller. So that pump, even Tokyo is declining now in population. That siphon is draining the water table. We can only rely on that so long.

But I think this is the risk for St. Louis in that kind of environment. People with opportunity might avoid or flee St. Louis and go to Austin, Texas or Nashville. They go to the handful of places in America that are really still growing. That’s a threat even for Indianapolis and Columbus, Ohio. In a declining market, it’s very hard to get people to want to come to a shrinking city because the opportunity space is shrinking. St. Louis’s opportunity space has been shrinking because you’re losing corporate headquarters and your working age population is declining. That dynamic is really going to be a challenge. But within that, the city of St. Louis might end up doing okay. Again, being small actually helps it here.

Susan Pendergrass (39:25): Any closing thoughts on that, David?

David Stokes (39:27): Just that the part of Missouri that is definitely still growing, and that probably is attracting those young rural people who are moving to a city, is going into southwest Missouri, the Springfield-Branson area. That’s absolutely the growing part of the state. And even Kansas City is growing certainly more than St. Louis is.

Aaron Renn (39:48): Yeah, it’s not a culturally cohesive state. Springfield and that area are definitely growing, and growing despite the fact that they have nowhere close to the urban assets of a St. Louis. It’s interesting to watch, and we’ll just have to see what happens.

Susan Pendergrass (40:05): It is. I think about it a lot. I’ve been talking about this in terms of school enrollment for years and years, where you could see the biggest kindergarten cohort was after the Great Recession of 2009. You know that that’s the biggest kindergarten cohort for the last 15, 16, 17 years. We do nothing but build schools and hire teachers. We are slow to catch on to these things happening. But I think your perspective is certainly very interesting. On the question of the merger, it’s not worth the cost for whatever benefits there might be. But it still gets talked about, so I appreciate you coming and giving us your thoughts on it. Maybe we’ll have to have you back to talk about it again.

David Stokes (41:02): And Aaron, I want you to come back. I want to find out how we get more roundabouts in Missouri. I love roundabouts. I go to Carmel it seems like once a year for these gigantic youth sports tournaments up at Westfield, just a little bit north of you. My kids’ sports take me there. And I love the roundabouts. You cannot get enough of them.

Aaron Renn (41:09): I’d love to talk about that. My favorite topic.

Aaron Renn (41:24): Yeah, it’s great. We hardly ever have to stop. There are barely any stoplights or stop signs left in our city. It’s amazing. We’re one of the few growing places in America where traffic is better today than it was 20 years ago.

Susan Pendergrass (41:32): They’re awesome.

David Stokes (41:45): People don’t realize how good that is for air quality and everything. You just keep moving along, not stop and start. We need 100 times more roundabouts in this area.

Susan Pendergrass (41:55): Are you pretending that people stop at stop signs in St. Louis? Because let’s be honest, people don’t stop at stop signs.

David Stokes (42:00): Well, they roll them, but it’s still wrong when they roll them. Maybe all the people blowing red lights on Kings Highway at 50 miles an hour are just being environmentally conscious. I need to give them more of the benefit of the doubt, I guess.

Susan Pendergrass (42:12): That’s exactly right. All right, thanks so much. I really appreciate it.

Aaron Renn (42:19): Thank you.

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The post The St. Louis City-County Merger with Aaron Renn and David Stokes appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A version of the following commentary appeared in the Columbia Missourian.

As technology companies try to meet the skyrocketing demand for AI-specialized computing capacity, they are dotting the country with data centers to the dismay of some and the delight of others. As is all too often the case in Missouri, many of these companies are being offered taxpayer-supported subsidies or tax exemptions.

For example, Independence, Missouri, is giving Nebius more than $6 billion in tax breaks over the next 20 years for a “hyper-scale” data center, and Montgomery County has offered Amazon hundreds of millions in tax abatements to build a data center near New Florence. But why would subsidies be needed when it seems like data-center developers have money to burn and are desperate for suitable building locations?

Recent actions of data-center developers suggest that it is not the cost of building and operating those facilities that is the barrier; the main problems appear to be finding pathways to secure reliable energy generation and getting their centers online smoothly and quickly (speed-to-operation).

These two obstacles are so serious that the major technology companies (Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, etc.) recently met with President Trump and signed the “Ratepayer Protection Pledge” to supply and pay for their own power for their AI data centers.

Why would these companies agree to take on this expense? Because their constraint is not cash. For these firms, time is money. The costs of delays in permitting and interconnection outweigh the value of a local tax incentive.

The negative effects of economic development subsidies and tax breaks are well known. When local officials offer these incentives, they diminish positive benefits that could come from a new data-center development: increased property-tax revenue to fill in the gaps for local services or be used to lower the overall tax rate of the community.

With all of this in mind, rather than just doing what most other states do (handing out checks or tax exemptions) Missouri should work on policies that actually deliver what these companies need most: pathways to secure and reliable energy generation, regulatory certainty, and speed-to-operation.

For local communities, this means they should not offer taxpayer dollars. Even with big tech agreeing to pay for their own power, many municipalities will still try to lure projects with incentives. No doubt the companies will take whatever money is offered to them, but subsidies are unlikely to significantly drive their decisions about where to locate.

Instead, local communities should offer a stable, predictable permitting environment and a suitable location to build. That would help address the greater desire for certainty and speed-to-operation.

And at the state level we should think even bigger. Policies like consumer-regulated electricity (CRE) could help make Missouri a true hub for data center development—without using unnecessary subsidies.

CRE would enable private electricity providers to serve large, energy-intensive customers independent of the existing, permission-heavy grid structure by allowing them to build their own power plants. Rather than spreading the costs for this infrastructure, CRE would create a “parallel path to energy abundance” —one financed by the large customers who demand the power.

CRE would allow these data centers to work with a private partner to meet their own energy needs, with less red tape, more certainty, more control, and more freedom to innovate. These benefits are likely to be more appealing than subsidies.

Unfortunately, offering subsidies seems to be a reflexive reaction in Missouri when there is an opportunity to attract a new business. But especially in this case, Missouri would be better off focusing on what the data center sector really needs. Efficient regulatory and permitting policies (like CRE), a predictable and stable environment in which to construct, and abundant energy would be far better suited to attracting and improving data center development than taxpayer dollars.

The post Why Hand Out Subsidies to Data-Center Developers? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

A version of the following commentary appeared in the Mound City Messenger.

A bad idea doesn’t get better with age. Bad ideas aren’t wine, jeans, or your high school memories. The tax subsidies for the Post-Dispatch building redevelopment in downtown St. Louis were a bad idea back in 2019 when the development was proposed, and they are a bad idea now.

Using tax subsidies for economic development rarely benefits the public. Instead, it lowers the risk and increases the returns for private investors. Under a capitalist system, the relationship between risk and reward for investors can be a wonderful thing, but in recent decades the government has somehow decided the public should get involved in private business dealings through tax subsidies and incentives. Taxpayers in St. Louis were left holding the bag for the failed St. Louis Marketplace tax increment financing (TIF) plan, the tax subsidy package for the Renaissance Hotel that was literally sold on the courthouse steps, and numerous other failed, subsidized enterprises. Most economic development schemes are like an expensive game of musical chairs in which the taxpayer is always the one with nowhere to sit.

The tax subsidy package for the old Post-Dispatch building at 900 N. Tucker on the northern edge of downtown St. Louis was approved by the Board of Aldermen in 2019. It primarily consisted of a $12 million TIF package. The summary included with the legislation featured the normal jargon required for such bills, and it included a statement that the development “will have approximately 1,250 jobs with an average salary of $76,500.”

How has that jobs promise worked out? Well, OK at first. The most recent annual TIF report (2024) filed by the developers with the state auditor repeated the same number of 1,250 estimated jobs created. It also listed 830 jobs created so far. There are two ways to look at that number, and both are accurate. The first is that, once again, developers exaggerated their job creation in order to get the subsidies they wanted. That often happens, and it may have happened here. The second is that getting to two-thirds of the promised jobs is actually better than many other subsidized developments, and maybe the developers deserve some credit. Not enough credit to justify all the subsidies in the first place, but, you know, some.

Except that recent actions indicate that the development is highly unlikely to ever get to 1,250, and it may quickly move in the other direction. The largest tenant in the redevelopment at 900 N. Tucker is Block, formerly known as Square. As you may have read, Block recently announced that it was laying off 4,000 people companywide, almost half of its total workforce. How many of those layoffs will be in St. Louis in unknown at this time, but the company previously announced much smaller layoffs in Missouri in both 2024 and 2025, so it seems unlikely that its St. Louis office will be unscathed.

I am not judging the company about the layoffs. If artificial intelligence is making some employees obsolete (the company’s stated reason for the move) then those people should be let go so they can do something else with their lives. That’s the creative destruction of capitalism. But this situation is a perfect example of why cities and counties should not give subsidies to private companies based on promises of employment, growth, renewal, or whatever the vibe of the moment is.

Numerous economic studies have disproved the belief that tax subsidies lead to economic growth. If tax subsidies worked, the City of St. Louis would already be awash in riches. Tax incentives have been piled on top of tax subsidies under every acronym under the sun for decades. None of it has worked. The city should focus on keeping tax rates level and low for everyone, not high for most and low (because of special exemptions) for the politically connected. A reliance on subsidies rewards cronyism, over-promising, and political grandstanding, but it doesn’t lead to real economic success. Just ask the Block employees who may be laid off soon.

The post Tax Subsidies Are a Mistake We Can’t Seem to Learn From appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Patrick Tuohey and David Stokes join Zach Lawhorn to break down the key issues Missouri voters will decide on April 7th. They discuss whether local elections should stay in April or move to November, property tax limit votes happening in more than 90 counties, new fire district sales tax authority and what it means for taxpayers, the 1% earnings tax renewals in Kansas City and St. Louis, and Springfield’s convention center lodging tax returning to the ballot after voters already rejected it. They also discuss use taxes, senior property tax freezes, the economic development sales tax on the ballot in O’Fallon, and more.

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Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post Missouri’s April 7 Ballot Breakdown with David Stokes and Patrick Tuohey appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The package of subsidies offered to the Kansas City Chiefs by the Missouri Legislature during last year’s special session was bad.

But that bill was not nearly as bad for taxpayers as what is being offered to the team by our neighbors in Kansas. House Bill 2793—the Kansas Sports Authority Act—offers the team, well, it seems, everything.

The bill sets up a Sports Authority to administer the site of a new stadium. That in and of itself is not unique. The Truman Sports Complex, in which the Chiefs and Royals currently play, is administered by the Jackson County Sports Complex Authority. But the power and portfolio of what is being considered in Kansas is breathtaking. Consider the following:

• The authority board includes “a representative of the professional sports team” using the facility as a voting member. This means the Chiefs would have a vote on such things as negotiating its lease, financing, and operations. Having the team oversee itself is a crazy conflict of interest and uncommon in other similar authorities if not absolutely unique, for obvious reasons.
• But the Chiefs aren’t merely one of several votes on the authority. The bill allows additional sports facilities to be placed under the authority if the governing body requests it and the Chiefs also recommend it—giving them an unusual role in expanding the authority’s jurisdiction. This provision may exist because team ownership wants to make sure nobody else can siphon away public funds.

• The authority’s powers “shall not be exercised in a way that conflicts with the terms and conditions set forth in the STAR bond agreement dated December 22, 2025.” This means the authority is locked into the already-negotiated agreement with the team, limiting its ability to adjust terms later.

The three items hand the Chiefs an incredible amount of power. The bill gives the Chiefs a voting seat on the governing authority, binds that authority to the STAR bond agreement the Chiefs negotiated, and gives the team an effective veto over whether additional sports facilities are added to the authority.

But wait, there’s more!

• Contractors must use competition only “to the extent reasonable and practicable in the authority’s sole discretion.” This is a significant weakening of competitive bidding requirements, increasing the risk of opaque contracting and favoritism.

• The authority is exempt from multiple statutes including the Kansas Civil Service Act and the Kansas Administrative Procedure Act, removing the standard hiring, rulemaking and administrative oversight safeguards that normally apply to public entities spending public funds.

• The authority must submit annual reports and testify if legislative committees request it. But this so-called oversight is largely after-the-fact reporting, with no routine legislative approval required for major contracts, bonds or development agreements.

• You read that correctly: the authority may issue special-obligation bonds for stadium construction and infrastructure. Although not legally state debt, political pressure often arises if revenues underperform, creating potential taxpayer exposure. If you doubt this, read up on the fiasco over Platte County and the Zona Rosa shopping center.
• In addition to capturing the increase in sales taxes in the approximately 300-square mile STAR bond district, the authority will be exempt from paying state and local sales and use taxes on purchases of materials, machinery, and services used to construct or equip the facility.

• “Insofar as the provisions of this act are inconsistent with the provisions of any other law, whether general, specific or local, the provisions of this act shall be controlling.” Yeah, that’s in the bill. The authority’s statute is designed to override conflicting state or local laws, potentially weakening local regulatory control.

• And what happens when the stadium is completed and paid for? Nothing. The statute does not include a sunset provision or dissolution trigger. That means the authority could become a permanent quasi-government entity in perpetuity.

• But at least the authority’s power is limited to the stadium, right? Nope. The authority’s purpose includes not just sports facilities and infrastructure used for it, but any “civic, community, athletic, educational, cultural and commercial activities.” “Commercial activities” seems like something that could cover, well, anything.

Kansas State Senator Mike Thompson claims that this measure will set up an unaccountable  “shadow government.” That seems like an over-the-top claim, but the provisions of this bill suggest he is at least directionally correct.

The post Kansas Sports Authority Lets Chiefs Play as Home Team, Referee and Rulebook appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Thomas Friestad at the Kansas City Business Journal wrote recently that an engineering firm (Gannett Fleming TranSystems, formerly GFT) is moving its offices to the H&R Block building in downtown Kansas City.

Longtime Show-Me Institute readers will recognize H&R Block as a poster child for the false claims that economic development subsidies drive job creation. But this latest news only makes the point more relevant.

The TIF project was adopted in July 2006 and will last for 23 years, through 2029. For the duration of that time, all the additional property taxes and half the increase in sales and income (earnings) tax generated at the site are returned to the developer to offset the costs of developing the site. According to the latest report from the Missouri Auditor’s office, as of April 2023, this subsidy has redirected $23.5 million in property taxes and another $73.4 million in sales and earnings taxes away from the basic services they would have otherwise supported (schools, roads, libraries, etc.), instead sending the money back to the developer.

GFT moving into the H&R Block building means that a portion of the taxes it pays, most notably the 1% earnings taxes levied on each employee, will now also be redirected away from basic services to the developer to pay down the cost of the H&R Block building.

A lot of time is spent talking about how Kansas City loses revenue when businesses leave the city. We need to remember that due to our generous subsidy culture, we often lose revenue even when companies remain.

Side note: One can immediately imagine a scenario wherein developer landlords in TIF districts lower their rents because they know they will capture the additional tax revenue, thus undercutting properties that actually pay taxes. These deals are no way to run a city.

The post The TIF that Keeps Taking appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Youth sports centers have been exploding around Missouri for two decades and, unfortunately, tax subsidies seem to go hand-in-glove with them. Let’s make one thing clear at the start: these aren’t parks. These aren’t public facilities where any kid or family can go and play or picnic or fly a kite with a delightful, singing nanny. These are businesses aimed at youth travel sports clubs, which are private, expensive teams. I like club sports (if my kids’ coaches are reading this, please don’t bench them). I just don’t think they fit any definition of a public good. These private facilities have no business being subsidized by taxpayers; if there is a market for them (there is), then they will succeed on their own.

Here is a brief listing of some of the major youth sports facilities that received taxpayer funds of various types (grants, incentives, special sales taxes, etc.) by various governments:

• Springfield heavily subsidized the Sports Town project.
• St. Louis County had trouble deciding which of multiple youth sports projects to ultimately fund (it eventually subsidized both).
• A baseball complex in Lake of the Ozarks has seen multiple battles over tax incentives.
• O’Fallon just rejected subsidies for another complex (yeah!), but then turned around one week later and approved them (boo!).

This is just a short list. I am sure there are more. The first policy change we need is to remove the ability of cities to make these decisions. At a minimum, counties should make all of these tax subsidy decisions. County officials are at least answerable to the voters for their choices. Municipalities routinely grant tax subsidies to businesses where the immediate impact to the city is limited but the harm to the school district, library district, and other entities that rely on tax revenue is substantial. Yet voters in those other districts often don’t live within the municipality and can’t hold anyone responsible with their votes.

Beyond that, we need local municipal officials to better understand basic economics and think both long term and regionally. I am not holding my breath.

The post What’s the Deal with the Tax Subsidies for Youth Sports Centers? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

In a column for The Kansas City Star, I challenged the rosy claims of the alleged economic windfall from hosting the World Cup. Every group I contacted indicated they got the number from someone else. When I finally found the organization that generated the number, it did not respond.

That seems to be the standard procedure.

The Kansas City Business Journal tried to dig into how Kansas City’s tourism bureau concluded that 650,000 visitors would descend on the region. Thomas Friestad wrote: “Visit KC declined to share its specific methodology for estimating visitors, saying it is proprietary information.”

Blaise Mesa, writing for The Beacon, examined the economic impact claims being made by proponents of a new Chiefs stadium in Kansas. He ran into the same wall, writing, “The Beacon contacted the firm that calculated economic development data on the stadium, but they didn’t reply to requests for comment.”

It should be a red flag for even the most diehard supporters of these deals that those who promote the claims refuse to answer basic questions.

The post Extraordinary Economic Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence—Sports Edition appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

How has the project worked out? Did the promises of redevelopment of this part of the city and a great return on the public tax investment pan out? Or did the warnings and concerns of people like Institute analyst Audrey Spalding prove correct?

Of course, Northside has been a total failure, and Audrey and others were correct.

The latest update on almost 20 years of policy failure is that a batch of McKee’s properties (which taxpayers bought for him) is being seized by the city via eminent domain. More of his properties may face the same fate soon. In this particular case, the properties are needed for the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) project, so the eminent domain seizures are for legitimate public use. The city tried to buy these properties from McKee, but no agreement could be reached on price, so the city is taking them. The final price paid for them will almost certainly be determined by a court.

Everything you need to know about why economic development using subsidies is a road to failure is wrapped up in this story. The entire project began not based on market forces, but on the forces of lobbyists, lawyers, and politicians. It was sold as a way to save parts of north St. Louis from decades of poverty and blight—conditions that were created in part by government policy in the first place. The entire Northside redevelopment project has been a colossal failure from the start, and the city and state should never have authorized tax subsidies for it. In the state’s case, it created a brand new law just for McKee to do this.

I would hope the city and state would learn a lesson from the failures of tax incentives and subsidies from this project. I doubt very much that they will. As Orwell said, to see the things in front of one’s nose requires a constant struggle—a struggle that politicians rarely have any incentive to engage in.

The post Live By the Sword, Die By the Sword appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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The post Is the Chiefs Move to Kansas Really a Done Deal? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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Guest hosting Mundo in the Morning on KCMO Talk Radio, Patrick Tuohey speaks with Neil deMause, editor of FieldofSchemes.com and coauthor of Field of Schemes: How the Great Stadium Swindle Turns Public Money Into Private Profit. DeMause draws on decades of research examining billions in public subsidies for pro sports facilities, explaining why stadium deals rarely deliver economic benefits and how proposed subsidies for a Kansas City Chiefs stadium fit a familiar national pattern.

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The post Listen: True Cost of Chiefs Stadium Subsidies with Neil deMause appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

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The post Does the Math Work on Kansas STAR Bonds for the Chiefs Stadium? appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

David Stokes, Elias Tsapelas, and Avery Frank join host Zach Lawhorn to outline what a responsible plan to eliminate Missouri’s income tax should include, from revenue triggers and spending restraint to rethinking other taxes. They also break down St. Louis County’s Bill 182 expanding prevailing wage and DBE mandates, Independence’s proposed TIF package for a new Wally’s gas station and what it says about corporate welfare, Missouri’s early literacy crisis and reforms like a universal third grade reading screener, mandatory retention, and banning three cueing, and what they are watching next on prefiled tax bills, data center policy, and rising property tax bills across the state.

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Timestamps

00:00 Introduction to Missouri’s Income Tax Elimination Plan
02:52 Strategies for Reducing Income Tax Reliance
05:19 Understanding Missouri’s Tax System
08:26 The Importance of Competitive Tax Policies
10:53 St. Louis County’s Prevailing Wage Bill Discussion
13:45 Economic Implications of Tax Subsidies
16:24 Independence’s Wally’s Gas Station Development
19:28 The Flaws in Tax Increment Financing
20:20 Addressing Early Literacy in Missouri
27:54 Looking Ahead: Legislative Priorities

Produced by Show-Me Opportunity

The post Eliminating Missouri’s Income Tax, Subsidies for Gas Stations, and Early Literacy Reform appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

Prevailing wage laws are harmful because they inflate the cost of projects taxpayers pay for or, in these cases, subsidize. Research on the subject suggests that prevailing wage laws can increase the total cost of public construction projects by as much as 25 percent. For local governments with many projects needing to be built, that could mean lower-priority but beneficial projects will go undone for lack of funding. Repeated year after year, the harm done by leaving these projects uncompleted compounds, leaving the community with fewer and inferior government services compared to what market labor rates would have otherwise allowed.

DBE programs require that a certain amount of work involved in a project go to contractors and subcontractors owned by women or minorities. DBE programs also inflate the cost of projects for taxpayers and have often been vehicles for fraud and abuse. Increasing costs and encouraging criminal activity . . . where do I sign up?

Finally, the proposed law requires that bidders offer apprentice-training programs, which are generally found in union shops. There is nothing wrong with apprenticeship programs, but instituting such a mandate is blatant favoritism for union shops over nonunion competitors. It would be a substantial burden for a typical independent, nonunion company to create an apprentice program before it could bid for a project. Whatever that burden may be, the county council has absolutely no business mandating it. This is a blatant ploy to guarantee that union companies will win all county bids.

Not surprisingly, much of the language in the bill was put in by unions, according to the Post-Dispatch story.

I am a strong opponent of tax incentives and subsidies for businesses, but imposing these types of regulations on all sorts of projects in St. Louis County is a terrible abuse of the political process. St. Louis County has no business making these rules, and, indeed, I question its legal authority to do so in some of these cases. Local government should address the major issue of incentive and subsidy abuse by saying “No” far more often. Saying “Yes, but with a bunch of new regulations and red tape” is the worst policy of all.

The post Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Right appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

The data center discussion is highly nuanced, marked by an interesting mix of not-in-my-backyardism and yes-in-my-backyardism.

This debate has touched down in Platte County in the Kansas City area, where “Project Kestrel” would grant substantial property and sales tax subsidies to support the development of a new, $100 billion data center campus. But is this the right move for Platte County, or for Missouri?

Missouri is in need of investment, and artificial intelligence and associated data centers already play a significant role in our economy.

However, economic development subsidies enrich individual developers at the expense of taxpayers, schools, and other public services. Using tax subsidies to lure data centers, filmmakers, sports teams, and others into Missouri shrinks the tax base of the region without leading to meaningful economic growth. Opportunity costs are largely ignored, with estimates for economic “boosts” not taking into account what the millions given away in subsidies could have achieved if invested in infrastructure, public safety, education, or tax rebates for Missourians.

Looking at electricity, data centers are enormous consumers that are prompting the buildout of new generation facilities. On a regulated grid, such as Evergy’s in the Kansas City area, building new generation and associated transmission is one of the most expensive processes for average ratepayers, because monopoly utilities are allowed to recoup the cost of their capital investments and typically earn a government-approved profit.

Now, it is true that average Missourians use artificial intelligence, indirectly driving the increased demand for data centers. It is also true that we currently cannot predict with certainty the amount of electricity artificial intelligence and data centers will ultimately require.

In April 2024, Goldman Sachs forecast that data centers would rise from 2.5 percent to 8 percent of all U.S. electricity usage by 2030. However, Google recently reported a 33-fold reduction in energy usage for AI queries in a single year.

Some legislation has been passed in an attempt to shield average Missourians from bearing “unjust or unreasonable” costs of powering new data centers. However, this does not mean that none of the burden of new power-plant construction will fall on average ratepayers. Furthermore, if utilities overbuild generation capacity based on overly aggressive demand projections, average ratepayers could find themselves footing the bill for underused assets.

Yet, there is risk in veering too far in the other direction as well: An underbuild of new generation would likely lead to Missouri missing out on significant investment.

To navigate this dilemma, policymakers in Missouri should think outside of the box. Instead of solely considering solutions inside the regulated, ratepayer-supported grid, Missouri should follow New Hampshire’s example and consider consumer regulated electricity (CRE). The idea is simple: huge customers like data centers are driving up electricity demand and putting strain on the grid and ratepayers. CRE would allow off-grid electricity providers to build and operate generation and transmission facilities whose output would be sold exclusively to these new customers. This approach would help shield Missouri ratepayers from both the rate hikes that would otherwise come with new plant construction and the risk of overbuild. CRE would also provide developers with speed, flexibility, and certainty—attractive qualities that are often lost to red tape and lengthy regulatory approval processes.

Adopting CRE could help ease tensions in Platte County and across the state. Of course, the pressure to offer tax subsidies would remain, but this problem is not exclusive to data center development. Corporate handouts are not the way to encourage economic growth. Instead of trying to lure businesses with subsidies, Missouri should have a free market–oriented economic and regulatory environment; for example, one that is conducive to polices like CRE.

The post Data Centers, Subsidies, and Electricity in Platte County and across Missouri appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

On November 4, Jefferson City voters will decide on a proposal to renew the city’s seven percent hotel tax. The proceeds from the tax will help fund a new conference center for the city. Supporters of the new conference center have claimed it will create 370 new jobs and generate over $100 million in economic growth. Exaggerated estimates such as this one have been made on behalf of convention and conference center projects all around the country for decades, and the historic evidence is clear that Jefferson City voters should be dubious of such claims.

Between now and November, Jefferson City residents who visit St. Louis should drive by the largely empty dome attached to St. Louis’s downtown conference center to see how these conference center promises often play out. That dome was a part of a large convention center expansion in the 1990s. The same promises of growth, revenue, and utopia were all made when St. Louis voters approved a hotel tax increase back then. Now the dome is mostly empty, and the regional body that manages it is struggling to pay for its upkeep. You can also visit the site of the taxpayer-subsidized convention center hotel that went along with the project. You can only visit the site of the hotel, not the hotel itself, because the hotel failed and was foreclosed on long ago.

Like a Cold War general in a Kubrick movie or a carpenter with a box full of nails, local tourism agencies have the same solution for every problem. Economic recession? Expand the convention center. Economic growth? Enlarge the convention center. Global nuclear war? Definitely gonna need a bigger convention center to commiserate in.

The renewed hotel tax isn’t the only public money being used as part of this plan. State tax dollars are being pursued in the legislature, and the conference center may receive local tax subsidies.

Supporters of the conference center plan in Jefferson City would likely say their plan is not as grandiose as a major convention center and dome project in St. Louis, and they are correct in that regard. However, there are plenty of examples of more comparable projects that have failed to reach the level of activity anywhere near was promised. Haywood Sanders is a researcher and writer with the University of Texas–San Antonio who has studied convention center expansions for decades. He has documented how cities and tourism agencies systematically inflate projections to get these projects approved. Sanders has cited the actual and underwhelming numbers of very comparable projects in Overland Park, Kansas, and St. Charles, Missouri. Overland Park opened its convention center and hotel in 2002. Project supporters had projected $36 million in annual hotel revenue by 2012, but the reality was much lower, coming in at under $20 million.

Sanders explains that the convention and conference-center industry peaked in the early 2000s and shows no signs of returning to the success it had back then. With a major convention area nearby in Lake of the Ozarks, a new center in Jefferson City will face intense competition for these limited conference opportunities.

Taxpayers should not be on the hook for conference centers whose overstated benefits, small as they will be, will largely go to private entities. Jefferson City is the capital of the Show-Me State, and the claims being made by convention-center supporters should be met with a healthy dose of skepticism by voters.

The post Jefferson City Residents Should Be Skeptical of Conference Center Project appeared first on Show-Me Institute.

On November 4, Springfield voters will decide on a proposal to increase the city’s hotel tax by three percent. The proceeds from the new tax will help fund a new convention center for the city. A recent report paid for by the Visit Springfield tourism bureau said exactly what Visit Springfield wanted it to say: that a new convention center will generate enormous revenue for the Springfield area. The report claims a new convention center will drive $1.3 billion in new spending over the next 30 years. Exaggerated estimates like this one have been made on behalf of convention centers all around the country for decades, and the historic evidence is clear that Springfield voters should be dubious of such claims.

Between now and November, Springfield residents who visit St. Louis should drive by the largely empty dome attached to St. Louis’s downtown convention center to see how these convention center promises often play out. That dome was a part of a large convention center expansion in the 1990s. The same promises of growth, revenue, and utopia were all made when St. Louis voters approved a similar hotel tax increase back then. Now the dome is mostly empty, and the regional body that manages it is struggling to pay for its upkeep. St. Louis’s local tourism agency thinks the solution is the same thing it always is: further expansion of the convention center. Like a Cold War general in a Kubrick movie or a carpenter with a box full of nails, tourism agencies have the same solution for every problem. Economic recession? Expand the convention center. Economic growth? Enlarge the convention center. Global nuclear war? Definitely gonna need a bigger convention center to commiserate in.

The increased hotel tax isn’t the only public money being used as part of this plan. Other local sales taxes are slated to be used for funding, and state tax dollars are being considered. Tourists, Springfield residents, and possibly all of Missouri will get to pay for this new event space, whether it is actually needed or not.

Haywood Sanders is a researcher and writer with the University of Texas–San Antonio who has studied convention center expansions for decades. He has documented how cities and tourism agencies systematically inflate projections to get these projects approved. Sanders has reviewed the Springfield convention report and noted in an interview with a Springfield News-Leader reporter earlier this year that the report didn’t state how it calculated its room occupancy estimates and ignored underwhelming numbers of comparable convention centers in Overland Park, Kansas, and St. Charles, Missouri. Sanders states that the convention-center industry peaked in the early 2000s and shows no signs of returning to the success it enjoyed back then. With two major convention areas so close by in Branson and Lake of the Ozarks, a new center in Springfield will face intense competition. But I have no doubt that local Springfield convention-center boosters will ignore reality in their quest for tax revenue and city spending.

Visit Springfield wanted a report that claims a convention center will be an economic boon for the city. They got it. As Springfield residents prepare to decide on the hotel tax increase proposal, they should study the work of Heywood Sanders and others to learn about how these claims have been made about many other convention centers in many other cities, and how they usually fail. Springfield voters can also go to St. Louis to see the failures of these promises with their own eyes. Taxpayers should not be on the hook for convention centers whose overstated benefits, such as they are, will largely go to private entities. This is the Show-Me State, and the claims being made by supporters of the convention center for Springfield should be met with a healthy dose of skepticism by voters.

The post Springfield Voters Should Be Skeptical About Convention Center Claims appeared first on Show-Me Institute.