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Is this plan going to be a positive step forward for the St. Louis area? No, not at all. It will be a wasteful doubling down on a failed strategy to force feed light rail into a metropolitan area that would be far better served by an improved bus system from a transportation, financial, and social perspective.

In a forthcoming paper for the Show-Me Institute, Randal O’Toole will discuss how addressing transit issues in St. Louis by expanding MetroLink is a fool’s errand, and an extremely expensive one at that. Metro’s total transit ridership in 2019 was less than it was in 1993, before MetroLink even opened. The pandemic only exacerbated this problem, with fewer jobs and workers in downtown than before. Jobs are spread out throughout the metropolitan area, and buses are well equipped to connect workers to changing jobs, students to new schools, and sports fans to games. (We can admit MetroLink does a good job with the sports teams for some—but that is hardly a justification for expanding the entire wasteful system.)

Metro would better serve our region by spending its tax money on an effective bus system, including bus rapid transit for high-volume areas, instead of expanding a costly, inefficient, and unwieldy fixed-route light-rail system that fails in its primary purpose—serving St. Louis transit users.

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Between 2014 and 2019, ridership on St. Louis Metro buses and light-rail trains dropped by nearly 25 percent. Thanks to the pandemic, ridership in recent months has only been half what it was in 2019, and thanks to increased numbers of people working at home it may not ever return to 2019 levels.

This suggests that St. Louis doesn’t need to spend hundreds of millions—or billions—of dollars building new light-rail lines. Yet that is exactly what St. Louis Mayor Tishaura Jones wants to do, not because St. Louis needs it, but because federal funding might become available for it. That federal funding would depend on local matching funds, meaning St. Louis taxpayers would have to pay higher taxes for train rides few of them will take.

St. Louis’s light-rail record is unimpressive. In 2001, Metro opened the 17-mile MetroLink College extension, doubling the total number of miles in the system. Metro carried fewer bus and light-rail riders the year after opening this line than it had carried the year before. The same thing happened when it opened the 3.5-mile Shiloh-Scott extension in 2003. The 8-mile Shrewsbury-Lansdowne MetroLink extension gained some new riders, but all of those riders were lost after the 2008 financial crisis, and most never came back.

Overall, light rail has failed to boost the region’s transit ridership. In 1993, before the region’s first light-rail line opened, buses carried 40.3 million riders. Since then, Metro has spent around $2.5 billion building 45 miles of light-rail lines. In 2019, buses and light rail together carried 36.1 million riders, 11 percent fewer than before light rail.

Part of the problem is that light rail is functionally obsolete: just about anything light rail can do, buses can do better for far less money. Counting capital costs, Metro spent $12.80 per light-rail rider but only $8.30 per bus rider in 2019.

The current proposal to expand MetroLink with a new north–south corridor line through downtown fails on two key fronts. First, while transit advocates say spending more money on transit helps low-income people, the fact is that most low-income people do not take transit to work. Census Bureau survey data show that only 4.4 percent of St. Louis–area workers who earned less than $25,000 a year took transit to work in 2019. Meanwhile, the sales taxes used to support Metro buses and light rail are highly regressive, meaning the 95.6 percent of low-income people who aren’t dependent on transit are disproportionately paying taxes to support rides they aren’t taking.

Second, cities that have successful rail transit have a high concentration of jobs in a central business district, and St. Louis is not one of those cities. The percentage of regional jobs in downtown St. Louis has been declining for years. It is currently down to about 60,000 employees downtown, very few of whom take light rail to work. Expanding MetroLink on the proposed north–south route will be a very expensive attempt to take people who don’t use light rail for work to jobs in an area where they don’t work.

The places in downtown St. Louis that benefit from MetroLink (the stadiums, convention center, etc.) already have it. The money Metro wisely spent adding and improving stations at Cortex and Barnes Hospital cost a fraction of the amount of a new line and served an area where people of all incomes actually use MetroLink to go to work. (The Barnes/Central West End stop is the busiest stop in the system.)

Meanwhile, while we debate MetroLink’s further expansion, Metro’s bus system is “disintegrating,” says engineer Richard Bose at the pro-transit NextSTL website, because the agency can’t find enough drivers to keep it operating. Jones and other city and regional officials should devote their efforts toward helping Metro run the system it already has rather than trying to expand it. Federal and local funds spent on an effective bus system offer a better solution to address the needs of the people who live in North St. Louis County. Otherwise, people might get the idea that the real purpose of light-rail transit is not to move people, but to move dollars from taxpayers’ pockets into the hands of light-rail contractors.

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The best available data indicate that the FRA plan would cost about $90 billion, or roughly one fifth the inflation-adjusted cost of the Interstate Highway System. This plan would provide trains with average speeds of 140/150 miles per hour (mph) in California, 75/85 mph in Florida, and moderate-speed trains averaging 55/75 mph in Missouri and 30 other states.

The average American would ride these trains less than 60 miles per year, or about one seventieth as much as the average American travels on interstate freeways. In fact, most of the taxpayers who pay for high-speed trains would rarely, if ever, use them. Because of a premium fare structure and downtown orientation, the main patrons of high-speed trains would be the wealthy and downtown workers, such as bankers, lawyers, and government officials, whose employers pay the fare.

A true high-speed rail system, with average speeds of 140/150 mph connecting major cities in 33 states, would cost well over $500 billion. Meeting political demands to close gaps in the system could bring the cost close to $1 trillion. At twice the cost of the Interstate Highway System, such a true high-speed rail system would provide less than one tenth the mobility offered by the interstates.

These costs include only the projected capital costs. If Missouri decides to build moderate- or high-speed rail, it may be responsible for cost overruns, operating losses, and the costs of replacing and rehabilitating equipment about every 30 years.

Upgrading the 250 miles of Missouri tracks in the FRA plan to run trains at 110 mph would cost taxpayers at least $875 million, or nearly $150 for every Missouri man, woman and child. Subsidizing passenger trains over those routes would cost millions more per year, yet the typical Missourian would take a round trip on such trains only once every six years.

Far from being environmental saviors, high- and moderate-speed trains are likely to do more harm to the environment than good. In intercity travel, automobiles are already as energy efficient as Amtrak, and the energy efficiencies of both autos and airliners are growing faster than trains. The energy cost of constructing new high-speed rail lines would dwarf any operational savings. As the state of Florida concluded in 2005, the environmentally preferred alternative is the No Build Alternative.

To add insult to injury, the administration is likely to require states that accept high-speed rail funds to regulate property rights in a futile effort to discourage driving and promote rail travel. These regulations would deny rural landowners the right to develop their land while they make urban housing unaffordable and disrupt neighborhoods through the construction of high-density housing.

A recent study for the Missouri Department of Transportation identified several enhancements to the current Amtrak route connecting Kansas City and Saint Louis that could significantly improve the current rail service between the cities for substantially less cost than the high-speed rail proposal.

For all of these reasons — high costs, tiny benefits, and interference with property rights Missouri taxpayers would not be well-served by the government’s provision of high-speed passenger rail service. A better plan would be to use the state’s share of the $8 billion stimulus funds solely for incremental upgrades, such as safer grade crossings, longer track sidings, and signaling systems, that do not obligate state taxpayers to pay future operations and maintenance costs.

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On June 17, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) asked states for proposals for spending the $8 billion of stimulus money that Congress allocated to high-speed rail. Which raises a question: Would you pay $1,000 so that someone — probably not you — can ride high-speed trains less than 60 miles per year? That’s what the FRA’s high-speed rail plan is going to cost: at least $90 billion, or $1,000 for every federal income taxpayer in the country.

That’s only the beginning. Count on adding $400 for cost overruns. Taxpayers will also have to cover operating losses: Amtrak currently loses $28 to $84 per passenger in most of its short-distance corridors.

The FRA plan also has huge gaps, such as Dallas to Houston, Jacksonville to Orlando, and the entire Rocky Mountains. Once states start building high-speed rail, expect local politicians to demand these gaps be filled at your expense. And don’t be surprised when the government asks for billions more in 30 years to rebuild what will then be a worn-out system.

What would we get for all this money? Unless you live in California or Florida, don’t expect superfast bullet trains. In Missouri and most of the rest of the country, the FRA is merely proposing to boost the top speeds of Amtrak trains from 79 miles per hour to 110 mph. A top speed of 110 mph means average speeds of only 60–70 mph, which is hardly revolutionary. Many American railroads were running trains that fast 70 years ago.

The pro-rail Center for Clean Air Policy predicts that, if the FRA’s system is completely built, it will carry Americans 20.6 billion passenger miles per year in 2025. That sounds like a lot, but, given predicted population growth, it is just 58 miles per person.

Missouri’s portion of the plan will cost at least $875 million, or nearly $150 for every Missouri resident, plus tens of millions more per year in operating subsidies. For that, the average Missourian will take a round trip on the train only once every six years. Most of the rest of your $1,000 will go to California, which wants to you to help pay for a costly bullet train. Even this train will do little to relieve congestion or save energy; mainly, it will just fatten the wallets of rail contractors.

Who will ride these trains? We can get an idea by comparing fares between New York and Washington, D.C. As of this writing, $99 will get you from Washington to New York in two hours and 50 minutes on Amtrak’s high-speed train, while $49 pays for a moderate-speed train ride that takes three hours and 15 minutes. Meanwhile, relatively unsubsidized and energy-efficient buses cost $20 for a four-hour-and-15-minute trip with leather seats and free Wi-Fi. Airfares start at $119 for a one-hour flight.

Who would pay five times the price to save less than 90 minutes? Those wealthy enough to value their time that highly would pay the extra $20 to take the plane. The train’s only advantage is for people going from downtown to downtown. Who works downtown? Bankers, lawyers, government officials, and other high-income people who hardly need subsidized transportation. Not only will you pay $1,000 for someone else to ride the train, but that someone probably earns more than you.

Nor is high-speed rail good for the environment. The Department of Energy says that, in intercity travel, automobiles are as energy-efficient as Amtrak, and that boosting Amtrak trains to higher speeds will make them less energy efficient and more polluting than driving.

An expensive rail system used mainly by a wealthy elite is not change we can believe in. Missouri should use its share of rail stimulus funds for safety improvements such as grade crossings, not for new trains that will obligate taxpayers to pay billions of dollars in additional subsidies.

Randal O’Toole is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, and author of the Show-Me Institute study “Review of Kansas City Transit Plans.”

[Editor’s note: A portion of the sixth paragraph of this op-ed originally read, “the average Missourian will take a round trip on the train only once every 12 years.” The correct figure for Missouri is “once every six years.” We have corrected this in the interest of accuracy, and apologize for the oversight.]

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Rail transit has become such an albatross around the necks of the American cities that have it that it is hard to imagine that anyone of good will would wish it upon Kansas City. Rail transit is expensive to build, operate, and maintain.

One of rail transit’s dirty secrets is that the entire system — rails, cars, electrical facilities, stations — must be replaced, rebuilt or rehabilitated roughly every 30 years. This costs almost as much as the original construction, which means for taxpayers that rails are a “pay now, pay more later” proposition.

The Chicago Transit Authority is on the verge of financial collapse. The agency estimates it needs $16 billion it doesn’t have to rehabilitate tracks and trains. To keep the trains running, the agency siphoned money away from the city’s bus system and lost a third of its bus riders between 1986 and 1996.

Newer systems face other financial challenges. San Jose’s light-rail system put the city’s transit agency so far in debt that when sales tax revenues fell short early in this decade, it was forced to cut bus and rail service by 20 percent.

Rail construction almost always costs more than the original estimates. Denver voters approved a 119-mile rail system in 2004 on the promise that it would cost $4.7 billion to build it by 2017. The current estimate is up to $7.9 billion, and the regional transit agency says the system might not be complete until 2034.

Once built, light-rail systems never live up to their promises, even in places like Portland. Before building light rail, Portland’s bus system carried 9.8 percent of the region’s transit riders to work. Today, thanks to cutbacks in the bus system forced by the high cost of rail, transit carries just 7.6 percent.

Nor is rail transit good for the environment. Most U.S. light-rail lines use more energy, per passenger mile, than an SUV. Considering that most of Missouri’s electricity comes from fossil fuels, a Kansas City light rail, like the ones in Dallas, Denver, and Cleveland, is also likely to produce more greenhouse gases per passenger mile than an SUV.

Buses can provide better, faster, safer transit service than light rail at a far lower cost. Light rail is a hoax perpetrated on taxpayers by companies that profit from designing and building rail lines.

Rail advocates tell Kansas Citians that they need to catch up with other cities that have rail transit. I suggest instead that Kansas City should be proud not to fall for the light-rail hoax.

Randal O’Toole is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, and author of the Show-Me Institute study, “Review of Kansas City Transit Plans.”

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After rejecting rail transit proposals at the polls six different times, Kansas City voters approved a light-rail plan in November, 2006. This plan, however, has proven infeasible, with costs at least 50 percent greater than its promoters projected. Implementing the plan would require cutting bus service by as much as 40 percent. While the City Council formally repealed the plan in November, 2007, many people in Kansas City still believe that some form of light rail or streetcars would be worthwhile. A close look at other urban areas that have built light-rail transit during the past three decades offers many lessons for Kansas City transportation policymakers.

• Light rail is not only expensive — typically costing as much to build as a four-lane freeway (and a mile of streetcar line typically costs as much as two freeway lane miles) — it suffers cost overruns averaging more than 40 percent.

• The average mile of light-rail line carries only about 30 percent as many riders as a single mile of freeway lane — and streetcars about 10 percent as many. This makes light rail and streetcars more than 10 times as expensive for moving people than freeways.

• Rail transit also costs considerably more to operate than buses on comparable routes.

• Rail transit takes years to plan and build, and there is no guarantee that people will still want to go where the rails lead when they finally open. This gives transit agencies a tremendous incentive to become social engineers, trying to bribe or coerce people to live near rail stations.

• Only three of the 13 formerly non-rail regions that have built new light-rail lines during the past 30 years have experienced an increase in percapita transit ridership.

• In most regions that have built light rail, public transit’s share of passenger travel and commuting actually declined. In the few regions where that share increased, the gains were so small — less than a quarter of 1 percent — as to have an imperceptible effect on congestion.

• When they operate in streets, light rail and streetcars actually add to congestion and disrupt coordinated traffic signals.

• Rail transit has been especially unsuccessful in regions like Kansas City, where only a small percentage of jobs is located downtown.

• Light rail is dangerous, killing three times as many people in accidents as buses, for every passenger mile carried. Light rail is also the scene of far more robberies, assaults, rapes, and other crimes than any other form of urban transit.

• Most light-rail lines consume more energy and emit more greenhouse gases, per passenger mile, than the average passenger car. All of them consume more energy per passenger mile than a Toyota Prius, or other hybrid-electric cars.

• Neither light rail nor streetcars stimulate urban redevelopment. Often, however, they do stimulate subsidies to urban redevelopment, which are simply one more type of burden to taxpayers.

This information suggests that light rail and streetcars would not be a good fit for Kansas City. Instead, this study recommends that the Kansas City Area Transportation Authority contract out bus operations to private companies, which is likely to save 30 to 40 percent of costs. This, in turn, will allow a 50- to 60-percent increase in bus services, including several new bus–rapid transit routes. These improvements should result in far more new riders using public transit than would be gained from light rail — without increasing the cost to taxpayers.

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